JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU

THE PLAN FOR PERPETUAL PEACE, ON THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND, AND OTHER WRITINGS ON HISTORY AND POLITICS

TRANSLATED BY CHRISTOPHER KELLY
AND JUDITH BUSH

EDITED BY CHRISTOPHER KELLY

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

J. J. ROUSSEAU.

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JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU

THE PLAN FOR PERPETUAL PEACE, ON THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND,

AND OTHER WRITINGS ON HISTORY AND POLITICS

THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF ROUSSEAU
Vol. 11

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Preface

Although Jean-Jacques Rousseau is a significant figure in the Western tradition, there is no standard edition of his major writings available in English. Moreover, unlike those of other thinkers of comparable stature, many of Rousseau's important works have never been translated or have become unavailable. The present edition of the *Collected Writings of Rousseau* is intended to meet this need.

Our goal is to produce a series that can provide a standard reference for scholarship that is accessible to all those wishing to read broadly in the corpus of Rousseau's work. To this end, the translations seek to combine care and faithfulness to the original French text with readability in English. Although, as every translator knows, there are often passages where it is impossible to meet this criterion, readers of a thinker and writer of Rousseau's stature deserve texts that have not been deformed by the interpretive bias of the translators or editors.

Wherever possible, existing translations of high quality have been used, although in some cases the editors have felt that minor revisions were necessary to maintain the accuracy and consistency of the English versions. Where there was no English translation (or none of sufficient quality), a new translation has been prepared.

Each text is supplemented by editorial notes that clarify Rousseau's references and citations or passages otherwise not intelligible. Although these notes do not provide as much detail as is found in the critical apparatus of the Pléiade edition of the *Oeuvres complètes,* the English-speaking reader should nevertheless have in hand the basis for a more careful and comprehensive understanding of Rousseau than has hitherto been possible.

The works contained in this volume are all concerned with practical political questions or history. Supplemented by the *Letters Written from the Mountain* and the *Letter to d'Alembert on the Theater* (*Collected Writings* 9:131–306 and 10:251–352), they show the depth of Rousseau's concern with the practice as well as the theory of politics. The inclusion of Voltaire's *Rescript of the Emperor of China on the Occasion of the Plan for Perpetual Peace,* particularly when this work is compared with Rousseau's own *Judgment of the Plan for Perpetual Peace,* shows that the idea that Rousseau is an unrealistic utopian thinker is an old one.

We thank Glen Feder and Elizabeth Winkowski for their very helpful work on the notes and index.

Chronology of Works in Volume 11

1712

June 28: Jean-Jacques Rousseau born in Geneva.

1737

Rousseau studies history and chronological matters in Chambéry. Probable date of composition of "Universal Chronology."

1749

October: On the way to visit Diderot, who is imprisoned at Vincennes, Rousseau has the "illumination" that inspires him to write his *Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts.*

1749–1756

Period during which Rousseau wrote "On Wealth."

1754–1756

Rousseau works on the "History of the Valais" and the writings of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre.

1761

Publication of the "Plan for Perpetual Peace."

Voltaire publishes the "Rescript of the Emperor of China."

1764

Rousseau is approached by Buttafoco to write *Plan for a Constitution for Corsica*.

1771–1772

Rousseau works on the *Considerations on the Government of Poland*.

1778

July 2: Rousseau dies at Ermenonville.

Note on the Text

The works by Rousseau contained in this volume can be found in *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1959–95), Volumes III and V. Voltaire's *Rescript of the Emperor of China on the Occasion of the Plan for Perpetual Peace* is from *Mélanges* (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1961). We have also consulted Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Political Writings,* edited by C. E. Vaughan (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), Volume II. There are many manuscript variants and changes made by Rousseau for most of these works. We have included only the major ones.

Some of the works included in this volume have been translated before. We have profited from the translations of "The State of War" and *Considerations on the Government of Poland* in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings,* edited by Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Gourevitch has noted numerous errors in the Pléiade edition. Valuable translations of *Considerations on the Government of Poland* and the "Constitutional Project for Corsica" can be found in *Political Writings,* translated and edited by Frederick Watkins (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986). We have followed the ingenious reconstruction of Rousseau's "State of War" given by Grace Roosevelt in *Reading Rousseau in the Nuclear Age* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). We have also consulted *A Project of Perpetual Peace* (London: Richard Cobden-Sanderson, 1927) and *Rousseau on International Relations,* edited by Stanley Hoffmann and David P. Fidler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

Introduction

Those who are familiar with Rousseau only from his reputation are likely to regard him as a bold but impractical, not to say utopian, thinker. This reputation is not of recent vintage. In his "Rescript of the Emperor of China on the Occasion of the Plan for Perpetual Peace" (included in this volume), Voltaire made fun of "Master Jean-Jacques's" boldness in judging "kings and republics without being asked to." He also ridicules the impracticality of the plan for perpetual peace by suggesting that the capital city of the universal confederation be located at the center of the earth and be made of crystal.[1] At least in this case, however, the accusation of impracticality was certainly misdirected. Rousseau's own "Judgment of the Plan for Perpetual Peace" argues that the plan could be accomplished only by revolutionary means "that are violent and formidable to humanity,"[2] and that to think otherwise would be to misunderstand the nature of international relations. Although Voltaire could not have known this because Rousseau's "Judgment" remained unpublished during his life, it is the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, whose plan Rousseau edited, who is guilty of utopianism, not Rousseau. The rest of the works contained in this volume of the *Collected Writings* are also concerned with political practice and the historically informed studies necessary to guide it. In many respects they also show Rousseau's concern with applying the theoretical principles of a work like the *Social Contract* to practical situations. In sum, these writings show the nonutopian character of Rousseau's thought.

Rousseau's interest in history as a source of guidance for political action (as well as personal improvement) is shown in his "Universal Chronology," which he probably wrote around the age of twenty-five. In his youthful effort to compile a history of the world from creation to the present, he buried himself "in the obscurity of chronology,"[3] but quickly rejected this enterprise, which required reconciling sacred teaching with secular history. At this time he abandoned historical chronology for the sake of "the exact measurement of and the path of celestial bodies" made possible by astronomy. It was only seven or eight years later, when he was serving as secretary to the French ambassador to Venice, that he developed his serious interest in politics.

The majority of Rousseau's mature statements on practical politics concern his fatherland, Geneva. The writings in which these statements occur can be found in Volumes IX and X of *The Collected Writings*. The topics of these statements range from the moral crisis posed by the debate over the public establishment of a theater to the constitutional crisis posed by citizens making remonstrances against the usurpations of the government. It is hardly surprising that a famous citizen of Geneva would feel compelled to address these issues of public importance. In fact, Rousseau insisted that it would be treason to argue that a citizen must remain silent in such cases. He did not restrict his writing about practical political issues to questions of immediate civic concern to Geneva, however. The writings contained in this volume—particularly those on the Valais, Corsica, and Poland—concern communities in which Rousseau had little or no personal stake.

Squaring the Political Circle

In the cases of Corsica and Poland, Rousseau received invitations to write his thoughts on these communities. There was, however, no need for him to accept these invitations, and he never hesitated to turn down requests to write on topics that did not interest him. What these communities and the Valais have in common, and what may well have piqued Rousseau's interest in writing about them, is that they were at the opposite extreme from the powerful modern states such as France and England that drew the most attention as political models in the eighteenth century. Beyond this, they could be regarded as singularly unpromising communities for useful political reform. In fact, in each case Rousseau indicates that it is precisely the features that make other thinkers despair of, or ignore, these communities that are the source of his interest. Rather than seeing the Valais as a rustic backwater in desperate need of sophistication, he regarded it as an extremely interesting community in which independence and self-sufficiency had been preserved. Rather than seeing Corsica as merely the uncivilized abode of bandits in need of colonial rule by a continental power, he regarded it as the one place in Europe still capable of receiving a sound legislation. It was his reference to this possibility in the *Social Contract*[4] that caused Corsican leaders to invite Rousseau to participate in legislating for their community.

These two cases are examples of Rousseau seeing political health where others saw backwardness. At first glance Poland, the one case in which Rousseau actually completed his work, represented the reverse of political health from any perspective. Rather than being a community not yet formed by political life (as were the Valais and Corsica), Poland appeared as a failed political experiment. Among Rousseau's contemporaries, Poland was widely regarded as the worst political community, being prey to powerful neighbors and having a form of government that made effective action impossible.[5] Rousseau himself summarized the condition of Poland in the first chapter of the *Considerations* by saying, "While reading the history of the government of Poland, one has difficulty understanding how a State so bizarrely constituted could have continued to exist."[6] Unlike Corsica, which Rousseau presents as only slightly corrupted by its Genoese masters, Poland is "depopulated, devastated, oppressed, open to its aggressors, at the height of its misfortunes and its anarchy." Nevertheless, this community with long-standing abuses, "still shows all the fire of youth; and it dares to ask for a government and laws, as if it had just been born." In fact, then, corrupt though it may be, Poland contains remarkable political resources. In this case, as with the others, what most observers regard as fatal flaws are really great advantages.

Several years before undertaking his detailed analysis of Poland, Rousseau had identified the distinctiveness of the Polish government in his *Letters Written from the Mountain*. There he contrasted Poland with Geneva, saying that both were flawed but with opposite flaws. He said to the Genevans, "The constitution of the Republic of Poland is good only for a Government in which there is no longer anything to do. Yours, on the contrary, is good only as long as the legislative Body always acts."[7] In Geneva, the inability of the citizenry to exercise oversight over a strong government led to usurpation of illegitimate powers by the government. The Genevan constitution was "good for establishing public liberty, bad for preserving it." The case of Poland is the reverse: its government is so weak that it is unable to oppress the people by usurping illegitimate powers. Most observers, including the Poles themselves, are all too likely to overlook this advantage because they see only the remarkable inefficiency and incompetence of the Polish government. The difficulty of accomplishing anything in Poland is shown most clearly by the *liberum veto* whereby any member of the legislative body could veto all legislation of any particular session of the Diet. There can be no doubt that Rousseau is a supporter of strong government, but he also insists that efficiency and strength of government must not be achieved at the expense of protecting against governmental usurpation of functions that do not belong to it.

In Rousseau's view this issue goes to the heart of a problem intrinsic to government not only in Poland but everywhere. It is this problem that makes the problem of establishing a good government comparable to the problem of squaring the circle.[8] In the *Social Contract* Rousseau claims, "The body politic, like the human body, begins to die at the moment of its birth, and carries within itself the causes of its destruction."[9] The cause intrinsic to the body politic that causes its death is the government itself. The tendency of the members of the government is to look at themselves as members of a small community (the government) within the larger community. Their tendency will be to prefer the interest of the smaller community to the larger one. The stronger the government is, the more efficient it is both at obtaining the loyalty of its members and at establishing the primacy of this smaller community over the larger one. This problem can be stated in terms of the claim of representative government to be genuinely representative of the people who choose the government.[10] Rousseau's argument is that the members of the government have a natural tendency to represent themselves and the government more than they represent the community as a whole. The government forms a state within the state having its own interests that differ from those of the larger community. It is the difficulties involved in acting upon these interests that make the inefficiencies of the Polish government attractive to Rousseau. The practical problem for Poland, then, is to make it more possible for this government to act without allowing it to exceed its legitimate bounds.

The first step in Rousseau's proposed solution is to make the legislative more genuinely representative of the will of the citizens. The best solution would be a legislative assembly made up of the whole community, but such is impractical even in a much smaller community like Corsica. It is simply impossible in a large nation like Poland. Therefore elected representatives are necessary. Rousseau suggests that these representatives, or members of the national Diet, must be constrained by specific instructions given by those who elect them. In other words, he insists that provision be made to be sure that they do not follow their own judgment on voting, except in rare emergency cases. They are given instructions about how to vote and, at the end of their term, must show that they have followed these instructions.

The method of providing precise instructions to the members of the Diet solves one part of the problem of representation in that it compels the legislative body in a large state to represent the will of the people, not merely of the representatives. This method does not, however, solve the problem of usurpation of legislative power by the executive who ignores the laws. To this problem Rousseau poses a more radical solution: the development of a motive that will counterbalance the natural preference of members of the government for themselves.

Emulation and Citizenship

In different contexts, in the writings contained in this volume and elsewhere, Rousseau considers a range of possible motives for tying citizens (including members of the government) to the community, consistently rejecting all but one. The issue, he says, is to make the law rule over the hearts of all the citizens. "But how to reach hearts? That is what our institutors, who never see anything but force and punishments, hardly think about, and that is what material recompenses would perhaps not lead to any better; justice, even of the greatest integrity, does not lead to it, because like health justice is a good which one enjoys without feeling it."[11] Here Rousseau identifies three possible motives for action: fear of punishments, desire for material reward, and love of justice, none of which, he thinks, forms an adequate basis for loyalty to a community.

The nonutopian character of Rousseau's thought is shown by his rejection of love of justice as a motive. He says that justice, by itself, "inspires no enthusiasm at all." Moreover, he argues in his *Judgment on the Polysynody* that justice, understood as devotion to the good of a particular community, raises the question of which community inspires one's deepest loyalty. He says that "what would be dishonorable in preferring oneself to others disappears when one favors a large social group of which one is a part, by dint of being a good senator, one finally becomes a bad citizen."[12] In his "Universal Chronology" he favorably cites the cosmopolitan view that one's highest loyalty is to the broadest community, the one made up of mankind as a whole,[13] but in his mature writings he never suggests that this can be a practical political motive. On the contrary, he insists that cosmopolitan feelings are always weaker than particular attachments.[14]

The rejection of love of justice as a dominant motive leaves fear of punishment and hope of reward. Rousseau notes that fear is the motive most often relied upon by governments. As Hobbes famously stated, "The passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear."[15] Rousseau, however, argues, "Fear does not excite, it holds back, and its use in penal law is not to lead people to do good but to keep them from doing evil."[16] While Hobbes may regard it as quite sufficient for a government to restrain its subjects in crucial cases, leaving them free to do what they wish in all other cases, Rousseau insists that communities ultimately require the capacity for collective action. This requirement demands "great positive motives for acting."

Hope for material gain seems like a promising motive for inspiring action. Indeed, Rousseau says, "One cannot make men act except by their self-interest";[17] he quickly adds, however, that pecuniary interest is "the least and weakest in the eyes of anyone who is well acquainted with the human heart." Moreover, it is by no means clear that this particular interest would not be best served by successful unjust behavior rather than cooperation with others. In the *Second Discourse* Rousseau says that to those who argue that "Society is so constituted that each man gains by serving the others," he would respond that "this would be very well, if he did not gain still more by harming them."[18] To make matters worse, Rousseau argues in "On Wealth," that even those who set out to become wealthy in order to use their wealth for just purposes are likely to be corrupted by the pursuit of wealth. This analysis is behind his proposals, for both Corsica and Poland, of limiting the role of money in administration.[19]

In spite of this very sharp criticism of the motive of pecuniary self-interest, in the political writings Rousseau spends relatively little time discussing narrow self-interest, or desire for money, because he sees this desire as the manifestation of more fundamental motives. He concludes, "When well-examined, the great motive powers that makes men act are reduced to two, sensual pleasure and vanity."[20] Aside from a very small number of genuine misers who have no desires properly speaking, those who pursue wealth do so in order to satisfy one of these other desires.

The desire for sensual pleasure leads away from political life altogether. When it is found in its pure form with no admixture of vanity, it "is simple and peaceful, it loves silence and introspection." In some contexts Rousseau portrays this motive rather positively. For example, he devotes a section of *Emile* to discussing how he would live if he were rich without having had to exert himself to become rich.[21] The life he describes is one of harmless self-indulgence and service to friends; it does not involve either virtue or vice in a political sense. This praise of a sort of refined hedonism raises issues about Rousseau's ultimate view of the satisfactions that are possible within political life. Nonetheless, it is clear that the desire for sensual pleasure is not compatible with good citizenship in any strong sense of the term.

The one remaining motive to be examined, then, is the hope of satisfying one's vanity. Vanity, Rousseau explains, is one of the branches of the still more fundamental phenomenon of amour-propre.[22] The other branch of this passion that makes humans concerned with the opinions of other people is pride.[23] Vanity manifests itself as attachment to frivolous objects, mere appearances. Pride, however, is the result of concern for "truly estimable goods," particularly independence and power, which are the most truly beautiful things according to Rousseau. Both vanity and pride can inspire great actions, but vanity necessarily involves deception and manipulation. Pride, then, is the passion to be reckoned on.

It is obvious that the love of independence and power characteristic of pride do not automatically lead to public-spiritedness. In fact, it would be reasonable to conclude that pride leads away from the life of devotion to a community almost as much as love of sensual pleasure does; the difference is that pride leads to the desire to rule—to be the most powerful—while the love of sensual pleasure leads to the desire to be left alone. Nonetheless, Rousseau suggests that the pride is the political passion *par excellence* because identification with a community means sharing in a greater degree of independence and power than is available to any individual. Moreover, pride can be linked with public recognition of one's genuine (rather than merely apparent) good qualities.

The first aspect of this attempt to make pride safe for politics is Rousseau's claim that citizens should be made to identify with their community. Thus Rousseau is a teacher of patriotism or nationalism in the strongest sense of these terms. In his "Political Economy," he stressed that patriotism is an outgrowth of amour-propre. He argued that one could "transform into a sublime virtue this dangerous disposition from which all our vices arise."[24] Doing so required training citizens "not to perceive their own existence, so to speak, except as part of the state's." In *Considerations on the Government of Poland,* he makes a similar point in the chapter "On Education," saying, "Upon opening its eyes a child ought to see the fatherland and until death ought to see nothing but it. Every true republican imbibes the love of the fatherland, that is to say of the laws and of freedom along with his mother's milk. This love makes up his whole existence; he sees only the fatherland, he lives only for it; as soon as he is alone, he is nothing: as soon as he has no more fatherland, he no longer is, and if he is not dead, he is worse than dead."[25] Such passages make it clear that Rousseau must be regarded as one of the fathers of modern nationalism, particularly if that nationalism is understood as a reaction against the liberal emphasis upon self-interest.

The second of these quotations indicates that the nationalism supported by Rousseau is of a very specific character in that it has a political component rather than being simply cultural or pre-political.[26] Rousseau does not merely incite love of the fatherland, he also identifies this love with love "of the laws and of freedom." In other words, he does not encourage attachment to a particular community based simply upon its ethnic ties, religion, or shared history. Rousseauian nationalism identifies the nation with a set of political institutions that are compatible with freedom.

There is yet another way in which Rousseau's recommendations for Poland qualify the idea that he is a supporter of all forms of collectivism to the point of being willing to abandon freedom altogether. Even if it were desirable, the total identification of citizens with their community is not strictly attainable. To put this in the language of the *Social Contract,* there always remains some friction between particular or private wills and the general will. This friction, as was indicated above, is the source of the tension between members of the government and the rest of the community. Accordingly, in the *Considerations* Rousseau accommodates the attachment of individuals to themselves with his account of what he calls emulation. This term occurs everywhere in *On the Government of Poland.* Its essence involves more than simple imitation. It is, rather, a competitive striving for public acknowledgment in a way that both stimulates personal pride and channels it in publicly useful directions.

The essence of Rousseau's account of emulation is found in the chapter, "Plan for Subjecting All the Members of the Government to a Graduated Progression,"[27] but its reach extends far beyond this chapter. In sum, what he suggests is that every Polish citizen, not merely members of the government, be made to see the possibility of advancement at every moment of their lives. Serfs must be made to see the possibility of being free. Free individuals must be made to see the possibility of being made into nobles. Minor government officials must be made to see the possibility of promotion. This hope for advancement extends all the way to the throne, which will be an elective office open to those who have proceeded far enough in the graduated progression. Even kings must be made to aspire to having a good reputation after their death by the prospect of a sort of earthly last judgment that takes place before their successor is chosen. The fact that hopes are constantly stimulated and never entirely satisfied acts as a great goad to pride; the fact that promotion depends upon public recognition of accomplishments channels pride in a wholesome manner. Thus, Rousseau's promotion of nationalist sentiments does not involve the total suppression of self-interest. Rather, it involves the use of a particular form of self-interest. Purely individual pride, linked to patriotism, provides the motive for healthy political life.

The Nation and Its Neighbors

Rousseau's proposals for reform make use of existing customs and institutions as much as possible. This reliance on the established does not mean that the reforms he urges are not substantial or even radical. In the *Social Contract* he said that "the time when a State is organized, like that when a battalion is formed, is the instant when the body is least capable of resisting and easiest to destroy."[28] What this means is that, absolutely and decisively, domestic politics is dependent on foreign relations. Although Corsica has been engaged in a prolonged struggle for independence, it is protected from other countries to a degree because it is an island. Poland, on the other hand, finds itself with indefensible borders surrounded by hostile neighbors. Rousseau insists that it can look forward to being invaded several times a century, a prediction that has proven to be only too accurate.[29] Its hopes for the peace necessary to accomplish its reforms reside in two factors: the mutual hostility of its neighbors and a possible alliance with Turkey, the only European power with a history of respecting its treaties.[30] It must be said that neither of these factors can be counted upon completely.

Rousseau's view of the European political situation does not differ markedly from the analysis given by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre whose plan for perpetual peace was based on his sense of the need for a European union to put an end to a constant condition of war. We need a plan for perpetual peace, wrote the abbé, because we live in something close to a perpetual war. Rousseau's reservations about the plan were not based on its simple impossibility. In fact, much of his "Judgment" of the plan consists of a discussion of the origins of this plan in the realistic, even if extremely ambitious, diplomacy of Henri IV.[31] What this discussion reveals, however, is that a realistic plan for perpetual peace is likely to take the form of one strong state finding a way to dominate the others. The main flaw in the abbé's plan is his lack of understanding of the dangerous means that would be required to effect it. It is his belief that it would be possible to appeal to princes on the basis of a rational understanding of their genuine interests that lead Rousseau to say, "He would have been a very wise man *if he did not have the folly* of reason. He seemed to be unaware that princes, like other men, conduct themselves only by their passions and they reason only to justify the foolish acts their passions cause them to do."[32] The abbé's ends may not be entirely utopian, but his means are.

Rousseau's deepest analysis of international relations can be found in his fragment "The State of War." Here he argues that the existence of multiple communities brings about "a manifest contradiction" in the human condition in that it causes people to exist simultaneously in civil society (within their own community) and in the state of nature (in relation to other communities).[33] In this contradictory state of affairs one experiences the disadvantages of both conditions. This account of the problem suggests that Rousseau would sympathize with plans to establish a new international order; we have already seen, however, that he is not optimistic about such plans' prospects.[34] At the very least it is clear that the existence of a diversity of communities provides a problem nearly as intractable as the one posed by the existence of governments as such.

Revolutions

In spite of his reservations about the plan for perpetual peace, Rousseau persisted in saying of it that "it is a solid and well thought out book, and it is very important that it exist."[35] In the *Confessions* he said about his function as editor of the abbé's work, "I was not forbidden to think for myself sometimes, and I could give such a form to my work that very important truths would pass in it under the Abbé de St. Pierre's cloak even more happily than under my own."[36] These remarks raise the question of what value Rousseau could have seen in publishing a scheme the value of which he doubted.

Perhaps the answer to this question can be found in Rousseau's account of the abbé's writing in the "Judgment on the Polysynody." There he offers two alternative explanations of the abbé's apparent simplicity: either he was genuinely naive, or he used his transparently false praise of defective institutions as a subtle criticism of these institutions.[37] If the latter is true, the reason for these books to exist is not found in the idealistic schemes of reform they suggest, but rather, in the devastating critique of existing institutions they contain. It is hardly necessary to point out that, even if the other explanation of the abbé's simplicity is correct, in his role as editor Rousseau has converted this simplicity to his own purposes. In his version, the plan for perpetual peace discloses the way in which despotic governments make use of a chaotic international environment to oppress their subjects. Similarly, the plan for a polysynody discloses that even a reformed French monarchy remains on the verge of despotism.

The expression of such views can be seen as incendiary, and it is clear that Rousseau was very cautious about the way he expressed them. Nevertheless, he did express them and therefore opens himself to the charge of inciting revolutions. A more precise view, however, is that, rather than inciting revolutions, Rousseau is predicting them based upon his analysis of the current European situation. As he says in *Considerations on the Government of Poland,* "I see all the States of Europe rushing to their ruin. Monarchies, Republics, all these nations so magnificently instituted, all these fine governments so wisely balanced, fallen into decrepitude, menaced by an impending death."[38] This view of the near impossibility of reform for the great monarchies, and even the republics, of Europe gives one more reason for Rousseau's interest in "backward" states like Poland and Corsica that might be the greatest hopes in the turmoil he foresaw.

THE PLAN FOR PERPETUAL PEACE, ON THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND,

AND OTHER WRITINGS ON HISTORY AND POLITICS

Universal Chronology or General History of Times From the Creation of the World Up to the Present

Composed and Drawn Up by Rousseau for His Use

Foreword

The title of this work indicates that it is not intended to see the light of day; it is a collection I have made for my own use. Thus it would appear ridiculous for me to write a long detailed account of the design I have proposed for myself in composing it, of the plan I have followed, and the authors I have taken as guides in this thorny route. Nevertheless, two reasons induce me to give myself a sort of abridged account of them in this foreword. The first and principal one is, that having proposed for myself a particular goal that could perhaps change in the continuation from various circumstances that I do not foresee, in such a way that the end of this collection might not have the necessary relation with the beginning—which would bring about a monstrous assemblage—I believed that by putting down on paper my aims in undertaking this work through a little summary that I would make of it at the beginning, and by imposing on myself the necessity of following them in the continuation, I would give my eyes something to forestall the changeability of my mind, and would happily oblige myself to make a uniform collection, and to constrain myself in the execution of a long and difficult undertaking.

My second reason is, that, since I am not certain whether in the continuation I might not have some occasion to please a friend by making my labor known to him, I would be very glad to inform him from the beginning of the frame of mind that caused me to undertake it so that, on the one hand, if his views do not correspond to mine, he might not waste his time uselessly going through it, and, on the other hand, in reading it and finding it treated in a somewhat unusual form, he might always conform to my ideas, and not be led astray in the places where I distance myself from the method of those who labor for the public.

History ought to make up one of the principal parts of the study of a decent man: this is based on two reasons as simple as they are judicious. We are all brothers, our neighbor ought to be as dear to us as we ourselves; I love the human race more than my fatherland, said the illustrious M. de Fenelon,[1] my fatherland more than my family, and my family more than myself. Sentiments so full of humanity ought to be common to all men. But, are we allowed to ignore the things that concern us, us or our friends; should we not be conversant with our business, and is there a man of good sense who would wish not to take part in what is occurring in his home? The Universe is a large family of which we are all members; thus we are also obliged to be acquainted with its situation and its interests: however small the extent of a private individual's power might be, he is always in a condition to make himself useful somewhere to the great body of which he makes up a part; if he can, he owes it indispensably; and if he owes it, how will he do it as long as he knows nothing about what has happened, and about what is happening at present, and thus he will not know either where his services are most necessary, nor of what sort they ought to be, nor how he ought to make use of them to make them more advantageous to others and to himself.

But the utility of history is incomparably more general in relation to the mind and to the heart, and of a greater influence in society. "History," says Monsieur Rollin,[2] "while causing to pass as if in review before us the Kingdoms and the Empires of the universe, and at the same time all the great men who distinguished themselves in any manner whatsoever, instructs us by Lessons and examples about everything that concerns the art of ruling, the science of warfare, the principles of government, the rules of politics, the maxims of civil society and the conduct of life for all ages and for all conditions."

"In it one also learns," continues the same author," how the sciences and the arts have been invented, cultivated, perfected; in it one recognizes, and one follows, as if with one's eyes, their origin and their progression; and one sees with admiration that the closer one comes to the places where the children of Noah lived, the more one finds the sciences and the arts in their perfection: whereas they appear forgotten or neglected in proportion as peoples have been at a greater distance from them: so that when they wanted to reestablish them, it was necessary to go back to the origin from whence they departed."

But another infinitely more interesting object ought to attract our attention. For, although profane history speaks to us only about people abandoned to all the follies of a superstitious worship, and given over to all the derangements of which human nature has become capable since the fall of the first man; it announces everywhere the greatness of God, his power, and his admirable wisdom with which his providence conducts the whole universe.

If the intimate conviction of this last truth elevated, according to Cicero's[3] remark,* the Roman people above all the peoples of the earth: one can be assured in the same way that nothing elevates history above many types of knowledge more than the fact that one finds imprinted almost on every page some precious traces, and striking proofs of that great truth, that God disposes of everything as Sovereign Master; that it is he who settles the fate of Princes, and the duration of Empires;** and that he transports the Kingdoms of one people to another in order to punish the injustices and violence that are committed there.

That is how M. Rollin speaks in the fine preface to his ancient history.*** The learned Father Lami[4] sets forth the same thing in a different light.****

"There are," he says, "general ideas that every man ought to have, that serve marvelously for forming the mind. There is nothing upon which one ought to work more than to know oneself. Now our mind is like the eye that sees everything and that does not see itself at all, unless it is by reflection when it looks in a mirror. The secret for knowing oneself and for judging well about ourselves, is to see ourselves in others. History is a large mirror in which one sees oneself as a whole. There is nothing that a man does that someone else does not do or might not do. Thus in paying attention to the great examples of cruelties, derangements, lewdness, and similar crimes we notice to where we can take the corruption of our heart when we do not work at curing it. The practice of the world teaches the art of living; those excel in it who have traveled, and who have had commerce with people of different countries, and of different temperaments. History takes the place of this practice of the world, of these troublesome travels that few people can make. One sees in it in what manner men have always lived. One learns to bear the accidents of life, not to be taken by surprise, not to complain at all about one's age, as if our complaints could prevent evils from which no age has been exempt. One recognizes the malignity and the misery of men, their vanity, how much one must disdain wealth, that great fortunes often have terrible catastrophes. So that when the study of history is done well, it is a Philosophy that makes all the more of an impression since it speaks to us by perceptible examples; of which it is good to keep a record, so as to represent them both to oneself, and to others as occasion requires."

I am going to conclude these long citations with a passage from the treatise on opinion[5] that will serve as a recapitulation for everything that I just said on this subject.*

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* de Arusp. Resp., n. 19.
** Eccl. 10:8.
*** Pp. I and II.
**** Entr. sur les sciences, p. 112.

To study history is to study the opinions, the motives, the passions of men and its fruit ought to be to learn to know oneself by knowing others; to correct oneself by means of examples, to acquire experience without danger.

Behold then the utility of history established; moreover it is pleasant, which is not of a lesser value in the eyes of the majority of men.

"One of the first passions of man is to seek to know what is around him.**[6] His mind's capacity is too vast to be satisfied with itself. It suffers at seeing itself confined within the narrow limits of time, space, and the persons with whom it passes the short space of its life; it continuously seeks to take flight in a more extended region; by its desires it does not cover any less than the knowledge of all men, of all reigns, of all places and of all times; and this is the unique way by which it can leave this sort of infancy, in which, like those souls still encased, it does not know everything that was done before it, and everything that takes place outside of it."

What charm, then, for a man of taste and intelligence to be able, by means of history, to make present for himself all the memorable events that filled the times that have passed and, so to speak, make them happen once again before him in order to enjoy this majestic spectacle. May he see on the one hand empires beginning and ending by means of the most surprising catastrophes, may he follow their secret springs, the work sometimes of the most mysterious policy and often also of the most ridiculous principles; may he enter into the most hidden interior of so many great men who have played the principal roles in this important Theater; may he examine the true motives that have caused them to act; may he judge from that of the solidity of their merit. On the other side, may he cast his eyes over the history of the human mind, over the invention and the progress of the arts and of the sciences, may he consider them departing from a small patch of earth still unformed and coarse to grow and perfect themselves in different regions following necessity, the taste or the convenience of the inhabitants: in Egypt, Geometry for the division of lands necessary after the inundations of the Nile; in Chaldea, Astronomy by the ease of observations because of their vast plains; in Phoenicia, Navigation so suited to enrich a nation situated in the most fortunate way for the convenience of commerce; in Asia (I am speaking of Asia Minor), painting, architecture and the other arts destined to gratify Asiatic indolence and luxury; in Greece, Eloquence, all powerful in the majority of its republics, and poetry, worthy by its majesty of singing the praises of the Gods and Heroes frequent in Greek mythology, finally may he consider the different relations in events, the diversity of morals, tastes, inclinations, the variety in men's opinions, the conformity in their passions, the means, always ingenious, often criminal that they use to satisfy them, the secret but infallible routes providence uses to make them execute its decrees without them even thinking they are doing so; there certainly is matter for procuring very delightful moments for every man who knows how to think, and who has some taste for the truly beautiful.

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*Tome 1, p. 248.

**Hist. des Emp. et des Répub. disc. prélim., p. 1.

I could authorize what I am saying about the attractiveness of history by means of examples of those famous cures, such as those of Alphonzo of Castile, of Lorenzo de Medici and of others for whom the reading of history was capable of giving back a health despaired of by the Doctors.

In sum I could treat here in particular the necessity of this study for Kings, Princes, Generals of armies, magistrates, and generally for all persons constituted in dignity or charged with some public employment; but I have been preceded on this last point by numerous great men who have ascertained and proven that much better than I.[7]

On Wealth and Fragments on Taste

1. Oh my dear Chrysophile;[1] I am so enchanted by the picture of your impending happiness sketched out in our last meeting that I cannot deny myself the desire to go over it again: let us give it, I beg you, its final strokes, and let us make its image so charming that your heart might never cease offering it to itself as its object and that, by contemplating it, mine might taste in advance the pleasure of seeing you happy.

I will admit it to you straightforwardly: until now I had regarded you only as an ambitious young man ready to sacrifice great talents to the hope for a great fortune and nature's treasures to those of opinion. I was pleased to grapple with you, I hastened, so to speak, to enjoy the sweetness of your conversation just like the shade of a young and beautiful tree which one is going to put to the axe and I never left you without saying while sighing, "He could be a man and wants to be rich."

But how surprised and charmed I was when you opened the depths of your heart to me, while seeing in it the lovable and pure source of that greediness that had shocked me, and how heartily I reproached myself for my injustice once the defect of which I had accused you appeared to me only as one more claim in you for deserving my esteem.

"Yes," you said to me in a tone that pierced me, "I aspire to fortune, but it is in order to atone for its injustices. I groan at seeing unfortunate people without being able to relieve them: I reproach myself for having only a sterile pity for them and I hate a situation that does not leave any exercise for humanity." "Doubtless," you added, "I attach great importance to wealth that is used to relieve someone else's misery and to gold with which inestimable goods are purchased. Rest assured that whatever treasures I might be able to acquire, I would never have enough to suffice for all the good that I would like to do." I frankly admit to you, this speech, which came from your heart, very nearly shook mine completely. I feel that, in fact, the poverty of which I was so proud is worth less than a situation that joins to the desire for being useful the means for becoming so, and that it can be even finer to make decent use of wealth than to know how to do without it. A benevolent rich man seems to me to be the agent of the divinity here below, the glory of the human race, and the imitator of providence of which the callous rich man is only the instrument.

I notice that the more I meditate about your good feelings the more I lose the happiness that I used to taste in my condition: not having at all the hope that sustains your zeal in order to console myself, the desire to relieve someone else's poverty makes me bear my own less patiently, and I fear that in speaking to me in such a lively way about the good that you want to do some day you have innocently done me present and real harm.

What soothes me a little on this point is that, while I have seen many poor people thinking as you do, I have never seen any rich person make use of the same maxims. From which I suspect that there might very well be some causes that make men change systems upon changing situation, and that deprive them of the will to do good while giving them the power to do it. Allow me then to clarify my doubts with you and for me to follow you for a moment on the path of fortune as if I were in your place or as if you were not worth any more than I am, not in order to dishearten you from your good plans, but in order to console myself for not being able to form similar ones.

The first thing I notice in this examination is an immense gap between wealth and poverty, without knowing what to fill this space with: for you have spoken to me well about your conduct once you are wealthy, but you did not tell me anything about what you would do while making yourself wealthy. Nevertheless, while considering the other extreme of your life from so far away, it seems to me that you ought not to forget the course and that it is not enough to envisage the conclusion of your voyage unless you also inquire about the path. For example, first some attention must be paid to the instruments that you wish to put into play to arrive at your goal: for since you are proposing to make use of the wealth you will have acquired in a different manner than ordinary men do, it seems to me that you ought not to employ the ordinary ways of acquiring it out of fear of putting yourself into contradiction with yourself from the first step. Thus, in order to ennoble it by the use you wish to make of it, making it illustrious must begin at its origin and its source must be as pure as its use must be honest.

I do not fear that you might be tempted to proceed to fortune by illegitimate routes; I know that your friends and your employment will put you within reach of making extremely great profits without injustice. But I have difficulty seeing how you will be able to accumulate these profits without deviating from your principles or for how long you must be pitiless in order to become beneficent some day. Tell me, Chrisophile, will the order of things be suspended for you during the whole progression of your elevation, will there be neither ills to relieve nor poor to aid until there is no longer anything left for you to desire? Or until then will it be quite necessary to rebuff every honest man ready to succumb under the weight of a misfortune from which you could deliver him? *My friend, humanity obliges me to allow you to perish because I do not yet have the hundred thousand livres of revenue that I need in order to do some good for you. I am being harsh it is true, and right now I would not give a crown to save the whole human race, but come back in thirty years when I am rich and you will see how beneficent I will be.* What a strange route it is for proceeding to the good to begin by doing wrong, and to be directed toward virtue by all the vices that destroy it; do you think that the sweet voice of nature will still deign to speak to you after having been rebuffed for so long, do you think that thirty years of hardening will leave you the power to open your heart to pity and your purse to the unfortunate at the end of this time? Oh my friend, if you want to be a man only in your old age, take a guarantee from nature that she will make you reach it out of fear that, mistaken in your expectations, you do not cease being before being good and do not die without having lived! Truly you ought very much to despise the pusillanimity of that Emperor who wished so much that he had a single day back again,[2] you who are beginning by crossing off your account the duration of your youth and the days of three-quarters of your life about which the best there will be to say is that they were only wasted.

Consider, in addition, that aside from the risk of a premature death, you are also running that of the success of your efforts. Are you unaware that in everything that is within the scope of fortune it has more force than zeal and activity do? Like a capricious beauty, she flees those who seek her and pursues those who disdain her. Vigilance, talents, even the occasion are not reliable warrants of her favors. The bizarre one will sometimes leave Aristippus for Diogenes,[3] and the office of the financier for the dusty study of the philosopher. Leibnitz will die in opulence and Las in poverty.[4] Who, then, can answer to you for the event? What recklessness it is to count, in order to fulfill your duties, upon a success that depends so little on yourself or what forgetfulness of reason it is to set so far aside, on the chance of a doubtful event, everything there ought to be that is decent and humane in all the events of your life. Wretch! do you dare to put the virtues into a lottery with fortune this way? If you die before the time, or heaven has not blessed your labor, your youth, employed in vain pursuit of an illusion, will cover your final days with opprobrium and despair. What a horrible fate, to have done everything for wealth that one has not acquired at all, to have lived like a greedy usurer, and to die poor and abandoned like a spendthrift, without being able to carry away with oneself either someone else's benedictions or contentment with oneself, and without making at least one happy person at one's death.

Behold you a poor and honest man. But do you know what you will become being rich, are you unaware that, in spite of you, your ideas and your maxims will change along with your situation, and that in spite of yourself when you are no longer what you are, you will no longer think as you think today?

"I would like," you say, "to be wealthy in order to make a good use of my wealth, and if I desire to have goods it is only to have the pleasure of doing some good and of coming to the aid of the unfortunate." As if the first good were not to do no evil at all.[5] How is it possible to become wealthy without contributing to impoverishing someone else, and what would one say about a charitable man who would begin by despoiling all of his neighbors in order to have the pleasure afterwards of giving them alms? You who reason this way, whoever you might be, I declare to you that you are a dupe or a hypocrite: either you are seeking to deceive others or your heart is deceiving you by disguising your avarice to you under the appearance of humanity.

. . . honest; otherwise by gaining by means of injustices something to lavish someday as benefits you would be acting like those zealous pious people who rob their neighbor in a holy way in order to make offerings to God.

But if one would assume all that and one could reconcile the habit of harshness with the object of beneficence, at what precise extent have you set the limit of your fortune; what solid reason will you have to be satisfied with it at one point rather than at another? What limits will you find in the nature of things at which you can reasonably say: this is enough? Alas, if you want to be in a condition to make reparations for all the evils your fellows will do, if you want to wait until your power extends as far as our miseries, I see you, insatiable and harsh up to the end of your days, ceaselessly accumulating for lack of having enough to lavish and dying overburdened with gold, years, and avarice without ever having found time or means to do good for anyone.

Work then, be ardent and active, gain as much as you can, but in order to lavish in proportion, hasten to take advantage of your gains by placing them on the person of the Poor and promptly change vile money into good works. But in spite of you it will be necessary for a time to pass between the moment at which the funds will come to you and the one at which you will distribute them. Oh Chrisophile, dread this dangerous gap, tremble that you not be tempted to abuse this sacred deposit and remember that the more reliable a man is, the less he exposes himself to temptations.

Men's manner of thinking depends very much on the people with whom they have to live and the temptations they have to overcome. It is difficult to keep maxims that are ceaselessly fought against both by everything around us and by the passions inside of us. The condition in which you are living now leaves the voice of honor and of truth free access to you and the luxury you cannot enjoy tempts you only indifferently, but do not hope for it to be the same when you never hear moderation treated as anything but pedantry, when hope will give force to all your desires, and when it will be necessary to face the present attraction of pleasure and the continuous raillery of your equals at the same time, and when the decorum of your station will be opposed to all your good feelings as a man. Thus as soon as you are wealthy, you must necessarily choose to live as a wealthy man and to be pitiless or to live as a poor man and be ridiculous. But in the rank in which Heaven has placed you, you can live modestly without baseness and practice virtue without fights; do you count such an advantage for nothing? Moreover all the sums that it will some day be necessary to consecrate to your upkeep are now distributed in society and perhaps do more good there without you getting mixed up with it than you will be able to do yourself after having acquired them; another consideration that gives some weight to the first.

But believe me, my dear Chrysophile, either your interest will persuade your virtue of many sophisms or you will never accumulate very great wealth.

But let's see! what marvels will you perform then with your treasures? To listen to you one would believe that only the wealthy man can be beneficent, and that we other poor people are deprived of the pleasure of ever engaging in the sweetest act of humanity.

To listen to you speak about the advantages that opulence procures for humanity, wouldn't it seem that one cannot be helpful except by dint of money? An opinion more suited to the one who believes he holds the supreme felicity in his safe, than to the one who seeks it in genuine goods.

The great needs are born from great possessions, said Favorinus[6] wisely, and often the best means of giving oneself the things one lacks is to take away those one has in excess.

What has he done for me then? He made me live. Ah! wouldn't I have lived without him! No he did not make me live, he made me languish and die in the most disreputable slavery. He dishonored and debased me, he extinguished in me all the pride natural to genius, he satiated me less with bread than with insults and the life I have led in his sad house has made me desire death a hundred times. But I, what have I done for him at the same time? I have nourished his vanity, I have freed his soul, dense from boredom, from itself, I have made him live at the expense of what is mine. While I cost him only in his purse, he exhausted my efforts, my talents, my freedom, my substance; he drank my blood and my life for the price of money; and claimed to make me live.

I know that the most scrupulous of those vile men who are called decent people despise so much delicateness and that their convenient probity, proud of not committing any evident injustice at all, is not careful to reject profits which, without appearing illegitimate, bring harm to others. But you, my dear Chrysophile for whom the sublimity of your intentions imposes a more severe duty, you are not unaware that the first good to do is not to do evil to anyone, and that it is a long way from the laws of justice to those of virtue. However legitimate your gain might be, others who perhaps need it more than you do would have made it instead of you, and at bottom isn't that really depriving them of everything that you do to their harm? Thus in all your affairs I see you ceaselessly preoccupied by the fear of harming someone without knowing anything about it and I cannot imagine by what means you will ever succeed in the goal of reassuring yourself against this suspicion, unbearable to every beneficent soul, of innocently bringing about someone else's misfortune.

If one cannot be truly human and remain wealthy, how could one be so and acquire wealth?

Wealth. One desires it in order to make good use of it, but one no longer makes good use of it when one has it.

When one believes oneself above the ills of humanity one no longer pities them in others.

I would keep myself from setting forth these difficulties to an ordinary man and I know well that he would make fun of me, but for you who wish to be virtuous and who even aspire to fortune only for that reason, these objections concern you, and you must resolve them.

I think that you will not answer me that it is just as well that you do for your profit what someone else would equally well do upon your refusal, for this would be to glorify yourself at not being the last of men and to renounce virtue until there were no more wicked people.

Or

Many decent people would willingly tell me that they like just as much to profit from pieces of roguery as many others would do in their place: a humble admission from someone who holds himself as virtuous enough just because he is not the biggest scoundrel of men, and does not believe himself obliged to be just until after the whole world becomes so. Oh Chrisophile, if I know your heart well enough, I will not need to refute such an excuse because you will never have the mind to find it.

Multiply the iron doors, the locks, the chains, the guards and watchmen, everywhere raise gibbets, wheels, gallows, every day imagine new forms of torture, harden your soul at the sight of all the sufferings of the indigent; establish pulpits and colleges where only the maxims that suit you are taught. Attract, ceaselessly pay new writers in order to make the poor man's theft even more infamous and the rich man's even more respected; every day imagine new distinctions in order to authorize in the one and punish in the other the same intrigues under other names. But be sure that your insatiable covetousness will serve only to nourish someone else's, that your acts of knavery will only cause to accumulate around you a multitude of other rascals who will return them to you in spite of your efforts and your experience; that a crowd of fallen women, vile instruments of your pleasures, will put up with disgust for them only so as to compensate themselves at your expense along with your most despicable followers; that your sensuality will be fed only by the worst foods of their type, that your table will be covered only by the rubbish from that of the modest private individuals who are their purveyors. Your greedy valets will serve you at a great price with disguised manure, unrecognizable to your spoiled sense of taste and about which your parasites will not dare to complain; both groups will laugh in secret at seeing the master of the house, that is to say the arbiter of taste, poisoning himself with rapture, and with virtuosity tasting in putrefied dishes the money they cost him. Nevertheless your ill-gotten and even more ill-managed possessions will be squandered in the search for happiness, which ceaselessly takes flight; they will leave you only remorse about their source and regret about their loss. Your efforts will all be deceived, your doors will be smashed open, you locks will be shattered, your strongboxes will be broken into. All your precautions will turn only to your ruin and if by chance you ever meet a good man whom you trust, a hundred scoundrels will unite right away to make him suspect and to rob you more easily. Surrounded by greedy hands, you will not be able to watch over one without letting a thousand others act, under your eyes everything will take on forms contrary to reality; everyone will talk to you only of attachment and you will be detested by everyone; inexorable to good people, you will be touched only by the flattery of scoundrels; the only ones who will know how to move you to pity will be the wretches who deserve it from no one, your very benefits, corrupted at their source and in their use, will only be new crimes; finally a thousand faithless and cowardly friends would want to shed their blood for your service and die for you if need be who secretly aspire only to the desired moment of your death throes. Do not even hope that they might wait to abandon you until you are unable to take notice of it: their greed will not leave them the time, and death will not have for any among you the pity to prevent this distressing spectacle; you will see them rush to the only things that attached them to you; despoiled while you are alive and under your eyes, you will die poor and abandoned for having lived rich and feted by everyone; and to state in a word what is most horrible in your fate, in all the sorrows that will come to crush you without end, if self-interest sometimes feigns taking your side, humanity itself will rejoice at all your misfortunes.

Cruel anxieties will come to afflict your soul in the bosom of voluptuous pleasures. In your most tumultuous feasts a thousand bitter memories, a thousand fatal pangs of remorse will cry out at the bottom of your heart, louder than all your guests. How many times will poorly restrained tears dampening your eyelids suddenly chase from the table the feigned gaiety that one tried hard to show there: how many times will you believe that, in place of a scented wine that will fill your cup, you are drinking the blood of the wretches that you will reproach yourself for having made: if pains come to seek you out this way in the midst of pleasures, what resource will you have left to repulse their attacks?

And do not think that this is the worst condition to which your softness toward yourself and your harshness for others can lower you. Regrets and pangs of remorse, cruel as they are, still have some foundation or other of secret sweetness for a soul in which the taste for the good and the charm of feeling are not entirely effaced. Above all be afraid of that canker of corrupted hearts, that shameful and abominable debasement, final limit of degradation and final fruit of the struggles that a stupid and barbarous rich man is forced to give over ceaselessly to his natural sensitivity.

Let them remain alone in their vast palaces; surrounded by pangs of remorse and troubles for their entire retinue and since they love servitude so much may they see nothing but valets around them!

Without pity he sees those wretches crushed by continuous labors, hardly drawing from them a dry and black bread that serves to prolong their misery. He does not find it strange that profit is in inverse ratio to labor and that a harsh and voluptuous sluggard grows fat on the sweat of a million wretches exhausted by fatigue and need. "That is their station," he says, "they are born in it, habit evens out everything and I am not happier under my paneled ceilings than a cowherd under his thatched roof, not more," he ought to add, "than the ox itself in its stable." But does someone speak about those savage climes whose inhabitants live in a continuous indolence without labor and without needs? Then he tenderly pities the fate of these wretches deprived of the happiness of preparing the conveniences of life for someone else, and he would not know how to understand that one can live in a country in which there are no decent rich men who charitably suck the people's blood. In fact, how is it possible not to prefer the brilliant destiny of the wretch who serves us to the idleness of the savage that is good for nothing for us? Such are the contradictions of your pretended wise men, vile adulators of opulence, even more vile detractors of poverty who prudently know how to accommodate philosophy to the taste of those who pay for it.

But is it not extremely strange that these effeminate people who spare nothing for some imaginary conveniences and who sometimes spend a great deal of money to free themselves from a noisy neighborhood, fear using some spare change to free themselves from the eternal importunity of a beggar? There is so much antipathy between the rich and the poor that the former prefer to be inconvenienced themselves rather than to contribute to the relief of the latter.

The least of all the outlays one can bring into a commerce of benefits is money.

Instead of basely putting yourself into the Class of the rich remain in the one of people of merit and leave the eternal separation nature has put between these two classes.

The one knows how to take testimonials of friendship only from his purse. While the other lavishes his efforts, his time, his talents, his feelings, his freedom, his life. And after this unequal distribution, the rich ingrate, proud of some wretched gifts, still impudently dares to demand gratitude.

We have talents or at least arms, leave them their unworthy riches and let us keep our freedom; believe me, Chrisophile, they will be more bothered than we will.

The most brilliant fortune could not give us shelter from its reversals, we will never subjugate it with its own arms. To vanquish it, it is necessary to use others that are of a better caliber.

All of that is done with such display, with such ostentation, that vanity draws its profit before humanity repents of it.

It is at least bearing witness to him that you commiserate with his misery. For what difference is there between telling him that with a compliment or with a penny, other than that the latter manner is more convenient, more humane, and less false? I admit, nevertheless, that it is even more convenient to be in a good carriage rolling fast that can cover the poor man's face with mud as sole response.

But do you want to do something more useful for humanity? Far from aspiring to fortune, learn to do without it; despise the arrogance of the rich and by your disinterestedness teach men to seek happiness in the most noble objects.

Remember that the gifts of the rich infallibly hide traps, and that it is necessary to be more afraid.

It is not even worth making the effort of persevering in refusing these despicable gifts.

Whoever has slept for a long time on cold hard ground does not desire a good bed at all; a woman of the fields notices neither the clear skies nor the sun that would cause a woman of the town to die, and the villager eats his yellow bacon fat with better appetite than a financier does the game that covers his table.

. . . practice thusly gradually rebuffing in the same way the decent needy person who if he can pierce all the way through to you will come to expose his misery to you in secret.

2. I congratulate you, Sir, at the good pace your fortune is making and even more on the good use that you are proposing to make of it. One could not possess soon enough the riches that one wants to use so worthily and I aspire to see you reach the limit at which you have resolved to be a good man.

3. For you will admit to me that to begin by impoverishing people for having the pleasure of giving alms to them is a rather singular charity.

4. humanity
. . . that there is a hundred times more merit and virtue in bearing poverty decently and patiently than in profusely lavishing one's benefits upon the poor.

5. That it is praiseworthy to seek to get rich in order to do good to those who need it, which just about signifies that it is good to seize other people's possessions to have the pleasure of giving them back a part of them.

6. Above all I complain about the disdain that M. de Voltaire affects on every occasion for the poor in his writings which otherwise inspire only the good of humanity. It is not that this author is wrong in everything of which he accuses this deplorable part of the human race, but can he believe that the excessive accommodativeness of well-off people needs to moderated and that society will get on better for it if men are even harsher? For example: I agree that the poor hound the rich and hasten from all directions in large towns in order to importune the citizens, but M. de V. is too enlightened not to agree in his turn that it is the large towns and rich men who have made poor people, and that, consequently, it is not entirely unjust that the latter look for the remedy for their illness in the cause that produces it.

7. For the rich and all those who are satisfied with their station have a great interest in things staying as they are while the wretched can only gain from revolutions.

8. shake this horrible colossus with a vigorous hand. . . . dare to transform their friends into valets unworthily.

[On Taste]

For, since taste is hardly susceptible of demonstration, if there is only one that is the good and each believes he possesses it, it is only by comparing all of them that one can be sure of which one deserves the preference. The advantageous opinion that we have of our own, as well as the one that each nation must have of its own, is, then, only a prejudice that will become a reason only in favor of the one that will have best sustained the parallel . . .

. . . to restore it to perfection.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the importance one gives to good taste is already a sure sign of its depravity. Never is taste or virtue so much talked about as in the times in which it is the least possessed. Everywhere that both the one and the other truly reign, their sensation is covered over by habit; one follows them, one loves them, and one does not talk about them at all. The intimate liaison of taste with morals cannot escape anyone who reflects about it for a moment. Constantly to act contrary to one's own judgments is an inconsistency that is not in man. The abstract beautiful is nothing at all; nothing is beautiful except by relations of conformity; and man, who has only himself as a measure of these relations, judges about them based only on his affections.

Man does nothing beautiful except by imitation. All the true models of taste are in nature. The more we distance ourselves from the master, the more disfigured our tableaux are. Then we take our model from the objects that we love; and the beautiful, which has no rule other than our whims, subject to caprice and to authority, is no longer anything except what pleases those who guide us.

Those who guide us are the artists, the grandees, the rich; and what guides them is their vanity. Hence luxury establishes its empire, and causes what is difficult and costly to be loved. The so-called beautiful, far from imitating nature, is such only by dint of contradicting it. How could these ways of seeing leave anything healthy in citizens' affections? They might be the best of men; by that alone they would become the most corrupt. Then prejudice, which owes its birth to our vices, carries them to the summit; it gives them more force than it takes from them; and it is by prejudice that one can no longer be an honorable man except by dint of being a knave.

It is not so much the luxury of softness that ruins as the luxury of vanity. This luxury, which does not turn to anyone's good, is the true scourge of society. This is what carries misery and death into the countryside; this is what devastates the earth and makes the human race perish.

Come, gaudy imbecile, who puts your pleasure only in someone else's opinion! Let me teach you to taste it by yourself. Be voluptuous, and not vain! Learn to flatter your senses, rich beast![7] Acquire some taste, and you will enjoy.

Fragments of a History of the Valais

I am undertaking to describe a country not very rich, not very well known, not very substantial in its extent, but singular from its position, from the form of its government and from the morals of its inhabitants.[1] Famous nations have been described so often and so carefully, that they offer almost no more new observations to make. Moreover, all the great peoples of Europe resemble each other so much today . . .

A country not very rich, not very well known, not very substantial in its extent, but singular from its position, from the form of its government and from the morals of its inhabitants . . .and I believed . . . perhaps it would be desirable that observations . . . philosophers supplementing . . . great nations have been endlessly described by multitudes of writers . . . their power has been incited . . . who often had more regard to . . .

Famous nations have been described so often and so singularly, that they offer almost no more new observations to make. Moreover all the great peoples of Europe resemble each other so much today from morals, from their maxims and even from the basis of their government, that there is little for each of them to learn from the description of the others.

I do not doubt that three months of such a stay would put into despair the least unreasonable woman of fashion; for, however pretty she might be, she would find there many other women who would not be less so, but so modest that they would not look at her even to hate her; and men serious and cold . . . frosty . . . who would look at her only to . . . who would hardly deign to poke fun of her and her impertinently polite airs.

Nevertheless a lovable Valaisan woman would be lovable and charming everywhere in the universe: so true is it that the tone of nature, foreign in many countries, is never shocking anywhere; whereas all the practices that stray from it, although established in some places in the world, are always ridiculous in all the others.

It is thus that in a small extent of country are united almost all the favors and disfavors of nature.

I shall not see the torments of humanity . . . the torments of civilization . . . which devours at the table of nature served by slaves . . . by the slaves that it buys.

I crossed the bridge . . .

Thus I am far away . . . I no longer see any habitations . . . I am outside of society.

The air is purer, the earth is uncultivated, the mountains are large. . . .[2] But as soon as there is childbirth . . . creation . . . satyrs and bacchantes will hasten.

How could one commit a crime here?

Poor and hospitable people.

What would a city dweller do there? What would a citizen set up there?

The necessary, it would be given to them, and they would not want it. The superfluous, it is not there, and it would not be accepted.

Beautiful old woman, interesting depiction of the soul.

This way they pass tranquil days without either great pleasures or great pains, and finally end them with an almost unfelt death after a long life, having felt little and thought very little; but having had only accurate ideas and upright feelings.

Instructions to Draw from the Valais

1. The Geography of the country, its productions, its natural history, its various temperatures.
2. The civil history and antiquities.
3. The Government, the Laws, the administration of justice, and in particular the diet, its rights, and those of the members of the ten.
4. The morals of the inhabitants, their customs, their ways of life, both in the valleys and in the mountains, both summer and winter. Their loves, their marriages, the education of children, the banquets, the public festivals if there are any there, and the way of life and the character of the women in particular.
5. Their military discipline, their way of waging war and their principles with regard to war, conquests, and their neighbors.
6. How the rich and the poor behave toward each other, and the people in office toward the private individuals. If there is much variation in fortunes, where it comes from, and what it brings about in society.
7. The commerce of the country; what it provides to foreigners, and what it receives from them, and its manner of carrying on commerce with them.
8. The apothegms, witticisms, and peculiar stories that can best make known the character and genius of the inhabitants.
9. Luxury, clothing, houses, and everything that concerns adornment in both men and women.

10. An idea of the number of inhabitants both free and subject, and of the proportion there is between this number and the space of land they occupy.[3]
12. What are the public revenues, the expenses of the State, whether there are taxes, how they are assessed, and what resources are found for extraordinary occasions.
13. The Election of the Bishop, his rights, his honors and his emoluments or pensions. What are the prerogatives and honoraria of all the other magistrates, and how respect is shown to them.
14. Whether the sciences and the arts are cultivated; to what degree; with what success, and which ones. Whether there are many mechanical arts and if the country makes use of them, or needs them, etc.[4]
15. The situation of the Cretins,[5] the way they act with regard to them, the cause of their imbecility.
16. What the inhabitants of the mountains and the valleys do during the winter and how they occupy themselves.

ON THE WRITINGS OF THE ABBÉ DE SAINT-PIERRE

Abstract of
Monsieur the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's Plan for Perpetual Peace

By J. J. Rousseau
Citizen of Geneva

Letter From M. Rousseau to M. de Bastide[1] Author of *The World*

I would have wished, Sir, to be able to respond to the decency of your solicitations by cooperating with your undertaking more usefully; but you know my resolution, and, for lack of anything better, in order to gratify you I am reduced to drawing from my old scribblings the enclosed piece as the least unworthy of the Public's attention. It was six years ago that, Count de Saint-Pierre having entrusted to me the manuscripts of his uncle the late M. the Abbé, I had begun to abridge his writings so as to make them more convenient for reading, and to make what is useful in them better known. My plan was to publish this abridgment in two volumes, one of which would have contained abstracts of the Works, and the other a detailed judgment on each plan: but after some attempt at this labor, I saw that it was not suited to me and that I would not succeed in it at all. Thus I abandoned this plan, after having executed it only on the Perpetual Peace and on the *Polysynody.* I am sending you, Sir, the first of these abstracts, as an inaugural subject for you who love peace, and the writings that breathe it. May we see it soon established among the Powers; for among Authors it has never been seen, and today is not the time that one must hope for it. I salute you, Sir, with all my heart.

Rousseau

From Montmorency, December 5, 1760.

Foreword by M. de Bastide

It appeared necessary to me to have the Letter which precedes reprinted for those who did not read the *World;* otherwise they would not have known why today I find myself the Editor of this excellent Writing on a perpetual Peace.

It is equally necessary for these first, and for my Readers in particular, to say why this Writing, intended to enter into my periodical Work, is becoming a separate being, and is deceiving the hope of those who were expecting to read it in this same work.

My innocence in this regard will never be doubted except by those who suspect as they ought to be suspected. A superior will forced me to fail in my promise; the reasons for it should not be explained here; but they can be known, and they are not against me.

Constrained to have this Writing printed separately, at least I have given all my efforts to it, I considered embellishing it with the Chisel of M. COCHIN,[2] who has shown both ardor for M. Rousseau's glory and disinterestedness and goodness for me; and the Engraving that one sees at its head is a proof of the zeal inspired in me by regret at unavoidably betraying the faith of a public promise.

This engraving represents the monument that the City of Rheims erected to the King, and the model for which has just been executed with so much applause by M. Pigalle.[3] This Artist has wisely thought that the ordinary practice of putting Slaves at the foot of these statues has the defect of not at all characterizing one reign more than any other, and seems that it must make people believe that we are still plunged rather deeply in barbarism for putting the glory of a King in the ambition of conquests, more than in that wisdom of government that causes the felicity of peoples. That is what M. Pigalle has provided against, by putting on the one side a woman leaning on a rudder, who with her right hand effortlessly leads a lion, while holding it only by several hairs of its mane. By that he allegorically represents mildness of government, docility of peoples, and their attachment for the Sovereign. On the other side, one sees a peaceful and satisfied Citizen savoring the sweetness of tranquillity of mind, and security in the possession of his wealth; this is why he is seated on chests and bales of merchandise, and one sees a golden vessel and several purses open at his feet. I believed that the tableau of a peaceful, happy, and consequently immortal reign, would make the system of a perpetual Peace more palpable and more precious. Independently of the relative ideas that led me to it, I wanted to join together three celebrated men whom I honor, and here it is feeling that has spoken.

From the simplicity of the title it will appear at first to many people that M. Rousseau here has only the merit of having made a good *abstract*. Do not be deceived by this, here, in many respects, the Analyst is the creator. I felt that a part of the Public might be deceived about this, I desired a different entitling. M. Rousseau, full of a scrupulous respect for the truth and for the memory of one of the most virtuous Citizens who ever existed, replied to me:

". . . With regard to the title, I cannot consent to it being changed to a different one that would usurp for me any further a Plan that does not belong to me at all. It is true that I have seen the object under a different point of view than the Abbé de Saint-Pierre did, and that I have sometimes given different reasons than his. Nothing prevents you from being able, if you want, to say a word about this in the Foreword, as long as the principal honor still remains with that respectable man."*

I should justify myself for having suppressed the word *Monsieur*[4] in the title of the Work. This is M. Rousseau's custom: in that he is following his principles; nevertheless, these ceremonial expressions form a part of our politeness, and one should always follow the practices of one's country when they pertain to consideration. Thus I was disposed to banish all distinction; but in the same letter that I received from him, he anticipated me and notified me of his intentions. "If you put my name," he notified me, "do not go, I beg you, putting politely *M. Rousseau,* but *J. J. Rousseau, Citizen of Geneva,* neither more nor less." I was obliged to gratify him, and everything is said in that regard by declaring that I did only what he wished.

Abstract of Monsieur the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's Plan for Perpetual Peace

Tunc genus humanum positis sibi consult armis,
Inque vicem gens omnis amet.[5]

Since no greater, finer, or more useful Plan has ever occupied the human mind than the one of a perpetual and universal Peace among all the Peoples of Europe, no Author has ever better deserved the attention of the Public than the one who proposes the means for putting this Plan into execution. It is even very difficult for such matter to leave a sensitive and virtuous man exempt from a bit of enthusiasm; and I do not know whether the illusion of a genuinely humane heart, whose zeal makes everything easy, is not preferable in this to that harsh and repellent reason, which always finds in its own indifference to the public good the first obstacle to everything that can favor it.

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*In spite of this noble refusal by M. Rousseau, I had believed I ought not to suppress the praises he deserved; he found them too strong and cut them out of the proof sheets, here is what he wrote to me . . .

"M. de Bastide gives me here all the merit of the work, and in addition, that of having refused it; that is not just. I am not at all modest, and there are praises for which I am extremely grateful; on the contrary I am proud enough not to want a usurped glory at all," etc.

I do not doubt that many Readers might arm themselves in advance with incredulity in order to resist the pleasure of persuasion, and I pity them for so sadly mistaking stubbornness for wisdom. But I hope that some honest soul will share the delightful emotion with which I take up the pen on a subject so interesting for humanity. I am going to see, at least in the mind's eye, men uniting and loving each other; I am going to think about a sweet and peaceful society of brothers, living in an eternal concord, all led by the same maxims, all happy with the common happiness; and carrying out such a touching tableau in myself, the image of a felicity that does not exist at all will make me savor a genuine one for several moments.

I could not deny these initial lines to the feeling with which I am full. Now let us try to reason coolly. Well resolved not to put anything forward without proving it, I believe I am able to beg the Reader in his turn not to deny anything that he does not refute; for it is not so much the reasoners that I fear, as those who, without yielding to proofs, do not want to raise any objections to them.

It is not necessary to have meditated for very long on the means of perfecting any Government whatsoever to notice the perplexities and obstacles that are born less from its constitution than from its external relations; so that one is constrained to give to its security the majority of the efforts that ought to be devoted to its public order, and to consider putting it in a condition to resist others more than to make it perfect in itself. If the social order were, as is claimed, the work of reason rather than the passions, would it have taken so long to see that either too much or too little has been done for our happiness in it; that since each of us is in the civil state with his fellow citizens and in the state of nature with all the rest of the world, we have forestalled private wars only to ignite general ones, which are a thousand times more terrible; and that by uniting ourselves to several men, we really become the enemies of the human race?[6]

If there is some way of resolving these dangerous contradictions, this can only be by a form of confederative government, which, uniting Peoples by bonds similar to those which unite individuals, equally subject both of them to the authority of Laws. Moreover, this government appears preferable to any other, in that it comprehends the advantages of large and small States at the same time, because it is formidable abroad because of its power, because the Laws are vigorous there, and because it is the only one suited to restraining Subjects, Leaders, and Foreigners equally.

Although this form may appear new in certain regards, and although it has in fact been well understood only by the Moderns, the Ancients were not unaware of it. The Greeks had their Amphictions, the Etruscans their Lucumonies, the Latins their Feriae, the Gauls their Cities, and the last gasps of Greece became even more illustrious in the Achaean League. But none of these confederations approached in wisdom that of the Germanic Body, of the Helvetian League and the Estates General. If these Bodies politic are still of such a small number and so far from the perfection of which one feels they would be susceptible, it is because the best is not executed as it is imagined, and because in Politics as well as in Morality, the extension of our knowledge hardly proves anything but the greatness of our ills.

Aside from these public confederations, others less apparent and no less real can be formed tacitly from the union of interests, from the similarity of maxims, from the conformity[7] of customs, or from other circumstances that allow common relations to exist between divided Peoples. This is how all the Powers of Europe form a sort of system among themselves which unites them by one single religion, the same international law, morals, literature, commerce, and a sort of equilibrium that is the necessary effect of all this, and which, without anyone in fact thinking about preserving it, would nevertheless not be as simple to break up as many people think.

This society of the Peoples of Europe has not always existed, and the particular causes that caused it to be born still serve to maintain it. In fact, before the Roman conquests, all the Peoples of this part of the world, barbarian and unknown to each other, had nothing in common but their quality of being men, a quality which, at that time degraded by slavery, in their mind hardly differed from that of a brute. Also the Greeks, reasoners and vain, distinguished, so to speak, two species in humanity; one of which, namely their own, was made to command; and the other, which comprehended all the rest of the world, uniquely to serve. From this principle, it resulted that a Gaul or an Iberian was nothing more for a Greek than a Kaffir or an American would have been, and the Barbarians themselves did not have any more affinity among themselves than the Greeks had with any of them.

But when this People, sovereign by nature, had been subjected to its slaves the Romans, and one part of the known hemisphere had submitted to the same yoke, a political and civil union formed among all the members of a single Empire; that union was drawn much closer by the maxim—either very wise or very insane—of transmitting to the conquered all the rights of the conquerors, and above all by the famous decree of Claudius,[8] which incorporated all the Subjects of Rome into the number of its Citizens.

To the political chain that brings all the members together into a body this way, were joined civil institutions and laws which give a new force to these bonds, by settling in an equitable clear, and precise manner—at least as much as can be done in such a vast Empire—the reciprocal duties and rights of the Prince and Subjects, and those of the Citizens among themselves. The Code of Theodosius, and afterwards the Books of Justinian were a new chain of justice and reason opportunely substituted for that of sovereign power, which was very palpably slackening.[9] This supplement very much slowed down the dissolution of the Empire, and for a long time preserved for it a sort of jurisdiction over the very Barbarians who were laying waste to it.

A third bond, stronger than the preceding ones, was that of Religion, and one cannot deny that it is above all to Christianity that Europe still owes today the sort of society that has endured among its members; to such an extent that the only one of its members that has not at all adopted the sentiment of the others on this point has always remained a stranger among them.[10] In the end, Christianity,[11] so despised at its birth, served as a refuge for its detractors. After having persecuted it so cruelly and so vainly, the Roman Empire found in it the resources it no longer had in its forces; its missions were worth more to it than victories; it sent Bishops to mend the errors of its Generals, and triumphed by means of its Priests when its Soldiers had been beaten. This is how the Franks, the Goths, the Burgundians, the Lombards, the Avars, and a thousand others finally acknowledged the authority of the Empire after having subjugated it, and received, at least in appearance, along with the Law of the Gospel that of the Prince who had had it proclaimed to them.

Such was the respect that was still paid to that great dying Body that up to the final moment its destroyers felt honored by its titles; the same Conquerors who had debased it were seen to become the Empire's Officials; the greatest Kings were seen to accept, and even court Patrician honors, the Prefecture, the Consulate; and, like a lion who fawns upon the man it could devour, these terrible Victors were seen to pay homage to the Imperial Throne which they were the masters of overthrowing.

This is how the Priesthood and the Empire formed the social bond for various Peoples, who, without having any real community of interests, of rights or of dependency, had one of maxims and opinions, whose influence has still remained, when its principle has been destroyed. The ancient image of the Roman Empire has continued to form a sort of connection among the Members who had composed it; and since Rome dominated in another manner after the destruction of the Empire, from this double bond* there has remained a closer society among the Nations of Europe, where the center of the two Powers was, than in the other Parts of the world, whose various Peoples, too scattered to communicate with each other, moreover, do not have any meeting point at all.

Join to this the particular situation of Europe, more evenly populated, more evenly fertile, better united in all its parts; the continuous mingling of interests that the bonds of blood and affairs of commerce, the arts, colonies have given the Sovereigns; the multitude of rivers and the variety of their flow, which makes all communication easy; the unstable mood of the Inhabitants, which leads them ceaselessly to travel and frequently to take them to each other; the invention of the Printing Press and the general taste for Letters, which has given them a community of studies and of knowledge; finally the multitude and smallness of the States, which, joined to the needs of luxury and to the diversity of climates, makes each of them always necessary to the others. All these causes joined together form out of Europe, not merely an ideal collection of Peoples who have nothing in common but a name like Asia or Africa, but a real society which has its Religion, its morals, its customs and even its laws, which none of the Peoples who compose it can set aside without soon causing disturbances.

To see, on the other hand, perpetual dissensions, brigandage, usurpations, revolts, wars, murders which daily despoil this respectable abode of the Wise, this brilliant sanctuary of the Sciences and the Arts; to consider our fine speeches and our horrible deeds, so much humanity in maxims and cruelty in actions, such a gentle Religion and such bloody intolerance, a Politics so wise in Books and so harsh in practice, such beneficent Leaders and such wretched Peoples, such moderate Governments and such cruel wars: one hardly knows how to reconcile these strange contradictions; and that so-called fraternity of the Peoples of Europe seems to be only a term of mockery in order to express their mutual animosity ironically.

Nevertheless, in this, things are only following their natural course;

* Respect for the Roman Empire has survived its power so much that many Jurisconsults have raised the question of whether the Emperor of Germany was not the natural Sovereign of the world; and Bartholus has gone so far as to treat as a heretic anyone who dared to doubt it. The books of the Canonists are full of similar decisions about the temporal authority of the Roman Church.[12]

every society without laws or Leaders, every union formed or maintained by chance, must necessarily degenerate into quarrel and dissension at the first change in circumstances that happens; the ancient union of the Peoples of Europe has complicated their interests and their rights in a thousand ways; they touch each other at so many points, that the slightest motion of some cannot fail to collide with the others; the more intimate their relations are the more fatal their divisions are; and their frequent quarrels are almost as cruel as civil wars.

Let us agree, then, that the relative state of the Powers of Europe is properly speaking a state of war, and that all the partial Treaties among some of these Powers are rather momentary Truces than genuine Peace; either because these Treaties commonly have no guarantee other than the contracting Parties, or because the rights of each of them are never radically settled, and because these badly extinguished rights, or the claims that take their place among Powers who do not acknowledge any Superior will infallibly be sources of new wars, as soon as other circumstances give new forces to the Claimants.

Moreover, since the public right of Europe is not at all established or authorized in concert, has no general principles, and constantly changes in accordance with times and places, it is full of contradictory rules which can be reconciled only by the right of the stronger; so that reason, without any secure guide, always yielding to personal interest in doubtful matters, war would still be inevitable, even if everyone would like to be just. All one can do with good intentions is to decide these sorts of affairs by the route of arms, or to lull them by means of transitory Treaties; but soon, to the occasions that stir up the same quarrels again, are joined others which modify them; everything grows confused, everything becomes complicated; one no longer sees to the bottom of things; usurpation passes for right, weakness for injustice; and amidst this continuous disorder, each finds himself insensibly so strongly displaced, that if one could get back to solid and primitive right, there would be few Sovereigns in Europe who would not have to give back everything they have.[13]

Another seed of war, more hidden but no less real, is that things do not change their form in changing their nature; that States hereditary in fact, remain elective in appearance; that there are Parliaments, or national Estates in Monarchies, hereditary Leaders in Republics; that one Power dependent on another still preserves an appearance of freedom; that not all Peoples subjected to the same power are governed by the same laws; that the order of succession is different in various States with the same Sovereign; so that each Government always tends to be corrupted without it being possible to prevent this progression. These are the general and particular causes that unite us in order to destroy us, and make us write such a fine social doctrine with our hands always stained with human blood.

Once causes of the evil are known, the remedy, if it exists, is adequately indicated by them. Everyone sees that every society is formed by common interests; that every division is born from opposed interests; that since a thousand fortuitous events can change and modify both of them, as soon as there is a society, a compulsory force is necessary, which orders and concerts its Members' movements, in order to give the common interests and reciprocal engagements the solidity they cannot have by themselves.

It would be a great error, moreover, to hope that this violent state could ever change by the force of things alone, and without the aid of art. The system of Europe has precisely the degree of solidity that can maintain it in a perpetual agitation, without overturning it completely; and if our ills might not be increasing, even less can they end, because every great revolution is impossible from now on.

In order to give this the necessary evidence, let us begin by casting a general glance on the present condition of Europe. The position of the mountains, seas, and rivers that serve as the borders of the Nations that inhabit it seem to have settled the number and extent of these Nations; and one can say that the political order of this Part of the world is, in certain regards, Nature's work.

In fact, let us not think that this much vaunted equilibrium has been established by anyone, and that anyone has done anything on purpose to preserve it: one finds that it exists; and those who do not feel themselves to have enough weight to break it, cover their particular intentions with the pretext of maintaining it.[14] But whether one thinks about it or not, this equilibrium exists, and needs nothing outside itself to be preserved, without anyone meddling in it; and if it were broken for a moment from one side, it would soon reestablish itself on another: so that, whether the Princes who are accused of aspiring to universal Monarchy really did aspire to it, in this they showed more ambition than genius; for how can one envisage this plan for a moment without soon seeing its ridiculousness? How could one not feel that there is no Potentate in Europe sufficiently superior to the others ever to be able to become their master? All Conquerors who have brought about revolutions always presented themselves with unexpected forces, or with foreign and differently hardened troops to Peoples who were either unarmed or divided, or without discipline; but where would a European Prince take up unexpected forces in order to overpower all the others, as long as the most powerful among them is such a small part of the whole, and they have such a great vigilance together? Will he have more troops than them all? He cannot, either he will only be ruined sooner by having them, or his troops will be worse because of their great number. Will he have more hardened ones? He will have fewer of them in proportion. Moreover, discipline is just about the same everywhere, or will become so presently. Will he have more money? Its sources are common, and money has never made great conquests. Will he make a sudden invasion? Famine or fortified places will stop him at every step. Will he want to make himself bigger step-by-step? He gives his enemies the way to unite in order to resist him; time, money, and men, will not delay in failing him. Will he divide the other Powers in order to conquer one of them by means of another? Europe's maxims make this Policy vain; and the most limited Prince will not fall into this trap. Finally, since none of them is able to have exclusive resources, in the long run the resistance is equal to the effort; and time soon repairs the brusque accidents of fortune, if not for each Prince in particular, at least for the general constitution.

Does anyone want to assume now an agreement of two or three Potentates for subjugating all the rest? Together these three Potentates, whoever they might be, will not make up half of Europe. Then the other half will certainly unite against them; they will then have to conquer something stronger than themselves. I add that the intentions[15] of some are too opposed to those of the others, and that too great a jealousy reigns among them for them to be able even to form such a plan: I also add that, if they did form it, if they put it into execution, and they did have some success, this very success would be seeds of discord for the Conquering allies; because it would be impossible for the advantages to be divided in such a way that each would be equally satisfied by his share; and the least happy would soon oppose[16] the progress of the others who, for a similar reason, would not delay in becoming divided themselves. I doubt that since the world has existed, three or even two great Powers have ever been seen to be well united in subjugating others without falling out over the contingents or the shares, and without soon giving new resources to the weak by means of their disagreement. Thus, whatever assumption is made, it is not likely that henceforth either a Prince or a League can change the state of things among us considerably and durably.

This is not to say that the Alps, the Rhine, the Sea, the Pyrenees are insurmountable obstacles to ambition; but these obstacles are supported by other ones that strengthen them, or bring States back to the same boundaries when momentary efforts have set them aside. What forms the true support of the system of Europe is certainly in part the interplay of negotiations, which almost always cancel each other out; but this system has another even more solid prop; and this prop is the Germanic Body, placed almost at the center of Europe. which keeps all the other parts in check, and perhaps serves to maintain its Neighbors even more than its own members: a Body formidable to Foreigners by its extent, by the number and valor of its Peoples; but useful to all by its constitution, which, depriving it of the means and the will of conquering anything, makes it into a stumbling block for Conquerors. In spite of the defects of this constitution of the Empire, it is certain that, as long as it exists, the equilibrium of Europe will never be broken, no Potentate will have to fear being dethroned by another,[17] and that, among us, the Treaty of Westphalia[18] will perhaps always be the basis of the political system. Thus, public Right, which the Germans study with such care, is even more important than they think, and is not only German public Right, but in certain regards, that of the whole of Europe.

But if the present system is unshakable, by that very fact it is stormier; for, among the European Powers there is an action and a reaction which, without completely dislodging them, maintains them in a continuous agitation; and their efforts are always vain and always being reborn, like those waves in the sea, which constantly agitate its surface without ever changing its level; so that Peoples are ceaselessly laid waste, without any tangible profit for Sovereigns.

It would be easy for me to deduce the same truth from the particular interests of all the Courts of Europe; for I would easily show that these interests cross each other in a way that keeps all of their forces mutually in check; but since ideas about commerce and money have produced a sort of political fanaticism, they cause the apparent interests of all Princes to change so promptly that one cannot establish any stable maxim based on their true interests, because now everything depends on some economic systems, most of them extremely bizarre, which run through the heads of Ministers. However that might be, Commerce, which daily tends to put itself into equilibrium, depriving certain Powers of the exclusive advantage they used to draw from it, at the same time deprives them of one of the great means they used to have for laying down the law for the others.[19]*

If I have insisted on the equal distribution of force which results from the present constitution in Europe, this was to deduce from it a consequence important for the establishment of a general association; for, in order to form a solid and durable confederation, it is necessary to put all its Members into such a mutual dependence that none might be in a position to resist all the others by itself, and that particular association which could harm the great one, may encounter sufficient obstacles in it to impede their execution:[21] without which the confederation would be vain; and each would be really independent under an apparent subjection. Now, if these obstacles are such as I have just said them to be, now that all the Powers are completely free to form Leagues and offensive Treaties among themselves, judge what they would be if there were a great armed League, always ready to forestall those who wished to undertake to destroy or resist it. This is enough to show that such an association would not consist in vain deliberations which each could resist with impunity; but that an effective power would be born from it, capable of forcing the ambitious to keep themselves within the limits of the general Treaty.

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*Things have changed since I wrote this; but my principle will always be true. It is, for example, very easy to foresee that twenty years from now, England, with all its glory, will be ruined, and moreover will have lost its remaining freedom. Everyone asserts that agriculture is flourishing on that Island, but I bet that it is dying. London grows larger every day, therefore the Kingdom is becoming depopulated. The English want to be conquerors, therefore it will not be long before they are slaves.[20]

Three incontestable truths result from this exposition. First, that except for the Turk, there reigns among all the Peoples of Europe a social relation, imperfect, but closer than the general and loose knots of humanity. Second, that the imperfection of this society renders the condition of those who compose it worse than the privation of all society among them would. Third, that these first bonds, which render this society harmful, at the same time render it easy to perfect; so that all its Members could draw their happiness from what at present constitutes their misery, and change the state of war that reigns among them into an eternal peace.

Now let us see how this great work, begun by fortune, can be completed by reason; and how the free and voluntary society which unites all the European States, taking on the force and the solidity of a true Body politic, can change itself into a real confederation. It is unquestionable that by giving to this association the perfection that it lacked, such an establishment will destroy its abuse, will extend its advantages, and will force all parties to cooperate for the common good; but for that this confederation must be so general that no considerable Power decline it; that it have a judicial Tribunal, which can establish laws and rule that must oblige all the members; that it have a compulsory and coercive force to constrain each State to submit to the common deliberations, either to act or to abstain; in sum, that it be firm and durable, so as to keep the Members from separating from it at their will as soon as they believe they see their particular interest contrary to the general interest. There are the certain signs from which one will recognize that the institution is wise, useful and unbreakable: now it is a question of extending this assumption in order to seek by analysis what effects should result form it, what means are suited for establishing it, and what reasonable hope one can have of putting it into execution.

From time to time there are formed among us sorts of general Diets under the name of congress, where they solemnly proceed from all the States of Europe in order to return the same way; where they assemble in order to say nothing; where all public business is treated in private; where they deliberate in common about whether the table will be round or square, whether the room will have more or fewer doors, whether such and such a Plenipotentiary will have his face or his back turned toward the window, whether such and such other one will travel two inches more or less in a visit, and about a thousand questions of similar importance, uselessly debated for three centuries and certainly very worthy of occupying the Political Thinkers of ours.

It can happen sometime that the Members of one of these assemblies might be endowed with common sense, it is not even impossible that they might sincerely want the public good; and from reasons that will be deduced below, one can also conceive that, after having smoothed down many difficulties, they will have an order from their respective Sovereigns to sign the general confederation that I assume to be contained summarily in the five following Articles.[22]

By the first, the contracting Sovereigns will establish among themselves a perpetual and irrevocable alliance, and will name Plenipotentiaries to hold in a determined place, a permanent Diet or Congress, in which all the differences of the contracting Parties will be settled and terminated by means of arbitration or of judgment.

By the second, there will be specified the number of Sovereigns whose Plenipotentiaries will have a vote in the Diet, those who will be invited to assent to the Treaty; the order, the time, and the manner in which the presidency will pass from one to the other by equal intervals; finally the relative quota of contributions for providing for the common expenses, and the manner of raising them.

By the third, the confederation will guarantee to each of its Members the possession and the government of all the States it possesses at present, likewise elective or hereditary succession, as the whole is established by the fundamental laws of each country; and to suppress all at once the source of contentions that are ceaselessly reborn, it will be agreed to take the present possession and the last Treaties as the basis of all the mutual rights of the contracting Powers; renouncing forever and reciprocally all other anterior claims; aside from future contentious successions, and other rights accruing, which will all be settled by the arbitration of the

Diet, without anyone being permitted to obtain compensation by force, nor ever to take up arms against each other, under any pretext whatsoever.

By the fourth, will be specified the cases in which every Ally in breach of the Treaty, will be put under the ban of Europe, and proscribed as a public enemy; namely if he refuses to execute the judgments of the great Alliance, if he makes preparations for war, if he negotiates Treaties contrary to the confederation, if he takes up arms to resist it, or to attack one of the Allies.

It will also be agreed by the same Article, that they will arm and act offensively, jointly and at common expense, against every State under the ban of Europe, until it has laid down its arms, executed the judgments and rulings of the Diet, given reparations for wrongs, reimbursed the expenses, and given compensation for the preparations for war contrary to the Treaty.

Finally, by the fifth, at the instructions of their courts the Plenipotentiaries of the European Body will always have the power to form in the Diet, by the plurality of votes for the provisional, and by three-quarters of the votes five years afterward for the definitive, the rules that they will judge important to procure for the European Republic and for each of its Members, all possible advantages; but nothing of these five fundamental articles will ever be changed except by the unanimous consent of the Confederates.

These five Articles, summarized this way and couched as general rules, are, I am not unaware, subject to a thousand petty difficulties, several of which will require long clarifications; but petty difficulties are easily removed at need; and they are not an issue in an undertaking of the importance of this one. When it is a question of details of the public order of the Congress, a thousand obstacles will be found, and ten thousand ways of removing them. Here it is a question of examining, by the nature of things, whether the undertaking is possible or not. One would get lost in volumes of trifles if it was necessary to foresee everything and respond to everything. By keeping to incontestable principles, one must not try to satisfy all minds, nor resolve all objections, nor say how everything will be done: it is enough to show that everything can be done.

What must be examined, then, to judge this system? Only two questions; for I do not wish to offer the reader the insult of proving to him that in general the state of Peace is preferable to the state of War.

The first question is, whether the proposed confederation would proceed surely to its goal, and would be adequate for giving Europe a solid and perpetual Peace.

The second, whether it is in the interest of Sovereigns to establish this confederation, and to purchase a constant Peace at this price.

When the general and particular utility have been demonstrated this way, one no longer sees in the reason of things what cause could prevent the effect of an establishment which depends only on the will of the Interested Parties.

To discuss the first article first, let us apply here what I said above about the general system of Europe and about the common effort which circumscribes each Power roughly within its limits, and does not permit it entirely to crush those of others. In order to make my arguments on this point more perceptible, I here join the list of the nineteen powers that are assumed to compose the European Republic; so that each having an equal vote, there would be nineteen votes in the Diet;

Namely:

The Emperor of the Romans.
The Emperor of Russia.
The King of France.
The King of Spain.
The King of England.
The Estates General.
The King of Denmark.
Sweden.
Poland.
The King of Portugal.
The Sovereign of Rome.
The King of Prussia.
The Elector of Bavaria and his Co-associates.
The Palatine Elector and his Co-associates.
The Swiss and their Co-associates.
The Ecclesiastical Electors and their Associates.
The Republic of Venice and its Co-associates.
The King of Naples.
The King of Sardinia.[23]

Several less significant Sovereigns, such as the Republic of Genoa, the Dukes of Modena and of Parma, and others omitted from this list will be joined to the less powerful in order to form an association, and along with them will have a right of suffrage, similar to the *votum curiatum*[24] of the Counts of the Empire. It is useless to give that enumeration more precisely here, because, up to the execution of the plan, from one moment to another accidents can crop up based on which it would be necessary to remake it, but which would not change anything at the basis of the system.

It is necessary only to cast a glance at this list to see with the utmost obviousness that it is not possible, either for any of the Powers that compose it to be in a condition to resist all the others united in a body, or for any partial League to be formed capable of having its own way against the great confederation.

For how could this League be formed? Would it be among the more Powerful? We have shown that it could not be durable; and it is very easy now to see also that it is incompatible with the particular system of each great Power and with the interests inseparable from its constitution. Would it be between one large State and several small ones? But the other large States united to the confederation will soon crush the League: And one must feel that, since the great alliance is always united and armed, it will be easy for it, by virtue of the fourth article, to forestall and stifle in advance every partial and seditious alliance that might tend to disturb the Peace and public order. Look at what happens in the Germanic Body, in spite of the abuses of its Public Order, and the extreme inequality of its Members: is there a single one of them, even among the most Powerful, which would dare to expose itself to the ban of the Empire, by openly wounding its constitution,[25] unless it believed it had good reasons not to fear that the Empire would want to act against it in earnest?

Thus I hold it as demonstrated that, once it is established, the European Diet will never have to fear rebellion, and, although some abuses might be introduced into it, they can never reach the point of evading the object of the institution. It remains to be seen whether that object will be well fulfilled by the institution itself.

For that, let us consider the motives that lead Princes to take up arms. These motives are, either to make conquests, or to defend themselves from a Conqueror, or to weaken a too powerful neighbor, or to uphold one's attacked rights, or to end a dispute that one has been unable to conclude amicably, or finally to fulfill the engagements of a treaty. There is neither cause nor pretext for war that one cannot classify under one of these six headings; now it is evident that none of the six can exist in this new state of things.

First, conquests must be renounced, because of the impossibility of making any, it being understood that one is certain of being stopped in one's path by greater forces than those one can have; so that by risking the loss of everything, one is powerless to gain anything. An ambitious Prince who wants to expand in Europe does two things. He begins by fortifying himself with good alliances, then he attempts to catch his enemy unprepared. But separate alliances will be useless against a stronger and always existing alliance; and since no Prince any longer has any pretext for arming, he will not be able to do so without being noticed, forestalled, and punished by the always armed confederation.

The same reason which deprives each Prince of all hope for conquests, at the same time deprives him of all fear of being attacked; and not only are his States, being guaranteed by all of Europe, as secure for him as their possessions are to the citizens in a well-ordered Country, but even more than if he were their sole and particular defender, in the same relation that all Europe is stronger than he is alone.

One no longer has any reason to want to weaken a neighbor from whom one no longer has anything to fear; and one is not even tempted to do so, when one has no hope of succeeding.

With regard to the maintenance of his rights, first it must be remarked that an infinite number of quibbles and obscure and tangled claims will all be annihilated by the third article of the confederation, which definitively settles all the reciprocal rights of the allied Sovereigns at their present possession. Thus all possible demands and claims will become clear for the future, and will be judged in the Diet to the extent that they can arise: add that if someone attacks my rights, I must maintain them by the same route. Now they cannot be attacked by arms, without incurring the ban of the Diet. Thus I no longer need to defend them by arms; one should say the same thing about insults, wrongs, reparations, and all the unforeseen disputes that can arise between two Sovereigns; and the same power that must defend their rights must also redress their grievances.

As to the final article, the solution leaps to one's eyes. First one sees that, no longer having any aggressor to fear, one no longer needs any defensive treaty, and that, since one could not make one more solid and more secure than that of the great confederation, all others will be useless, illegitimate, and consequently nullified.

Thus it is not possible that, once established, the confederation can leave any seed of war among the confederates, and that the object of perpetual Peace not be precisely fulfilled by the execution of the proposed system.

Now it remains for us to examine the other question which regards the advantage of the contracting parties; for one feels very well that it would be in vain to make the public interest speak to the prejudice of private interest. To prove that Peace is in general preferable to war, is to say nothing to someone who believes he has reasons to prefer war to Peace; and to show him the means for establishing a durable Peace is only to stir him up to oppose it.

In effect, it will be said, you are depriving Sovereigns of the right of carrying out justice for themselves; that is to say of being unjust when it pleases them; you are depriving them of the power to expand at the expense of their neighbors;[26] you are making them renounce[27] that display of power and of terror with which they love to frighten the world, that glory of conquests, from which they draw their honor; finally you are forcing them to be equitable and peaceful. What will be the compensations for so many privations?[28]

I would not dare respond along with the Abbé de Saint-Pierre:[29] That the genuine glory of Princes consists in procuring the public utility, and their Subjects' happiness; that all their interests are[30] subordinate to their reputation; and that the reputation that one acquires among the wise is measured by the good one does for men; that, since perpetual Peace is the greatest undertaking that has ever been done, it is the most capable of covering its Author with immortal glory; that, since this same undertaking is also the most useful for Peoples, it is also the most honorable for Sovereigns; above all the only one that is not soiled with blood, rapine, tears, curses; and finally that the surest way to distinguish oneself in the crowd of Kings is to work for the public happiness. In the chambers of Ministers these speeches[31] have covered the Author and his projects with ridicule: but let us not despise his arguments as they do; and whatever the virtues of Princes might be, let us speak about their interests.

All the Powers of Europe have rights or claims against each other; these rights are of such a nature that they cannot ever be perfectly clarified; because there is no common and constant rule for judging them, and they are often founded on equivocal or uncertain facts. The disputes they cause cannot ever be irreversibly terminated both for lack of a competent arbitrator and because as the occasion arises each Prince unscrupulously revokes the concessions that were torn from him by force in treaties by the more powerful, or after unfortunate wars. Thus it is an error to consider only one's claims upon others, and to forget those of others upon us, when neither side has either more justice or more advantage in the means for enforcing these reciprocal claims. As soon as everything depends on fortune, present possession is of such a value that wisdom does not allow it to be risked against the profit to come, even with an equal chance; and everyone blames a well-off man, who, in the hope of doubling his possessions, dares to risk them at a throw of dice. But we have shown that even in the present system in projects of expansion each must find a resistance superior to his effort; from which it follows that the more powerful having no reason to play, nor the weaker any hope of profit, it is a good for all to renounce what they desire in order to secure what they possess.

Let us consider the consumption of men, money, forces of all sorts, the exhaustion into which the most fortunate war throws any State at all; and let us compare this harm to the advantages it takes from it, we shall find that it often loses when it believes it is gaining, and the winner, always weaker than before the war, has only the consolation of seeing the defeated more weakened than he is; also this advantage[32] is less real than apparent, because the superiority one might have acquired over one's adversary, one has lost at the same time against the neutral Powers, who—without changing condition—are strengthened in relation to us from all our weakening.

If all Kings have not yet recovered from the folly of conquests, at least it seems that the wisest are beginning to glimpse that they sometimes cost more than they are worth. Without entering in that regard into a thousand distinctions that would lead us too far, one can say in general that a Prince, who, in order to push back his borders, loses as many of his former Subjects, as he acquires of new ones, weakens himself while growing larger; because with a larger space to defend he does not have any more defenders. Now, one cannot be unaware that by the manner in which war is waged today, the slightest of the depopulations it produces is the one caused in the armies: that is the apparent and tangible loss; but at the same time in the whole State there is a more serious and more irreparable loss than that of the men who die, from the ones who are not born, from the increase in taxes, from the interruption in commerce, from the forsaking of the countryside, from the abandonment of agriculture; this evil that one does not notice at all at first, makes itself cruelly felt later on:[33] and that is when one is astonished at being so weak, as a result of having made oneself so powerful.

What makes conquests even less advantageous is that it is now known how one can double and triple one's power, not only without extending one's territory, but sometimes by contracting it as the Emperor Hadrian very wisely did. It is known that it is men alone who make the strength of Kings; and it is a proposition that follows from what I have just said, that of two States which feed the same number of inhabitants, the one that occupies a smaller extent of land is really the more powerful. It is then from good Laws, from a wise public order, from large economic views, that a judicious Sovereign is certain of increasing his strength, without leaving anything to chance. The genuine conquests he makes over his neighbors are the more useful establishments he forms in his own States; and all the additional Subjects that are born to him are so many enemies that he kills. It must not be objected to me here that I am proving too much, in that, if things were as I represent them, each having a genuine interest in not entering into war, and private interests being united to the common interest for maintaining the Peace, this Peace ought to be established by itself, and last forever without any confederation; this would be making an extremely bad argument in the present constitution; for, although it might be much better for all always to be at Peace, the common defect of security in that regard, makes it so that each, being unable to be assured of avoiding war, at least tries to begin it at his advantage when the occasion favors it, and to anticipate a neighbor, who would not fail to anticipate him in his turn, upon the opposite occasion; so that many wars, even offensive ones, are unjust precautions for making secure one's own possession, rather than means of usurping that of others. However salutary the maxims of public good might generally be, it is certain that in not considering anything but the object that is considered in Politics, and often even in Morality, they become pernicious to the one who persists in practicing them with everyone, when no one practices them with him.

I have nothing to say about the display of weapons, because stripped of solid foundations, of either fear or hope, this display is a children's game, and Kings ought not to play with dolls. I do not say anything about the glory of Conquerors either, because if there were some monsters who are grieved solely at having no one to massacre, one must not speak reasonably to them,[34] but deprive them of the means of exercising their murderous rage. The guarantee for the third article having forestalled all solid reasons for war, once cannot have any motive for kindling it against anyone else which could not provide just as much of one for someone else to do so against ourselves; and to free oneself from a risk in which each is alone against all is to gain a great deal.

As for the dependence each will have upon the common Tribunal, it is very clear that it will decrease none of the rights of sovereignty, but on the contrary will strengthen them, and make them more certain by the third article, by guaranteeing to each, not only his States against all foreign invasions, but also his authority against all rebellion of his Subjects; thus Princes will not be any less absolute for it, and their Crown will be more certain for it: so that by subjecting oneself to the judgment of the Diet in their disputes of equal to equal, and depriving oneself of the dangerous power of seizing the property of someone else, they will only be securing for themselves their genuine rights, and renouncing those they do not have. Moreover, there is a great deal of difference between depending on someone else, or only on a Body of which one is a member and of which each is the leader in his turn; for in this latter case one does nothing but secure one's freedom by the pledges one gives for it; it would be alienated in the hands of a master, but it is strengthened in those of Associates.

This is confirmed by the example of the Germanic Body; for although in many regards the sovereignty of its members is weakened by its constitution, and they are consequently in a less favorable case than those of the European Body would be, nevertheless there is not a single one of them, however jealous it might be of its authority, that would want, if it could, to be certain of an absolute independence by detaching itself from the Empire.

Notice, in addition, that since the Germanic Body has a permanent Leader, the authority of this Leader must necessarily constantly tend toward usurpation; which cannot happen in the same way in the European Diet, where the presidency ought to alternate, and without regard to the inequality of power.

To all these considerations is joined another, even much more important for people as greedy for money as Princes always are; that is an additional great facility for having a lot of it, from all the advantages that will result for their Peoples and for them, from a continuous Peace, and from the excessive expense that is spared by the reform of the military condition, of those multitudes of fortresses, and of that enormous quantity of troops that absorb their revenues, and every day become more burdensome to their Peoples and to themselves. I know that it does not suit all Sovereigns to suppress all their troops, and not to have any public force in hand to stifle an unexpected riot, or to repel a sudden invasion.* I also know that a contingent will have to be provided for the confederation, both for guarding the borders of Europe and for the provision of the confederative army intended to enforce, at need, the Diet's decrees. But all these expenses being made, and the extraordinary one of Wars being suppressed forever, there would still remain more than half the ordinary military expense to divide between the relief of the Subjects and the coffers of the Prince; so that the People would pay much less; so that the Prince, much richer, would be in a condition to stimulate Commerce, Agriculture, the Arts, to make useful establishments, which would further increase the People's wealth and his own; and with this the State would be in a much more perfect security than the one it can draw from its armies, and from all that display of war which does not fail to drain it in the bosom of Peace.

Perhaps someone will say that the border Countries of Europe would then be in a much more disadvantageous position, and might equally have wars to support, either with the Turk, or with the African Pirates, or with the Tartars.

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*Other objections present themselves here; but since the Author of the Plan did not make them, I have transferred them to the examination.

To that I respond, 1st, that these Countries are in the same circumstance today, and that, consequently, for them this would not be a positive disadvantage to cite, but only one advantage less, and an inevitable inconvenience to which their situation exposes them. 2nd, That, freed from all anxiety on the side of Europe, they would be much more in a condition to resist outside, 3rd, that the suppression of all fortresses in the interior of Europe, and the expenses necessary for their maintenance, would put the confederation in a condition to establish a large number of them on the borders, without being a burden on the confederates. 4th, That these fortresses, built, maintained, and garrisoned at the common expense, would be so much security and means of saving for the Border-Powers, whose States they would guarantee. 5th, That the troops of the confederation, distributed on the boundaries of Europe, would always be ready to repel the aggressor. 6th, Finally, that such a formidable Body as the European Republic would remove from Foreigners the desire to attack any of its members; as the Germanic Body, infinitely less powerful, does not fail to be powerful enough to make itself respected by its neighbors, and effectively to protect all the Princes who compose it.

One might also say that, since the Europeans will no longer have any wars among themselves, the military Art would imperceptibly fall into oblivion; that the troops would lose their courage and their discipline; that there would no longer be either Generals or Soldiers there, and that Europe would remain at the mercy of the first comer.

I respond that one of two things will happen: either Europe's neighbors will attack it and wage war on it, or they will stand in fear of the confederation, and will leave it in peace.

In the first case; there are the occasions for cultivating military genius and talents, for hardening[35] and forming troops; in this regard the armies of the confederation will be the school of Europe, one will go to the border to learn war; in the bosom of Europe one will enjoy Peace; and by this means one will unite the advantages of both. Does anyone believe that it is always necessary to fight at home to become a warrior, and are the French less brave because the Provinces of Tourain and Anjou are not at war against each other?

In the second case, it will be impossible to become hardened, it is true, but it will no longer be necessary; for what good is practicing war in order not to wage it against anyone? Which is better, to cultivate a harmful Art, or to make it useless: If there were a secret for enjoying a health not subject to deterioration, would there be any good sense in rejecting it so as not to deprive Doctors of the opportunity for acquiring experience? It remains to be seen in this parallel which of the two Arts is more salutary in itself, and better deserves to be preserved.

Let us not be threatened with a sudden invasion; it is well known that Europe has none to fear at all, and that this first comer will never come. It is no longer the time of those irruptions of Barbarians who seemed to fall from the clouds. Since we have been wandering around the whole surface of the earth with a curious eye, nothing can any longer reach us that has not been foreseen from very far away. There is no Power in the world that is now in a condition to threaten all of Europe; and if one ever does come, either we will have time to prepare, or we will at least be in more of a condition to resist it, being united into one body, than if it were necessary suddenly to end long contentions and to unite hastily.

We have just seen that, well weighed, all the pretended inconveniences of the state of confederation are reduced to nothing. Now we ask whether anyone on earth would dare to say as much about those that result from the present manner of settling the contentions between Prince and Prince by the right of the stronger, that is to say, of the state of public disorder and war necessarily engendered by the absolute and mutual independence of all Sovereigns in the imperfect society that reigns among them in Europe. So that one might be in a better condition to weigh these inconveniences, I am going to sum them up in a few words the contents of which I leave it up to the Reader to examine.

1. No secured right other than that of the stronger. 2. Continuous and inevitable changes of relations among Peoples, which keep any of them from being able to stabilize in its hands the strength it enjoys. 3. No perfect security at all, as long as Neighbors are not subjugated or annihilated. 4. General impossibility of annihilating them, considering that while subjugating the first ones, one finds more of them. 5. Immense precautions and expenses for keeping oneself on guard. 6. Lack of force and defense during minorities and revolts; for when the State is divided, who can support one of the Parts against the other? 7. Lack of security in mutual engagements. 8. No justice ever to hope for from anyone else, without immense expenses and losses, which do not always obtain it, and for which the disputed object only rarely compensates. 9. Inevitable risk of one's States, and sometimes of one's life, in the pursuit of one's rights. 10. Necessity of taking part, in spite of oneself, in one's Neighbors' quarrels, and of having war when one least wants it. 11. Interruption of Commerce and of public resources at the moment they are the most necessary. 12. Continuous danger from a powerful Neighbor, if one is weak; and from a league, if one is strong. 13. Finally, the uselessness of wisdom where fortune presides, continuous laying waste of Peoples, weakening of the State in successes and reversals, total impossibility of ever establishing a good Government, of counting on one's own possessions, and of making either oneself or others happy.

Let us recapitulate the advantages of European Arbitration for the confederated Princes in the same way.

1. Complete security, that their present and future contentions will always be concluded without any war; a security that is incomparably more useful for them than would be, for Private Individuals, that of never having a lawsuit.

2. Subjects of contestation removed or reduced to very insignificant things by the annihilation of all anterior claims, which will compensate for the renunciations, and will affirm the possessions.

3. Complete and perpetual security of the person of the Prince, of his Family, of his States, and of the order of succession settled by the laws of each country, both against the ambition of unjust and ambitious Pretenders, and against the revolts of rebel Subjects.

4. Perfect security of the execution of all reciprocal engagements between Prince and Prince, from the guarantee of the European Republic.

5. Perfect and perpetual freedom and security with regard to Commerce both from State to State and for each State in distant regions.

6. Total and perpetual suppression of their extraordinary military expenditure by land and by sea in time of war, and considerable diminution of their ordinary expenditure in time of peace.

7. Tangible progress of Agriculture and of population, the wealth of the State and the revenue of the Prince.

8. Ease of all the establishments that can increase the glory and the authority of the Sovereign, the public resources and the happiness of Peoples.

I leave, as I have already said, to the judgment of the Readers, the examination of all these articles and the comparison of the state of peace that results from the confederation, with the state of war that results from the European public disorder.

If we have reasoned well in the exposition of this Plan, it is demonstrated: first, that the establishment of perpetual Peace depends solely on the consent of the Sovereigns, and does not offer any difficulty at all to remove other than their resistance; second, that this establishment would be useful to them in every way, and that there is no comparison to make, even for them, between the inconveniences and the advantages; in the third place, that it is reasonable to assume that their will agrees with their interest; so that this establishment, once formed on the proposed plan, would be solid and durable, and would fulfill its object perfectly. Doubtless, this is not to say that the Sovereigns will adopt this Plan; (Who can answer for anyone else's reason?)[36] but only that they would adopt it if they consulted their true interests: for it should be well noted that we have not at all assumed men to be as they ought to be, good, generous, disinterested, and loving the public good out of humanity; but as they are, unjust, greedy, and preferring their self-interest to everything. The only thing that is assumed in them is sufficient reason to see what is useful to them, and enough courage to bring about their own happiness. Thus, if, in spite of all this, this Plan remains unexecuted, it is not because it is chimerical; it is because men are insane, and because it is a sort of folly to be wise in the midst of fools.

Fragment

While examining the constitution of the States that make up Europe I saw that some were too big to be able to be governed well, the others too small to be able to maintain themselves in independence, the infinite abuses that reign in all of them appeared to me difficult to forestall, but impossible to correct because the majority of these abuses are founded upon the very interest of those who could destroy them: I found that the connections which exist among all the powers would never leave any of them the time and the security necessary for recasting its constitution. Finally prejudices are so much against any sort of change[37] that, unless one had the force ready to hand, one would have to be as simple as the Abbé de Saint-Pierre to propose the slightest innovation in any government at all.

Rescript of the Emperor of China on the Occasion of the Plan for Perpetual Peace

By Voltaire

We the emperor of China, we have had introduced into our council of State the thousand and one pamphlets that are sold daily in the renowned village of Paris for the instruction of the universe. We have noticed, with an imperial satisfaction, that they print more thoughts, or modes of thinking, or thoughtless expressions in said village situated on the little stream of the Seine, containing around five hundred thousand amusing people or people wishing to be amusing, than they make pieces of porcelain in our city of Kingtzin on the Yellow River which city possesses double the inhabitants, who are not half as amusing as those of Paris.

We have attentively read the pamphlet of our beloved Jean-Jacques, citizen of Geneva, which Jean-Jacques has written the abstract of a *Plan of Perpetual Peace* by the bonze Saint-Pierre, which bonze Saint-Pierre had abstracted it from a clerk of the mandarin marquis de Rosny, Duke de Sully, an excellent economist, who had abstracted it from the depth of his brain.

We have been keenly afflicted to see that in the said abstract edited by our beloved Jean-Jacques, where are set out the easy means for giving Europe a perpetual peace, the remainder of the universe—which must always be in view in all these pamphlets—has been forgotten. We knew that the monarchy of France, which is the foremost of monarchies; the anarchy of Germany, which is the foremost of anarchies; Spain, England, Poland, Sweden, which are, according to their historians, each in its kind, the foremost power of the universe, are all required to accede to the treaty of Jean-Jacques. We have been edified to see that our dear cousin the empress of all Russia was similarly required to furnish her contingent. But great was our imperial surprise when we searched in vain for our name in the list. We judged that, being such a near neighbor of our dear cousin, we should have been named along with her; that the Great Turk neighbor of Hungary and of Naples, the king of Persia neighbor of the Great Turk, the Great Mogol neighbor of the king of Persia, similarly have the same rights, and that it would be doing a flagrant injustice to Japan to forget it in the general confederation.

We thought by ourselves, after the advice of our council, that if the Great Turk attacked Hungary, if the European, or Europeic, or Europaic[38] Diet did not find it had ready cash at that time; if, while the queen of Hungary opposed the Turk at Belgrade, the king of Prussia marched to Vienna; if the Russian attacked Silesia at that very time; if the French then threw themselves upon the Netherlands, England upon France, the king of Sardinia upon Italy, Spain upon the Moors, or the Moors upon Spain, these little combinations could disturb the perpetual peace.

Thus our accession was of an absolute necessity, we have resolved to cooperate with all our forces for the general good, which is evidently the goal of every emperor, as of all pamphlet writers.

To this effect, having noticed that they had forgotten to name the city in which the plenipotentiaries of the universe should assemble, we have resolved to build one without delay. We have had introduced to us the plan of an engineer of His Majesty the king of Narsingue,[39] who proposed, several years ago, to bore a hole to the center of the earth to carry out experiments of physics there; our intention being to perfect this idea, we will have the globe pierced from end to end. And since the most eminent philosophers of the village of Paris on the stream called the Seine believe that the core of the globe is glass, which they have written, and which they would never have written if they had not been certain of it, our city of the diet of the universe will be entirely of crystal, and will continuously receive light from one end or another; so that the conduct of the plenipotentiaries will always be enlightened.

In order to solidify better the work of perpetual peace, we shall bring together for a conference in our transparent city, our holy father the great lama, our holy father the great daïri, our holy father the mufti, and our holy father the pope, who will all be easily in accord thanks to the exhortations of some Portuguese Jesuits. We will end all at once the ancient proceedings of ecclesiastical and secular justice, of the revenue and of the people, the nobles and the plebeians, of the sword and of the robe, of masters and valets, of husband and wives, of authors and readers.

Our plenipotentiaries will enjoin all the sovereigns never to have any quarrel, under pain of a pamphlet from Jean-Jacques for the first time, and the ban of the universe for the second.

We ask the republic of Geneva and that of San Marino to name, jointly with us, Master Jean-Jacques as first president of the diet, considering that the said Master, having already judged kings and republics without being asked to, will judge them just as well when he is at the head of the chamber; and our opinion is that he should regularly be paid his honorarium[40] from the net product of the transactions of tax-farms, lottery tickets, and those of the Paris India Company, which are the best bills payable in the universe. Praying Tien[41] that he have in his holy care the said Jean-Jacques, as also Master Volmar, the damsel Julie and her false seed.

Given at Pekin, the 1st of the month of Hi han, the year 1898436500
of the foundation of our monarchy.

Judgment of the Plan for Perpetual Peace

Since the plan for perpetual peace is by its object the one most worthy of occupying a good man, it was also, of all of the Abbé de St. Pierre's, the one which he meditated the longest and which he followed with the most stubbornness: for one can hardly give any other name to that missionary zeal which never left him on this point, in spite of the evident impossibility of success, the ridicule to which he abandoned himself from day to day, and the disgust he had to suffer ceaselessly. It seems that this healthy soul,[42] attentive only to the public good, measured the efforts it gave to things solely upon the greatness of their utility without letting itself be rebuffed by the obstacles or ever considering personal interest.

If ever a moral truth was demonstrated, it seems to me that it is the general and particular utility of this plan. The advantages that result from its execution both for each Prince and for each people, and for all Europe are immense, clear, undeniable; there can be nothing more solid and more precise than the arguments by which the author establishes them. To make his European Republic real for a single day would be enough to make it last forever, so much would each find by experience his private profit in the common good. Nevertheless, these same Princes who would defend it with all their forces if it existed would now be opposed to its execution in the same way and would keep it from being established as infallibly as they would keep it from passing away. Thus at first the Abbé de St. Pierre's work on perpetual peace appears useless for producing it and superfluous for preserving it; thus some impatient Reader will say it is a vain speculation. No, it is a solid and well thought out book, and it is very important that it exist.

Let us begin by examining the difficulties raised by those who do not judge reasons by reason but only by results, and who have nothing to object against this plan other than that it has not been executed. In effect, they will doubtless say, if these advantages are so real why then haven't the sovereigns of Europe adopted it? Why do they neglect their own interest, if that interest is so well demonstrated to them? Does one see them otherwise rejecting means for increasing their revenues and their power? If this one were as good for that as is claimed, is it believable that they would be less eager for it than for all those that have been leading them astray for so long, and that they would prefer a thousand deceitful resources to an evident profit?

Without a doubt, that is believable; unless one assumes that their wisdom is equal to their ambition[43] and that the more strongly they desire their advantage, the better they see it; whereas it is the great punishment of the excess of amour-propre[44] always to have recourse to means that deceive it and the very ardor of the passions is almost always what diverts them from their goal. Let us distinguish, then, in politics as in morality, real interest from apparent interest; the first would be found in perpetual peace, that has been demonstrated in the *plan,* the second is found in the state of absolute independence which removes sovereigns from the empire of the law in order to subject them to that of fortune, like an insane pilot who, in order to make a show of a vain knowledge and command his sailors, would rather drift among rocks during the storm than tie down his vessel with anchors.

The entire occupation of Kings, or of those they charge with their functions, relates to only two objects, extending their domination abroad and rendering it more absolute at home. Every other intention, is either related to one of these two, or serves only as a pretext for them. Such are those of *public good,* of the *happiness of the subjects,* of the *glory of the nation,* words forever proscribed from chambers and so clumsily applied in public edicts that they never herald anything but disastrous orders and the people shudder in advance when their masters speak to them about their paternal cares.

Based on these two fundamental maxims, judge how Princes might receive a proposition which directly strikes at one and which is hardly more favorable to the other, for one feels very well that the government of each State is no less settled by the European Diet than its boundaries are,[45] that one cannot guarantee Princes against the revolt of subjects without guaranteeing the subjects against the Tyranny of the Princes at the same time and that otherwise the institution could not continue to exist. Now I ask whether there is in the world a single sovereign who, limited in this way forever in his dearest plans, would without indignation put up with the mere idea of seeing himself forced to be just, not only with Foreigners, but even with his own subjects.

Also it is easy to understand that, on the one hand, war and conquests and, on the other, the progression of Despotism mutually reinforce each other; that among a people of slaves one takes unlimited money and men for subjecting others, that reciprocally war provides a pretext for pecuniary extortions and another no less likely looking one for always having large armies for keeping the people in check. In sum, each sees well enough that conquering Princes wage war against their subjects at least as much as against their enemies and that the position of the conquerors is not any better than that of the conquered.[46] *I have beaten the Romans,* wrote Hannibal to the Carthaginians, *send me Troops; I have subjected Italy to contribution, send me money.* That is the significance of the Te Deums, the celebratory bonfires, and the cheerfulness of the People at the Triumphs of its masters.

As for the differences between Prince and Prince, can one hope to subject to a superior Tribunal men who dare to boast that they hold their power by their sword alone, and who even refer to God only because he is in heaven? In their quarrels, will Sovereigns subject themselves to judicial paths that all the rigor of the Laws have never been able to force private individuals to accept in theirs? An offended simple Gentleman disdains bringing his complaint to the Tribunal of the marshals of France,[47] and you want a King to bring his to the European Diet? There is also this difference that the former offends against the laws and risks his life doubly, while the latter risks hardly anything but his subjects; that in taking up arms he makes use of an accepted right of the whole human race and for which he claims to be accountable only to God alone.

A prince who rests his case on the hazards of war is not unaware that he is running some risks, but he is less struck by them than by the advantages he promises himself because he fears fortune much less than he hopes from his own wisdom; if he is powerful he counts on his forces, if he is weak, he counts on his alliances; sometimes it is useful for him at home to purge some bad humors, to weaken unruly subjects, even to suffer reverses and the skillful political thinker knows how to draw an advantage from his own defeats. I hope it will be remembered that I am not the one who reasons this way, but the sophist of the Court who prefers a large territory and a few poor and subjugated subjects to the unshakable Empire that justice and laws give the Prince over a happy and flourishing people.

It is also by the same Principle that he refutes for himself the argument drawn from the suspension of commerce, from depopulation, from the disorder of finances, and from the real losses that a vain conquest causes. Always to evaluate the gains or the losses of sovereigns in money is a very faulty calculation; the extent of power they aim at is not at all counted by the millions one possesses. The Prince always makes his plans circularly; he wants to command in order to get wealthy and to get wealthy in order to command; he will sacrifice both of them one after the other in order to acquire whichever one he lacks, but it is only so as to succeed in possessing both of the two together in the end that he pursues them separately;

for in order to be the master of men and of things he must have empire and money at the same time.

Let us add, finally, about the great advantages that should result for commerce from a general and perpetual peace, that they are very certain and incontestable in themselves, but that, being common to all, they will be real for no one, considering that such advantages are felt only by their differences, and that in order to increase one's relative power one must seek only exclusive goods.

Ceaselessly deceived by the appearance of things, Princes thus would reject this Peace, even if they weighed their interests by themselves; what will happen when they have them weighed by their Ministers whose interests are always opposed to those of the people and almost always to those of the Prince? Ministers need war to make themselves necessary, to throw the Prince into quandaries from which he cannot extricate himself without them, and to lose the state, if needed, rather than their position; they need it to harass the people under the pretext of public necessities; they need it to find positions for their creatures, to rig the markets, and secretly to make a thousand invidious monopolies in them; they need it to satisfy their passions, and mutually to oust each other; they need it to take possession of the Prince by taking him away from the Court when dangerous intrigues are being formed against them there; with perpetual peace they would lose all these resources, and the public does not fail to ask why, if this plan is possible, they have not adopted it? It does not see that there is nothing impossible in this plan other than it being adopted by them. What will they do then to oppose it? What they have always done: they will turn it to ridicule.

One must not believe along with the Abbé de St. Pierre either that, even with the goodwill that neither Princes nor their Ministers will ever have, it would be easy to find a moment favorable for the execution of this system.[48] For this it would be necessary that the sum of particular interests not outweigh the common interest and that each believe he sees the greatest good that he can hope for himself in the good of all. Now it is asking for a concurrence of wisdom in so many heads and a concurrence of relations in so many interests, that one must hardly hope for the fortuitous harmony of all the necessary circumstances from chance; nevertheless, if a harmony does not take place, force is the only thing that can take its place, and then it is no longer a question of persuading but of constraining and what is necessary is not to write books but rather to raise troops.

Thus although the plan was very wise, the means for executing it make one feel the author's simplicity. He simply imagined that all that was necessary was to gather together a Congress, to propose his articles there, that they were going to be signed, and that everything would be accomplished. Let us agree that, in all this honorable man's plans, he saw rather well the effect of things if they were established, but that he judged the means for establishing them like a child.

In order to prove that the plan for the Christian Republic is not chimerical, I would only like to name its first author: for surely Henri IV was not mad nor Sully a visionary.[49] The Abbé de St. Pierre grounded himself on these great names in order to renovate their system. But what a difference in times, in circumstances, in the proposition, in the manner of making it, and in its author. To judge about it, let us cast a glance at the general situation of things at the moment chosen by Henri IV for the execution of his plan.

The greatness of Charles V who reigned over one portion of the world and made the other tremble, made him aspire to universal monarchy with great means for success and great talents for employing them. Uninterruptedly following a plan that he was not capable of executing, his son—richer and less powerful—did not fail to make Europe constantly anxious, and the house of Austria had taken such an ascendancy over the other powers that no prince reigned in security unless he was on good terms with it. Philip III, even less skillful than his Father, inherited all his pretensions. Fear of the Spanish power still kept Europe in check and Spain continued to dominate more by the habit of commanding than by the power of making itself obeyed. In fact, the revolt of the Netherlands, the armada against England, the civil wars of France, had exhausted the forces of Spain and the treasures of the Indies; the House of Austria, divided into two branches, no longer acted with the same harmony; and, although the Emperor made efforts to keep or recover the authority of Charles V in Germany, he only alienated the Princes and fomented leagues which did not take long to hatch and almost dethroned him. Thus the decadence of the house of Austria and the reestablishment of common freedom were being prepared from afar. Nevertheless, no one dared to be the first to run the risk of throwing off the yoke and of exposing himself to war by himself. The example of Henri IV himself, who came off badly, deprived all the others of courage. Moreover if one excepts the Duke of Savoy, too weak and too subjugated to undertake anything, among so many sovereigns there was not a single competent man in a position to form and maintain an undertaking; each was expecting the moment to break his chains from time and circumstances. That is roughly what the state of things was when Henri[50] formed the plan for the Christian Republic and got ready to execute it. A plan very great, very admirable in itself and whose honor I do not want to tarnish, but which, having as its hidden reason the hope of bringing down a formidable enemy, received from this pressing motive an activity which it would have been hard to draw from common utility alone.

Now let us see what means this great man had used to prepare such a lofty undertaking. I would willingly count as the first that he had seen all of its difficulties; so that having formed this plan from his childhood, he meditated upon it his whole life, and reserved its execution for his old age; behavior which first proves that ardent and sustained desire which alone can conquer great obstacles in difficult things, and beyond that, that patient and considered wisdom that smoothes out the paths for the long term by virtue of foresight and preparation: for there is a great deal of difference between necessary undertakings in which prudence itself wants one to leave something to chance, and those which success alone can justify because, since one could have done without them, one should not attempt them without certainty. The profound secrecy he kept all his life up to the moment of execution was also as essential as it was difficult in such a great business in which the cooperation of so many people was necessary, and which so many people had an interest in thwarting. It appears, that although he put the greatest part of Europe on his side and he was leagued with the most powerful potentates, he never had more than a single confidant who knew the whole extent of his plan, and out of a good fortune which heaven grants only to the best of Kings, this confidant was a minister with integrity. But although nothing of these great plans leaked out, everything proceeded silently toward their execution. Twice Sully had gone to London; the party with King James was tied, and the King of Sweden was engaged on his side: the league was concluded with the Protestants of Germany; they were even sure of the Princes of Italy, and everyone cooperated toward the great goal without being able to say what it was, like workers who labor separately on pieces of a new machine whose form and use they do not know. What is it then that favored this general movement? Was it perpetual peace which no one foresaw and about which few would have cared? Was it the public interest, which is never that of anyone? The Abbé de St. Pierre might have hoped so! But really each worked only in the aim of his particular interest which Henri had possessed the secret of showing to them all under a very attractive side. The King of England had to free himself from the continuous conspiracies of the Catholics of his Kingdom, all fomented by Spain. He found, moreover a great advantage in the liberation of the United Provinces that cost him much to support, and each day put him on the eve of a war which he dreaded or to which he preferred to contribute once along with all the others so as to free himself from it forever. The King of Sweden wanted to secure Pomerania and get a foothold in Germany. the Elector Palatine, at that time a Protestant and leader of the Augsburg confession, had intentions toward Bohemia and participated in all those of the King of England. The princes of Germany had to repress the usurpations of the House of Austria. The Duke of Savoy was to obtain Milan and the crown of Lombardy which he ardently desired. Even the Pope, fatigued by the Spanish Tyranny, was a member of the party by means of the Kingdom of Naples which they had promised him. The Dutch, better compensated than all the others, gained the assurance of their freedom. In sum, aside from the common interest of bringing down a prideful power that wanted to dominate everywhere, each had a particular one, very avid, very tangible, and which was not at all balanced by the fear of substituting one Tyrant for the other, because it was agreed that the conquests would be divided among all the Allies, except France and England, who could keep nothing for themselves. That was enough to calm the most anxious people about Henri IV's ambition: but this wise Prince was not unaware that by not reserving anything through this treaty he nevertheless gained more than anyone else; for without adding anything to his patrimony it was enough for him to divide that of the only one more powerful than he was in order to become the most powerful himself; and one sees very clearly that by taking all the precautions that could assure the success of the enterprise, he did not neglect those that were to give him primacy in the body he wished to found.

Further: his preparations were not at all limited to forming formidable leagues abroad, nor to contracting an alliance with his neighbors and those of his enemy. By interesting so many peoples in bringing down the foremost potentate of Europe, he did not forget to put himself in a condition to become it by himself in his turn. He used fifteen years of peace for making preparations worthy of the undertaking he was meditating. He filled his coffers with money, his arsenals with artillery, arms, munitions; he saved up from afar resources for unforeseen needs; but doubtless he did more than all that by governing his peoples wisely, by imperceptibly uprooting all seeds of divisions, and by putting such good order into his finances that they could provide for everything without crushing his subjects; so that tranquil at home and formidable abroad, he saw himself in a condition to arm and maintain sixty thousand men and twenty warships, to leave his Kingdom without leaving the slightest source of disorder there, and to make war for six years without touching his ordinary revenues or imposing a penny of new taxes.

To so many preparations, add for the conduct of the undertaking the same zeal and the same prudence that had formed it both on his Minister's part and on his own. Finally, at the head of the military expeditions, a Captain such as he was while his adversary no longer had one to oppose to him, and you will judge whether anything that could proclaim a fortunate success was lacking to the hope of his. Attentive to his immense preparations without having penetrated his intentions, Europe awaited their effect with a sort of fright. A slight pretext was going to begin that great revolution. A war which was supposed to be the final one was preparing an immortal peace, when an event[51] the horrible mystery of which must increase its dread, came to banish forever the final hope of the world. The very blow that cut off the life of this good King plunged Europe back into eternal wars which it must no longer hope to see end. Whatever might be the case, these are the means that Henri IV had gathered in order to form the same establishment that the Abbé de St. Pierre claims to do with a book.

Let it not be said, then, that if his system has not been adopted, it is because it is not good; on the contrary one should say that it was too good to be adopted; for the evil and the abuses from which so many people profit find their way in by themselves; but what is useful to the public hardly finds its way in except by force, considering that private interests are almost always opposed to it. Without a doubt, perpetual peace is a very absurd plan at present; but give us back a Henri IV and a Sully, perpetual peace will become a reasonable plan again; or rather, let us admire such a fine plan, but console ourselves for not seeing it executed; for that cannot be done except by means that are violent and formidable to humanity. One does not see federative Leagues established by any way other than by revolutions, and on this principle who among us would dare to state whether this European League is to be desired or to be feared?[52] Perhaps it would cause more harm all at once than it would prevent for centuries.

Judgment on perpetual peace.

N.B. Take care to have a fair copy of this written only by someone who is very intelligent, very precise but who will not meddle with guessing about it.

The State of War

I open the books about right and about morality, I listen to the learned and the legal experts and, imbued with their insinuating discourses, I deplore the miseries of nature, I admire the peace and justice established by the civil order, I bless the wisdom[53] of public institutions[54] and I console myself for being a man by seeing myself as a citizen. Well instructed about my duties and my happiness, I close the book, leave the classroom, and take a look around me; I see unfortunate peoples groaning under an iron yoke, the human race crushed by a handful of oppressors, a starving crowd weighed down with pain and hunger, whose blood and tears the rich drink in peace, and everywhere the strong armed against the weak by the formidable power of the laws.

All this is done peacefully and without resistance; this is the tranquillity of the companions of Ulysses closed up in the Cyclops' cave, waiting to be devoured.[55] One must shudder and keep silent. Let us draw an eternal veil over these objects of horror. I raise my eyes and look into the distance. I perceive fires and flames, deserted countryside,[56] pillaged cities. Fierce men, where are you dragging those wretched people? I hear a frightful noise; what tumult! what cries! I draw near; I see a theater of murders, ten thousand slaughtered men, the dead piled up in heaps, the dying crushed under the hooves of horses, everywhere the image of death and agony. This, then, is the fruit of these peaceful institutions! Pity, indignation raise themselves at the bottom of my heart. Ah barbarous philosopher! Come read us your book on a battlefield!

What human entrails would not be moved by these sad objects? but one is no longer allowed to be a man and to plead the cause of humanity. Justice and truth must be bent to the interest of the most powerful: that is the rule. The People give neither pensions, nor employment, nor chairs, nor positions in Academies; in virtue of what would one protect them? Magnanimous princes, I speak in the name of the literary body; oppress the people in security of conscience; it is from you alone that we expect everything; the people is no good to us for anything.

How could such a feeble voice make itself heard above so many venal outcries? Alas! I must keep silent; but can my heart's voice not pierce through such a sad silence? No; without entering into odious details

that would pass for satire by the sole fact that they would be true, I shall limit myself, as I have always done, to examining human establishments through their principles; to correcting, if possible, the false ideas which self-interested authors have given us of them; and at least to making it so that injustice and violence do not impudently take on the name of right and equity.

The first thing that I notice upon considering the position of the human race is a manifest contradiction in its constitution, which makes it always vacillate. From man to man, we live in the civil state and subject to laws; from people to people, each enjoys natural freedom: which at bottom renders our situation worse than if these distinctions were unknown. For, living in the social order and in the state of nature at the same time, we are subject to the inconveniences of both, without[57] finding security in either of the two. The perfection of the social order consists, it is true, in the cooperation of force and law; but, for this, law must direct force; instead of which, in the ideas of the absolute independence of princes, force alone, speaking to the citizens under the name of law and to foreigners under the name of reason of state, deprives the latter of the power and the former of the will, to resist, so that everywhere the empty word of justice serves only as the safeguard of violence.

As to what is commonly called the right of nations,[58] it is certain that, for lack of a sanction, its laws are only illusions even weaker than the law of nature. At least the latter speaks to the heart of private individuals while, since the right of nations has no guarantee other than the utility of the one who subjects himself to it, its decisions are respected only to the extent that self-interest confirms them. In the mixed condition in which we find ourselves, to whichever of the two systems one gives the preference, by doing either too much or too little, we have not done anything, and we are put into the worst state in which we could find ourselves. There, it seems to me, is the genuine origin of public calamities.

For a moment let us oppose these ideas to the horrible system of Hobbes; and we shall find, completely in reverse of his absurd doctrine, that far from the state of war being natural to man, war is born from peace, or at least from the precautions that men have taken to secure for themselves a durable peace. But before entering into this discussion, let us try to explain what it . . .[59]

[Who could have imagined without shuddering the insane system of natural war of each against all? What a strange animal this is that would believe its own good depended upon the destruction of its entire species! and how can it be conceived that this species, so monstrous and so detestable, could endure even for two generations? Nevertheless, that is where the desire or rather the rage for establishing despotism and passive obedience have led one of the finest geniuses that ever existed. Such a ferocious principle was worthy of its object.

The state of society which constrains all our natural inclinations could not, nevertheless, annihilate them; in spite of our prejudices and in spite of ourselves, they still speak at the bottom of our hearts and often lead us back to the true which we leave for illusions. If this mutual and destructive enmity were attached to our constitution, it would then still make itself felt and push us back in spite of ourselves, through all social bonds. The frightful hatred of humanity would gnaw at man's heart. He would be afflicted by the birth of his own children; he would rejoice at the death of his brothers; and when he would find someone sleeping his first motion would be to kill him.

The benevolence that makes us share in the happiness of our fellows, compassion that identifies us with the one who is suffering and afflicts us with his pain, would be feelings unknown and directly contrary to nature. A man who was sensitive and subject to pity would be a monster; and we would naturally be what we have a lot of trouble becoming in the midst of the depravity that pursues us.

The sophist would say in vain that this mutual enmity is not innate and immediate, but founded on the inevitable competition of the right of each to all things.[60] For the feeling of this pretended right is not any more natural to man than the war he causes to be born from it.]

I have already said it and I cannot repeat it too much that the error of Hobbes and of the philosophers is to confuse natural man with the men they have before their eyes,[61] and to transport into one system a being who can continue to exist only in a different one. Man wants his well-being and everything that can contribute to it; that is incontestable. But naturally this well-being of man is limited to what is physically necessary; for when he has a healthy soul and his body does not suffer, what is lacking for him to be happy in accordance with his constitution? He who has nothing desires few things; he who commands no one has little ambition. But the superfluous awakens covetousness; the more one obtains, the more one desires. He who has a lot wants to have everything; and the folly of universal monarchy has never tormented any heart except that of a great king. Behold the course of nature, behold the development of the passions. A superficial philosopher observes souls a hundredfold kneaded and fermented in the leaven of society and believes he has observed man. But in order to know him well one must know how to disentangle the natural gradation of his feelings and it is not among the inhabitants of a big city that one must look for nature's first feature in the imprint of the human heart.

Thus, this analytical method offers only abysses and mysteries where the wisest understands the least. If one asks why morals are corrupted to the extent that minds are enlightened; not being able to find the cause for it, they will have the audacity to deny the fact.[62] If one asks why savages transported among us share neither our passions nor our pleasures, and are not concerned at all about everything we desire so ardently, they will never explain it, or will explain it only by means of my principles. They know only what they see, and have never seen nature. They know extremely well what a Bourgeois of London or Paris is; but they will never know what a man is.[63]

But even if it were true that this unlimited and uncontrollable covetousness were developed in all men to the point our sophist assumes, it still would not produce that universal state of war of each against all whose odious tableau Hobbes dares to trace. This unbridled desire to appropriate everything for oneself is incompatible with that of destroying all one's fellows; and the victor, who—having killed everyone—had the misfortune of remaining alone in the world, would enjoy nothing from the very fact that he would have everything. Wealth itself, what is it good for other than to be transmitted; what use would the possession of the whole universe be for him if he were its only inhabitant? What? Will his stomach devour all the fruits of the earth? Who will gather the produce of all climates for him? Who will bear witness of his empire in the vast solitudes that he will never inhabit? What will he do with his treasures, who will consume his commodities, for what eyes will he display his power? I understand. Instead of massacring everyone, he will put them all in chains in order at least to have some Slaves. That suddenly changes the entire state of the question; and since it is no longer a question of destroying, the state of war is annulled. Let the reader suspend his judgment here. I shall not forget to treat this point.

Man is naturally peaceful and fearful, at the slightest danger his first motion is to flee; he hardens himself only as a result of habit and experience. Honor, interest, prejudices, vengeance, all the passions that might make him brave perils and death, are far from him in the state of nature. It is only after having made a society with some man that he decides to attack another one; and he does not become a soldier until after having become a citizen.[64] One does not see there any great dispositions to wage war on all one's fellows. But this is pausing too long over a system as revolting as it is absurd, which has already been refuted a hundred times.

There is, then, no general war of man against man at all; and the human race has not been formed solely to destroy itself. It remains to consider the accidental and particular war that can arise among two or several individuals.

If natural law were written only in human reason it would hardly be capable of directing the majority of our actions, but it is also engraved in man's heart in indelible characters and it is there that it speaks more strongly than do all the precepts of Philosophers; it is there that it cries out to him that he is not allowed to sacrifice the life of someone like him except for the preservation of his own, and that it causes him horror at shedding human blood without anger, even when he sees himself obliged to.

I conceive that in the quarrels without arbiters which can arise in the state of nature, one angry man will sometimes be able to kill another, either by open force, or by surprise. But if this was a question of a genuine war, imagine in what a strange position this same man must be in order to be unable to preserve his own life except at the expense of someone else's and if by an established relation between them it was necessary for one to die for the other to live. War is a permanent state which assumes constant relations, and these relations very rarely take place between man and man, where among individuals everything is in a constant flux which constantly changes relations and interests. So that a subject of dispute arises and ceases almost at the same moment, a quarrel begins and ends in one day, and there can be combats and murders but never or very rarely long enmities and wars.

In the civil state, where the life of all citizens[65] is in the sovereign's power and where none has the right to dispose of his own nor of anyone else's, the state of war cannot take place among private individuals; and as for Duels, challenges, cartels, summons to single combat, aside from the fact that they are an illegitimate and barbarous abuse of an entirely military constitution, there did not result from them a genuine state of war, but rather a private affair that was so settled at a specific time and place that a new summons was necessary for a second combat. One must make an exception for the private wars that were suspended by daily truces called the peace of God and which received sanction by the establishments of St. Louis.[66] But this example is unique in history.

One might still ask whether Kings who in fact are independent of human power could establish among themselves personal and private wars, independent of those of the state. That is certainly an idle question, for—as is known—it is not the custom of Princes to spare anyone else in order to expose themselves personally. Moreover, this question depends on another one which I am not the one to decide: namely whether the Prince is himself subject to the laws of the state or not; for if he is subject, his person is tied and his life belongs to the state, like that of the least important citizen. But if the Prince is above the laws[67] he is living in the pure state of nature and does not have to account for any of his actions either to his subjects or to anyone.

On the Social State

We are now entering into a new order of things. We are going to see men, united by an artificial harmony, gather together in order to cut each other's throats and all the horrors of war born from the efforts that had been taken to prevent it. But first it is important to form more precise notions about the essence of the body politic than has been done up to now. Let the reader consider only that here it is less a question of history and facts than of right and justice, and that I am examining things by their nature rather than by our prejudices.

Once the first society has been formed, the formation of all the others follows necessarily. One must either join it or unite in order to resist it. One must imitate it or let oneself be swallowed by it.

Thus the whole face of the earth is changed; everywhere nature has disappeared; everywhere human art has taken its place, independence and natural freedom have given way to laws and to slavery, no free being exists any longer; the philosopher looks for a man and no longer finds any. But one vainly thinks that nature is nullified, it is reborn and shows itself where one least expected it. The independence taken away from men takes refuge in societies, and these great bodies, abandoned to their own impulsions, produce more terrible shocks in the proportion that their masses outweigh those of individuals.

But, someone will say, since each of these bodies has such a solid base how is it possible that they ever happen to come into collision with each other? Shouldn't their own constitution maintain an eternal peace between them? Are they obliged as men are to go look outside for something to provide for their needs? Do they not have in themselves everything that is necessary for their preservation? Are competition and exchange a source of inevitable discord and haven't inhabitants existed in all the countries of the world before commerce—an invincible proof that they can continue to exist without it?

To this, I could be satisfied with responding with facts and I would have no response to fear but I have not forgotten that here I am reasoning about the nature of things and not about events that might have a thousand particular causes, independent of the common principle. But let us attentively consider the constitution of bodies politic and, although at a pinch each suffices for its own preservation, we shall find that their mutual relations do not fail to be much more intimate than those of individuals. For at bottom man has no necessary relationship with his fellows, he can continue to exist in all possible vigor without their cooperation; he does not need the efforts of man as much as he does the fruits of the earth; and the earth produces more than it needs for nourishing all of its inhabitants. Add that man has a limit of force and size fixed by nature and which he cannot surpass. From whatever side he envisages himself, he finds all his faculties limited. His life is short, his years are numbered. His stomach does not get bigger along with his wealth, however much his passions increase, his pleasures have their measure, his heart is limited like everything else, his capacity to enjoy is always the same. Exalt himself in his mind as he will, he still remains small.

On the contrary, since it is an artificial body the state has no fixed extent, the size that is suited to it is indefinite, it can always increase it, it feels itself to be weak as long as there are any stronger than it. Its safety, its preservation, require it to make itself more powerful than all its neighbors. It can increase, nourish, use its forces only at their expense, and, if it does not need to seek its subsistence outside itself, it endlessly looks there for new members who might give it a more solid substance. For the inequality of men has limits set down by nature's hands, but that of societies can endlessly increase, until a single one absorbs all the others.

Thus, since the size of the body politic is purely relative, it is forced constantly to compare itself in order to know itself; it depends on everything that surrounds it, and must take an interest in everything that happens there, for, wish as it might to remain inside itself without gaining or losing anything, it becomes small or large, weak or strong, according to whether its neighbor extends or contracts and becomes stronger or weaker. Finally, by making its relationships more constant, its very solidity gives a more certain effect to all its actions and makes all its quarrels more dangerous.

It seems that they[68] have taken on the task of reversing all the true ideas of things. Everything leads natural man to rest; to eat and to sleep are the only needs he knows; and hunger alone uproots him from laziness. They have made him into a wild man always quick to torment his fellows because of passions about which he knows nothing at all; on the contrary these passions, excited in the bosom of society by everything that can inflame them, are looked upon as not existing there. A thousand writers have dared to say that the Body politic is without passions and that there is no other reason of state at all other than reason itself. As if one did not see, on the contrary, that the essence of society consists in the activity of its members and that a State without motion would be only a dead body. As if all the histories in the world did not show us the best constituted societies being also the most active, and the continuous action and reaction of all their members either inside or outside bear witness to the vigor of the entire body.

The difference between human art and the work of nature makes itself felt in its effects, as much as citizens call themselves members of the state they cannot be united to it as true members are to the body; it is impossible to make it so that each of them does not have an individual and separate existence by which he can suffice for his own preservation by himself; the nerves are less sensitive, the muscles have less vigor, all the bonds are looser, the slightest accident can make everything come apart.

Considering how inferior the public force is in the aggregation of the body politic to the sum of private forces, how much friction there is, so to speak, in the play of the entire machine and it will be found that—all proportion preserved—the most frail man has more force for his own preservation than the most robust State has for its.

Thus, for this state to continue to exist it is necessary for the liveliness of its passions to supplement that of its motions, and for its will to be enlivened as much as its power is slackened. This is the conserving law that nature itself establishes among the species and which maintains them all in spite of their inequality. That is also, to state it in passing, the reason why small states have proportionately more vigor than large ones, for the public, sensitivity does not increase with the territory, the more it is extended, the more tepid the will becomes, the weaker the motions become and this large body, overburdened by its own weight, gives way, falls into languor and perishes.

After having seen the earth covered with new States, after having discovered among them a general relationship that tends toward their mutual destruction, it remains for us to see in precisely what consist their existence, their well-being, and their life in order afterwards to find by what kinds of hostilities they can attack and harm each other.

It is from the social pact that the body politic receives unity and the common "I"; its government and its laws make its constitution more or less robust, its life is in the hearts of the citizens, their courage and their morals make it more or less durable, the only actions which it performs freely and which can be imputed to it are dictated by the general will and it is by the nature of these actions that one can judge whether the being that produces them is well or badly constituted.

Thus as long as a common will to observe the social pact and the laws exists, this pact also continues to exist, and as long as this will manifests itself by external actions, the State is not annihilated. But without ceasing to exist, it can find itself at a point of vigor or of withering away, from which—either weak, healthy, or sick, and tending to destroy itself or to strengthen itself—its well-being can increase or deteriorate in an infinite number of ways, which almost always depend on it. This immense detail is not a part of my subject; but here is the summary of what does relate to it.

General Idea of the War between State and State

The principle of life of the body politic, and if one can speak this way, the heart of the State, is the social pact by which, as soon it is wounded, it instantly dies, falls, and dissolves itself, but this pact is not at all a parchment charter that it is sufficient to tear up in order to destroy, it is written in the general will and it is not easy to annul it there.

Thus, not being able to divide the whole at first, one strikes it through its parts, if the body is invulnerable one wounds the members in order to weaken it, if one cannot deprive it of existence one at least weakens its well-being, if one does not reach its seat of life one destroys what maintains it, one attacks the government, the laws, the morals, the goods, the possessions, the men. The State must certainly perish when everything that preserves it is annihilated.

All these means are employed or can be in the war of one power against another and they are also often conditions imposed by the victors in order to continue to harm the disarmed vanquished party.

For the object of all the harm one does one's enemy in war is to force him to put up with having even more done in peace. History provides us with examples of every sort of these hostilities. I do not need to speak about pecuniary contributions in merchandise or in produce, nor about territory taken away, nor of inhabitants transplanted. Even the annual tribute of men is not a rare thing. Without going back to Minos and the Athenians,[69] it is known that the Emperors of Mexico attacked their neighbors only to have captives to sacrifice, and in our day the wars of the Kings of Guinea among themselves and their treaties with the peoples of Europe have as their only object slave tribute and trade. That the aim and the effect of war are sometimes only to spoil the constitution of the enemy State is not any more difficult to prove.

The republics of Greece attacked each other less to deprive each other of freedom than to change their form of government, and they changed the government of the conquered only to keep them more dependent. The Macedonians and all the conquerors of Sparta always made it an important business to abolish the laws of Lycurgus there, and the Romans believed they could not give a greater mark of clemency to a subjugated people than to leave it its own laws. It is also known that it was one of the maxims of their politics to foment among their enemies and to remove from themselves the effeminate and sedentary arts that enervate and soften men. Let us leave the Tarentines their angry Gods said Fabius, when entreated to carry off to Rome the statues and pictures with which Tarentum was adorned and the first decadence of Roman morals is justly imputed to Marcellus for not having followed the same policy at Syracuse.[70] So true is it that a skillful conqueror sometimes harms the vanquished more by what he leaves them than by what he takes from them and that, on the contrary, a greedy usurper often harms himself more than his enemy by the harm he does him indirectly. This influence of morals has always been regarded as very important by truly enlightened princes. The entire penalty that Cyrus imposed on the Lydians when they revolted was a soft and effeminate life and the manner in which the Tyrant Aristodemus undertook to maintain the inhabitants of Cumae in dependence on him is too curious not to mention.[71]

What the State of War Is

Although these two words of war and peace appear exactly correlative, the second contains a much more extended signification, considering that one can interrupt and disturb the peace in several ways without proceeding as far as war. Rest, union, concord, all the ideas of benevolence and mutual affection seem included in this sweet word, peace. It brings to the soul a plenitude of feeling that makes us love our own existence and someone else's at the same time, it represents the linkage of beings that unites them in the universal system, it has its entire extent only in the mind of God whom nothing that exists can harm and who wants the preservation of all the beings he has created.

The constitution of this universe does not allow all the sensitive beings that compose it to cooperate at the same time for their mutual happiness, but since the well-being of one causes the harm of the other, in accordance with the law of nature, each gives preference to itself both when it is laboring for its advantage or for someone else's harm; instantly peace is disturbed with regard to the one who suffers, then, not only is it natural to repel the evil that pursues us, but when an intelligent being sees that this evil comes to it from the ill will of someone else, it gets angry at it and seeks to repel it. From this is born discord, quarrels, sometimes combats, and not yet war.

Finally when things are at the point that a being endowed with reason is convinced that the care of its preservation is incompatible not only with someone else's well-being but also with its existence; then it takes arms against its life and seeks to destroy it with the same ardor with which it seeks to preserve itself and for the same reason. Feeling that the security of its existence is incompatible with the aggressor's existence, the attacked in its turn attacks with all its force the life of the one who has designs upon its own. This manifest will of destroying each other and all the acts that depend on it produce between the two enemies a relation that is called war.

It follows from this that war does not at all consist in one or several unpremeditated combats, not even in homicide and murder committed in an outburst of anger, but in the constant, reflective, and manifest will to destroy one's enemy, for in order to judge that the existence of that enemy is incompatible with our well-being, coolness and reason are necessary, which produce a durable resolution; and for the relation to be mutual it is necessary that the enemy, being aware in its turn that one has designs on its life, has the design of defending itself at the expense of ours. All these ideas are included in the word, war.

The public effects of this ill will reduced into action are called hostilities: but whether there are hostilities or not, once the relation of war is established it can end only with a formal peace. Otherwise, since each of the two enemies has no evidence that the other has ceased to have designs on his life, they could not or should not cease to defend it at the expense of the other's life.

These differences give rise to some distinction in terms. When people are reciprocally kept in long-term continuous hostilities, that is what is properly called waging war. On the contrary, when two declared enemies remain tranquil and do not commit any offensive act against each other, their relationship does not change because of that, but as long as it has no present effect at all, it is called only a state of war. This state is ordinarily produced by long wars of which one grows weary and which one cannot end. Sometimes the animosity, far from falling asleep in inaction, is only waiting for a favorable moment to surprise the enemy, and often the state of war that produces slackening is more dangerous than war itself.

It has been disputed whether truce, armistice, the peace of God were a state of war or of peace. It is clear from the preceding concepts that all this is only a modified state of war, in which the two enemies tie their hands without losing or disguising the will to harm each other. They make preparations; they hoard weapons, material for sieges, all military operations that are not specified continue. That shows well enough that intentions have not changed. It is also the same when two enemies meet each other on neutral ground without attacking each other.

These examples suffice to give an idea of the various means by which one can weaken a state and of the means whose practice seems to be authorized by war in order to harm one's enemy; with regard to the treaties of which these means are the conditions, what are such peaces at bottom, other than war continued with all the more cruelty because the conquered enemy no longer has the right to defend itself. I shall speak of this elsewhere.[72]

Join to all this the palpable evidence of ill will which indicates the intention of harming such as refusing a power the titles due to it, refusing to recognize its rights, rejecting its claims, depriving its subjects of freedom of commerce, of stirring up its enemies; in sum, transgressing the right of nations with regard to it, under any possible pretext.

These various ways of offending a body politic are not all equally practical, nor equally useful to the one who makes use of them; and those from which our own advantage and detriment to the enemy result at the same time are naturally preferred. Land, money, men, all the spoils one can take possession of thus become the principal objects of reciprocal hostilities. As this base greediness insensibly changes ideas about things, war finally degenerates into brigandage, and from enemies and warriors, one little by little turns into Tyrants and thieves.

Out of fear of adopting these changes of ideas without thinking about it, let us fix our own at first by a definition, and seek to render it so simple that it would be impossible to misuse it.

Thus I call war between power and a power the effect of a mutual, constant, and manifest disposition to destroy the enemy State, or at least to weaken it[73] by all means that one can. This disposition, reduced into action is war properly speaking; as long as it remains without effect, it is only the state of war.

I foresee an objection: because according to me the state of war is natural among powers why does the disposition from which it results need to be manifested? To that I answer that I have spoken above about the natural state, that here I am speaking about the legitimate state, and that I shall show afterwards how, to make it such, war needs a declaration.

Fundamental Distinctions

I beg the readers not to forget that I am not looking for what makes war advantageous to the one who wages it, but what makes it legitimate. It is almost always costly to be just. Is one dispensed from being so because of that?

If there never was and never could be any genuine war between private individuals, who then are the ones between whom it takes place and who can truly be called enemies? I answer that they are public persons. And what is a public person? I answer that it is a moral being that is called, sovereign, to whom the social pact gave existence, and all of whose wills bear the name of laws. Let us apply the preceding distinctions here; in the effects of war it can be said that it is the sovereign who does the damage and the State that receives it.

If war takes place only between moral beings, it is not directed at all at men, and one can wage it without depriving anyone of his life. But this requires an explanation.

Viewing things only in accordance with the rigor of the social pact, the land, money, men, and everything that is included in the confines of the state belong to it without reserve. But since the rights of society, being founded upon those of nature, are not able to annihilate them, all these objects ought to be considered under a double relationship: namely, the soil as public territory and as patrimony of private individuals; goods as belonging in one sense to the sovereign and in another to the owners; the inhabitants as citizens and as men. Basically, since the body politic is only a moral person, it is only a being of reason. Remove the public convention, the state is immediately destroyed without the slightest alteration in everything that composes it; and all of men's conventions can never change anything in the physical aspect of things. What, then, is waging war to a sovereign? It is to attack the public convention and everything that results from it; for the essence of the state consists only in that. If the social pact could be severed with a single blow, immediately there would no longer be any war; and by this blow alone the State would be killed without a single man dying. Aristotle says that in order to authorize the cruel treatments the Helots were made to suffer at Sparta, upon entering office the Ephors solemnly declared war on them.[74] This declaration was as superfluous as it was barbaric. The state of war necessarily continued to exist between them by the mere fact that the ones were masters and the others slaves. There is no doubt that, since the Lacedaemonians killed the Helots, the Helots had the right to kill the Lacedaemonians.

Fragments on War

1

In order to know precisely what the rights of war are let us examine the nature of the thing carefully and let us accept as true only what is necessarily deduced from it. Let two men fight each other in the state of nature, behold war ignited between them. But why are they fighting? Is it in order to devour each other? Even among animals that happens only among different species. Among men, as among Wolves, the subject of the quarrel is always entirely alien to the lives of the combatants. It can very well happen that one of the two dies in the combat, but then his death is the means and not the object of the victory, for as soon as the vanquished one gives way, the victor lays hold of the thing contested, the combat ends and the war is over.

It must be remarked that, since the social state gathers around us a multitude of things which belong more to our whims than to our needs and which were naturally indifferent to us, the majority of the subjects for war become even much more alien to the lives of men than in the state of nature and that this often proceeds to the point that private individuals care extremely little about the outcome of public war. Arms are taken up in order to dispute about power, wealth, or consideration, and the subject of the quarrel is finally so removed from the person of the Citizens that they are neither better nor worse off for being victors or vanquished. It would be very strange for a war constituted this way to have any relation to their lives and for someone to believe he had the right to slaughter men merely to show that he is stronger than they are.

One kills in order to vanquish, but there is no man so ferocious that he seeks to vanquish in order to kill.

2

Now that the state of nature has been abolished among us, war no longer exists among private individuals and men who attack others on their own authority even after having received some insult from them are not at all regarded as their enemies but rather as genuine brigands. That is so true that a subject who, taking the terms of declaration of war literally, wanted to set upon the enemies of his Prince without a commission or letter of marque would be punished for it, or ought to be.

3

Only Peoples who have been tranquilly settled for a very long time can imagine making War into a genuinely separate profession and the people who practice it into a particular class. Among a new People where the common interest is still in all its vigor, all citizens are soldiers during times of war and there are no longer any soldiers during times of peace. This is one of the best signs of the youth and vigor of a nation. Men always armed must necessarily be the enemies of all others by their station or one must never employ these artificial forces except as a resource against internal weakening and the first regular troops are in some manner the first wrinkles that proclaim the impending decrepitude of the government.

4

Thank God nothing like this is seen any longer among the Europeans. People would be horrified by a Prince who massacred his prisoners. They are outraged even by those who treat them badly and these abominable maxims which revolt reason and make humanity shudder are known only by Jurisconsults who tranquilly make them into the basis of their Political systems and who, instead of showing us sovereign authority as the source of men's happiness, dare to show it to us as the punishment of the vanquished.

If only one proceeds from conclusion to conclusion, the error of the principle makes itself felt at every step; and in such a reckless decision it is seen throughout that neither reason nor nature has been consulted. If I wanted to get to the core of the concept of the state of war I would easily demonstrate that it can result only from the free consent of the belligerent parties; that if one wanted to attack and the other did not want to defend itself there would not be any state of war but only violence and aggression; that, since the state of war is established by the free consent of the parties, this free and mutual consent is also necessary to reestablish peace; and that, unless one of the adversaries is annihilated, the war between them cannot end until the moment that both of them declare in freedom that they renounce it, so that by virtue of the relation of master and slave they continue—and even in spite of themselves—still to be in the state of war. I could call into question whether promises torn by force and in order to avoid death are obligatory in the state of freedom, and whether all those which the prisoner makes to his master in that state can signify anything but this. *I engage myself to obey you for as long as, being the stronger, you do not make an attempt on my life.*

There is more. Let someone tell me which ought to prevail, solemn and irrevocable engagements taken with the fatherland in full freedom or those which fear of death make us contract with the conquering enemy. The so-called right of slavery to which prisoners of war are subject is limitless. The Jurisconsults decide it emphatically. There is nothing, says Grotius, that one cannot inflict with impunity on such slaves. There is no action at all that one cannot command them, or to which one cannot constrain them, in any way whatsoever. But if, sparing them from a thousand torments, one is satisfied to require that they bear arms against their country, I ask which they ought to fulfill: the oath they freely made to their fatherland or the one that the enemy just extracted from their weakness. Will they disobey their masters or will they massacre their fellow citizens?

Perhaps someone will dare to tell me that since the state of slavery subjects prisoners to their master, they exchange states instantaneously and that, becoming subjects of their new sovereign, they renounce their old fatherland.

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If a thousand ferocious peoples have massacred their prisoners, if a thousand Scholars, minions of Tyranny, have excused these crimes, what does men's error matter to the truth and what does their barbarity matter to justice? Let us not look for what has been done but for what ought to be done and let us reject vile and mercenary authorities which tend only to make men slaves, wicked, and unhappy.

POLYSYNODY

By the Abbé de St. Pierre

Chapter I.

Necessity in Monarchy of a Form of Government Subordinate to the Prince.

If Princes considered the functions of Government as indispensable duties, the most capable would find themselves the most overburdened; their labors would always appear excessive to them compared to their forces; they would be observed to be as ardent in restricting their States or their Rights as they are eager to expand both of them. And the weight of the Crown would soon crush the strongest head that wanted to bear it seriously. But far from envisioning their power by what is painful and obligatory about it, they see in it only the pleasure of commanding; and since, in their eyes, the People is only the instrument of their whims, the more whims they have to satisfy, the more the need to usurp increases. And the more limited and petty their understanding, the more they want their authority to be great and powerful.

Nevertheless, the most absolute Despotism still requires labor to sustain itself. Whatever maxims it establishes to its advantage, it must always cover them with an illusion of public utility; using the force of Peoples against themselves, it must prevent them from uniting against it; it must continuously stifle the voice of nature and the cry of freedom, always ready to issue from extreme oppression. Finally, even if the People were only a vile herd[75] without reason, efforts would still be required to lead it, and the Prince who gives no thought at all to making his subjects happy does not forget, at least if he is not insane, to preserve his patrimony.

What does he have to do, then, to reconcile indolence with ambition, power with pleasures, and the dominion of the Gods with animal life?[76] Choose vain honors and idleness for himself,[77] and give others the troublesome functions of government, reserving for himself at most the right to dismiss or change those who acquit themselves too badly or too well in them. By this method, the least of men will peacefully and comfortably hold onto the scepter of the universe; submerged in insipid sensual delights, he will parade his ignorance and his boredom from one entertainment to another if he likes. Nevertheless, people will treat him as Conqueror, invincible, King of Kings, August Emperor,[78] Monarch of the world, and sacred Majesty. Forgotten on the Throne, nothing in the eyes of his neighbors and even in those of his subjects, flattered by everyone without being obeyed by anyone, feeble instrument of the Tyranny of Courtiers and of the enslavement of the People, he will be told he is ruling, and will believe he is ruling. That is the general picture of the government of every overextended monarchy. Whoever wants to hold up the world and does not have the shoulders of Hercules must expect to be crushed.

The Sovereign of a great Empire is basically scarcely more than the Minister of his Ministers or the representative of those who govern under him. They are obeyed in his name,[79] and when he believes he is making them execute his will, it is he, without knowing it, who executes theirs. It could not be otherwise, for, since he can see only through their eyes, he must necessarily allow them to act through his hands, Compelled to abandon to others what people call detail* and what I myself would call the essential point of Government, he keeps for himself the great affairs, the verbiage of Ambassadors, the pestering of his favorites, and at most the choice of masters, for one must have some despite oneself, as soon as one has so many slaves.[80] Moreover, what does a good or bad administration matter to him? How would his happiness be disturbed by the misery of the people whom he cannot see, by their complaints which he cannot hear, and by public disorders about which he will never know anything? The glory of princes is like the treasures of the madman who in his mind is the owner of all the Vessels that sailed into port: the opinion of enjoying it all prevented him from desiring anything, and he was no less happy with the riches he did not have, than if he had possessed them.

How would the most just Prince with the best intentions do better from the moment he undertakes a labor which nature placed beyond his forces? He is a man and assumes the functions of a God; how can he hope to fulfill them? The wise man, if perhaps he is on the throne, renounces dominion or divides it. He considers his force. He uses it to measure the functions he wants to fulfill; and to be a truly great King, he does not burden himself with a large Kingdom. But what the wise man would do has little relation to what Princes will do. Let us at least seek how they can do what they will always do with the least possible harm.

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* What matters to Citizens is to be governed justly and peacefully. What is more, that the State be large, powerful, and flourishing, that is the private business of the Prince, and the subjects have no interest in it. Thus the Monarch should first attend to the detail comprising civil freedom, the People's security, and even his own in many respects. After that, if he has any remaining time to waste, he can devote it to all those great matters which interest no one, never emerge except from the vices of government, and consequently are nothing for a happy People and little for a wise King.

Before beginning this discussion, it is good to observe that if, by miracle, some great soul[81] can be adequate to the difficult responsibility of Royalty, the hereditary order established by successions and the extravagant education of the heirs to the Throne[82] will always furnish a hundred imbeciles for one true King. There will be issues of nonage, illness, times of delirium and passion which will often leave at the head of the State only the semblance of a Prince. However, business must be attended to. Among all Peoples who have a King, it is therefore absolutely necessary to establish a form of government that can do without the King. And as soon as it is granted that a sovereign can rarely govern by himself, the only thing left is to know how he can govern through someone else. The discourse on the Polysynody is intended to resolve this question.

Chapter II.
Three Specific Forms of Subordinate Government

A Monarch, says the Abbé de St. Pierre, may listen to only one man in all his affairs and confer all his authority on him, as the Kings of France used to give it to the Mayors of the Palace, and as Oriental Princes still confer theirs now on the person named the Grand Vizier in Turkey. For brevity, I will call this type of Ministry the Vizierate.

This Monarch may also divide his authority among two or several men, each of whom he listens to separately concerning the type of affair entrusted to them, approximately as Louis XIV did with Colbert and Louvois.[83] It is this form that I will call the Demi-Vizierate in what follows.

Finally this Monarch may have the business of Government discussed in assemblies, and for that purpose form as many Councils as there are types of business to handle. This form of Ministry, which the Abbé de St. Pierre calls a plurality of Councils or Polysynody, is, according to him, approximately what the Regent Duke of Orléans had established under his administration, and what gives it still more weight is that it was also adopted by the Pupil of the virtuous Fénelon.[84]

To choose among these three forms and judge which of them deserves preference, it is not sufficient to consider them roughly and by the first aspect they present. Neither must we contrast the abuses of one with the perfection of the other, nor focus only on certain passing moments of disorder or brilliance, but rather assume them all as perfect as they can be throughout their duration, and under those conditions seek their relations and their differences. That is how one can make an exact parallel of them.

Chapter III.
Relation between These Forms and Those of the Supreme Government

The elementary maxims of politics can already be applied here. For the vizierate, the demi-vizierate, and the Polysynody manifestly relate in the economy of the subaltern government to the specific forms of supreme government, and numerous of the principles applicable to the sovereign administration can be easily applied to the Ministry. Thus the vizierate generally ought to have more vigor and speed, the demi-vizierate more precision and care, and the Polysynody more justice and constancy. It is certain, furthermore, that, just as Democracy naturally tends to Aristocracy, and Aristocracy to Monarchy, so the Polysynody tends to the demi-vizierate, and the demi-vizierate to the vizierate. This progression of the public force toward a slackening, which requires strengthening the springs, slows down or speeds up in proportion to how well or badly constituted all the parts of the State are; and, since despotism and the vizierate are reached only when all the other mechanisms are exhausted, to pretend to give up that form in order to take one of the preceding ones is, in my opinion, a badly conceived project. For no other one can suffice for any people that has been able to tolerate that one. But without wanting to abandon one for the other, it is nonetheless useful to know which of the three is worth the most. We have just seen that by a rather natural analogy, the Polysynody already deserves preference;[85] it remains to be examined whether this can be confirmed by the examination of the things themselves. But before beginning this examination, let us start with a more precise idea of the form the Polysysnody ought to have according to our Author.

Chapter IV.
Division and Departments of the Councils

The Government of a large State such as France includes within it eight principal objects which ought to form the same number of departments and consequently each one has its separate council. These eight parts are justice, public order, finance, commerce, maritime, war, foreign affairs, and those of Religion. There should be in addition a ninth Council, forming the liaison among all the others, which unites all the parts of the government, where important matters treated and discussed for the last time await only the Prince's will for their final decision, and which—thinking and working for him as needed—make up for his absence when illnesses, nonage, old age, or aversion to labor prevent the King from performing his functions. Thus this general Council should always be in place, whether for present necessity or as a precaution for future need.

Chapter V.
Manner of Composing Them

With regard to the manner of composing these Councils, the most advantageous that can be used appears to be the method of the Ballot; for, by any other route, it is evident that the Synody will be only apparent; since the Councils are filled only by Creatures of the favorites, there will be no real freedom in the votes, and there will be only a true vizierate or demi-vizierate under other names. I will not expound here on the method and advantages of the Ballot; since it constitutes one of the outstanding points of the Abbé de St. Pierre's System of Government, I discuss it elsewhere at greater length.[86] I will be satisfied to note that whatever form of Ministry one adopts, there is no other method by which one can be assured of always giving preference to the truest merit, a reason which shows the advantage rather than the ease of having the Ballot adopted by the Courts of Kings.

This first precaution presupposes others that make it useful; for it would be of little use to choose by Ballot among people one did not know, and one could not know the capabilities of those whom one has not seen working in the field for which they are intended. If, then, there must be ranks in the military from Ensign up to Marshall of France to train young officers and make them capable of the functions they must someday fulfill, is it not even more important to establish similar ranks in the Civil administration, from Clerks to Presidents of the Councils? Is less time and experience needed to learn to lead a People than to command an army? Is the knowledge of a Statesman[87] easier to acquire than that of a Warrior?[88] Or is good order less necessary to political economy than to military discipline? Scrupulously observed ranks were the school of many of the great men produced by the Republic of Venice, and why would we not begin from the same point in Paris to serve the prince as in Venice to serve the State?

I am not unaware that the self-interest of the viziers is opposed to this new public order.[89] I well know that they do not want to be subjected to forms that hamper their Despotism, that they want to employ only Creatures who are entirely devoted to them and whom they can relegate by a single word to the dust from which they drew them. A well-born man, for his part, who feels for this crowd of valets only the scorn they deserve, disdains competing with them in the same career, and the Government of the State is always ready to fall prey to the dregs of its Citizenry. Thus it is not at all in the vizierate, but in the polysynody alone that one can hope to establish honest ranks in the civil administration, which presuppose not baseness but merit, and which can bring the nobility back to the affairs from which one pretends to distance it and which it pretends to scorn in turn.

Chapter VI.
Rotation of Departments

From the establishment of ranks follows the necessity of having departments rotate among the members of each Council, and even from one Council to another, so that each member, successively enlightened about all the parts of the Government, becomes capable someday of offering an opinion in the general Council and participating in the overall administration.

This vision of making the departments circulate is drawn from the Regent, who established it in the Council of finances; and if the authority of a man who knew the mechanisms of government so well is not enough to have it adopted, at least one cannot disagree about the palpable advantages that would emerge from this method. Doubtless there might be cases where this rotation would appear of little utility or difficult to establish in the polysynody: But it is never impossible there, and never practicable in either the vizierate or the demi-vizierate. Now it is important, for many very strong reasons, to establish a form of administration in which this rotation can take place. 1. First, to prevent embezzlements by Clerks who, changing offices with their masters, will not have the time to organize their cheating as conveniently as they do today. Add that being, so to speak, at the discretion of their successors, when they change departments they will be more cautious about leaving the affairs of the one they are leaving in a condition that could lead to their ruin if by chance their successor happened to be an honest man or their enemy. 2. In the second place, to oblige the councillors themselves to keep better watch over their behavior or that of their Clerks, for fear of being accused of negligence and even worse when their management constantly changes objects, and each time will be known by their successor. 3. To stimulate praiseworthy emulation among the members of the same body for whoever goes beyond his predecessor in the same labor. 4. By these frequent changes, to correct the abuses that the errors, prejudices, and passions of each subject will have introduced into his administration. For, amid so many different characters who will successively direct the same part, their mistakes will cancel each other out, and everything will go more constantly toward the common object. 5. To give each member of a council more precise and extensive knowledge of matters and their various relations, so that, having handled the other parts, he might see distinctly how his fits into the whole, so that he might not always believe he is the most important person in the State, and not harm the general good in order to do the good of his own department better. 6. In order that all opinions be better informed, each understand all the matters about which he must give an opinion, and a greater uniformity of enlightenment give more harmony and reason to the shared deliberations. 7. In order to exercise the mind and talents of Ministers: for, tending to rest and to dwell on a single piece of work, they finally make it only a routine that constricts and circumscribes genius by habit so to speak. Now attention is to the mind what exercise is to the body. It is what gives it vigor and skill, and makes it suited to endure labor. Thus it may be said that each Councillor of State, after several years of rotation returning to the work of his first department, will really find himself more capable of doing it than if he had not had any change from it. I do not deny that, if he had stayed in the same department, he would have acquired greater facility in expediting the affairs connected with it; but I say they would have been less well done, because he would have had more limited views, and he would not have acquired such precise knowledge of the relations between these affairs and those of other departments: so that, what he loses in one area by rotating is more than offset by what he gains in another. 8. Finally, in order to conserve more equality in power, more independence among the Councillors of State, and consequently more freedom in the votes. Otherwise, in a Council that appears numerous, there would really be only two or three opinion givers to whom all the others would be subjugated, approximately like those who in Rome used to be called *Senatores pedarii,* who usually paid less attention to an opinion than to its author: a drawback all the more dangerous because the need to manage votes is never in favor of the better faction.

This rotation of departments could be carried even further by extending it to the Presidency itself. For if it was to the advantage of the Roman Republic that at the end of the year Consuls returned to being simple senators while waiting for a new Consulate, why would it not be to the advantage of the Kingdom for Presidents to return after two or three years to being simple Councillors, while waiting for a new Presidency? Would it not be, so to speak, offering a reward every three years to those of the Company who, during this interval, distinguished themselves[90] in their Body? Would it not be a new spring well suited to maintaining the movement of the Public machine in constant activity? And isn't the true secret of animating the common labor always to have the recompense proportionate to it?

Chapter VII.
Other Advantages of This Rotation

I will not go into detail about the advantages of rotation carried to this last degree. Everyone must see that the removals necessitated by the senility or weakening of Presidents will thus be done without harshness and effortlessly; that the Ex-presidents of the particular Councils will still have a goal for promotion which will be to sit in the general Council, and the members of this Council will have the goal of being able to preside there when their turn comes; that this alternation between subordination and authority will make each of them simultaneously more perfect and milder; that this rotation of the presidency is the surest way to prevent the polysynody from being able to degenerate into a vizierate; and that, in general, because rotation spreads the enlightenment and power of the ministry more equally among several members, Royal authority more easily dominates over each of them: All that should leap to the eyes of an intelligent Reader, and if it were necessary to say everything, nothing could be condensed.

Chapter VIII.
That Polysynody is the Most Natural Administration by Subordination

For the same reason I stop here over the form of the polysynody, after having established the general principles on which it is to be ordered so as to become useful and lasting. If some trouble is presented at first, it is because it is always difficult to keep together for a long period two governments as different in their maxims as the monarchic and the Republican are, although basically this union perhaps might produce a perfect whole and the masterpiece of politics. Careful distinction must therefore be made between the apparent form,[91] which reigns everywhere, and the real form being discussed here; for in a sense it can be said that Polysynody is the first and most natural of all administrations by subordination, even in monarchy.

Indeed, just as the first national laws were made by the nation assembled as a body, so the first deliberations of the Prince were made with the Principal People of the national assembled as a council. The Prince has Councillors before he has viziers; he finds the former and makes the latter. The highest ranking Order in the State naturally forms the Synod or general Council. When the Monarch is elected, he has only to preside and everything is done: But when a minister or favorites must be chosen, an arbitrary form begins to be introduced in which intrigue and natural inclination play a much greater role than reason or the voice of the People. It is no less simple that in the many affairs of different natures presented by government, the national Parlement divides itself into various Committees always presided over by the King, who assigns to each one the matters about which they ought to deliberate; and thus the particular Councils emerged from the general Council of which they are the natural members, and synody changed into polysynody, a form which I do not claim is the best in that state, but rather the first and most natural.

Chapter IX.
And the Most Useful

Let us consider now the right end of government and the obstacles that move government away from it. This end is without contradiction the greatest interest of the State and the King; these obstacles are, besides lack of enlightenment, the private interest of administrators; from which it follows that the more constraint and opposition these private interests encounter, the less they counterbalance the public interest; so that if they can collide and destroy each other, however lively they are assumed to be, they would become null in deliberations, and the public interest alone would be heeded. What surer way can there be, then, to annihilate all these private interests than to set them against each other by multiplying those who state opinions? What makes interests private is that they are not in agreement, for if they were it would no longer be a private interest but a common one. Now by having all these interests destroy one another, what remains is the public interest which ought to gain in the deliberation everything the private interests lose.

When a Vizier states an opinion to his master without a witness, what constraint is there then on his personal interest? Does he need much skill to deceive a man as limited as Kings ordinarily must be, circumscribed by everything surrounding them in such a small circle of enlightenment?

When they are personally advantageous to him, who is to prevent him from using falsified explanations, specious pretexts, sophistical reasoning to resolve the Prince in favor of the most deadly undertakings with the great words *honor of the Crown and good of the State?* Certainly it is pure chance if two private interests as active as those of the vizier and the Prince allow some influence for the public interest during deliberations in chambers.

I know very well that Councillors of State will be men just as viziers are; I have no doubt that just like them, they might often have private interests that conflict with those of the nation, and gladly prefer the former to the latter when they state their opinion. But in an assembly where all the members are clear-sighted and do not have the same interests, each one would try in vain to make the others agree to what suits him exclusively. Without persuading anyone, he would only make himself suspected of corruption and infidelity. Much as he will want to fail in his duty, he will not dare try to do it or will try in vain in the midst of so many observers. He will then make a virtue of necessity, publicly sacrificing his private interest to the good of the fatherland, and whether reality or hypocrisy, the effect will be the same in this case for the good of society. It is then because a very powerful private interest, which is that of his reputation, coincides with the public interest. Whereas a vizier who knows how to use the obscurity of Chambers to keep State secrets hidden from all eyes, always flatters himself that no one can distinguish what he appears to be doing for the public interest from what he really is doing for his own; and since, after all, this vizier is dependent only on his master whom he easily deceives, he is bothered very little by the muttering of everyone else.

Chapter X.
Other Advantages

Flowing from this first advantage, one can see a host of others that cannot take place without it. First, the resolutions of the State will less often be based on errors of fact, because it will not be as easy for those who report the facts to disguise them before an enlightened assembly, where there will almost always be other witnesses to the matter, than before a Prince who has seen nothing except through the eyes of his vizier. Now it is certain that the majority of State resolutions are dependent on knowledge of the facts, and it can even be said that in general one hardly adopts false opinions except by assuming facts that are false to be true or facts that are true to be false. In the second place, taxes will be taken to a less unbearable excess when the Prince can be enlightened about the genuine condition of his People and about their genuine needs. But will he not find this enlightenment more easily in a Council of which several members will not be handling finances at all or having any precautions to maintain rather than in a vizier who wants to excite the passions of his master, manipulate the rascals in favor, enrich his creatures, and play his hand for himself? We also see that women will have less power and consequently the State will be better off. For it is easier for a scheming woman to position one vizier than fifty Councillors, and to seduce one man than a whole College. It is seen that business will no longer be suspended or upset by the removal of a vizier; that it will be more precisely expedited when, bound by common deliberation, its execution is nonetheless divided among several councillors, each of whom has his department, than when everything has to leave the same Office: that political systems will be better followed and regulations much better observed when there are no longer any revolutions in the Ministry: and then every vizier will no longer make it a point of honor to destroy all the useful things established by his predecessor, so that one will be sure when a project is formed that it will no longer be abandoned except when its execution has been recognized to be impossible or bad.

To all these consequences, add two more, no less certain but even more important, that are only their final result and ought to confer on them a value that nothing counterbalances in the eyes of the true Citizen. The first is that in a labor in common, merit, talents, and integrity will be more easily known and rewarded, either in the members of the Councils who will constantly be in each other's sight and that of the whole State, or in the entire Kingdom where no noteworthy actions, no men worthy of being distinguished can escape for long the notice of an assembly that wants and is able to see everything, and where the jealousy and emulation of its members often bring them to make creatures whose worth surpasses those of their rivals. The second and last consequence is that when honors and tasks are distributed with more equity and reason, when the interest of the State and Prince are better listened to in deliberations, the better expedited business and more honored merit must necessarily arouse in the hearts of the People that love of the Fatherland which is the most powerful spring of a wise government and which is never extinguished in Citizens except by the fault of the Leaders.

Such are the necessary effects of a form of government that forces private interest to yield to the general interest. Polysynody offers still other advantages that confer new value on these. Numerous and enlightened assemblies will furnish more enlightenment about expedients, and experience confirms that the deliberations of a senate are in general wiser and better digested than those of a vizier. There is more ruse and secrecy in the vizierate, but there is more rectitude and enlightenment in the synody.[92] Kings will be better informed about their business; they will be unable to attend Council meetings without learning about them, for they dare to speak the truth in them, and the members of each Council will have the greatest interest in the Prince's assiduous attendance in order to maintain its power or authorize its resolutions. There will be fewer vexations and injustices on the part of the stronger, for a Council will be more accessible to the oppressed than the throne is. They will run less risk in bringing their complaints to it, and will always find some members there to be better protectors against the violence of the others than under the vizierate against a single man who can do everything, or against a demivizier who has agreed with all his colleagues to refer to each of them the judgment of complaints brought against him. The State will suffer less from nonage, weakness, or senility of the Prince. There will never be a minister powerful enough to become a threat to his master, if he is of high birth, or to push aside and displease the Great if he is of low birth; consequently, on the one hand there will be less leaven for civil wars, and, on the other, more security for the preservation of the rights of the Royal House. There will also be fewer foreign wars, because there will be fewer people interested in instigating them and they will have less power to do so successfully. Finally, the Throne will be strengthened in all ways; the will of the Prince—which is or ought to be only the public will—better executed, and consequently the nation happier.

Besides, my Author himself agrees that the execution of his plan would not be equally advantageous at all times, and that there are moments of crisis and trouble when extraordinary Commissions must be substituted for permanent Councils, and that when finances, for example, are in definite disorder they must necessarily be handed over to a single man to unravel, as Henri IV did to Rosni[93] and Louis XIV to Colbert. Which would mean that Councils are good for making things work only when they are working by themselves; indeed, to say nothing about the polysynody of the Regent, one knows the laughter provoked in thorny circumstances by that ridiculous council of reason stupidly requested by the notables of the assembly of Rouen and cleverly granted by Henri IV.[94] But since the finances of Republics are generally better administered than those of Monarchies, it is believable that they will be better or at least more faithfully administered by a Council than by a Minister. And that if, perhaps, a Council is initially less capable of the activity necessary to extract them from a state of disorder, it is also less subject to the negligence or unfaithfulness that makes them fall into it. This should not be understood to be true of a temporary and subordinate assembly, but of a genuine polysynody where the Councils really have the power they appear to have, where the administration of affairs is not taken away from them by Demi-viziers, and where under the specious names of *Council of State* or *Council of Finance,* these bodies are not merely tribunals of justice or Accounting chambers.

Chapter XI.
Conclusion

Although the advantages of Polysynody are not without drawbacks, and the drawbacks of the other forms of administration are not without at least apparent advantages, whoever makes the parallel between them impartially will find that the polysynody has no essential drawbacks that a good government cannot easily tolerate, whereas all those of the vizierate and Demi-vizierate attack the very foundations of the constitution; That an uninterrupted administration can perfect itself constantly, a progress impossible in the gaps and revolutions of the Vizierate; That the even and unified progression of a Polysynody compared with a few brilliant moments of the vizierate is a coarse sophism which cannot deceive a true political thinker, because there is a great difference between the rare and fleeting administration of a good vizier and the general form of the vizierate in which centuries of disorder always follow a few years of good conduct. That diligence and secrecy, the only true advantages of the vizierate, far more necessary in bad governments than in good ones, are weak substitutions[95] for good order, justice, and foresight, which prevent ills instead of remedying them; That these substitutions can still be obtained if need be in the Polysynody through extraordinary commissions, whereas the vizierate never has a similar recourse for the advantages it lacks; That even the example of the ancient Senate of Rome and that of Venice proves that commissions are not always necessary in a Council to expedite the most important affairs promptly and secretly; That the vizierate and the Demi-vizierate which debase, corrupt, and degrade the lower orders would nevertheless require perfect men in this first rank; that one can scarcely rise in it or maintain oneself in it except by dint of crimes, nor behave well in it except by dint of virtues; that, always an obstruction to itself this way, the government continually engenders the vices that deprave it, and consuming the State to reinforce itself, finally perishes like a building one wanted to erect with materials constantly taken from its foundations.[96] This is the most important consideration in the eyes of the Statesman, and the one upon which I am going to end.

The best form of government, or at least the most durable one, is the one which makes men the way it needs them to be. Let us allow the Readers to reflect on this axiom; they will apply it with ease.

Judgment on the Polysynody

Of all the Abbé de St. Pierre's works, the Discourse on the Polysynody is, in my opinion, the most deeply thought out, the best reasoned, the one in which the fewest repetitions are found, and even the best written, praise for which the wise author would have cared very little, but which is not indifferent to superficial Readers. Also this piece of writing was only a rough sketch which he claimed not to have time to abridge, but which in fact he did not have time to spoil out of the wish to say everything. And God protect an impatient reader from his sort of abridgements!

In this discourse, he was even able to avoid the reproach that occurs so easily to the ignorant, who know how to measure the possible only by the existing, or to the wicked, who find good only what is useful for their wickedness, when one shows both of them that what is could be better. I say he evaded that strong grip which habitual foolishness almost always has on the new views of reason, with those cutting words *projects in the air* and *reveries.* For when he was writing in favor of the Polysynody he found it established in his Country. Always peaceful and sensible, he took pleasure in showing his Compatriots the advantages of the Government to which they were subject; he made a reasonable and discreet comparison between that and the one whose rigors they had just experienced; he praised the System of the ruling Prince; he deduced its advantages; he showed those that could be added to it, and the very additions he asked for consisted less, according to him, in changes to be made than in the art of perfecting what had been done. One part of these views had occurred to him under the reign of Louis XIV; but he had had the wisdom to remain silent about them until the interest of the State, that of the Government, and his own allowed him to publish them.

It must be acknowledged, however, that, although the name was the same, there was a vast difference between the Polysynody that existed and the one proposed by the Abbé de St. Pierre; and, with the slightest reflection about it, one will find that the administration he cited as an example served him far more as a pretext than as a model for the one he had imagined. He even rather skillfully transformed the defects to be noted in the Regent's system into objections against his own system, and under the name of replies to his[97] objections, he showed both these defects and their remedies without danger. It is not impossible that the Regent, although often praised in this writing in turns of phrase that do not lack cleverness,[98] saw through the subtlety of this criticism, and that he abandoned the Abbé de St. Pierre as much out of annoyance as out of weakness, more offended perhaps by the defects that were found in his own work than he was flattered by the advantages that were noticed in it. Perhaps, too, he felt ill will toward him for having, in a sense, unveiled his secret aims by showing that his establishment was as far as it could possibly be from what it should be in order to become advantageous to the State and assume a fixed and stable position. Indeed, one sees clearly that it was the form of the Polysynody established under the Regency that the Abbé de St. Pierre accused of being capable of degenerating too easily into a Demi-vizierate and even into a Vizierate; of being susceptible, just as both of them are, to corruption within its members and to collaboration among them against the public interest; of never having any security for its duration other than the will of the Reigning Monarch; finally, of being suited only to hardworking Princes, and consequently of being more often contrary than favorable to good order and the expediting of affairs. It was the hope of remedying these various drawbacks that prompted him to propose a different Polysynody, entirely different from the one he pretended to want only to perfect.

The conformity of the names must not, then make one confuse his project with that ridiculous Polysynody with which he wanted to authorize his own, but which was even then[99] derisively called the seventy ministers, and which was reformed after several months without having accomplished anything except to spoil everything. For the way this administration had been established shows well enough that there had not been much concern about having it work better, and that far more consideration had been given to making the parlement despised by the People than really to giving its members the authority that was feigned to be vested in them. It was a trap for the intermediary powers similar to the one Henri IV had already set for them at the assembly of Rouen, a trap into which vanity will always make them fall and which will always humiliate them.[100] The Political order and the civil order in Monarchies have such different Principles and such opposite rules that it is almost impossible to combine the two administrations, and in general the members of Tribunals are little suited to Councils, either because the habit of formalities is harmful to the expedition of business which calls for no formalities, or because there is a natural incompatibility between what are called maxims of State and justice and Laws. Moreover, leaving the facts aside, I myself believe that the Prince and the Philosopher could both be right without agreeing on their system. For the temporary and often stormy administration of a Regency is one thing, and a lasting and constant form of government that ought to be part of the constitution of the State is another. Here, it seems to me, is found the ordinary defect of the Abbé de St. Pierre, which is never to apply his views well enough to the men, the times, and the circumstances, and always to offer as facilitating factors for the execution of a project, advantages that often become obstacles to it. In the plan in question, he wanted to modify, by means completely foreign to its present constitution, a government whose long duration caused it to decline. He wanted to restore that universal vigor which places the whole person, so to speak, in action. It was as though he had said to a decrepit and gouty old man: walk, work, use your arms and legs; exercise is good for your health.

Indeed, nothing less than a revolution is at issue in the Polysynody, and just because at present we see Councils in the Courts of Princes and it is Councils that are proposed, one must not believe there is little difference between one system and the other. The difference is so great that it would be necessary to begin by destroying everything that exists to give the Government the form imagined by the Abbé de St. Pierre; and no one is ignorant of how dangerous the moment of anarchy and crisis is that necessarily precedes a new establishment in a large State. The introduction of the ballot alone had to cause terrible upheaval, and give each part a convulsive and continual movement rather than new vigor to the body. Judge the danger of rousing up just once the enormous masses that compose the French monarchy! Who will be able to hold back the disturbance produced or foresee all the effects it can produce? Even if all the advantages of the new plan were incontestable, what man of sense would dare undertake to abolish the old customs, change the old maxims, and give the State a different form than the one to which it was gradually led over a period of thirteen hundred years? Whether the current government is still that of former times, or whether it has imperceptibly changed its nature over the centuries, it is still equally imprudent to tamper with it. If it is the same, it must be respected. If it has degenerated, it is by the force of time and things, and human wisdom cannot do anything further about it. It is not enough to consider the means one wants to use without considering also the men one wants to make use of. Now when an entire Nation no longer knows how to attend to anything except silliness, what attention can it give to great things, and in a country where Music has become an affair of State,[101] will the affairs of State be anything but songs? When one sees all of Paris in fermentation over a position for a Mountebank or a Fine wit, and the business of the academy or the Opera cause the interest of the Prince and the glory of the Nation to be forgotten, what can be hoped for from public affairs brought closer to such a People and shifted from the Court to the City? What confidence can be placed in balloting for Councils when balloting for an Academy is seen to be in the power of women? Will they be any less eager to select ministers than learned men, or will they be more knowledgeable about politics than they are about eloquence? It is very much to be feared that such establishments in countries where morals are ridiculed will not be made with tranquility, will not be maintained without difficulties, and will not give forth the best subjects.[102]

Besides, without opening up that old question of the venality of offices, which can be debated only among people provided with more money than merit, can any practical way be imagined to abolish this venality in France? Or would it be thought that venality could subsist in one part of the government and the ballot in the other, the one in the Tribunals, the other in the Councils, and that only places remaining in good favor would be left to elections? It would be necessary to have very shortsighted and false views to want to mesh such dissimilar things, and found[103] a single system on such different Principles. But let us leave these applications and consider the thing in itself.

What are the circumstances under which a hereditary Monarchy can be tempered without revolutions by forms that bring it closer to an aristocracy? Can or should the intermediate bodies between the Prince and the People have a jurisdiction independent of both, or, if they are precarious and dependent on the Prince, can they ever enter the constitution of the State as integral parts and even have real influence on affairs? These are preliminary questions that required discussion and do not appear easy to resolve. For if it is true that the natural tendency is always toward corruption and consequently toward Despotism, it is difficult to see what resources of Policy the prince could use, even if he wanted, to give this tendency an opposite direction which could not be changed by his successors or their Ministers. The Abbé de St. Pierre did not claim, it is true, that his new form took anything away from Royal authority; for he gives Councils the deliberation about matters, and leaves the decision to the King alone. He says that, without preventing the King from doing everything he wants, these different Councils will often preserve him from wanting things that are harmful to his glory and happiness; they will carry the torch of truth before him to show him the best path and protect him from traps. But could this enlightened man dazzle himself with such bad arguments? Did he hope that the eyes of Kings could see objects through the glasses of wise men? Did he not feel that either the deliberations of Councils would soon become an empty formality or that the Royal authority would be impaired by them, and did he not himself admit that it introduced a mixed government, in which the Republican form was combined with the Monarchical? Indeed, numerous Bodies that would not be entirely of the Prince's choosing, and would not have any power by themselves would soon become a useless burden to the State; without making affairs go better, they would only delay their expedition by lengthy formalities, and, to use his own terms, would be only show Councils. The Prince's favorites, who are rarely the Public's, and who consequently would have little influence in Councils formed by ballot, would decide all matters by themselves; the Prince would never attend Councils without having already made up his mind about everything to be debated there, or would never leave them without consulting again in his Chambers and with his favorites about the resolutions that had been passed; in the end, the councils would necessarily have to become contemptible, ridiculous, and totally useless or Kings would have to lose their power;[104] an alternative to which the latter will certainly not expose themselves even if it were to result in the greatest good for the State and themselves.

Those, it seems to me, are just about the directions from which the Abbé de St. Pierre should have considered the basis of his system in order to establish its principles well; but instead of that, he amuses himself by resolving fifty bad objections which were not worth the trouble of examining or, worse still, giving bad replies himself when good ones naturally presented themselves, as though he sought to adopt his opponents' turn of mind in order to lead them back to reason rather than the language of reason to convince wise men.

For example, after raising the objection that in the Polysysnody each of the Councillors has his own general Plan, and that this diversity necessarily produces contradictory decisions and hindrances in the overall movement, he replies to this that there can be no other general plan than to seek to perfect the regulations that cover all parts of the Government. Isn't the best plan of government, he says, the one that proceeds most directly to the greatest good of the State in each particular affair? From which he draws the very false conclusion that neither the various general plans nor consequently the regulations and affairs related to them can ever conflict or be mutually harmful.

Indeed, the greatest good of the State is not always such a clear thing, nor one that depends as much as one might believe on the greatest good of each part; as if the same affairs could not have an infinity of different orders and connections more or less strong among them, which cause just as many differences in the general plans. These well-digested Plans are always two-sided, and include in a comparative system the present form of the State and its form perfected according to the Author's views. Now this perfection in a whole as complex as the body politic does not depend solely on the perfection of each part, just as in arranging a Palace it is not sufficient to organize each of its rooms well, but it is necessary in addition to consider the overall relations, the most suitable connections, the most convenient order, the easiest communication, the most perfect ensemble, and the most regular symmetry. These general objects are so important that, for the better of the whole, the skillful Architect sacrifices a thousand particular advantages he might have preserved in a less perfect and less simple arrangement. In the same way, the Political Thinker does not look in particular at either finance, or war, or commerce, but relates all these parts to a common object; and from the proportions that best suit them result the general plans whose dimensions can vary in a thousand ways according to the ideas and views of those who formed them, either by seeking the greatest perfection of the whole, or by seeking the easiest execution, without it being easy sometimes to discern which of these plans deserves preference. Now one can say of these Plans that, if each Council and each Councillor has his own, there will be only contradictions in affairs and hindrance to the common movement: But instead of belonging to this man or that, the general Plan should be, and in fact in the Polysynody is, only that of the Government, and it is to this great model that the common deliberations of each Council and the particular work of each member necessarily relate. It is even very certain that such a plan is conceived and preserved better in the care of a Council than in the head of a Minister and even a Prince. For each Vizier has his plan that is never that of his predecessor, and each Demi-Vizier also has his which is neither that of his predecessor nor that of his colleague: Thus we generally see Republics change systems less than Monarchies. From which I conclude, along with the Abbé de St. Pierre, but for different reasons, that the Polysysnody is more favorable to the unity of the general Plan than the Vizierate and the demi-Vizierate.

With regard to the particular form of his polysynody and the details he goes into to determine it, all that is well perceived and very good separately to prevent the difficulties that each thing should remedy: But when it comes to its execution, I do not know if enough harmony would prevail in the thing as a whole; for it seems that the establishment of ranks fits badly with that of rotation; and balloting even worse with each of them, besides, if the establishment is dangerous to do, it is to be feared that, even after the establishment is done, these different jurisdictions might cause a thousand hindrances and a thousand breakdowns in the working of the machine when the time comes to make it run.[105]

The rotation of the Presidency in particular would be an excellent means to prevent the Polysynody from quickly degenerating into a Vizierate, if that rotation could last and were not stopped by the will of the Prince in favor of the first of the Presidents who had the much sought after art of pleasing him. That is to say that the Polysynody will last until the King finds a Vizier to his liking; but under the Vizierate itself, there is no Vizier any earlier than that. It is a weak remedy whose virtue fades at the approach of the evil it is supposed to cure!

Is it not still another bad expedient to give us the necessity of obtaining the votes a second time as a brake to prevent Presidents from abusing their influence the first time? Will it not be quicker and safer to abuse it to the point of no longer having anything to do with votes; and doesn't our Author himself grant Princes the right to prolong Presidents at will if necessary, that is, to make them genuine viziers? How could he not notice a thousand times in the course of his life and his writings what an empty occupation it is to seek enduring forms for a state of things that always depends on the will of a single man?

These difficulties did not escape the Abbé de St. Pierre, but it may have suited him better to disguise them than to resolve them. When he talks about these contradictions and pretends to reconcile them, it is by such absurd means and such unreasonable arguments that one sees very well he is perplexed or that he is not proceeding in good faith. Would it be believable that he would have put forward so inappropriately and included among these means love of the fatherland, the public good, the desire for true glory, and other chimeras long since vanished, or traces of which remain only in a few small republics? Did he seriously think that anything of all that could really have influence in a monarchical form of government? And after having cited the Greeks, the Romans, and even a few moderns who had ancient souls, doesn't he himself admit that it would be ridiculous to base the constitution of the State on dead maxims? What does he do, then, to take the place of these foreign means whose inadequacy he recognizes? He replaces one difficulty with another, establishes one system on top of another, and founds his Polysynody on his European Republic. "Couldn't this Republic," he says, "being the guarantor of the execution of the Imperial Capitulations for Germany, of the Parliamentary Capitulations for England, of the *Pacta Conventa* for Poland,[106] also be the guarantor of royal capitulations about the form of the Government signed at the Coronation of Kings, when that form would be passed as a fundamental Law? And, after all, is not protecting

Kings from falling into the Tyranny of a Nero protecting them and their posterity from total ruin?"

"It is possible," he goes on to say, "to pass the regulation for the Polysynody in the form of a fundamental Law in the Estates General of the Kingdom, have it sworn at the coronation of the Kings, and give it thereby the same authority as the Salic law."

The pen falls from one's hands when one sees a sensible man seriously propose such expedients.

Let us not leave this matter without casting a general glance at the three forms of ministry compared in this work.

The vizierate is the last resource of a faltering State. It is a palliative sometimes necessary to restore a certain apparent vigor for a while: But in this form of administration, there is a multiplication of forces altogether superfluous in a healthy government. The Monarch and the Vizier are two exactly similar machines, one of which becomes useless as soon as the other is in motion: For indeed, as Grotius put it, *qui regit, rex est.*[107] Thus the State bears a double weight that produces only a simple effect. Add to this that a large part of the force of the Vizierate, being used to make the Vizier necessary and maintain his position, is useless or harmful to the State. Thus the Abbé de St. Pierre with reason calls the Vizierate a form of government that is crude, barbarous, pernicious for Peoples, dangerous for Kings, deadly for Royal houses, and it can be said that there is no more deplorable government in the world than one where the People is reduced to desiring a Vizier. As to the demi-Vizierate, it is advantageous under a King who knows how to govern and bring together in his hands all the reins of the State; but under a weak Prince or one who works little, this administration is bad, cumbersome, without system and vision, for want of connection among its parts and agreement among the Ministers, especially if one among them, more skillful or more wicked than the others, tends in secret toward the Vizierate. Then everything happens as court intrigues, the State remains languishing, and to discover the reason for everything that is done under such a government, one must ask not what purpose it serves, but who is harmed by it.

As for the Polysynody of the Abbé de St. Pierre, I cannot see that it could be useful or practicable in any genuine Monarchy, but solely in a kind of mixed Government, where the Leader is only the President of the Councils, has only the executive power, and can do nothing on his own: And I still cannot believe that such an administration could last long without abuses: for the interests of partial social groups are neither less distinct from those of the State nor less pernicious to the Republic than those of private individuals, and they even have an added disadvantage that people glory in sustaining at any cost whatsoever the rights and pretensions of a body of which they are members, and that what would be dishonorable in preferring oneself to others disappears when one favors a large social group of which one is a part, by dint of being a good senator, one finally becomes a bad citizen. That is what makes Aristocracy the worst of sovereignties.* This is what would make the polysynody possibly the worst of all Ministries.

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*I would wager that a thousand people will again find here a contradiction with the *Social Contract*. That proves that there are even more readers who should learn to read, than authors who should learn to be consistent.[108]

[Fragments on the Polysynody]

[In the Form of a Dialogue between the Abbé de St. Pierre and Me, Rousseau]

1. PREFACE. THE ABBÉ: *One should not confuse here two very different things, the government of this or that Vizier with the Vizierate in general. It can happen that a Vizier might be of an excellent mind, very industrious, very temperate, of perfect health; it can happen that he has no intention of enriching or elevating his house, his relatives, his friends; or that he might be always solely and strongly occupied with justice and the good of the State; it can even happen that he might be capable of preferring these*[109] *sorts of interest to his own reputation: But there is an infinite difference between the Government of such a Vizier for twenty or thirty years, and the Vizierate which I assume to be a permanent form of government, etc.*[110]

ME: Thus it is a question of knowing whether in the selection of a form of government one must stop at the one that in the natural order of things ought to have a degree of goodness, or at the one that will be able to be much more excellent in truth; but only in rare and almost miraculous circumstances. Moreover, new vizier, new maxims, all the good arrangements of the preceding one are soon destroyed by his successor.

2. THE ABBÉ: *I maintain that, before his death, a perfect Vizier could do nothing better than to establish the Polysynody in the very State he was governing.*

ME: Is there any Vizier, as perfect as one wants to assume him to be, who would not be delighted to have his administration mourned for and who would want to leave one after him that would be worth more than his own?

3. THE ABBÉ: *An establishment as vast as the Polysynody which has not yet had in the world an excellent model and which demands such a great overturning* ought not to be judged by the first years of its exercise *nor to acquire its perfection in such little time.*

Me: . . . beside the point, for Scipio it was not a question of establishing a new practice, but of following one completely established, furthermore in proposing this expedient he himself agrees that different ones are needed for a country where love of the fatherland is dead.

. . . as when he [the abbé] wants love of the fatherland to bind the presidents in charge at present voluntarily to renounce the perpetual presidency and make the sacrifice of precedence to the duty of the citizen and he cites Scipio the Great serving under his brother against Antiochus[111] without accounting for the fact that the Romans come here for [. . .]

4. Me: The majority of the advantages that he [the abbé] deduces from his Polysynody once established appear to me perfectly demonstrated. But when he wants to demonstrate in addition the ease of establishing this polysynody, he writes nothing but verbiage: it is even worse when he wants to assure for this establishment a duration of which it is not susceptible in a monarchy, and to reconcile the supreme authority of the prince with the unshakable form of the councils. When one wants to reason and instruct oneself one must not follow the Author that far, And one must know how to separate what he said for making a project useful from what he said for making it adopted.[112]

5. Preface of the Polysynody. He [the abbé] begs his adversaries *to use against him only the same method that he uses against them, [and to] resolve to battle with equal arms and to proceed not with the emphasis of declamation nor with the subtle shafts of a playful satire that amuses without proving anything: but simply and methodically by dividing, by defining and by the common terms of first and of second, so that the reader can more conveniently compare their proofs to his own, his objections to theirs and finally system to system.*

6. Instead of resolving an objection drawn from the resistance of particular individuals, he [the abbé] often rests content with showing public utility of the thing, as if the Prince[113] himself could follow his self-interest against that of the people who surround him.

7. The Abbé: *Men are not fortunate enough not to have any drawbacks at all to fear whatever form of government they might choose; but the most dangerous is the one or ones which have authority [and] can abuse it with impunity. That is what I call despotism. Now it is known that when the public man believes he has no accounting to render of his actions,* he is abusing, etc. sort of despotism.

8. He [the abbé] calls what causes the public interest to be preferred to the private interest, "a spring."

9. The Abbé: *I do not blame those who want to serve well and be well paid, they are just without being good.*

10. The Abbé: *The Councillors of State observe each other too much to dare to do anything contrary to the most precise duty: thus one can say that their mutual jealousy turns to the profit of the State.*

11. The Abbé: *Polysynody is the form (of government) in which the most corrupt ministers (of State) will always find it most difficult to enrich themselves excessively at the expense of the State and of the King—and consequently it is the form that is least costly to the Kingdom,* even when it otherwise would cost more.[114]

Me: For what one spends in wages, emoluments, and other legitimate gratuities is always less onerous to the nation and of less dangerous consequences for the government than the same sum lost in knavishness and embezzlement.

12. The Abbé: *The majority of votes causes the same effect as unity.*

Me: Would kings want a form of government that would go well by itself and in which they couldn't spoil anything?

13. He [the abbé] wants a great Prince, capable of governing, to put business in a condition to proceed, so to speak, by itself under a more limited leader; but, on the contrary, a good head wants to act itself and is not angry at seeing itself mourned, a weak head, weighed down by its own labors, is very far from being able to teach others to acquit themselves easily. How will a common man, who barely knows how to play the minister or the clerk, be able to play the Prince and the Master?

14. The Abbé: *Although a great genius may have nothing but his voice, he is soon recognized as such by his colleagues and consequently preferred in a ballot for the presidency and when it rotates by election he is more often president than anyone else. Thus, in his company he has an authority proportionate to his enlightenment and consequently renders to the State services proportionate to his talents.* Example *Cicero in the Senate [had nothing but his voice].*[115]

15. The Abbé: *The Ex-presidents of a council will pass to others successively in order to become capable of sitting on the general council because each vizier*

has his own which is never that of his predecessor, each demivizier also has his own which is neither that of his Predecessor nor that of his colleague.

16. *A Prime Minister would neglect very important projects of which he was not the author in order to execute others incomparably less advantageous because he imagined them.*

17. Me: Will favorites look to give, by the majority of votes, places that will no longer depend on them and with which they will no longer be able to gratify their creatures?

18. The Abbé: *Giving men a great deal of activity, private interest also gives a great deal of motion* to affairs, and this is in general what makes the monarchical government more lively and more active than the Republican. But all these motions are often irregular and convulsive, and for lack of being ordered toward a common end often [harm] trouble the entire working of the machine more than they help it.

19. The Abbé: *Women choose, not the qualities necessary for the Minister they do not know these qualities, they are not at all concerned with them, the only quality they ask from a Minister is a perfect devotion to their ambition and their whims.*

20. The Abbé: *Whims and private interests differ from wisdom and reason in this: it is that interests are always opposed in different persons while reason and the general good go in concert to the same goal.*[116]

21. The Abbé: Two general causes of revolutions. 1. Invasion by a foreign power. 2. Usurpation by a subject who has become too powerful. Now the monarchy governed most wisely and by principles directed most toward the general good will be less subject to foreign wars, and the authority shared among more members will be less great and less dangerous in the hands of each of them.

22. The Abbé: *I would rather,* he said, *be too clear and too long for some than to be too short and obscure for the great number.*

Me: How[117] did he not see on the contrary that adequately developed arguments are followed only by the small number and that one is never brief enough for the multitude, for, according to him, small oversights are not unbecoming in great subjects, where the matter is greatly at issue and the style a little, the opposite of academic discourses, in which one pays attention only to the style, because the subject is nothing.

23. The Abbé: *If divisions are engendered in the general Council, however slight the authority of the King, of the Regent, or of the Female Regent might be, it would always be great enough to pacify them.*

Me: proof that he felt very much the impairment that the Polysynody must cause in the Royal authority; perhaps this was even one of the advantages that he envisaged in that new form, but that he dissimulated out of fear of harming its establishment.
example taken from the Responses against the majority of the defects for which the Polysynody is reproached.

24. Why wouldn't twenty or thirty years of rotation give enough experience in each department to judge all of them well in the general council? Could a vizier, who decides all affairs by himself, have studied them better and ought he to know them better than twenty or thirty councillors, who have all labored successively in each? This objection resembles the one that used to be made against the undertaking of the Encyclopedia by twenty literary people, and who were accused of recklessness, although nothing was said to Chambers for having dared to execute it alone.[118]

25. The study of medicine does not require knowledge any less extensive than that of politics and nevertheless a single man.

26. The Abbé: Witticism of Grotius always going to Cardinal de Richelieu and neglecting Louis 13: *Qui Regit, Rex est.*[119]

27. The Abbé: In the administration of a Vizier who always puts his interests ahead of the public good, the more prompt and frequent the decisions are, the worse it will be for the state.

28. The Abbé: *It is as natural for an ambitious person to exempt himself from troublesome sacrifices when he has reached the first position as it is for him to make many sacrifices to reach it.*

29. The Abbé: To force each councilor every year to give a memorandum on the means of perfecting the administration of the Company of which he is a member.

30. The Abbé: one of the advantages of Polysynody is that in it one does not stupidly adopt a new project without having maturely examined

it; that the bad ones are more surely rejected in it and the good more surely accepted at one time or another.

31. THE ABBÉ: *Politics is a science in which three parts are required to excel: 1. Penetration, in order to sort out and clarify obscure issues. 2. Scope of mind to embrace and compare several aims and relations at the same time. 3. And precision to perceive easily the weakness or the strength of an argument and the necessary or unnecessary connection of means with their end.*

ME: The Abbé de St. Pierre forgets, in this division, the natural disposition that leads two men endowed with the same qualities to make different uses of them and for one to excel in one science and the other in another so that although there might have been at the time of Cardinal Richelieu, a hundred geniuses equal or superior to him in a thousand other matters, he was nevertheless the first of all in politics, not only for being more practiced in it, but also for having received the talent for it to a higher degree. It seems to me that he thinks very falsely that it is only practice and habit that lead the mind to one science rather than to the other and that a man would succeed equally in all of them if he gave them all the same application.

32. ME: From which one see clearly that the Abbé de St. Pierre did not have any marked talent at all for Politics, and that he had applied himself to it only from reason as the science most useful to men.

33. ME: Of all the qualities of the political thinker, the most necessary is a true desire to procure the public good, if genius makes one find the means to do it, it is virtue that makes one seek them; thus something other than talents is needed to govern well and[120] as soon as it is a question of someone else's interest, the head always goes badly as long as a beautiful soul does not lead it.

34. THE ABBÉ: More equality in enlightenment will produce fewer contradictions in the councils.

Various Fragments

Extirpation of the Pirates.

35. But there is no Statesman among us who does not think that as a good policy it is more important to do harm to others than good to oneself.

36. Since Italy and Spain are situated more favorably than the rest of Europe for commerce with the Ports of the Levant and the coasts of Africa, it is important to the other peoples to allow an insurmountable barrier to exist which keeps these two nations from establishing such a commerce from which they themselves profit from time to time, so that intermittently they might possibly gain more from this exclusive commerce than they lose from the seizures that the Pirates make against them during war and from the gifts they demand during peace; that at least is what must be examined.

37. [. . .] the one who believes himself capable [of being] [of changing] of forming a People ought to feel himself in a condition to change, so to [speak] the nature of men, he must transform each individual who is by himself a perfect and solitary whole, into part of a greater whole from which this individual receives in some way his life and his being [his existence], he must mutilate so to speak the constitution of man in order to [. . .]

[Plan for an Introduction to a Work on the Abbé de St. Pierre]

In projects that concern public administration, there are two things to consider, namely invention and execution. It is up to the author to show that what he is proposing is useful and practicable; it is up to the government to accept it or reject it; it is up to the wise man to judge[121] whether the two of them have done well or ill. In general the people with projects are blamed for fabricating chimeras. Ministers are also blamed for always being opposed to the good of the State. These two opinions are false and dangerous. What sensible man will believe that private interest can never be in accord with public interest or that one can propose nothing useful, or that everything that the minister adopts is necessarily good and what he rejects necessarily bad, that the government never commits an error and that nothing could be touched[122] without doing harm? For that to be true it would be necessary to think, either that everything always necessarily turns out badly, or that everything is as good as it can be, or that things have never been better nor even different than they are; it would be necessary to grant to kings the infallibility that belongs only to God, or to despair forever of the public cause. Thus reason would remain silent in its most important business. We would draw neither fruit from history, nor knowledge from our reflections, we would always go along the same course, without regard for times, for circumstances, for new needs, and, in the sublime art of governing peoples, we would conduct ourselves as automatons rather than as men.

Thus it is a prejudice to disdain a project solely because it is new, it is an even more ridiculous one to disdain it because it has not been put into execution, and to reject as impracticable everything that is not in practice. It would be another one to approve without examination all the projects that one executes and to judge things only on the opinions of the people, always suspect and often deceived, who judge them much more for themselves than for us and sometimes very poorly for themselves. These errors are harmful to society and reason is enough to protect every judicious man from them, even if he is limited, for one must not let oneself be imposed upon by those so-called secrets of politics, about which no mystery would be made if they were good to know. They are bad, or they are nothing, as it is a question only of making peoples happy, which is or ought to be the sole aim of government. The art[123] of succeeding in it has nothing dark in it, but this fatal obscurity covers springs[124] more odious than incomprehensible and that they tell us are so profound only out of fear that we might attempt to discover them.

Let us apply these principles to this work.[125] It will follow from them that, although the things that are proposed in it have not been executed, this is not to say that they could or should not be, nor that, on the contrary, this refusal is a prejudice favorable to them, nor finally that private individuals cannot judge whether the government is wrong or right in that. Several of the projects that are summarized in them were presented to the minister in their time: they were all neglected. On that occasion they were treated as chimeras and no one read them;[126] I have done my best to put them in a condition to be read. It is up to citizens to read them in the same spirit that dictated them and that abstracts them; it is up to the public to judge them.

If[127] I have stated my sentiment about them myself, I have stated my reasons for it at the same time; in that I have done only what every private individual will do who reads this book with the attention that the importance of the material demands and that I was forced to give it while recasting it. Thus my judgment is not a rule, but an example. I wish that it might be followed by all my readers and that, for the public utility, each might want to state his own opinion about it, for or against, as frankly as I have stated mine, without regard to my position as editor and without special treatment for an author whom I respect. *Amicus Plato, magis amica veritas.*[128] I do not know whether one will find in it the reason that ought to authorize all our judgments: I am certain that one will find in it at least the impartiality that honors them.

Fragments and Notes on the Abbé de St. Pierre

1

I am writing the life of a simple, honest,[129] and true man. These qualities made me love him and will doubtless make readers love him. It will not be my fault if one does not find them in his story. Those who will not be satisfied by them can dispense themselves from reading it.

The Abbé de St. Pierre was born in 1658 at the chateau of St. Pierre Eglise in basse Normandy of an illustrious family, an honor from which he was able to draw a merit by making himself illustrious, even though his ancestors might have dispensed him from that effort.

2

He had little warmth and his virtues were rather the work of his reason than of his character: but in his soul he had all the simplicity that could facilitate in him the practice of a gentle and humane Philosophy, and at the same time all the firmness necessary to make himself constantly adhere to the maxims he had constructed for himself.

3

He would have been a very wise man *if he did not have the folly* of reason. He seemed to be unaware that princes, like other men, conduct themselves only by their passions and they reason only to justify the foolish acts their passions cause them to do.

4

He had so much pleasure in seeing his machine proceed that he hardly considered the ways to make it go. His imagination perpetually deceived his reason. He gave demonstrations, it is true, but he gave demonstrations only of the effects of a cause impossible to produce and reasoned very well based on false principles.

5

His works would not have been read any more but his person might have been more respected, or if he had still been disparaged, it would only have been as a good man and not as a visionary.

6

He drew so to speak the summit of an Edifice whose foundation he needed to trace.

7

. . . although he felt how frivolous we were, he put into his writings only reason without ornaments. His defect was less to regard us as children than to speak to us as men.

8

Men, he said, are like children: one must repeat the same thing to them a hundred times for them to retain it. But a child to whom one says the same thing twice, yawns at the second and doesn't listen any more unless one forces him to. Now how does one force big children to listen other than from the pleasure of the reading? By neglecting to please readers the Abbé de St. Pierre, then, went against his own principles.

9

He did not see that if, during a Philosophic age, they excel less in works of literature and taste, they judge them better than when they did excel in them.

10

If he deigned to answer all these objections, this is not because he did not see very well the futility of doing so. But his object was to succeed and not to shine, thus he needed to answer the small minds upon whom the success of good undertakings almost always depends as carefully as the great ones who often do nothing but approve them.

11

His beneficence was not at all that of a sensitive heart seized by an ardent love for humanity. It was cold and methodical as he was. He was beneficent and he incited everyone to be so because he had found by his reasoning that it was good that one be so.

The Abbé de St. Pierre, doing good and without passion, seemed a God among men but in wanting to make them adopt his principles and make them relish his disinterested reason he made himself more of a child than they were.

12

St. Pierre

Nevertheless he had loved. This is a tribute that the wise man ought to pay one time to folly or to nature. But although this weakness might not at all have impaired his universal reason, his particular reason suffered so much from it that he was obliged to go to his province for several years to repair the hole that his errors had made to his capital.

13

How was this man of sense unaware that it is even more difficult to pardon other people for the evil one has done to them than for the evil one received from them?

14

"I know well, Sir," he said to him coldly, "that I myself am an extremely ridiculous man; but what I am telling you does not fail to be extremely sensible; and if you were ever obliged to answer it seriously, be certain that you would play a character even more ridiculous than mine."

The man in office, stung, left off joking, wanted to reason and consequently was defeated. I have this fact from the man himself.

15

The Abbé de St. Pierre.

Portrait of the Abbé de St. Pierre in *The Age of Louis XIV.*[130]

1. He believed Citizens obliged to produce a certain number of children for the Fatherland. He always had a servant the right age to produce them and slept with her every Saturday and no longer touched her as soon as she was pregnant.

   In this regard he was sparing of his pleasure in order to keep himself fit for generation for a longer time. He believed himself accountable to the public good for his prolific virtue.

He had his bastards learn a skill which was not subject to fashion. It is because of this that he did not make any wig makers.

2. On a lady[131] who thought little and spoke well: Why doesn't that woman say what I think?

3. On a discourse read to M. de Fontenelle[132] who found it insipid: it will resemble me all the more.

4. [He] said that in France everyone was a child. M. de Fontenelle asked him: what age would you say I am? Ten years old. One will see in his collections of writings that he was sometimes a child himself.

Polysynody. Upon his exclusion from the academy he had all black balls aside from a single white one, and M. de Fontenelle declared that it was his. Almost unique example of a literary Body that dishonored itself unanimously.

5. [He] was poorly received by ministers and without wanting to take notice of their poor welcome always went to his purpose; it is then above all that he needed to remind himself that he was speaking to children very proud of playing with big Dolls.

6. One is not better received in secular courts with projects advantageous to Peoples than in that of Rome when proposing the reform of the clergy.

7. The first three [years] that I passed in Paris I argued with everyone, finally, having noticed that reason never brought anyone around I stopped arguing.

8. It would be necessary, M. de Fontenelle said to him, for men to be reasonable in order to adopt your system and, if they were, they wouldn't need it.

9. What made dealing with him agreeable is that, although simple, his letters always had allusions peculiar to the person to whom he was writing, so that . . .

10. "I take pleasure everywhere," he said naively, "because I have a healthy soul."

11. The Abbé de St. Pierre saw his mistress every Saturday and stopped as soon as she was pregnant.

12. M. de Fontenelle, who was his Aristarchus,[133] having told him about his speech of reception for the French academy that the style was insipid. So much the better, said the abbé, it will resemble me all the more and it is enough for a decent man to give two hours of his life to a speech for the academy.

13. Moreover they claim that in his youthful aberrations, which age does not always make a decent man cover up, he always had the same reserve with his mistress that Zenobia formerly had with her husband.[134]
14. Men, said Dryden[135] are only big children; our inclinations change as much as theirs, and we are neither less changeable than they are nor less insatiable.
15. The Abbé de St. Pierre had written to most of the schools of the Kingdom in order to establish in each of them a prize of beneficence by majority vote of the students. I do not know whether that establishment was accepted anywhere, so much do they have the progress of genuine virtue at heart in the colleges.
16. In addressing himself to princes, he should not have been unaware that he was speaking to children who were much more children than the others and did not fail to speak reason to them as if to wise men.

16

Out of some strange vexation could one label in him as reveries projects . . .

The plan of perpetual peace was owed to Henri IV, the proportional measurement to Maréchal de Vauban,[136] the Polysynody to the Regent. He did almost nothing but perfect the ideas that greater Statesmen had had and nevertheless he is reproached for chimeras.

17

Memoranda for the Life of Monseigneur the Abbé de St. Pierre.[137]

Charles Castel de St. Pierre was born at the chateau of Saint Pierre Eglise in basse Normandy on February 13, 1658. He was the third son of Charles Castel baron of St. Pierre, great bailiff of Cotentin[138] and of Madelaine Gigaut de Bellefonds, a lady of great merit. It has been claimed that it was she who was depicted by St. Evremond in his discourse which has as its title *Idea of the woman who doesn't exist at all* and it was hardly possible to praise more magnificently even a woman who did exist.[139]

Along with two of his younger brothers, in 1667 the Abbé de St. Pierre was sent to the College of the Jesuits at Rouen, where he stayed until

1667, when his father called him back to be with him, where he stayed for three years.

In this interval he applied himself to the study of laws, and above all those of his province.

After the death of his father he chose the ecclesiastical station and began his interrupted studies again at the College of the Jesuits at Caen, where he did his philosophy, and also studied theology. But in order to have more convenience for studying and for seeing the most skillful people of the kingdom, in each science, he went to reside in Paris in 1680 and brought with him M. Varignon, a priest from Caen with whom he was pleased to argue about physics and theology, and upon whom he settled 300 livres of income for life, even though he had only 1500 livres of lawful income himself, having four brothers and several sisters.

He studied chemistry under M. Lemery, anatomy under M. du Vernay, both of the academy of Sciences, he often saw Father Malbranche and the most skillful people in the natural sciences.

In 1683 there fell into his hands the first volume of the *Dialogues of the Dead* by M. de Fontenelle, which had just appeared in public. This work gave him the desire to become acquainted with the author who resided at Rouen at that time. Some family business that drew M. the Abbé de St. Pierre there gave him the occasion to become connected with him. They saw each other every day, and he undertook to come to Paris and fix his abode there.

M. de Fontenelle who lodged at the home of his uncle, M. Corneille, near St. Roch, often came to pass several days at the home of M. the Abbé de St. Pierre who lodged at the Faubourg St. Jacques. M. the Abbé de Vertot his former comrade at college, also came to pass two days a week at the Abbé de St. Pierre's home; at that time he was working on his *History of the Conspiracy of Portugal.* The Abbé de St. Pierre was working on his moral observations and M. de Fontenelle on his pastoral poems. In the afternoon they went to Luxembourg Gardens to continue their conversations and their arguments, taking advantage this way of their mutual criticism.

The preference that M. the Abbé de St. Pierre gave to morality over physics and mathematics came from the fact that he judged that knowledge of morality could contribute much more to making men happy and virtuous than the knowledge of the other sciences. After three years of residence in the Faubourg St. Jacques, M. Varignon was named professor of mathematics at the College Mazarin; he went to live there, the Abbé de Vertot went to finish his stay in Normandy. Alone of this society the Abbé de St. Pierre remained, returned to the heart of the city where he continued to see the people who had the greatest reputation for intelligence and for the sciences.

After different reflections that he made about the different means men take for increasing their happiness and for rising above their ills, he noticed that the greatest part of the happiness and unhappiness of men came from good or bad laws. He saw clearly that if those who are the most useful to society, as much by their great talents as by their virtue, were always in the greatest occupations, and more honored and more respected in proportion to their national merit, that is to say in proportion to the advantages they procured for their nation, human society would be incomparably more happy for it. Thus he remained persuaded that as long as the laws of the government were not wise enough to turn men's desires toward talents and toward virtue, by means of adequate and justly distributed recompense, men could not be extremely happy.

It was this persuasion that determined him thenceforth to apply himself to the study of government: to try to discover the means of forming wise rules and to cause good Establishments to be made, which adequately induce men by means of their private interest to work constantly and ardently to procure the public interest, and above all he resolved to seek the most efficient means to induce those who govern to support everything that could contribute to such salutary establishments.

This reflection, which often presented itself to his mind, persuaded him that morality was not the most important science for the happiness of men, but that politics or the science of government was and that a single wise law could make incomparably more men happy than a hundred good treatises of morality.

Thus with the intention of becoming more useful to society, he gave up the study of morality for the study of politics, as he had given up the study of physics for that of morality; after that he applied himself almost solely to the science of the government of States and he was surprised to find so few people who applied themselves to the same study.

His brother, Father de Saint Pierre, a Jesuit, was named confessor of Madame, the sister-in-law of the king in 1692 and 1693. The Abbé de St. Pierre purchased the office of first almoner of that princess.

Among the considerations that induced him to pursue the court there were two that were very much to his taste: the first is that there he could see from as close as possible the men who play the principal roles of the kingdom, become acquainted with their talents and judge with greater certainty whether they were happier and more skillful in making themselves happy than simple private individuals who are without employment and without great fortune, the second was that he could become acquainted more precisely and more easily with the secrets of the machinery of government and discover how one could perfect it, either to increase the glory of those who govern, or to increase the advantages of those who are governed.

He thought that with much meditation he could open new paths in politics, to cause political philosophers to make very great progress in a few years in this very neglected science.

This aim of being useful to men in general, and to his fatherland in particular, was the principal motive of the study he undertook of the laws of the different parts of the government.

He was received into the French academy in 1695, and passed several years at court, where he studied men and political affairs and where, at the same time, he picked up some materials for writing what appeared to him most worthy of attention in the events of his time.

In 1707 he was obliged to go to Normandy for some family business, it was there that he wrote two works, the first on the importance and the means of making the great roads more practicable, the other was the first sketch of his great work, entitled *Plan for rendering peace perpetual in Europe.*

He sold his office of first almoner of Madame in 1713 in order to have more leisure to meditate and write. He kept his lodging at the royal palace; from time to time he went to pass the summer in an estate in Normandy belonging to his brother the count de Saint Pierre, there he wrote various works on politics. In 1717 he had printed his third volume in duodecimo of the *Plan for Perpetual Peace.*

In order to have a longer morning, which is the time most suited to writing, he usually went to bed at eight o'clock and rose at four, he did not work at all after dinner, at seven o'clock he ate some bread and drank several cups of wine with a great deal of water. Afterward, he cut back on the wine. He dined with an extremely good appetite. He attributed to his regime the exemption from the painful maladies of gravel and gout and believed he could cure himself of most maladies by eating little and drinking a great deal of hot water when he felt indisposed.

The excessive misery in which he had seen peasants in the country caused by the disproportionateness of the arbitrary *taille*[140] caused him much [pain]; he wrote several memoranda to remedy it, and subsequently had them printed, under the title of *Plan for fixing the taille.*

He took great pleasure in talks with skillful people, his morals were gentle, even, and full of indulgence, he rarely blamed, often excusing, and willingly praised what was praiseworthy, —patient, simple, without display, loving good glory more than fortune, and the public good more than glory, and said: *I occupy myself as a man in the morning, after dinner*

I often amuse myself with big children, for lack of being able to talk with men. He called women and the general run of men *big children*.

He was always occupied, but these were occupations free and of his choice; he was extremely docile about the criticisms that were made of his works. He even prided himself on this docility, he had no passion and ambition other than to work with success for the public utility, and he ended his life by working every day to make his works more useful. He died in 1743, at 85 years of age, with much gentleness and tranquillity, after having received the full sacrament of the church.

18

[Note on the Exclusion of the Abbé de St. Pierre from the French Academy][141]

Having learned what was being plotted against him at the Academy, on May 4, 1718, the Abbé de Saint Pierre wrote to M. de Sacy, at that time the director, to proclaim the uprightness of his intentions[142] and to show what he believed he owed to himself and to his [supporters] by justifying himself against an accusation in which he was reproached more for ill will than for imprudence. He added that, based on the scandal that certain expressions appeared to cause people of consideration whom he respected, he was ready, if that could satisfy them, to sign a disavowal of them, but only with a clause that justified his intentions and the respect that he had always had for the memory of the late king, a clause in conformity with the truth, for which he preferred to be the victim[143] rather than to accuse himself falsely.

To this letter was joined a memorandum on the form of his judgment in which he proved that they were proceeding against him in an irregular manner, against both the statutes and practices of the Academy, and even unjust in every respect, if they condemned him without wanting to listen to him. He begged M. de Sacy to have this memorandum read to the Academy in the next day's session, and this very next day, May 5, he wrote another memorandum on the basis of the accusation, in which he demonstrated these five propositions: The first, that every time the present government is better than that of the preceding reign, it is up to a good citizen to say so and to prove it and that every writer who does both of these cannot be blameworthy in that. The second, that one could not administer any perfect proof on this matter without making a complete parallel of the inconveniences and the advantages of both of these administrations. The third, that if, out of some consideration for particular families, this author dissimulated or weakened the faults of the preceding ministry, he would be betraying the public cause. The fourth, that it was not true that in his work he had failed in respect toward the memory of the late king. The fifth, that a writing in which one established more truths useful to the State than one reproved particular faults in some of its deceased members is more worthy of praise than of blame, and that consequently the author deserved rather to be recompensed than punished.

But, while the Abbé de Saint-Pierre demonstrated his innocence this way, the Academy did not proceed any more judiciously or any less quickly to his condemnation, and this very day, May 5, that he set down his memorandum, he was excluded from the assemblies by almost unanimous deliberation. For that his place was not declared vacant and he was treated as Furetière had been.[144] It is said that there was only a single white ball and that when one of his persecutors[145] sought who this ball could have been from, M. de Fontenelle declared out loud that it was from him. This is how a weak but upright man found strength and courage in his virtue when it was a question of justice and his friend.

The Abbé de Saint-Pierre bore up under his disfavor, not only with the moderation that suits the wise man, but with that superiority of reason that was his own and that seemed inaccessible to human passions. He pushed consideration to the point of writing to M. de Sacy a second letter, full of gentleness and decency, in which he begged him to bear witness to the Academy of the regret he had of being deprived of the honor and the pleasure of attending the assemblies; he entreated his former colleagues to pardon him for the displeasure he might have caused them, as on his part he pardoned them for the wrong they had done him, offering his services as needed to the very ones who had declared against him in the most lively way. He did more, he continued to go to the Abbé de Dangeau's home and, redoubling politeness and gentleness with him, he spared nothing to make him tolerate his presence. But, since one never pardons as easily the offenses one has committed as those one has received,[146] the Abbé Dangeau made him understand that after what had passed it was no longer suitable for them to see each other, and he took his leave very sorry that the decent people who had deprived him of the Academy, deprived him of their society in addition.

19

[On the Same Subject][147]

Moreover, that an author might be insulted publicly and with impunity for having preferred the present government to the one that preceded it is an example unique in history and the greatest proof of justice, of weakness or of negligence that this very government that he praises can give.[148] So that the very misfortune of this author provides a proof against him on this occasion. Such a brazenness on the part of the Academy might have born the name of courage if it had been the fruit of integrity rather than of a faction, and if it were ever allowed to give a decent name to an unjust action [. . .]

20

Supplement to the Journals of the Learned and of Trévoux, April 1758, p. 111 etc.

[The Abbé de Saint-Pierre] had a soul without passions and without prejudices. He listened to nothing but Reason, he said nothing but the truth, but undisguisedly, as he saw it through the veil that power casts over injustices. "Let us allow," he said, "the vulgar fool to measure men by their power; the one who knows measures them by the greatness of the motives of their undertaking." It is based on this that one is allowed to judge Kings, Heroes, Ministers.

Virtue along with mediocre knowledge is more useful for oneself and for others than is great knowledge with a mediocre virtue or with vices mixed with virtues. Also the skillfulness of the Venetians did not keep their power from diminishing for two centuries, while the Swiss with their good sense are considered with greater respect.

The Abbé de St. Pierre wrote without elegance, without conviction and I do not tire at all of reading him! Why? Because he is always thinking and in a useful way; because his policy is so well blended with morality, that the majority of his maxims of state are counsels of virtue.

The public treasury of honors becomes very necessary in a state in which private individuals are rich. The venality of offices and employments is, thus, one of the principal causes of the decadence of monarchies.

Segrais said that almost all young people have the desire at the age of 15, or 18 years to become Clergy, and he called this desire the smallpox of the mind. *I had that smallpox,* said the Abbé de St. Pierre, *but I did not remain pock marked by it.*

One day a Clergyman paid him a compliment on some letters against the Jansenists that were circulating under his name. *Father,* he answered him, *I love above everything peace and tranquillity in the state and in the Church. In truth I am of the opinion of Molina*[149] *on liberty, but not a Molinist, because that is a label of a persecuting party. But Mylord,* said the

Clergyman, *you are not concerned then with saving the truth from the artifices of error. No, Father,* answered the Abbé de St. Pierre, *if in order to save the truth it is necessary to lose charity. Truth never flounders whereas charity is lost from marks of disdain and hatred.*

21

Age of L. XIV, by M. De Voltaire.[150]

The Abbé de St. Pierre was a gentleman from Normandy who, having only a mediocre fortune, shared it for a long time with the celebrated Varignon and Fontenelle. He always lived in Paris as if he had been a Philosopher of Athens, speaking and writing freely his thought on all subjects, and using the style of a Legislator of times past. He mixed the greatest simplicity and the most incorruptible gentleness with the most invincible stubbornness. His works are only plans. The majority of his good intentions were regarded as ridiculous from the manner in which he set them out and from the details into which he entered, and because he always seemed to be speaking to men of another century. *Nevertheless he was very useful under the Regency of the Duke d'Orléans in freeing the Kingdom from the arbitrary taille. He wrote as a statesman on this subject alone* and acted as a true citizen by aiding through his efforts more than one Intendant in the establishment of the proportional taille. This service rendered to his fatherland is enough to render his memory respectable. *Nevertheless he was excluded from the assemblies of the French Academy of which he was a member, for having preferred a little harshly, in one of his political treatises entitled the Polysynody, the Councils established by the Regent to Louis XIV's manner of governing. Cardinal de Polignac, who was conspiring against the Regent at that time*—doubtless along with Madame du Maine—had the influence in the Academy *to have the Abbé de Saint-Pierre excluded; and what is strange in this is that the Duke d'Orléans who lodged this Abbé at the Palais Royal and who had his whole family in his service, put up with this exclusion: even at his death they failed in the practice established in Academies of making some eulogy of those that have been lost, and they deprived his tomb of those vain flowers, which, in truth, never add anything to reputation but whose refusal becomes an insult.* His morals, his pure intentions, *the services he rendered, make him deserve not to be forgotten here. He died at 82 years in 1742.*[151] *Several days before his death I asked him with what attitude he looked at his end: he answered me,* like a trip to the country.

PLAN FOR A CONSTITUTION FOR CORSICA

Plan for a Constitution for Corsica

Foreword

You are asking for a Plan of a Government good for Corsica. That is asking for more than you think. There are peoples who, however one sets about it, cannot be well governed because the law lacks any hold over them and because a government without law cannot be a good government. On the contrary, the Corsican people, appears to me most fortunately disposed by nature to receive a good administration. But that is not enough. All things can be abused, often necessarily so, and the abuses of political establishments are so closely related to their foundation that it is almost not worth the effort to make one only in order to see it degenerate so quickly.

Some want to ward off this drawback by mechanisms that maintain the government in its primitive condition, they give it a thousand chains, a thousand shackles to keep it in its path, and they encumber it so much that, sagging under the weight of its irons, it remains inactive, immobile, and if it does not decline toward its fall, it does not go toward its end either.

All that comes from separating two inseparable things, namely the body which governs and the body which is governed. By the primitive foundation these two bodies make up only one, they become separated only by the abuse of the foundation.

In such a case, the wisest people, observing relations of suitability, form the government for the nation. Nevertheless, there is something much better to do, that is to form the nation for the government. In the first case, to the extent that the government declines while the nation stays the same, the conformity vanishes; in the second, everything changes at an even pace and the nation, dragging the government along by its force, maintains it when it maintains itself and makes it decline when it declines. The one is always suited to the other.

The Corsican people is in the fortunate condition that makes a good foundation possible; it can depart from the first point and take measures in order not to degenerate. Full of vigor and health it can devote itself to the government that keeps it vigorous and healthy. Nevertheless this establishment must already find some obstacles. The Corsicans have not yet taken on the vices of other nations, but they have already taken on their prejudices; it is these prejudices that must be combated and destroyed in order to form a good establishment.

[Plan]

The[1] advantageous situation of the island of Corsica and the fortunate natural disposition of its inhabitants seem to offer them a reasonable hope of being able to become a flourishing people and one day to make a figure in Europe if, in the foundation they are meditating they turn their sights in that direction, but the extreme exhaustion into which forty years of continuous war have cast them, the present poverty of their Island and the state of depopulation and devastation it is in does not allow them to give themselves right away the sort of expensive administration that would be needed to give them a public order for that purpose. Moreover, a thousand invincible obstacles would oppose the execution of this plan. Genoa, still mistress of a part of the coast and of almost all the maritime positions, would a thousand times crush their nascent navy ceaselessly exposed to the double danger of the Genoese and the Barbary pirates.[2] They could hold the sea only with armed ships that would cost them ten times more than trade could return to them. Exposed on land and sea, forced to protect themselves on all sides, what would become of them? At everyone's discretion, in their weakness not able to make any advantageous commercial treaty, they would receive the law from everyone; in the midst of so many risks they would have only those profits that no one else would condescend to make, and which would be reduced to nothing. If they overcame all these difficulties by an almost incomprehensible good fortune, their very prosperity, attracting their neighbors' eyes to them, would be a new peril for their poorly established freedom. A constant object of covetousness for the great powers and of jealousy for the small ones, their Island would be threatened at every moment by a new servitude from which it could not extract itself again.

Whatever the Corsican nation's intention might be in giving itself a public order, the first thing it ought to do is to make itself as consistent as it can be by itself. Anyone who depends on someone else and does not have his resources in himself cannot be free. Alliances, treaties, the faith of men, all these can bind the weak to the strong and never bind the strong to the weak. Thus leave negotiations to the powers and do not count on anything but yourself. Brave Corsicans, who knows better than you do everything that one can draw from oneself? Without friends, without support, without money, without an army, enslaved to terrible masters, alone you have thrown off their yoke. You have seen them band together against you, one by one, the most formidable potentates of Europe, flood your Island with foreign armies; you have surmounted everything. Your constancy alone has done what money could never have done; if you wanted to preserve your wealth you would have lost your freedom. You must not draw conclusions from other nations to fit yours. Maxims drawn from your own experience are the best upon which you can govern yourself.

It is less a question of becoming different than you are than of knowing how to preserve yourself that way. Corsicans have gained much since they have been free, they have joined prudence to courage, they have learned to obey their equals, they have acquired virtues and morals, and they do not have any laws at all. If they could stay that way by themselves, I would see almost nothing to do. But when the peril that has brought them together goes away, the factions that it pushes aside will be reborn among them and, instead of bringing their forces together for the maintenance of their independence; they will use them up against each other and will no longer have any for self-defense if someone comes again to attack them. That is what must be forestalled. The divisions among the Corsicans have always been an artifice of their masters for making them weak and dependent; but employed ceaselessly, this artifice has finally produced the inclination and has made them naturally restless, turbulent, hard to govern even by their own leaders. Good laws are necessary, a new foundation is necessary in order to reestablish harmony the very desire for which Tyranny has destroyed. Subjected to foreign masters whose harsh yoke she never bore patiently, Corsica was always turbulent. It is now necessary for her people to study something new; and look for peace in freedom.

Here then are the principles which, according to me, ought to serve as the basis of their legislation: to make use of their people and of their country as much as possible; to cultivate and gather together their own forces, to depend upon them alone, and to think about foreign powers no more than one would if none of them existed.

Let us begin from there to establish the maxims of our foundation.

Being unable to get richer in money, the Island of Corsica ought to try to get richer in men.[3] The power that comes from the population is more real than the one that comes from finances and produces its effect more certainly. Not being able to hide itself, the use of men's arms always reaches the public destination, it is not the same for the use of money; it slips away and melts into private destinations; one heaps it up for one purpose, one gives it out for another; the people pay in order to be protected and what they give serves to oppress them. That is why a state rich in money is always weak, and a state rich in men is always strong.*

In order to multiply men it is necessary to multiply their means of existence, hence agriculture. By this word I do not understand the art of talking about agriculture in a sophisticated way, of establishing academies that speak about it, of writing books that treat it. I do understand a constitution that leads a people to spread itself out over the whole surface of its territory, to settle there, to cultivate all its places, to love the country life, the labors that relate to it, to find the necessities and embellishments of life so well in them that it does not at all desire to leave it.

The taste for agriculture is advantageous to the population not only by multiplying men's means of existence, but also by giving the body of the nation a temperament and morals that cause them to be born in greater number. In every country the inhabitants of the countryside multiply more than those of the cities, either from the simplicity of the rustic life which forms better constituted bodies, or by the constant attention to labor which forestalls disorder and vices. For, everything being equal, the most chaste women, those whose senses are less inflamed by habituation to pleasure, have more children than the others, and it is no less certain that men enervated by debauchery, the certain fruit of idleness, are less fit for generation than those whom a laborious condition makes more temperate.

Peasants are much more attached to their soil than city dwellers are to their towns. For those who do not know any other life, the equality, the simplicity of the rustic one has an attraction that gives them no desire to change it. Hence the satisfaction with one's station which makes man peaceful, hence the love of the fatherland which attaches him to its constitution.

The culture of the earth forms patient and robust men such as they must be to become good soldiers. Those that are taken from the towns are rebellious and soft, they cannot bear the fatigues of war, they fade away in the marches, maladies consume them, they fight among themselves and flee before the enemy. Trained militiamen are the most reliable and best troops; the genuine education of the soldier is to be a plowman.

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*The majority of usurpers have used one of these two means in order to strengthen their power. The first to impoverish the subjugated peoples and make them barbarians, the other on the contrary to effeminate them under the pretext of educating and enriching them. The first of these ways has constantly produced an effect opposed to its object, and acts of vigor, revolutions, republics on the part of the oppressed peoples have always resulted from them. The other way always succeeds, and softened, corrupt, delicate, reasoning peoples, making fine speeches about freedom in the ignominy of servitude, have all been crushed under their masters then destroyed by conquerors.

The only means for maintaining a State in independence of others is agriculture. Even if you have all the wealth in the world, if you do not have anything with which to nourish yourself you are dependent on others. Your neighbors can give your money whatever value they please because they can wait; but the bread that we need has an indisputable value for us and in every sort of commerce it is always the least hurried person who gives the law to the other. I admit that in a system of finance, it would be necessary to operate in accordance with other views; everything depends on the final aim to which one inclines. Commerce produces wealth but agriculture assures freedom.

It will be said that it would be better to have both at the same time, but they are incompatible as will be shown below. In every country, it will be added, they cultivate the land. I agree to this; just as there is some commerce in every country, in every one they traffic a little or a great deal, but this is not to say that agriculture and commerce flourish everywhere. I am not examining here what is done by the necessity of things but what results from the sort of Government and the general spirit of the nation.

Although the form of Government that a people gives itself might be the work of chance and fortune more often than it is a true choice, nevertheless, there are qualities in the nature and the soil of each country that make one government more suitable than another, and each form of Government has a particular force that brings peoples toward one occupation or another.

The form of Government we have to choose is, on the one hand, the least costly because Corsica is poor, and on the other the most favorable to agriculture because agriculture is at present the sole occupation that can preserve for the Corsican people the independence that it has acquired and give it the consistency it needs.

The least costly administration is the one that passes through the fewest ranks and requires the fewest different orders; such is in general the republican and in particular the democratic state.

The administration most favorable for agriculture is the one whose force, not being at all united in some point, does not involve the unequal distribution of the people, but leaves it evenly dispersed over the territory; such is democracy.

In Switzerland one sees a very striking application of these principles. In general Switzerland is a poor and sterile country. Its government is Republican everywhere. But in cantons that are more fertile than the others such as those of Berne, of Soleure, and of Fribourg, the Government is Aristocratic. In the poorest ones, in those in which cultivation is more unprofitable and requires greater labor the Government is Democratic. The State has only what it needs to continue to exist under the simplest administration. It would exhaust itself and perish under every other one.

It will be said that Corsica, more fertile and in a milder climate, can bear a more burdensome Government. That would be true at another time, but now, crushed by a long enslavement, devastated by long wars, the nation needs to reestablish itself first. When it has developed its fertile soil it will be able to dream about becoming flourishing and giving itself a more brilliant administration. I will say more. The success of the first foundation will make change necessary afterwards. Cultivation of fields cultivates the mind; every people of cultivators multiplies; it multiplies in proportion to the product of its land and if this land is fecund it finally multiplies so strongly that the land is no longer sufficient for it; then it is forced to establish colonies or to change its government.

When the country is saturated with inhabitants one can no longer use the surplus for cultivation. Then this surplus must be employed in industry, in commerce, in the Arts and this new system requires a different administration. May the establishment that Corsica is going to make soon make it necessary for it to change this way. But as long as it does not have more men than it can nourish, as long as an inch of land lying fallow remains on the Island, it ought to hold to the rustic system and change it only when the Island is not sufficient for it.

As I have said the rustic system entails the Democratic state. Thus the form that we have to choose is given. It is true that there are some modifications to make in its application because of the size of the Island; for a purely democratic government suits a small town rather than a nation. One could not assemble the whole people of a country like that of a city and when the supreme authority is conferred upon deputies, the government changes and becomes Aristocratic. The one that suits Corsica is a mixed Government in which the people is assembled only in parts and in which the depositaries of its power are often changed. This was seen very well by the author of the memorandum written in 1764 at Vescovado, an excellent memorandum, which one can consult confidently about everything that is not explained in this one.[4]

If it is well established, two great advantages will result from this form. One, to confer the administration only upon a small number, which allows the selection of enlightened people. The other, to make all the members of the State collaborate in the supreme authority, which, making all the people perfectly level, allows it to spread out over the whole surface of the Island and to populate it evenly everywhere. This is the fundamental maxim of our foundation. Let us make it so that it keeps its population in equilibrium everywhere and by that alone we will have made it as perfect as it could be. If this maxim is good, our rules become clear and our work is simplified to a surprising extent.

A part of this work has already been done: we have fewer establishments than prejudices to destroy, it is less a question of changing than of completing. The Genoese themselves prepared your foundation and with a care worthy of Providence they founded freedom while believing they were consolidating Tyranny. They deprived you of almost all commerce and now is not in fact the time to have any. If it were open abroad it would be necessary to forbid it until your constitution has found its footing and until the interior furnished you with everything you can draw from it. They have hindered the exportation of your commodities. It is not at all to your advantage to export them, but rather that enough men be born on the Island to consume them.

The counties[5] and particular jurisdictions they formed or preserved in order to facilitate the collection of taxes and the execution of orders are the only possible way to establish democracy in a whole people which cannot assemble at the same time in the same place; they are also the only means of keeping the country independent of the cities which are easier to keep under the yoke. They also applied themselves to destroying the nobility, to depriving it of its functions, of its titles, extinguishing the great fiefs; it is fortunate for you that they took upon themselves what was odious in this enterprise and which you perhaps would not have been able to do if they had not done it before you. Do not hesitate at all to complete their work; while believing they were working for themselves, they were working for you. Only the goal is very different, for the goal of the Genoese was in the thing itself and yours is in its effect. They wanted only to debase the nobility and you want to ennoble the nation.[6]

This is a point on which I see that the Corsicans do not yet have healthy ideas. In all their documentary memoranda, in their protestation of Aix-la-Chapelle they complained that Genoa weakened or rather destroyed their nobility.[7] That was a doubtless a grievance, but this was not a misfortune, on the contrary it is an advantage, without which it would be impossible for them to remain free.

To put the dignity of a State in the titles of some of its members is to take the shadow for the body. When the Kingdom of Corsica belonged to Genoa it might have been useful to it to have marquises, counts, titled nobles who served so to speak as mediators between the Corsican people and the Republic. But now against whom would such protectors be useful to it, protectors less suited to protecting it from Tyranny than to usurping it themselves, who would lay it waste by their quarrels and their disputes, until one of them, having enslaved the others, made all his fellow citizens into his subjects?

Let us distinguish two sorts of nobility. Feudal nobility, which is connected with Monarchy, and political nobility, which is connected with Aristocracy. The first has numerous orders or degrees, some titled, others not titled, from great vassals to simple Gentlemen; its rights, although hereditary, are so to speak individual, private, attached to each family and so independent of each other that they are even independent of the constitution of the state and of sovereignty. The second, on the contrary, united into a single indivisible body all of whose rights are in the body and not in its members, forms so essential a part of the body politic that the former cannot continue to exist without the latter nor the latter without the former, and all the individuals who compose it, equal by their birth in titles, in privileges, in authority, merge under the shared name of patricians.

It is clear from the titles that the ancient Corsican nobility bore and from the fiefs that it possessed, with rights approaching sovereignty itself, that it was in the first class and that it owed its origin either to Moorish or French conquerors, or to Princes in whom the Popes had vested the Island of Corsica. Now this sort of nobility can so little enter into a democratic or mixed Republic that it cannot even enter into an aristocracy, for aristocracy accepts only corporate rights and not individual rights. Democracy does not know any nobility other than virtue except for freedom, and, in the same way, aristocracy does not know any nobility other than authority. Everything foreign to the constitution ought to be carefully banished from the body politic. Thus, leave to other states all those titles of Marquis and of Count, debasing for simple Citizens. The fundamental law of your foundation ought to be equality. Everything ought to be related to it, even authority itself which is established only to defend it. All ought to be equal by right of birth. The state ought not to grant distinctions except to merit, to virtues, to services rendered to the fatherland and these distinctions ought not to be any more hereditary than are the qualities based on which they are founded. We shall soon see how one can calibrate different orders in a people without birth and nobility entering into it for anything.

All fiefs, homages, rents, and feudal rights hitherto abolished will therefore be so forever, and the state will buy back those that still continue to exist so that all seigniorial rights will remain extinct and suppressed on the whole Island.

So that all the parts of the State might keep among themselves, as much as possible, the same levelness that we are trying to establish among the individuals, the limits of the districts, counties, and jurisdictions will be regulated in such a manner as to diminish the extreme inequality that makes itself felt there. The province of Bastia and Nebbio alone contains as many inhabitants as the seven provinces of Capo Corso, Alleria, Porto Vecchio, Sartene, Vico, Calvi, and Algagliola. That of Ajaccio contains more than the four adjacent to it. Without removing the boundaries entirely and overturning the jurisdictions, one can moderate these enormous disproportions by means of some slight changes. For example the abolition of fiefs makes it easy to form out of those of Canari, Brando, and Nonza, a new jurisdiction which, strengthened by the County of Pietrabugno, will be found to be just about equal to the jurisdiction of Capo Corso. The fief of Istria joined to the Province of Sartene will still not make it equal to that of Corte, and that of Bastia and Nebbio, even though diminished by one County, can be divided into two still very strong jurisdictions which will be separated by the Guolo. This is only an example for making myself understood; for I do not know the locale well enough to be able to settle anything.

By these slight changes the Island of Corsica, which I am assuming to be entirely free, would be found to be divided into twelve jurisdictions which will not be extremely disproportionate, above all when, the municipal rights of the cities having been restricted as they ought to be, less weight will remain in the jurisdiction of these cities.

Cities are useful in a country in the proportion to the cultivation of commerce and the arts there, but they are harmful to the system that we have adopted. Their inhabitants are cultivators or idle. Now cultivation is always done better by settlers than by city-dwellers, and all the vices that have devastated Corsica up to this moment come from idleness. The stupid pride of bourgeois does nothing but debase and discourage the plowman. Given over to softness, to the passions it excites, they plunge into debauchery and sell themselves in order to satisfy it; self-interest makes them servile and laziness makes them restless, they are slaves or rebels, never free. This difference made itself felt very much throughout all of the present war, and since the nation has broken its irons. It is the vigor of your counties that brought about the revolution, it is their firmness that sustained it; that unbreakable courage that no reversal can beat down comes to you from them. Cities populated by mercenary men have sold their nation in order to preserve for themselves some petty privileges that the Genoese know artfully to turn to good account and, justly punished for their cowardice, they remain nests of Tyranny, while already the Corsican people are gloriously enjoying the freedom that it acquired at the price of its blood.

A cultivating people must not look covetously at residence in cities and envy the fate of the sluggards who live there; consequently the habitation of cities must not be favored at all by advantages harmful to the general population and to the freedom of the nation. A plowman must not be inferior by birth to anyone, he must see above him only the laws and the magistrates and he must be capable of becoming a magistrate himself if he is worthy of it from his enlightenment or from his probity. In a word, the cities and their inhabitants, no more than the fiefs and their possessions, ought to keep any exclusive privilege; the whole Island ought to enjoy the same rights, bear the same expenses, and become without distinction what is called in the terms of the country: *terra di commune.*[8]

Now if cities are harmful, capitals are even more so. A capital is a pit into which almost the entire nation goes to lose its morals, its laws, its courage, and its freedom. It is imagined that big cities favor agriculture because they consume a great deal of commodities, but they consume even more cultivators, either from the desire of taking on a better profession which attracts them or from the natural wasting away of bourgeois races which the countryside always brings up to strength. The surroundings of capitals have an air of life, but the farther one goes from them the more deserted everything is. From the capital is exhaled a continuous plague which undermines and finally destroys the nation.

Nevertheless, the Government must have a center, a meeting point to which everything is related: there would be too much inconvenience in having the supreme administration roam. In order to make it circulate from Province to Province it would be necessary to divide the Island into several small confederated States each one of which would have the Presidency in its turn; but this system would complicate the action of the machine, its pieces would be less tied together. Not big enough to make this division necessary, the Island is too big to be able to do without a capital. But this capital must bring about the correspondence of all the jurisdictions without attracting their people; everything must be connected to it and each thing must stay in its place. In a word the seat of the supreme Government must be less a capital than an administrative center.

On this issue, necessity by itself has directed the nation's selection just as reason itself would have done. Having remained masters of the maritime positions, the Genoese have left you only the city of Corte, not any less fortunately situated for the Corsican administration than Bastia was for the Genoese administration. Positioned in the middle of the Island, Corte sees all its shores at almost equal distances. It is precisely between the two great parts *di quà e di là da'i monti*[9] equally within reach of all. It is far from the sea which will preserve the morals, the simplicity, the uprightness, the national character of its inhabitants for longer than if it were subject to the influx of foreigners. It is in the most elevated part of the Island, in very healthy air, but in an unfertile soil, and being almost at the source of the rivers, which, at first making accessibility of supplies more difficult, does not allow it to grow too much. If one adds to all that the precaution of not making any of the great functions the State hereditary or even for life, it is to be presumed that the public men, having only temporary occupancy there, will not give it that fatal splendor that causes the luster and the ruin of States for a long time.

These are the first reflections that a rapid examination of the site of the Island has suggested to me. Before speaking in more detail about the Government, now it is necessary to begin by seeing what it ought to do and upon what maxims it ought to be conducted. That is what ought to conclude the decision about its form, for each form of Government has its spirit which is natural, proper to it, and from which it will never diverge.[10]

Up to now we have distributed the national soil as equally as we could; now let us seek to draw the plan of the building that is to be built there. The first rule we have to follow is the national character. Every people has or ought to have a national character, and if it lacks one it would be necessary to begin by giving it one. Islanders above all, being less mixed, less blended with other peoples, ordinarily have a more marked one. The Corsicans in particular have a naturally very perceptible one; and if being so disfigured by slavery and Tyranny it has become difficult to know, on the other hand it is also easy to reestablish and preserve because of its isolated position.

The Island of Corsica, says Diodorus, is mountainous, full of woods, and watered by large rivers. Its inhabitants feed themselves upon milk, honey, and meat with which the country generously furnishes them. They observe among themselves the rules of justice and humanity more precisely than the other barbarians; the one who first finds some honey on the mountains and in hollows of trees is assured that no one will dispute it with him. They are always certain of finding their sheep upon which each puts his mark and which they afterwards allow to graze in the countryside without anyone watching over them: the same spirit of equity appears to guide them in all the encounters of life.[11]

In the simplest narratives and without reasoning themselves, the great historians know how to make perceptible to the reader the reason for every fact they report.

When a country is not populated by colonies, it is from the nature of the soil that the primitive character of the inhabitants is born. A rough, uneven terrain, hard to cultivate, ought to furnish more nourishment for animals than for men, fields must be rare there and pastures abundant. From that comes the multiplication of livestock and pastoral life. The flocks of private individuals wandering in the mountains mix together there, blend. Honey has no key other than the mark of the first occupier; property cannot be established or preserved except through public faith and it is very necessary for everyone to be just, otherwise no one would have anything and the nation would perish.

Mountains, woods, rivers, pastures. Would one not believe that one was reading the description of Switzerland? Also was the same character that Diodorus attributes to the Corsicans not found in the Swiss: equity, humanity, good faith? The whole difference was that, living in a rougher climate they were more laborious. Buried under the snow for six months, they were forced to make provisions for the winter, scattered over their rocks, they cultivated them with a fatigue that made them robust; a continuous labor deprived them of the time to become acquainted with the passions; communication was always difficult, when the snow and ice finished closing them up, each was forced to suffice for himself and his family in his hut: from that came fortunate and unpolished industry. Each practiced all the necessary arts in his house; all were masons, carpenters, joiners, wheelwrights. On the other hand, the rivers and the torrents that separated them from each other gave each the means of doing without his neighbors. With saws, forges, mills multiplying, they learned to arrange the streams of water both for the operation of wheels and for distributing the water to many places. This is how, each, living on his land in the midst of their precipices and their vales, succeeded in drawing all he needed from it, in living on a generous scale there, in desiring nothing outside. With interests and needs that did not intersect at all and none of them dependent on anyone else, the only relations they had among themselves were relations of benevolence and friendship; harmony and peace reigned effortlessly in their large families, they had almost nothing else to deal with among themselves except marriages in which inclination alone was consulted, which ambition did not form at all, which interest and inequality never stopped. In the most perfect independence, this poor but not needy people multiplied in a union that nothing could corrupt; it did not have any virtues because, not having any vices at all to conquer, doing good cost it nothing, and it was good and just without even knowing what justice and virtue were. From the force with which this laborious and independent life attached the Swiss to their fatherland resulted two greater means for defending it, namely agreement in resolutions and courage in combat. When one considers the constant union that reigned among men without masters, almost without laws, and which the Princes who surrounded them struggled to divide by all the maneuvers of policy; when one sees the unbreakable firmness, the constancy, even the ferocity that these terrible men brought into combat, resolved to die or to conquer and not even having the idea of separating their life from their freedom, one no longer has any difficulty in conceiving the prodigies they performed for the defense of their country and their independence, one is no longer surprised at seeing the three greatest powers and the most warlike troops of Europe fail successively in their undertakings against this heroic nation whose simplicity made it as invincible to ruse as its courage was to valor. Corsicans, here is the model that you ought to follow to return to your primitive state.

But these rustic men, who at first did not know anything but themselves, their mountains, and their livestock, learned to know other nations by defending themselves against them. Their victories opened the borders in their neighborhood to them, their reputation for bravery engendered in Princes the idea of employing them. They began to pay these troops they had been unable to conquer. These brave people who had defended their freedom so well became the oppressors of other people's freedom. It was surprising to see them bring to the service of Princes the same valor they had put into resisting them, the same fidelity they had kept for the fatherland; sell at the price of money the virtues that can least be bought and that money corrupts most quickly. But in these first times they brought to the service of Princes the same pride they had put into resisting them; they looked at themselves less as henchmen than as defenders and believed they had sold them less their services than their protection.

Insensibly they debased themselves and were no longer anything but mercenaries. The taste for money made them feel that they were poor; disdain for their station insensibly destroyed the virtues that were its work and the Swiss became five-penny men, as the French are four-penny ones. Another more hidden cause corrupted this vigorous nation. Their isolated and simple life made them independent as well as robust; each knew no master but himself; but all, having the same interests and the same tastes, united without difficulty in order to want and do the same things; the uniformity of their life took the place of law for them. But when the frequentation of other peoples make them love what they ought to have feared and admire what they ought to have disdained, the ambition of the principal men made them change their maxims; they felt that in order to dominate the people better it was necessary to give them more dependent tastes. From that came the introduction of commerce, of industry, and of luxury, which, tying private individuals to the public authority by their professions and by their needs, made them depend upon those who govern much more than they depended on them in their primitive state.

Poverty did not make itself felt in Switzerland until money began to circulate there. It put the same inequality into resources as in fortunes; for acquiring, it became a great means of which those who had nothing were deprived. Establishments of commerce and manufacturing multiplied. The arts took multitudes of hands away from agriculture. While distributing themselves unevenly, men multiplied, they spread out into countries more favorably situated and where resources were even easier to come by. Some deserted their fatherland, others became useless to it by consuming while not producing anything. The multitude of children became burdensome. Population growth sensibly diminished, and while they multiplied in the cities, since the cultivation of the lands was more neglected and the necessities of life more costly, which made foreign commodities more necessary, they made the country more dependent on its neighbors. The idle life introduced corruption and multiplied pensioners of the powers; love of the fatherland, extinguished in all hearts, gave way there to love of money alone; all the feelings that give resiliency to the soul being stifled, one no longer saw either firmness in conduct or vigor in resolutions. Previously poor Switzerland gave the law to France, now rich Switzerland trembles at the knit brow of a French minister.

These are great lessons for the Corsican people; let us see how it ought to apply them. The Corsican people preserve a large number of its primitive virtues which will facilitate our constitution a great deal. In its servitude it has also contracted many vices which it ought to cure; of these vices some will disappear by themselves along with the cause that gave birth to them, others need a cause to uproot the passion that produced them.[12] *

In the first class I put the indomitable and ferocious mood that is attributed to them. They are accused of being unruly; how is this known since they have never been governed justly? By animating them ceaselessly against each other, it should have been foreseen that this animosity would often turn against those whose work it was.

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* There is in all states (peoples) a progression, a natural and necessary development from their birth until their destruction. In order to make their duration as long and also as fine as possible, it is better to take note of (to push back) the first limit to before rather than after this point of vigor (and of force) (It is better that the state has still to grow in strength from the moment of institution than no longer to have anything but to decline) One must not wish that Corsica be right away what it can be (for it would not maintain itself at all in such a condition); it is better that it arrive there and that it ascend rather than to be there right away and do nothing but decline. The condition of wasting away in which it is would make its condition of vigor into a very weak condition, instead of which, by disposing it to reach it, this condition will afterwards be a very good condition.

I put in the second class the inclination toward theft and murder which has made them odious. The source of these two vices is laziness and impunity; that is clear as to the first, and easy to prove as to the second since the family hatreds and plans for vengeance with which they were ceaselessly occupied with satisfying are born in idle conversations and take consistency in somber meditations and are executed without difficulty because of the assurance of impunity.

Who could not be seized with horror against a barbarous Government that, in order to see these unfortunate people cutting each other's throats, did not spare any effort for inciting them to do so? Murder was not punished; what am I saying, it was rewarded; the price for blood was one of the republic's revenues; in order to avoid a total destruction it was necessary for the unfortunate Corsicans to buy the favor of being disarmed by means of a tribute.

The Genoese boasted about having favored agriculture on the Island, the Corsicans appear to agree with them. I would not similarly agree; the poor success proves that they had made use of poor means. In this conduct, the Republic did not have as a goal multiplying the inhabitants of the Island, since it so openly favored murders, nor making them live in comfort since it ruined them by exactions, nor even facilitating the collection of taxes since it burdened commodities with duties of sale and transportation and forbade their exportation. On the contrary, it had as its goal making more onerous these same taxes which it did not dare to increase, always holding the Corsicans in abasement by attaching them so to speak to their soil, by turning them away from commerce, the arts, from all the lucrative professions, by keeping them from rising up, from being educated, from becoming rich. Its goal was to get all produce dirt cheap from the monopolies of its officials. It took every measure for draining the Island of money in order to make it necessary there, and in order always to keep it from returning to it. Tyranny could not apply a more refined maneuver, while appearing to favor cultivation, it succeeded in crushing the nation; it wanted to reduce it to a heap of base peasants living in the most deplorable misery.

What happened from that? The discouraged Corsicans abandoned a labor that was not animated by any hope. They preferred to do nothing rather than to fatigue themselves at a pure loss. The laborious and simple life gave way to laziness, to inaction, to all sorts of vices, theft procured them the money they needed to pay their tax, and which they did not find at all with their produce; they left their fields in order to labor as highwaymen.

May the Corsicans, brought back to a laborious life, lose the habit of wandering around the Island like bandits, may their even and simple occupations keeping them absorbed in their family leave them few interests to contest among themselves! May their labor easily furnish them with enough to continue to exist, them and their family! May those who have everything necessary for life not also be obliged to have money in cash, either to pay taxes and other impositions or to furnish needs of whims and of luxury, which, without contributing to the well-being of the one who shows it off, only stimulates other people's envy and hatred!

One easily sees how the system to which we have given preference leads to these advantages, but that is not enough. It is a question of making the people adopt this system's practices, of making it love the occupation we want to give it, of fixing its pleasures, its desires, its tastes there, in general of making it into the happiness of life, and of limiting plans of ambition to it.

I see no more prompt and more certain means for reaching that point than the two following ones: the one of attaching men to the land, so to speak, by drawing their distinctions and their rights from it, and the other, of strengthening this bond by that of the family by making the land necessary to the station of fathers.

In this intention, I thought that, by posing the fundamental law upon distinctions drawn from the nature of the thing, one could divide the whole Corsican nation into three classes whose constant personal inequality could happily be substituted for the inequality of descent or habitation that results from the municipal feudal system that we are abolishing.

The first class will be that of citizens.

The second that of Patriots.

The third that of aspirants.

It will be said below by what titles one will be inscribed in each class and what privileges one will enjoy there.

This distinction by Classes ought not at all to be done by a census or enumeration at the moment of foundation, but it ought to be established gradually by itself by the simple progression of time. The first act of the planned establishment ought to be a solemn oath sworn by all Corsicans of twenty years of age and older, and all those who swear this oath ought to be inscribed without distinction in the number of citizens. It is very just that all these valiant men who have freed their nation at the price of their blood enter into possession of all these advantages and enjoy in the first rank the freedom they acquired for it.

But from the day the union has been formed and the oath solemnly sworn, all those born on the Island who have not come of age will remain in the Class of aspirants until they can ascend to the two other classes upon the following conditions.

Every aspirant married in accordance with the law, who has some estate of his own independently of his wife's dowry will be inscribed in the class of the patriots.

Every patriot married or widowed who has two living children, a habitation of his own, and an estate of land sufficient for his subsistence will be inscribed in the class of citizens.

This first step, sufficient for making land esteemed, is not sufficient for putting it into cultivation unless one removes the necessity for money that caused the Island's poverty under the Genoese government. It is necessary to establish as a definite maxim that everywhere that money is of the utmost necessity the nation detaches itself from agriculture in order to throw itself into more lucrative professions; the station of plowman is then either an object of commerce and a sort of manufacture for the big farmers, or the last resource of poverty for the crowd of peasants. When they have earned enough, those who get rich by means of commerce and industry place their money in landed estates which others cultivate for them; the whole nation thus finds itself divided into rich sluggards who possess the land and wretched peasants who do not have enough to live on while cultivating it.

The more necessary money is for private individuals, the more necessary it is for the government; from which it follows that, the more commerce flourishes, the higher the taxes are, and in order to pay these taxes it is useless for the peasant to cultivate his land if he does not sell its product. He might very well have wheat, wine, oil, he absolutely needs money, he must carry his produce here and there into the towns, make himself into a petty merchant, petty salesman, petty knave. Brought up in brokering, his children become debauched, attach themselves to the towns, lose the taste for their station and make themselves into sailors or soldiers rather than take on their father's station. Soon the countryside is depopulated and the town swarms with vagabonds, little by little bread is lacking, public poverty increases along with the opulence of some private individuals and in concert both things bring about all the vices that finally cause the ruin of a nation.

I look at every system of commerce as destructive of agriculture so much so that I make no exception even for commerce in commodities that are the product of agriculture. For it to be maintained in this system, the profit would have to be capable of being divided equally between the merchant and the cultivator. But this is what is impossible because the trade of the one being free and that of the other forced, the first will always give the law to the second, a relation which—breaking equilibrium—cannot form a solid and permanent condition.

It must not be imagined that the Island will be richer when it has a lot of money. This is true in relation to other peoples, and by its external relations, but in itself a nation is neither richer nor poorer for having more or less money or, what comes down to the same thing, because the same quantity of money circulates there more or less actively. Not only is money a sign, but it is a relative sign which has a genuine effect only by the inequality of its distribution. For assuming that on the Island of Corsica each private individual has only ten crowns or that he has one hundred thousand crowns, the respective condition of all is absolutely the same in the two cases; there are neither richer nor poorer among them and the only difference is that the second assumption makes trade more troublesome. If Corsica needed foreigners it would need money, but being able to be self-sufficient, it does not need it; and since it is useful only as a sign of inequality, the less of it that circulates in the Island the more real abundance will reign there.[13]

It is necessary to see whether what is being done with money cannot be done without money; and assuming that it can be, it is necessary to compare the two means relatively to our object.

It is proven by the facts that, even in the fallow and exhausted state in which it is, the Island of Corsica is sufficient for the subsistence of its inhabitants, since for thirty-six years of war when they handled weapons more than the plow, never did, nevertheless, a single ship of produce and provisions of any sort arrive for their use. It even has all that it needs in addition to provisions to put them and maintain them in a flourishing state without borrowing anything from abroad. It has wool for its fabric, hemp and linen for sails and rigging, leather for shoes, timber for the navy, iron for forges, copper for utensils and for small coinage. It has some salt for its use; it will have much more beyond that by reestablishing the saltworks of Alleria which the Genoese kept in a state of destruction with so much difficulty and expense, and which still gave salt in spite of them. Even if they wanted to, the Corsicans could not carry on trade abroad without buying superfluities; thus even in such a case money would not be necessary for them for commerce, since it is the only merchandise that they would go looking for. It follows from this that, in these relations of nation to nation, Corsica has no need of money.

In the interior the Island is rather large and divided by mountains; its large and numerous rivers are hardly navigable; its parts do not naturally communicate among each other; but the difference of their products ties them in a mutual dependence by the need they have for each other. The Province of Capo Corso, which produces almost nothing but wine, needs the wheat and oils that Balagna provides it. On the heights, in the same way Corte yields grains and lacks all the rest; Bonifacio, at the feet of rocks at the other extremity of the Island, needs everything and provides nothing. The project of an evenly distributed population thus requires a circulation of commodities, an easy flowing from one jurisdiction into another and consequently an interior commerce.

But to this I say two things. One, that with the cooperation of the government this commerce can be done in large part by exchanges; the other, that with the same cooperation and from a natural consequence of our establishment, this commerce and these exchanges ought to diminish from day to day and finally be reduced to very little consequence.

It is known that in the exhaustion into which the Genoese had put Corsica, money, always leaving and not returning at all, became so rare in the end that in some cantons of the Island currency was not even known and that they made neither sales nor purchases except by exchanges.

In their memoranda the Corsicans have cited this fact among their grievances; they were right, since, money being necessary for paying the taxes, these poor people who no longer had any, seized and enforced upon their households, saw themselves despoiled of their most necessary utensils, of their furnishings, of their clothing, of their rags which it was necessary to transport from one place to another and the sale of which did not return the tenth part of their value. So that, for lack of money, they paid ten times for one imposition.

But, since in our system one will no longer be forced to pay the tax in specie, the lack of money—not being at all a sign of poverty—will not serve at all for increasing it; exchanges can be made in kind and without intermediate values, and one will be able to live in abundance without ever handling a penny.

I see that under the Genoese governors who forbade and in a thousand ways hindered trade of produce from one province to another, communes made storehouses of wheat, of wine, of oil to wait for the favorable and allowed moment for trade, and that these storehouses served the Genoese officials as pretext for a thousand odious monopolies. Since the idea of these storehouses is not new, it will be all the easier to put it into practice and will provide a convenient and simple means for exchange for the public and for private individuals without risk of the inconveniences that made it onerous to the people.

Even without having recourse to these storehouses or bonded warehouses, one could establish in each parish or county seat a doubleentry public register in which each year private individuals would have inscribed on one side the sort and quantity of produce that they have in excess and on the other those that they lack. From the balance and comparison of these registers made from province to province one could regulate the prices of produce and the volume of trade so well that each County would make the consumption of what was superfluous and the acquisition of what was necessary, without there being either deficit or excess in quantity and almost as conveniently as if its harvest was proportioned to its needs.

These operations can be done with the greatest precision and without real money, either by means of exchanges or by aid of a simple ideal money that would serve as expression of comparison as, for example, pistoles are in France, or by taking as money some real good which is numbered as were oxen among the Greeks or sheep among the Romans, and which one settles in its average value, for then an ox can be worth more or less than one ox and a sheep more or less than one sheep, a difference which makes the ideal money preferable, because it is always precise, not being taken for anything but an abstract number.

As long as one sticks to that, trade will be maintained in equilibrium and exchanges, being regulated solely on the relative abundance or rarity of produce and on the greater or lesser ease of transportation, will always and everywhere remain compensated relatively, and all the productions of the Island being dispersed equally will take on the level of the population by themselves. I add that without inconvenience the public administration will be able to preside over this trade, over these exchanges, keeping balance in them, regulating the volume, making their distribution because as long as they are made in kind the public officials will not be able to abuse them and will not even have the temptation to do so; whereas the conversion of produce into money opens the door to all the exactions, to all the monopolies, to all the knavishness usual to people in positions in such cases.

One must expect much confusion at the beginning, but this confusion is inevitable in every establishment that is beginning and is opposed to an established practice. I add that once this rule has been established it will become easier every year not only from practice and experience, but from the successive decrease in trade that should necessarily result from it until it is reduced by itself to the smallest quantity possible, which is the final goal that ought to be proposed.

Everyone must live and no one get rich. This is the fundamental principle of the nation's prosperity, and for its part the public order that I am proposing moves toward this goal as directly as possible.[14]

Not being at all an object of commerce and not yielding any money, the superfluous produce will be cultivated only in proportion to the need that will be had for what is necessary and anyone who can procure for himself immediately the ones he lacks will not have any interest in having too much.

As soon as the products of the earth are not merchandise at all, their cultivation will little by little adjust itself in each province and even in each private holding to the general need of the province and the particular need of the cultivator. Each will exert himself to have everything that he needs in kind and by his own cultivation rather than by means of exchanges that will certainly always be less convenient, however easily they might be made.

Without contradiction it is an advantage for each piece of land to produce what is best suited to it; by this disposition one draws more and more easily from a country than by any other. But this consideration, as important as it is, is only secondary. It would be better for the land to produce a little less and the inhabitants be better ordered. Among all these movements of traffic and exchange it is impossible for destructive vices not to slip into a nation. The lack of some conveniences in the selection of pieces of land can be compensated for by labor and it would be better to use fields badly than men. Moreover, every cultivator can and ought to make this choice in his land and each parish or community in its communal goods, as is said below.

It will be feared, I feel it, that this economy might produce an effect contrary to the one that I expect from it, that instead of stimulating cultivation it might discourage[15] it, that the settlers, having no demand for their produce might neglect their labors, that they might limit themselves to subsistence without seeking abundance, and that satisfied with harvesting what is absolutely necessary for themselves, they might moreover leave their lands fallow.[16] It will even appear well founded based on the experience of the Genoese government under which the prohibition of exporting commodities outside of the Island produced exactly this effect.

But it is necessary to consider that under that administration money, being of primary necessity, formed the immediate object of labor, that consequently all labor that could not produce money was necessarily neglected, that the cultivator weighed down with disdain, vexations, miseries regarded his station as the height of misfortune, that seeing that he could not find his needs in it he sought another one or fell into discouragement. Instead of which, all the intentions of the foundation here tend to make this station happy in its mediocrity, respectable in its simplicity. Furnishing all the needs of life, all the public tributes without sales and without trafficking, all the means for consideration, it will not even allow a better or nobler one to be imagined. Not seeing anything above them, those who carry it on will make it their glory, and opening up for themselves a path to greater employments they will fill it like the first Romans. Not being able to leave this station, one will want to distinguish oneself in it, one will want to fill it better than others do, to make larger harvests, to furnish a stronger contingent to the state, to deserve the people's votes in elections. Large families well nourished and well clothed will bring honor to leaders; and, since real abundance will be the sole object of luxury, each will want to distinguish himself by that sort of luxury. As long as the human heart remains what it is such establishments will not produce laziness.

What the particular magistrates and the fathers of families ought to do in each jurisdiction, in each county, in each private holding in order not to need others, the general government of the Island ought to do in order not to need the neighboring people.

An exact record of the merchandise that has entered the Island during a certain number of years will give a certain and faithful account about the things it cannot do without; for luxury and superfluity cannot occur in the present situation. With attentive observation over both what the Island produces and what it can produce it will be found that the foreign things necessary are reduced to very little. This is confirmed perfectly by the facts, since in the years 1735 and '36 when the Island, blockaded by the Genoese navy, had no communication with the mainland not only was there no lack of foodstuffs, but no unbearable needs of any sort. Those which made themselves felt the most were munitions for war, leather, cottons for wicks; the pith of certain reeds even took the place of this latter.

From this small number of necessary importations it is still necessary to retrench everything that the Island does not furnish now, but which it can furnish when better cultivated and enlivened by industry. The more carefully one ought to set aside the idle arts, the arts of comfort and softness, the more one ought to favor those that are useful for agriculture and advantageous to human life. We do not need either sculptors or goldsmiths, but we do need carpenters and blacksmiths, we do need weavers, good woolworkers, and not embroiderers or drawers of gold.

The beginning will be made by making sure of the most necessary raw materials, namely wood, iron, wool, leather, hemp, and flax. The Island abounds in wood both for building and for heating, but one should not take pride in this abundance and abandon the use and cutting down of forests to the sole discretion of the owners. To the extent that the population of the Island increases and clearing expands, a rapid devastation of the woods will be caused which can be replaced only very slowly. On this point one can draw lessons of foresight from the country in which I live.[17] Switzerland was formerly covered with woods in such abundance that it was inconvenienced by it. But both for the expansion of pasturage and for the establishment of manufacturing they were cut down without measure and without rule; now these immense forests show only almost naked rocks. Fortunately, warned by the example of France, the Swiss have seen the danger and have put as much order into it as they could. It remains to be seen whether their precautions are not too late; for if, in spite of these precautions, their woods are diminishing daily it is clear that they must soon be destroyed.

By setting about it from farther away, Corsica will not have to fear the same danger. It is necessary to establish early a precise public order over the forests and to regulate the cutting so that reproduction equals consumption. It will be necessary not to act as in France, where the masters of water and forests, having a right over the cutting of trees, have an interest in destroying everything, a care which they also discharge as well as they can. It is necessary to foresee the future from afar: although it might not be appropriate to establish a navy at present, the time will come when this establishment must take place and then the advantage of not having given over to foreign navies the fine forests that are close to the sea will be felt. The old woods which are no longer thriving ought to be exploited or sold, but it is necessary to leave standing all those that are in their strength; they will have their time for use.

It is said that a copper mine has been found on the Island; that is good, but iron mines are worth even more. There surely are some on the Island; the situation of the mountains, the nature of the terrain, the thermal waters that one finds in the province of Capo Corso and elsewhere, everything makes me believe that many of these mines will be found if one looks well for them and if one uses capable people in these searches. That being assumed, one will not allow their exploitation indiscriminately, but one will choose the most favorable positions, the ones most within reach of the woods and rivers in order to establish forges, and where one will be able to open routes most convenient for transportation.

One will have the same attention to manufacturing of all sorts, each in the things that concern them, so as to facilitate labor and distribution as much as possible. Nevertheless, one will be very careful not to set up these sorts of establishments in the most populated and most fertile districts of the Island. On the contrary, everything being equal, one will choose the most arid pieces of land which would remain deserted if they were not populated by industry. From that there will be some additional difficulty for the necessary provisioning; but the advantages that will be found there and the inconveniences that will be avoided ought to prevail infinitely over that consideration.

First, this way we are following our great and first principle which is not only to extend and multiply the population but to spread it out evenly over the whole Island as much as possible. For if the sterile places were not populated by industry they would remain deserted and this would be so much lost for the possible enlargement of the nation.

If one set up such establishments in fertile places, the abundance of provisions and the profit from labor, necessarily greater in the arts than in agriculture, diverting the cultivators or their families from rustic efforts and insensibly depopulating the country, would force new settlers to be attracted from far away in order to cultivate it. Thus overburdening some points of the territory with inhabitants we would be depopulating others and, breaking the equilibrium this way, we would proceed directly against the spirit of our foundation.

Since transportation of commodities makes them more costly in factories, it will diminish the workers' profit and keeping their station closer to that of the cultivator will better maintain equilibrium between them. Nevertheless there cannot be so much of an equilibrium that the advantage will not always be for industry, either because more of the money in the state goes there, or by the means of fortune by which power and inequality play their game, or by the greater force that more men assembled have, a force which the ambitious know how to bring together for their advantage. Thus it is important that this too favored part remain in dependence upon the rest of the nation for its subsistence; in case of internal divisions it is in the nature of our foundation for the settler to give the law to the worker.

With precautions one can favor the establishment of the useful arts on the Island without danger, and I suspect that these establishments well conducted can provide for all necessary things without needing to draw anything from abroad aside from some bagatelles for which a proportionate exportation will be allowed, always carefully balanced by the administration.

To this point I have shown how the Corsican people could continue to exist comfortably and independently with very little trade, how from this little that will be necessary for it the greatest part can easily be made by exchanges, and how it can reduce the necessity for importations from outside of the Island to almost nothing. From that it is seen that if the use of money and currency cannot be absolutely annihilated in the affairs of private individuals, at least it can be reduced to so small a thing that it will be difficult for abuses to arise, that no fortunes at all will be made by this way, and that if they could be made they would become almost useless and would give little advantage to their possessors.

But how shall we govern public finances? What revenues shall we assign to the administration? Shall we establish it for free or how shall we regulate its upkeep? This is what must be considered now.

* * *

Systems of finance are modern inventions. This word "finance" was no more known by the ancients than those of *taille*[18] and capitation. The word *vectigal*[19] was taken in another sense as will be said below. The sovereign laid assessments on conquered or vanquished peoples, never on its immediate subjects, above all in Republics. The people of Athens was far from being burdened with taxes, on the contrary it was paid by the Government; and Rome, whose wars must have cost so much, often made distributions of grain and even of land to the people. Nevertheless the state continued to exist, maintained large armies on sea and on land, performed considerable public works and its expenses were proportionally at least as great as those of modern states. How was this done?

Two epochs must be distinguished in States, their beginning and their growth. In the beginning of a State, it had no revenue other than the public Domain and this domain was considerable. Romulus made it one-third of all the land. He assigned the second third for the upkeep of the Priests and sacred things, only the remaining third was divided among the citizens. This was little, but this little was free. Do you believe that the French farm worker would not willingly limit himself to one third of what he cultivates on the condition of having this third free of all *taille,* of all census tax, of all tithe, and of not paying any sort of tax?

Thus the public revenue was not at all drawn in money but in produce and other commodities. The expenditure was of the same nature as the receipt. Neither the magistrates nor the troops were paid, they were fed, their clothing was provided for them, and in pressing needs extraordinary levies on the people were in statutory labor and not at all in money. These superb public labors cost the state almost nothing; they were the work of those formidable legions who worked as they fought and which were made up not of rabble but of citizens.

When the Romans began to expand and became conquerors they imposed the maintenance of their troops on the vanquished peoples, when they paid them, the subjects were taxed, never the Romans. In pressing dangers the Senate assessed itself, it took loans which it paid back faithfully and during the whole duration of the republic I do not know that the Roman people ever paid any pecuniary tax either by capitation or upon land.

Corsicans, this is a fine model! Do not be surprised that there was more virtue among the Romans than elsewhere, money was less necessary there. The State had small revenues and did great things. Its treasure was in the citizens' hands. I could say that from Corsica's situation and the form of its government there will not be a less expensive state in the world, since being an Island and a Republic it will have no need of regular troops and since the leaders of the State all return to equality they will not be able to draw anything from the common mass that does not return there in very little time.

But this is not how I envisage the nerve of the public force. On the contrary, I want much to be spent for the service of the state; to say it better I dispute only about the choice of specie. I look at finances as the fat of the body politic which, becoming congested in certain muscular webs, overburdens the body with a useless stoutness and makes it heavy rather than strong. I want to nourish the state with a healthier food which unites itself with the substance, which changes itself into fibers, into muscles without congesting the vessels, which gives vigor and not thickness to the members and which reinforces the body without weighing it down.

Far from wanting the state to be poor, on the contrary, I would like it to have everything and everyone to have his part of the common possession only in proportion to his services. The acquisition of all of the Egyptians' goods for the King done by Joseph would have been good if he had not done too much or too little.[20] But without entering into these speculations, which would take me too far away from my object, this is enough to make my thought understood, which is not to destroy private property absolutely, because that is impossible, but to restrict it within the narrowest limits, to give a measure, a rule, a brake that restrains it, that directs it, that subjugates it, and keeps it always subordinated to the public good. In a word, I want the property of the state to be as great, as strong and that of the citizens as small, as weak as possible. That is why I avoid putting it in things whose private possessor is too much the master such as currency and money that one easily hides from public inspection.

The establishment of a public domain is not, I agree, as easy a thing to do today in Corsica, already divided up among its inhabitants, as it was in nascent Rome before its conquered territory belonged to anyone. Nevertheless, I know that there remains on the Island a large quantity of excellent fallow land of which it is very easy for the government to take advantage, either by alienating it for a certain number of years to those who will put it into cultivation or by having it cleared by statutory labor in the community of each. It would be necessary to have been on the spot to judge the distribution that one could make of this land and of the advantage one can draw from it, but I do not doubt at all that by means of some exchanges and certain not very difficult arrangements one could, in each jurisdiction and even each County, procure communal estates that will even be able to increase in a few years by the order that will be spoken about in the law of inheritance.

Another means, easier still, and which ought to provide a more definite, more certain, and much more considerable revenue is to follow an example that I have under my eyes in the Protestant Cantons. Since the reformation of these Cantons, they took possession of the ecclesiastical tithes and these tithes upon which they maintain their clergy decently have made up the principal revenue of the State. I do not say that the Corsicans ought to touch the revenues of the Church, God forbid! but I believe that the people will not be extremely vexed if the State asks them for as much as the clergy—already sufficiently endowed with estates of land—ask them. The basis of this tax will be [established] without difficulty, without trouble and almost without expenses because it will only be necessary to double the ecclesiastical tithe and take half of it.

I draw a third sort of revenue, the most reliable and the best, from the men themselves, by using their labor, their arms, and their heart, rather than their purse in the service of the fatherland, either for its defense in the militias, or for its conveniences by statutory labor in public works.

Do not let this word of statutory labor be at all shocking to Republicans! I know that it is abhorred in France but is it in Switzerland? There the roads are also built by statutory labor and no one complains. The apparent convenience of payment can seduce only superficial minds and it is a reliable maxim that the fewer intermediaries there are between the need and the service, the less onerous the service ought to be.

Without daring to unfold my thought completely, without giving statutory labor and all personal work by the citizens as an absolute good here I will agree, if it is wished, that it would be better for everything to be done by paying if the means for paying did not introduce an infinite number of abuses without measure and of greater, more unlimited evils than the ones that can result from this constraint, above all if the one who imposes it is of the same station as those who are imposed upon.

Moreover, for the contribution to be divided equally it is just for the one who has no land at all and is not able to pay the tithe on its produce to pay it with the labor of his arms. Thus statutory labor ought to fall especially on the order of the aspirants. But citizens and patriots ought to lead them to labor and set the example for them. Let everything done for the public good always be honorable! Let the magistrate himself, occupied by other cares, show that those are not beneath him, like those Roman Consuls who put their hand first to the labors of the camp in order to set the example for their troops.

As to fines and confiscations which make up a fourth sort of receipt in Republics, I hope by means of the present establishment that it will be almost nothing in ours, thus I do not take it into account.

Since all these public revenues are in kind rather than in money, they appear troublesome to collect, to take care of, and to use; and that is true in part, but here it is less a question of the easiest administration than of the healthiest, and it would be better for it to give a little more trouble and to engender fewer abuses. The best economic system for Corsica and for a Republic is assuredly not the best for a monarchy and for a large state. The one that I am proposing would not succeed either in France or in England and could not even be established there, but it has the greatest success in Switzerland where it has been established for centuries, and it is the only one that it could put up with.

The receipts of each jurisdiction are farmed out; they are made in kind or in money at the choice of the contributors; the payment of the magistrates and officials is also made for the greatest part in wheat, in wine, in fodder, in wood. In this way the collection is neither troublesome for the public nor onerous to private individuals but the inconvenience that I see in it is that there are men whose profession is to make a profit from the prince and to vex the subjects.

It is extremely important in the republic not to allow financiers by station: less because of their dishonest gains than because of their principles and their examples which, too quick in spreading among the nation, destroy all good feelings from esteem for illicit abundance and its advantages, cover disinterestedness, simplicity of morals and all the virtues with disdain and opprobrium.

Let us beware of increasing the pecuniary treasury at the expense of the moral treasury; it is this latter that genuinely puts us in possession of men and of all their power, whereas by the other one obtains only the appearance of services but the will is not bought at all. It would be better for the fiscal administration to be that of the father of a family and lose something than to gain more and be that of a usurer.

Let us leave tax collection in state control, even if it must bring in much less. Let us even avoid making this tax collection into a profession, for this would be almost the same inconvenience as farming it out. What makes a system of finance most pernicious is the use of a financier. Whatever the price might be, there must be no publicans in the state. Instead of making tax collection and public revenues a lucrative profession, on the contrary, it is necessary to make it the test of the merit and integrity of young citizens; it is necessary for this tax collection to be, so to speak, the novitiate of public employment and the first step toward attaining magistracies. What suggested this idea to me is the comparison of the administration of the Charity Hospital of Paris whose depredations and acts of brigandage are known to everyone, with the Charity Hospital of Lyon which offers an example of order and disinterestedness which perhaps has no equal on earth. Where does this difference come from? Are the Lyonnais in themselves worth more than the Parisians? No. But at Lyon this office of administration is a station of passage. It is necessary to begin by filling it well in order to be able to become Alderman and Provost of merchants while at Paris the administrators are such by station for their whole life; they contrive to draw the best possible advantage from an employment that is not a test for them but a profession, a reward, a station attached, so to speak, to other stations. There are certain positions about which it is agreed that the revenues will be increased by the right to rob the poor.

And do not think that this labor requires more experience and enlightenment than young people can have; it requires only a level of activity for which they are singularly suited, and since they are ordinarily less avaricious, less harsh in exactions than old people are, being on the one side sensitive to the miseries of the poor and on the other strongly interested in filling well an employment that serves as a test for them, they behave precisely as befits the thing.

The receiver of each parish will render his accounts to his county, that of each county to its jurisdiction, and that of each jurisdiction to the chamber of accounts which will be composed of a certain number of councillors of State and presided over by the Doge. In this manner, the public treasury will consist for the most part in commodities and other products divided into small warehouses over the whole kingdom and for some part in money that will be put into the general coffer after small expenses to make on the spot have been withdrawn.

Since private individuals will always be free to pay their quota in money or in produce at the levels that will be set every year in each jurisdiction, once the government has calculated the best proportion that ought to be found between these two sorts of quotas, as soon as this proportion is altered it will be in a position to notice this alteration on the spot, to seek its cause and to remedy it.

This is the key to our political Government, the only part that requires art, calculations, meditation. This is why the chamber of accounts, which everywhere else is only a very subordinate tribunal, will be the center of business here, will give the impetus to the whole administration and will be composed of the foremost heads of the state.

When collections in produce go beyond their measure and those in money do not reach theirs, this will be a sign that agriculture and population are going well, but that useful industry is being neglected; it will be appropriate to rekindle it a bit out of fear that the private individuals, having also become too isolated, too independent, too unsociable will not hold the government highly enough.

But this defect of proportion, an infallible sign of prosperity, will always be little to be feared and easy to remedy. It will not be the same for the contrary defect which, as soon as it makes itself felt, is already of the greatest consequence and cannot be corrected too early. For when the contributors provide more money than commodities this will be a certain mark that there is too much exportation to foreign countries, that commerce is becoming too easy, that the lucrative arts are being extended on the Island at the expense of agriculture and consequently that simplicity and all the virtues attached to it are beginning to degenerate. The abuses that produce this alteration indicate the remedies that must be brought to it, but these remedies require a great wisdom in the manner of administering them; for here it is easier to prevent the evil than to destroy it.

If one did nothing but put taxes on the objects of luxury, close one's ports to foreign commerce, suppress manufacturing, stop the circulation of specie, one would do nothing but throw the people into laziness, misery, discouragement; one will make money disappear without increasing produce; one will remove the resource of fortune without reestablishing that of labor. To touch the value of currencies is also a bad operation in a republic, first because then the public robs itself which signifies nothing at all, in the second place because, between the quantity of signs and that of things, there is a proportion that always regulates their respective value in the same way and because when the Prince wants to change the signs he does nothing but change the names since then the value of the things necessarily changes in the same relation. Among Kings it is a different matter and when the Prince inflates the currency he draws the real advantage from it of robbing his creditors: but if this operation is ever repeated this advantage is neutralized and erased by the loss of public credit.

Establish sumptuary laws, then, but make them always more severe for the foremost people in the State, relax them for the inferior orders;

act so that there is vanity in being simple and so that a rich person does not know how to make himself honored for his money. These are not impractical speculations at all: this is how the Venetians grant only to their nobles the right of wearing their coarse ugly cloth from Padua, so that the best city-dwellers hold it an honor to have the same permission.

When there is simplicity in morals, agrarian laws are necessary, because then the rich man, not being able to place his wealth in anything else, accumulates his possessions: but neither[21] agrarian laws nor any laws can ever have a retroactive effect and one cannot confiscate any land acquired legitimately however large it might be in virtue of a posterior law that forbids having that much.

No law can despoil any private individual of any portion of his possession. Law can only keep him from acquiring more; then if he breaks the law he deserves punishment and the illegitimately acquired surplus ought to be confiscated. The Romans saw the necessity of agrarian laws when it was no longer time to establish them, and, for lack of the distinction I have just made, they finally destroyed the Republic by a means that ought to have preserved it: the Gracchi[22] wanted to deprive the Patricians of their lands; it would have been necessary to prevent them from acquiring them. It is very true that afterwards these same Patricians acquired more in spite of the law, but this is because the evil was deep-rooted when it was passed and it was too late to remedy it.

Fear and hope are the two instruments with which one governs men; but instead of using the one and the other indiscriminately, it is necessary to use them in accordance with their nature. Fear does not excite, it holds back; and its use in penal laws is not to lead people to do good but to keep them from doing evil. We do not even see that fear of poverty makes idle people laborious. Thus in order to excite among men a genuine emulation in labor one must not show it to them as a means for avoiding hunger but as a means of proceeding to well-being. Thus let us posit this general rule that no one ought to be castigated for having abstained but for having acted.

Thus in order to awaken a nation's activity it is necessary to give it great desires, great hopes, great positive motives for acting.[23] When well examined, the great motive powers that make men act are reduced to two, sensual pleasure and vanity, still if you remove from the first everything that belongs to the second, in the final analysis, you will find that everything is reduced almost to vanity alone. It is easy to see that all those who show off their pursuit of sensual pleasure are merely vain. Their so-called sensual pleasure is merely ostentation, it consists more in showing it or describing it than in tasting it. True pleasure is simple and peaceful, it loves silence and introspection; the one who tastes it belongs completely to the thing, he does not amuse himself by saying, “I am having some pleasure.” Now vanity is the fruit of opinion; it is born from it and nourishes itself upon it. From which it follows that the arbiters of a people’s opinion are the arbiters of its actions. It seeks things in proportion to the value it gives them; to show it what it ought to esteem is to tell it what it ought to do.

This name, vanity, is not well chosen because it is only one of the two branches of amour-propre. I must explain myself. The opinion that puts a great value on frivolous objects produces vanity; the one that falls upon objects great and beautiful by themselves produces pride. One can thus make a people prideful or vain according to the selection of the objects upon which one directs its judgments.

Pride is more natural than vanity because it consists in esteeming oneself based on truly estimable goods, whereas vanity, giving a value to what does not have any at all is the work of prejudices slow to be born. Some time is necessary to fascinate a nation’s eyes. Since there is nothing more really beautiful than independence and power, at first every people that is formed is prideful. But no new people was ever vain, because by its nature vanity is individual; it cannot be the instrument of such a great thing as forming the body of a nation.[24]

Two contrary states cast men into the torpor of laziness. One is that peace of soul that makes one satisfied with what one possesses; the other an insatiable longing that makes one feel the impossibility of satisfying it. The one who lives without desires and the one who knows he cannot obtain what he desires remain equally in inaction. In order to act one must both aspire to something and be able to hope to attain it. Every government that wants to make the people active ought to take care to put into its grasp objects capable of tempting it. Make it so that labor offers great advantages to citizens, not only according to your estimation but according to theirs; you will infallibly make them laborious.[25] Among these advantages, not only is wealth not always the most attractive, but it can be less so than any other, as long as it does not serve as a means for attaining the ones by which one is tempted.

The most general and the surest way that one can have for satisfying one’s desires, whatever they might be, is power. Thus toward whatever passion a man or a people might be inclined, if he has some lively ones he avidly aspires to power, either as an end if he is prideful or vain, or as a means if he is vindictive or a lover of pleasure.

Thus the great art of government consists in the economy of civil power well understood, not only in order to maintain it, but in order to diffuse activity and life into the whole state; in order to make the people active and laborious.

Civil power is exercised in two manners: the one legitimate from authority, the other abusive from wealth. Everywhere that wealth dominates, power and authority are ordinarily separated, because the means of acquiring wealth and the means of attaining authority, not being the same, are rarely employed by the same people. Then the apparent power is in the hands of the magistrates and the real power is in those of the rich. In such a government everything proceeds at the pleasure of men, nothing tends toward the goal of the foundation.

It happens then that the object of longing is divided: some aspire to authority in order to sell its use to the rich and to enrich themselves by this means; the others and the greatest number go directly toward wealth with which they are sure of having power one day by buying either authority or those who are its depositaries.

Assume that, in a State constituted this way, on the one side, honors and authority are hereditary, and that, on the other, the means of acquiring wealth are within the grasp of a small number and depend on influence, favor, friends; then it is impossible, while some adventurers proceed to fortune and from there by degrees to positions, for a universal discouragement not to reach the bulk of the nation and not to cast it into languor.

Separate Fragments

Thus generally in every rich nation the government is weak, I call by this name equally the one that acts only weakly and, what amounts to the same, the one that needs violent means to maintain itself.

I cannot clarify my thought any better than by the example of Carthage and Rome. The first massacred, crucified its generals, its magistrates, its members and was only a weak government that everything incessantly frightened and shook. The second deprived no one of his life, did not even confiscate possessions, the accused criminal could leave it peacefully and the trial ended there. The vigor of this admirable government did not need cruelty; the greatest of misfortunes was to cease to be one of its members.

Peoples will be laborious when labor is held in honor and it always depends on the government to make it so. Let consideration and authority be in the grasp of the Citizens, they will exert themselves to reach them; but if they see them as too far away they will not make a step. What casts them into discouragement is not the amount of the labor, it is its uselessness.

I will be asked if it is while plowing one's field that one acquires the talents necessary for governing. I will answer, yes in a simple and upright government such as ours. Great talents are the supplement of patriotic zeal, they are necessary for leading a people that does not love its country at all and does not honor its leaders at all. But act so that the people delight in the commonwealth, look for virtues and leave your great talents; they would do more harm than good. The best motive force of a government is love of the fatherland and this love is cultivated along with the fields. Good sense is enough to lead a well constituted state, and good sense is elaborated as much in the heart as in the head, men whose passions do not blind them always act well.

Men are naturally lazy but the ardor for labor is the first fruit of a well-regulated society and when a people falls back into laziness and discouragement it is always from the abuse of this same society that no longer gives to labor the value it ought to expect.

Everywhere money reigns that which the people gives in order to maintain its freedom is always the instrument of its slavery and what it pays voluntarily today is used to make it pay by force tomorrow.

Every child born on the Island will be a citizen and member of the Republic when he is old enough according to the statutes, and none will be able to be one except in this manner.

Thus it will not be possible to give the right of the city to any foreigner aside from one single time every fifty years to a single one if he presents himself and if he is judged worthy of it, or the most worthy of those who present themselves. His reception will be a general festival on the whole Island.

Every Corsican who, having reached forty years of age, is not married and has not been so at all will be excluded from the right of the City for his whole life.

Every private individual who, changing residence, passes from one county to another will lose his right of the City for three years and at the end of this time will be inscribed in the new county upon paying a fee, without which he will continue to be excluded from the right of the City until he has paid.

From the preceding point are excepted all those who fill any public charge who ought to be admitted to all the rights of the City in the county in which they are found as long as they are in office.

The Corsicans were subject to the Genoese. It is known what treatment forced them to revolt, almost forty years ago. Since that time they have kept themselves independent. Nevertheless the Gazetteers always call them rebels and it is not known for how many centuries they will continue to call them thus. The present generation has not seen servitude at all: it is hard to conceive how a man born free and who keeps himself such is a rebel while a lucky usurper is a sacred monarch, a legitimate King at the end of three years. Thus prescription takes place only in favor of Tyranny, it is never allowed in favor of freedom. This sentiment is as reasonable in itself as it is honorable to its partisans. Fortunately words are not things. Ransomed at the price of their blood, the Corsicans, rebels or not, are free and worthy of being so in spite of the Genoese and the Gazetteers.

In each county will be kept a register of all the land that each private individual possesses.

None will be able to possess land outside of his county.

None will be able to possess more than [ ][26] land. One who has this quantity will be able to acquire similar quantities by exchange, but not larger ones even of less good land and all gifts, all legacies that could be given to him in land will be nullified.

Because you have governed a free people justly for three years, it entrusts the same administration to you for three more years.

No bachelor will be able to make a will, but all his possessions will pass to the community.

Corsicans, keep silence, I am going to speak in the name of all. Let those who will not consent go away, and let those who will consent raise their hand.

It will be necessary to have this act preceded by a general proclamation bringing an injunction to each to make his way to the place of his residence at a time that will be prescribed, under pain of losing his right of birth and naturalization.

I

The whole Corsican nation will combine by a solemn oath into a single body politic of which both the bodies that compose it and the individuals will be members henceforth.

II

This act of union will be celebrated the same day on the whole Island and all Corsicans will attend it to the best of their ability, each in his city, village, or parish as will be more specifically ordered.

III

Formula of the oath pronounced under the sky and hand on the Bible:

> In the name of omnipotent God and upon the holy Gospels by a sacred and irrevocable oath I unite myself by body, by possessions, by will, and by all my power to the Corsican nation in order to belong to it in all property, myself and all that depends on me. I swear to live and die for it, to observe all its laws and

to obey its legitimate leaders and magistrates in everything that is in conformity to the laws. Thus may God help me in this life and have mercy on my soul. May freedom, justice, and the Republic of the Corsicans live forever. Amen.

And all keeping the right hand raised will answer: Amen.

In each parish there will be kept a precise register of all those who have assisted in this solemnity. Their name, their father's name, their age and their residence will be noted in it.

As for those who will not have been able to assist at this solemnity for valid impediment other days will be assigned to swear the same oath and have themselves inscribed in the space of three months at the latest after the solemn oath; when this term has passed all those who have neglected to fulfill this duty will have their right foreclosed, and will remain in the Class of foreigners or aspirants which will be spoken about below.

A country has its greatest independent force when the land there produces as much as possible, that is, when it has as many cultivators as it wants.

For each child he has of more than five years of age he will be allotted a *patrimony* on the township.

Fathers who have children who are absent will not be able to have them go through the accounting until after their return and those who are off the Island for an entire year will no longer be able to be counted even after their return.

They will be turned away from superstition by being very much occupied with their duties as citizens; by having display put into national festivals, by having much of their time taken away from ecclesiastical ceremonies in order to give them to civil ceremonies, and that can be done with a little skill without making the Clergy angry, by acting so that it always has some share in them, but so that this share is so small that attention does not stay fixed on them at all.

Of all manners of living the one that attaches men most to their country is the rustic life.

The Guardians of the Laws will be able to convoke the estates general whenever they want and, from the day of convocation to the day after the assembly, the authority of the great Podesta and of the council of state will be suspended.

The person of the guardians of the laws will be sacred and inviolable and there will be no one on the Island who has the power to arrest them.

Each County will have the right to revoke its guardians and of substituting others for them whenever it pleases but unless they are expressly recalled they will be for life.

Once convoked extraordinarily by the Senate, the Estates will not be able to be dissolved unless the Senate or the great Podesta are dismissed.

The Laws concerning inheritances ought all to tend to bring things back to equality so that each might have something and no one have anything in excess.

Every Corsican who leaves his county in order to go to live in another will lose his right of the city for three years. At the end of which upon his request and a proclamation, if no charge is brought against him, he will be inscribed on the registers of the new county and in the same order into which he was inscribed in the other: citizen if he was citizen and patriot if he was patriot and aspirant if he was only an aspirant.

And Corsicans must pay a duty in order to obtain the favor of being unarmed.

There will be no carriages on the Island; Ecclesiastics and women will be able to make use of two-wheeled chaises. But laymen of any rank whatsoever will be able to travel only on foot or on horseback unless they are crippled or seriously ill.

None will be allowed to take an oath on things concerning his interest. But the oath . . .

None will be able to be put in prison for debt and even in seizures that might be made in the house of a debtor, he will be left with (in addition to clothes to cover himself) his plow, his oxen, his bed and his most indispensable furnishings.

Every boy who gets married before having reached the age of twenty or only after having reached the age of thirty, or who marries a girl who has not reached the age of fifteen, or a person—maid or widow—whose age differs from his by more than twenty years will remain excluded from the order of citizens until he attains it by public reward for services rendered to the State.

Given the unequal distribution of the productions of the Island it is necessary not to close communications; in some things it is necessary to have consideration for the people's prejudice and shortsightedness. Seeing that one does not allow it to go to its neighborhood to seek among its compatriots the commodities it lacks, it would accuse our laws of capriciousness and of harshness, it would mutiny against them, or would hate them in secret.

If we could do without money and have all the advantages that money gives we would enjoy these advantages much better than we would with wealth, because we would have them separated from the vices that poison them and that money brings along with it.

None ought to be magistrate by station nor soldier by station. All ought to be ready to fill the functions the fatherland imposes on them indiscriminately. There ought not to be any permanent station on the Island other than that of citizen and that one alone ought to comprehend all the others.

As long as money is useful to the Corsicans they will love it, and as long as they love it the Republic will maintain among them emissaries and treaties that will have influence over deliberations and, so to speak, will keep the State in the pay of its former masters.

One must not at all count on a lively but always brief enthusiasm after freedom is recovered. Popular Heroism is a moment of fire that follows languor and slackening. It is necessary to found a people's freedom upon its manner of being and not on its passions. For the passions are temporary and change their object; but the effect of a good constitution lasts as long as the constitution and no people could remain free except for as long as it feels well as a result of freedom.

May they remember well that every sort of privilege is for the profit of the private individuals who obtain them and the burden of the nation that gives them.

This is the ridiculous contradiction into which fall all violent governments that, wanting to keep peoples in a condition of weakness nevertheless want to put themselves into a condition of strength from them.

The nation will not be at all illustrious but it will be happy. It will not be spoken about; it will have little consideration abroad; but it will have abundance, peace, and freedom in its bosom.

Every litigant who has rejected the arbitration of the elders or who, having accepted it refuses to rely on their judgment if he loses his suit in law court, will be noted down and unable to exercise any public employment for five years.

Every daughter of a citizen who marries a Corsican of any class whatsoever will be given a dowry by the husband's county; this dowry will always be a piece of land and, if he is an aspirant, will suffice for him to ascend to the class of patriots.

Of all governments the Democratic is always the least expensive because public luxury is only in the abundance of men, and because, where the people is the master, power has no need of any dazzling sign.

For two or several States to be subject to the same Prince, that has nothing contrary to right or to reason. But that a State be subject to another State, that appears incompatible with the nature of the body politic.

Although I know the Corsican nation has prejudices very contrary to my principles, my intention is not at all to employ the art of persuading in order to make them adopt them. On the contrary I want to tell them my opinion and my reasons with such simplicity that there is nothing in it that can seduce them, because it is very possible that I am mistaken and I would be very sorry for them to adopt my sentiment to their harm.

From where do the dissensions, quarrels, civil wars come in Corsica that have torn it apart for so many years and finally forced it to have recourse to the Pisans, then to the Genoese? Isn't all that the work of its nobility, isn't it the nobility that reduced the people to despair and forced it to prefer a tranquil slavery to the ills that it was suffering under so many Tyrants? Now after having shaken off the yoke does it want to return into the state that forced it to submit to it?

I shall not preach morality to them,[27] I shall not order them to have virtues, but I shall put them in a position so that they will have virtues without knowing the word; and so that they will be good and just without knowing very well what justice and goodness are.

I do not know how it happens, but I do know very well that the operations for which one keeps the most registers and account books are precisely those in which the most knavery is committed.

Such were the young Romans who began by being questors or treasurers of arms before commanding them. Such financiers were not base men, it did not even enter into their heads that one could profit from public money, and military cash boxes could pass into the hands of the Catos without risk.

Instead of [repressing] luxury by means of sumptuary laws, it would be better to forestall it by an administration that makes it impossible.

I am persuaded that by looking for them well one will find iron mines on the Island; it would be better to find iron mines there than gold mines.

And in doubt itself it is better to begin by the state that naturally leads to the other and which one can always do without if one hopes to find a better one, than by the one from which one cannot not return to the other, and which has nothing before it but destruction and ruin.

Le prerogative che godernno le sudette famiglie.[28]

This point is destructive of the spirit of the Republic which wants the military to be extremely subordinated to the magistrate and regards itself only as the minister of the ministers of the law. It is extremely important that the military not be a station by itself, but an accident of the station of citizen. If the nobility had prerogatives, distinctions in the Troops, soon military officers would believe they were above civil officials; the leaders of the Republic would no longer be regarded as anything but Men of the Robe,[29] and being governed militarily the state would very promptly fall under despotism.

To see the man who has been so much respected while he is in place return to the private station is an excellent means of teaching how to relate everything to the law, and for him to be assured that one day he will find himself back again in their number is a great lesson for maintaining the rights of private individuals.

For example, since the province of Capo Corso is unable to produce anything but wine, it is necessary that there not be enough cultivated in all the rest of the Island so that this part cannot sell its own.

For since private property is so weak and so dependent, the Government needs only a little force and, so to speak, leads the people with a movement of its finger.

Where are the Princes who take it into their head to assemble Theologians in order to consult whether what they want to undertake is legitimate?

Preface

I have a profound respect for the Republic of Genoa; I have one for every sovereign in particular, even though I sometimes tell all of them truths that are a little harsh. And would heaven grant for their own advantage that one might dare to tell them to them more often and that they sometimes might deign to listen to them.

Pay attention I beg you to the fact that I am not giving statutory labor or any sort of forced labor as an absolute good; it would be better for all that to be done freely and by paying, if the means of paying did not introduce an infinity of abuses without measure of greater evils, more unlimited than those that can result from this constraint above all when those who impose it are of the same station as those who are imposed upon.

For if there is only one sort of revenue, namely the fruits of the earth, there will be no more than one sort of possession, namely the earth itself.

For the genuine spirit of public property is that for private property to be very strong in the stock and very weak or nonexistent in the collateral.

And to raise the taxes in order to give value to the commodity and to take value away from money.

The Corsicans are almost still in the natural and healthy state, but much art is needed to keep them there because their prejudices are taking them away from it, they have precisely what suits them but they want what is not good for them; their sentiments are upright, it is their false enlightenment that fools them. They see the false glitter of neighboring nations and burn to be like them, because they do not feel their misery and do not see that they are infinitely better.

To prevent the exportation of commodities is to cut off the great holdings by the root.

Noble people, I do not at all want to give you artificial and systematic laws invented by men but to lead you back underneath the laws of nature and of order alone which command hearts and do not tyrannize wills at all.

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND AND ON ITS PLANNED REFORMATION

Considerations on the Government of Poland and on Its Planned Reformation

[I] State of the Question.

The picture of the government of Poland made by Count Wielhorski, and the reflections he has joined to it, are instructive pieces for anyone who wants to form an orderly plan for the recasting of this government. I do not know anyone in a better position to lay out this plan than himself, who joins to the general knowledge that this labor demands all the knowledge of the locality and particular circumstances, impossible to give in writing, and nevertheless necessary to know to fit an institution to the people for whom one destines it. Unless one has a thorough knowledge of the Nation for which one is laboring, the work one does for it, however excellent it might be in itself, will always err in application, and even more so when it is a question of a nation already completely instituted, whose tastes, morals, prejudices and vices[1] have taken root too much to be easily stifled by new seeds. A good institution for Poland can only be the work of the Poles or of someone who has studied well the Polish nation and those[2] that border it on the spot. A foreigner can hardly give anything but general views, can enlighten the institutor, not guide him. Even when my head was in all its vigor, I would not have been able to grasp the ensemble of these great relationships. Today, now that I barely still have the faculty of linking ideas, in order to obey Count Wielhorski and show my zeal for his fatherland, I must limit myself to giving him an account of the impressions made on me by the reading of his work and the[3] reflections it suggested to me.

While reading the history of the government of Poland, one has difficulty understanding how a State so bizarrely constituted could have continued to exist for such a long time. A large body formed of a large number of dead limbs, and of a small number of disunited limbs, with all of its movements almost independent of each other, far from having a common end, mutually[4] destroy each other, which tosses and turns a great deal in order to do nothing, which can make no resistance to anyone who wishes to encroach on it, which falls into dissolution five or six times each century, which falls into paralysis with every effort it wants to make, with every need it wants to provide for, and which in spite of all this lives and preserves itself in vigor; there, it seems to me, is one of the most singular spectacles that can strike a thinking being.[5] I see all the States of Europe rushing to their ruin. Monarchies, Republics, all these nations so magnificently instituted, all these fine governments so wisely balanced, fallen into decrepitude, menaced by an impending death; and Poland, that region depopulated, devastated, oppressed, open to its aggressors, at the height of its misfortunes and its anarchy, still shows all the fire of youth; and it dares to ask for a government and laws, as if it had just been born. It is in irons, and discusses the means to preserve itself in freedom! It feels in itself that force which that of tyranny cannot subjugate. I believe I am looking at besieged Rome tranquilly ruling the lands on which its enemy has just pitched its camp. Brave Poles, beware; beware that for wanting to be too well, you might make your situation worse. In considering what you want to acquire, do not forget what you can lose. Correct, if possible, the abuses of your constitution; but do not despise the one that has made you what you are.

You love freedom, you are worthy of it; you have defended[6] it against a powerful and cunning aggressor who, pretending to present you with the bonds of friendship, burdened you with the irons of servitude. Now, weary of the disturbances of your fatherland, you sigh after tranquillity. I believe it is extremely easy to obtain it; but to preserve it along with freedom, that is what appears difficult to me. It is in the bosom of that anarchy that is odious to you that those patriotic souls that have protected you from the yoke were formed. They were sleeping in a lethargic repose; the storm awoke them. After having broken the chains that were intended for them, they are feeling the weight of fatigue. They would like to combine the peace of despotism with the sweetness of freedom. I am afraid that they might want contradictory things. Repose and freedom appear incompatible to me; it is necessary to choose.

I do not say that things must be left in the state they are in; but I do say that they must be touched only with extreme circumspection. At this moment one is more struck by the abuses than by the advantages. The time will come, I fear, when these advantages will be better felt, and unfortunately this will be when they have been lost.

It may be easy, if you wish, to make better laws. It is impossible to make any that men's passions do not abuse, as they have abused the first ones. To foresee and to weigh all these abuses to come is perhaps an impossible thing for the most consummate Statesman. To put law over man is a problem in politics which I compare to that of squaring the circle in geometry. Solve this problem well, and the government based on this solution will be good and without abuses. But until then, be sure that where you believe you are making the laws rule, it will be the men who are ruling.

There will never be any good and solid constitution except the one in which the law rules over the hearts of the citizens. As long as the legislative force does not reach that point, the laws will always be evaded. But how to reach hearts? That is what our institutors, who never see anything but force and punishments, hardly think about, and that is what material recompenses would perhaps not lead to any better; justice, even of the greatest integrity, does not lead to it, because like health justice is a good which one enjoys without feeling it, which inspires no enthusiasm at all, and whose worth one feels only after one has lost it.

How then to move hearts, and make the fatherland and laws loved? Shall I dare to say? With children's games; with institutions that are idle[7] in the eyes of superficial men, but which form cherished habits and invincible attachments. If I am spouting nonsense here, at least I am doing so very completely, for I admit that I see my folly under the features of reason.

[II] Spirit of Ancient Institutions.

When one reads ancient history, one believes one has been transported into another universe and among other beings. What do the French, the English, the Russians have in common with the Romans and the Greeks? Almost nothing but the shape. The strong souls of the latter appear to the others as exaggerations of history. How could those who feel themselves to be so small think that there could have been such great men? Nevertheless, they did exist, and they were humans as we are: what prevents us from being men like them? Our prejudices, our base philosophy, the passions of petty self-interest, concentrated along with egoism in all hearts by the inept institutions that genius never laid down.

I take a look at modern nations: I see there many makers of laws and not one legislator. Among the ancients I see three principal ones who deserve particular attention: Moses, Lycurgus, and Numa. All three put their principal efforts into objects that would appear worthy of derision to our learned people. All three had successes that would be judged impossible if they were less well attested.

The first formed and executed the astonishing enterprise of founding into the body of a nation a swarm of unfortunate fugitives without arts, without arms, without talents, without virtues, without courage, and who—not having a single inch of ground of their own—made up an alien band upon the face of the earth. Moses dared to make out of this wandering and servile troop a body politic, a free people, and while it wandered in the desert without having a stone upon which to lay its head, he gave it that durable institution, proof against times, fortune, and conquerors, which five thousand years have not been able to destroy nor even to impair, and which still continues to exist today in all its force, even though the body of the nation no longer exists.[8]

In order to keep his people from dissolving among foreign peoples, he gave it morals and practices incompatible with those of other nations; he overburdened it with distinctive rites, ceremonies; he constrained it in a thousand ways in order to keep it ceaselessly in suspense and to make it always a stranger among other men, and all the bonds of fraternity that he placed among the members of his republic were so many barriers which kept it separate from its neighbors and prevented it from blending with them. That is how this singular nation, so often subjugated, so often dispersed, and apparently destroyed, but always idolatrous of its rule, has nevertheless preserved itself up to our times scattered among the others without merging with them, and how its morals, its laws, its rites, continue to exist and will endure as long as the world does, in spite of the hatred and persecution of the rest of the human race.

Lycurgus undertook to institute a people already degraded by servitude and by the vices that are its effect. He imposed on it a yoke of iron, the like of which no other people has ever borne; but he attached it to the yoke, identified it with it so to speak, by always keeping it occupied with it. He ceaselessly showed it the fatherland in its laws, in its games, in its home, in its loves, in its festivities. He did not leave it a moment of relaxation to be by itself, and from that continuous constraint, ennobled by its object, was born in it that ardent love of the fatherland that was always the strongest or rather the only passion of the Spartans, and which made of them beings above humanity. Sparta was only a city, it is true; but by the sheer force of its institution this city gave laws to all of Greece, became its capital, and made the Persian Empire tremble. Sparta was the focal point from where its legislation extended its effects all around it.

Those who have seen Numa as nothing but a founder of religious rites and ceremonies have judged this great man very badly. Numa was the true founder of Rome. If Romulus had done nothing but assemble some brigands whom one setback could have dispersed, his imperfect work could not have withstood the test of time. It was Numa who made it solid and durable by uniting these brigands into an indissoluble body, by transforming them into Citizens, less by means of laws, of which their rustic poverty had hardly any need yet, than by means of mild institutions that attached them to each other and all to their land by finally making their city sacred by means of apparently frivolous and superstitious rites, the force and the effect of which are felt by so few people, and yet the first foundations of which were laid by Romulus, the fierce Romulus himself.[9]

The same spirit guided all the ancient Legislators in their institutions. All looked for bonds which attached the Citizens to the fatherland and each to each other, and they found them in distinctive practices, in religious ceremonies which were always exclusive and national by their nature (see the end[10] of the *Social Contract*), in games which kept the citizens assembled very much, in exercises which increased their pride and self-esteem along with their vigor and strength, in spectacles which, recalling to them the history of their ancestors, their misfortunes, their virtues, their victories, gained the interest of their hearts, inflamed them with a lively emulation, and strongly attached them to that fatherland with which they were kept ceaselessly occupied. It is the poems of Homer recited to the Greeks solemnly assembled, not in boxes, on stages and cash in hand, but in the open air and as a body of the nation; it is the tragedies of Aeschylus, of Sophocles, and of Euripides, often represented before them, it is the prizes with which, to the acclamations of all of Greece,[11] the victors in their games were crowned which continuously set them aflame with emulation and glory, brought their courage and their virtues to that degree of energy of which nothing today gives us any idea, and which the moderns cannot even believe. If they have laws, it is solely to teach them to obey their masters well, not to pick pockets, and to give a lot of money to public scoundrels. If they have customs, it is in order to be able to amuse the idleness of obliging ladies, and gracefully walk their own about. If they assemble it is in Temples for a worship which has nothing national, which in no way recalls the fatherland, and which is turned almost to derision; it is in completely closed-up rooms and at the price of money, in order to see in effeminate, dissolute theaters where they don't know how to talk about anything but love, histrions declaim, prostitutes simper, and to take lessons of corruption there, the only ones out of all the ones they claim to be given there that are taken advantage of; it is in festivals where the people, always despised, is always without influence, where public blame and approbation produce nothing; it is in licentious throngs, in order to make secret liaisons there, in order to look there for pleasures that separate, isolate men the most, and which weaken hearts the most. Are these stimulants for patriotism? Must one be surprised that such dissimilar manners of living produce such different effects, and that the moderns no longer find in themselves any of that vigor of soul that everything inspired in the ancients? Excuse these digressions to a remnant of warmth that you have brought back to life. I return with pleasure to the one of all the peoples of today which distances me the least from those about whom I have just been speaking.

[III] Application.

Poland is a large State surrounded by even more substantial States, which have a great offensive force because of despotism and their military discipline. On the contrary, because of its anarchy, it is weak, exposed to all their affronts in spite of Polish valor. It has no fortified places at all to stop their incursions. Its depopulation puts it almost absolutely in no position to defend itself. No economic order, few or no troops, no military discipline, no order, no subordination; always divided inside, always menaced from outside, it has no stability of its own, and depends on its neighbors' caprice. In the present state of things I see only a single means of giving it that stability it lacks: that is to infuse, so to speak, the soul of the confederates into the whole nation; that is to establish the Republic so much in the hearts of the Poles that it continues to exist there in spite of all its oppressors' efforts. That, it seems to me, is the only refuge where force can neither reach nor destroy it. A forever memorable proof of this has just been seen. Poland was in Russia's bonds, but the Poles remained free. A great example which shows you how you can defy the power and the ambition of your neighbors. You might not be able to keep them from swallowing you; at least make it so they cannot digest you. However one undertakes to do it, before one has given Poland all it lacks for being in a condition to resist its enemies, it will be overpowered by them a hundred times. Its Citizens' virtue, their patriotic zeal, the distinctive form which national institutions can give their souls, that is the only rampart always ready to defend it, and which no army could force. If you make it so that a Pole can never become a Russian, I answer to you for it that Russia will never subjugate Poland.

National institutions are what form the genius, character, tastes, and morals of a people, what make it itself and not another, what inspire in it that ardent love of the fatherland founded on habits impossible to uproot, what make it die of boredom among other peoples in the bosom of delights of which it is deprived in its own. Remember that Spartan glutted with voluptuous pleasures at the Court of the great King, who was reproached for missing his black broth. "Ah!" he said to the satrap while sighing; "I know your pleasures, but you do not know ours."[12]

Today there are no longer any French, Germans,[13] Spanish, even English, whatever might be said about it; there are only Europeans. All have the same tastes, the same passions, the same morals, because none of them has received any national form by means of a distinctive foundation. In the same circumstances all of them will do the same things; all will say they are disinterested and be scoundrels; all will speak about the public good and think only about themselves; all will praise mediocrity and want to be Croesus; they are ambitious only for luxury, they have no passion except the one for gold. Sure of having, along with it, everything that tempts them, all will sell themselves to the first who is willing to pay them. What does it matter to them which master they obey, the law of which State they follow? As long as they find money to steal and women to corrupt they are in their own country everywhere.

Give another inclination to the Poles' passions, you will give their souls a national physiognomy which will distinguish them from other peoples, which will keep them from dissolving, taking pleasure, uniting with them, a vigor which will replace the abusive operation of vain precepts, which will make them do out of taste and passion what is never done well enough when it is done only out of duty or interest. It is upon such souls that an appropriate legislation will take hold. They will obey the laws and will not evade them, because the laws will suit them, and they will have the internal assent of their will. Loving the fatherland, they will serve it out of zeal and with all their heart. With this feeling alone, legislation, even if it were bad, would make good Citizens; and it is never anything but good Citizens who make up the force and the prosperity of the State.

I will explain below the regime of administration which, almost without touching your laws at bottom, appears to me suited to bring patriotism and the virtues that are inseparable from it to the highest degree of intensity they can have.[14] But whether or not you adopt this regime, always begin by giving the Poles a great opinion of themselves and of their fatherland: after the manner they have just shown themselves, that opinion will not be false. It is necessary to seize the occasion of the present event to raise souls to the pitch of ancient souls. It is certain that the Confederation of Bar[15] saved the dying fatherland. This great period must be engraved in sacred characters in all Polish hearts. I would like a monument to be erected in its memory, the names of all the Confederates to be put on it, even those who subsequently might have betrayed the common cause, such a great action ought to erase the faults of a whole life; a periodic solemnity to be founded in order to celebrate it every ten years with a pomp, not brilliant and frivolous but simple, proud, and republican; the eulogy of those virtuous citizens who had the honor of suffering for the fatherland in the enemy's chains to be made worthily but without emphasis, some honorific privilege to be granted even to their families which would always recall this fine memory to the eyes of the public. Nevertheless, I would not want any invective against the Russians to be permitted in these solemnities, nor that they even be spoken about. That would be honoring them too much. This silence, the memory of their barbarity, and the eulogy of those who resisted them, will say everything that needs to be said about them: you ought to despise them too much to hate them.

I should like all the patriotic virtues to be given luster by means of honors, the Citizens to be kept ceaselessly occupied with the fatherland, it to be made their most important business, it to be kept incessantly before their eyes. In this way they would have less, I admit it, opportunity and time for getting rich, but they would also have less desire and need to do so: their hearts would learn to know a different happiness than that of fortune, and that is the art of ennobling souls and of making them into an instrument more powerful than gold.

The succinct exposition of the morals of the Poles that M. de Wielhorski kindly passed on to me is not sufficient to make me well acquainted with their civil and domestic practices. But a large nation which has never mingled very much with its neighbors must have a lot of practices suited to itself, and which perhaps are being bastardized day by day by the general inclination in Europe to take on the tastes and morals of the French. It is necessary to maintain, or reestablish these old practices, and to introduce suitable ones, which are specific to the Poles. These practices, even if they are indifferent, even if they are bad in certain respects, as long as they are not essentially so, will always have the advantage of winning the affection of the Poles for their country and of giving them a natural repugnance for mingling with foreigners. I regard it as a piece of good fortune that they have a distinctive form of dress. Preserve this advantage carefully; do exactly the opposite of what that so vaunted Czar did.[16] May neither the King, nor the Senators, nor any public man ever wear any other clothes than those of the nation, and let no Pole dare to appear at Court dressed in the French manner.

Many public games in which the good mother homeland[17] is pleased to see her children play. Let her look after them often so that they will always look after her. It is necessary to abolish, even at Court, because of the example, the ordinary amusements of courts, gambling, theaters, comedies, opera; everything that effeminates men, everything that distracts them, isolates them, makes them forget their fatherland and their duty; everything that makes them feel well everywhere as long as they are amusing themselves; it is necessary to invent games, festivals, solemnities that are so specific to that Court that they are not to be found in any other one. One must be amused more in Poland than in other countries, but not in the same way. In a word, an execrable proverb must be reversed and every Pole must be made to say at the bottom of his heart: *Ubi patria, ibe bene.*[18]

Nothing exclusive, if possible, for the Great and the rich. Many spectacles in the open air, where the ranks might be carefully distinguished, but where the people take part equally as among the ancients, and where, on certain occasions, the young nobility proves itself in force and skill. Bullfights have contributed no small amount to maintaining a certain vigor among the Spanish nation. Those amphitheaters in which the young people of Poland used formerly to exercise ought to be carefully reestablished; they ought to be made into theaters of honor and emulation for them. Nothing would be easier than to substitute for the former fights less cruel exercises in which, nevertheless, strength and skill would have a share, and in which the victorious would have honors and rewards in the same way. For example, horsemanship is a very suitable exercise for Poles and very susceptible to the brilliance of spectacle.

Homer's Heroes were all distinguished by their force and skill, and by that means would show to the eyes of the people that they were made to command them. The Knights' tournaments formed, not only strong and courageous men, but men avid for honor and glory, and fit for all the virtues. Since the use of firearms has rendered these faculties of the body less useful for war, it has made them fall into discredit. Hence it happens that, aside from qualities of mind which are often equivocal, out of place, about which there are a thousand ways of being deceived, and about which the people is a bad judge, a man, with the advantage of birth, has nothing in him that distinguishes him from any other, which justifies his fortune, which shows in his person a natural right to superiority, and the more one neglects these external signs, the more those who govern us are effeminate and corrupted with impunity. Nevertheless, it matters, and more than one thinks, that those who must one day command others show themselves from youth to be superior to them at every point, or at least that they try to do so. Furthermore, it is good that the people often find themselves with their leaders on pleasant occasions, that it become acquainted with them, that it become accustomed to seeing them, that it share its pleasures with them. As long as subordination is always maintained and they do not become confused with it at all, this is the way for it to gain affection for them and to join attachment for them to respect. Finally, the taste for bodily exercises turns one away from a dangerous idleness, effeminate pleasures and luxury of mind. It is above all because of the soul that the body must be exercised, and that is what our petty wise men are far from seeing.

Do not neglect a certain public ornamentation at all; let it be noble, imposing, and let the magnificence be in men more than in things. One could not believe to what point the people's heart follows its eyes and how impressed it is by the majesty of ceremony. Majesty gives authority an air of order and rule that inspires confidence and removes the ideas of capriciousness and whim attached to the idea of arbitrary power. In the pomp of solemnities one must only avoid the flashy, the tinselly, and the luxurious decorations that are in use at courts. The festivals of a free people ought always to breathe decency and gravity, and one ought not to present to its admiration anything but objects worthy of its esteem. The Romans lavished an enormous luxury in their triumphs; but it was the luxury of the conquered, the more brilliant it was, the less it seduced. Its very brilliance was a great lesson for the Romans. The captive Kings were chained with chains of gold and of precious stones.[19] That is luxury well understood. One often arrives at the same goal from two opposed routes. To my eyes the two wool sacks, put in the House of Lords of England in front of the Chancellor's place, form a touching and sublime decoration. To my taste, two sheaves of wheat placed in the same way in the Senate of Poland would make no less fine an effect.

The immense distance between the fortunes that separate the Lords from the petty nobility is a great obstacle to the reforms needed for making the love of the fatherland the dominant passion. While luxury reigns among the Great, cupidity will reign in all hearts. The object of public admiration will always be that of the wishes of private individuals, and if it is necessary to be rich to shine, the dominant passion will always be to be rich. This is a great means of corruption which must be weakened as much as possible. If other attractive objects, if marks of rank distinguished men in office, those who were only rich would be deprived of them, secret wishes would naturally take the route to these honorable distinctions, that is to say those of merit and virtue, if one succeeded only by that route. Often the Consuls of Rome were very poor, but they had lictors, the array of the lictors was coveted by the people, and the plebeians attained the Consulate.

To remove completely the luxury in which inequality reigns appears to me, I admit it, a very difficult undertaking. But might there not be a way to change the objects of this luxury and to make its example less pernicious? For example, formerly the poor nobility in Poland attached themselves to Grandees who gave an education and subsistence to their retinue. That is a truly great and noble luxury, the inconvenience of which

I feel perfectly, but which at least, far from debasing souls, raises them up, gives them feelings, resilience, and was not abused among the Romans as long as the Republic lasted. I have read that the Duc d'Epernon, encountering the Duc de Sulli one day, wanted to pick a fight with him, but that, having only six hundred gentlemen in his retinue, he did not dare to attack Sulli, who had eight hundred of them. I doubt that a luxury of that sort leaves a lot of room for the luxury of trinkets; and at least its example will not seduce the poor. May the Great in Poland return to having only this sort, perhaps divisions, parties, quarrels will result from it, but it will not corrupt the nation. After that let us tolerate military luxury, that of weapons, of horses, but let all effeminate adornment be held in contempt, and if one cannot make the women renounce it, at least teach them to disapprove of it and disdain it in men.

Besides, one does not succeed in the goal of extirpating luxury by means of sumptuary laws. It must be uprooted from the depths of hearts, by impressing healthier and more noble tastes there. To forbid things that one ought not to do is an inept and vain expedient unless one begins by making them hated and held in contempt, and the disapproval of the law is efficacious only when it comes to the support of that of judgment. Whoever gets involved in founding a people ought to know how to dominate opinions and to govern men's passions by them. This is true above all in the object about which I am speaking. Sumptuary laws irritate desire by means of constraint rather than extinguishing it by means of punishment. Simplicity in morals and in adornment is less the fruit of the law than of education.

[IV] Education.

This is the important item. It is education that must give the national form[20] to souls, and direct their opinions and their tastes so that they will be patriots by inclination, by passion, by necessity. Upon opening its eyes a child ought to see the fatherland and until death ought to see nothing but it. Every true republican imbibes the love of the fatherland, that is to say, of the laws and of freedom along with his mother's milk. This love makes up his whole existence; he sees only the fatherland, he lives only for it; as soon as he is alone, he is nothing: as soon as he has no more fatherland, he no longer is, and if he is not dead, he is worse than dead.

National education belongs only to free men; they are the only ones who have a common existence and are truly tied together by Law. A Frenchman, an Englishman, a Spaniard, an Italian, a Russian are all just about the same man: he leaves school already completely formed for license,[21] that is to say for servitude. At twenty years of age a Pole ought not to be a different sort of man; he ought to be a Pole. I wish that in learning to read, he might read things about his country, at ten years of age he might be acquainted with all its products, at twelve all the provinces, all the roads, all the cities, at fifteen he might know all of its history, at sixteen all the laws, that there not be in all of Poland a fine action or an illustrious man about which his memory and heart are not full, and about which he cannot give an account at a moment's notice. One can judge from this that I would not like children to follow the usual studies directed by foreigners and priests.[22] The law ought to regulate the material, the order and the form of their studies. They ought not to have any but Poles as instructors, all married if possible, all distinguished by their morals, by their probity, by their good sense, by their enlightenment, and all destined for employments, not more important nor more honorable, for that is not possible, but less difficult and more brilliant, when at the end of a certain number of years they have fulfilled that one well. Above all beware of making the station of pedagogue into a profession. Every public man in Poland ought not to have any permanent station other than that of Citizen. All the posts he fills and above all the ones that are important, like this one, ought to be considered only as testing places and steps for rising higher after having deserved to do so. I exhort the Poles to pay attention to this maxim upon which I shall often insist: I believe it to be the key to a great spring in the State. Below it will be seen how one can, in my opinion, make it practicable without exception.

I do not at all like those distinctions between schools and academies that make it so that the rich nobility and the poor nobility are brought up differently and separately. Since, by the constitution of the state, all are equal, they ought to be brought up together and in the same manner, and if one cannot establish a completely free public education, at least one must set a price for it that the poor are able to pay. Could one not establish in each school a certain number of purely free places, that is to say at the State's expense, and which are called scholarships in France? These places, given to children of poor gentlemen who have deserved well from the fatherland, not as a charity, but as a recompense for the fathers' good services, would become honorable by virtue of that, and could produce a double advantage that is not to be neglected. For this purpose the nomination could not be arbitrary, but would be made by a sort of judgment about which I shall speak below. Those who would fill these places would be called children of the State, and distinguished by some honorable mark that would give them precedence over other children of their age, even those of the Grandees.

In all the Schools a gymnasium or place of physical exercises must be established for the children. In my opinion, this very neglected item is the most important part of education, not only for forming robust and healthy temperaments, but even more for the moral object which is either neglected or fulfilled only by means of a heap of pedantic and vain precepts that are so many wasted words. I shall never repeat enough that good education ought to be negative. Prevent the vices from being born, you will have done enough for virtue. The means for this is of the greatest simplicity in good public education. It is always to keep the children on alert, not by means of boring studies of which they understand nothing and for which they acquire a hatred by the sole fact that they are forced to stay put; but by means of exercises that please them by satisfying their body's need to act while it is growing, and the pleasure of which for them will not be limited to that.

They ought not to be allowed to play separately at their whim at all, but all together and in public, in such a manner that there is always a common goal to which all aspire and which excites competition and emulation. Parents who prefer domestic education, and have their children brought up under their own eyes, ought nevertheless to send them to these exercises. Their instruction can be domestic and private, but their games ought always to be public and common to all; for here it is not only a question of keeping them occupied, of forming a robust constitution for them, of making them agile and strongly built; but to accustom them early to regulation, to equality, to fraternity, to competition, to living under the eyes of their fellow citizens and to desiring public approval. For that, the prizes and recompenses of the victors must not be distributed arbitrarily by the masters of the exercises nor by the heads of the schools, but by acclamation and by the judgment of the spectators; and one can count on these judgments always being just, especially if one is careful to make the games attractive to the public by ordering them with a little pomp and so that they become a spectacle. Then it is to be presumed that all decent people and all good patriots will make it a duty and a pleasure for themselves to attend them.

At Berne, there is a very singular exercise for the young Patricians who are leaving school. It is the one they call *the external State.* It is a miniature copy of everything that makes up the government of the Republic: a Senate, the Principal Magistrates, the Officials, the Bailiffs, the Orators, lawsuits, judgments, solemnities. The external State even has a little government and some revenues, and this institution, authorized and protected by the sovereign, is the nursery of the Statesmen who one day will direct public affairs in the same employments they first exercised only as a game.

Whatever form one gives public education, the particulars of which I do not enter into here, it is advisable to establish a College of Magistrates of the first rank which has its supreme administration, and which names, revokes, and changes at its will both the Principals and heads of the schools, who themselves will be candidates for the high magistracy as I have said, and the masters of the exercises, whose zeal and vigilance one will also be careful to excite by means of the higher places that will be open or closed based on the manner in which they will have fulfilled those. Since it is upon these establishments that the hope of the Republic, the glory and the fate of the nation, depends, I find them, I admit, to have an importance that I am very surprised that people have not considered giving them anywhere. I am distressed for humanity that so many ideas that appear to me good and useful are always found, although very practicable, so far from everything that is done.

Moreover, here I am not doing anything but giving an indication, but that is enough for those whom I am addressing. These poorly developed ideas show from afar the routes unknown to the moderns by which the ancients led men to that vigor of soul, to that patriotic zeal, to that esteem for truly personal qualities, without regard to what is only foreign to the man, that are without example among us, but which the leavens in all men's hearts are only waiting to put into action by suitable institutions in order to ferment. Direct the practices, the customs, the morals of the Poles in this spirit of education, you will be developing in them that leaven that is not yet made flat by corrupt maxims, by worn-out institutions, by an egotistical philosophy that preaches what is deadly. The nation will date its second birth from the terrible crisis out of which it is coming and, seeing what its still undisciplined members have done, it will expect much and obtain more from a well-pondered establishment; it will cherish, it will respect laws that flatter its noble pride, that render it, that maintain it happy and free; tearing from its bosom the passions that evade them, it will nourish there the ones that make them loved; finally renewing itself, so to speak, by itself, in this new age it will reacquire all the vigor of a nascent nation. But without these precautions expect nothing from your laws. However wise, however farsighted they might be, they will be evaded and vain, and you will have corrected some abuses that wound you, only in order to introduce others that you will not have foreseen. These are the preliminaries that I consider indispensable. Now let us cast our eyes upon the constitution.

[V] Radical Vice.[23]

Let us avoid, if possible, throwing ourselves into chimerical projects from the first steps. What undertaking, Sirs, is occupying you at this moment? That of reforming the Government of Poland, that is to say of giving the constitution of a large kingdom the stability and vigor of that of a small republic. Before working for the execution of this project, one must first see whether it is possible to succeed. Greatness of Nations! Extensiveness of States! first and principal source of the misfortunes of the human race, and above all of the numberless calamities that undermine and destroy publicly ordered peoples. Almost all small States, republics and monarchies alike, prosper by the sole fact that they are small, since all the citizens in them know each other and watch each other, since the leaders can see by themselves the evil that is done, the good they have to do; and since their orders are executed under their eyes. All great peoples crushed by their own mass groan, either in anarchy as you do, or under subordinate oppressors which a necessary gradation forces Kings to give them. God alone can govern the world, and more than human faculties would be needed to govern great nations. It is surprising, it is amazing that the vast extent of Poland has not already a hundred times over brought about the conversion of the government into despotism, debased the souls of the Poles, and corrupted the mass of the nation. It is an example unique in history that after centuries such a State is still only in anarchy. The slowness of this progression is due to advantages inseparable from the inconveniences from which you want to free yourselves. Ah, I cannot say it too many times; think well before touching your laws, and above all the ones that made you what you are. The first reform you need is that of your extent. Your vast provinces will never allow the severe administration of small Republics. Begin by compressing your boundaries if you want to reform your government. Perhaps your neighbors are considering doing this service for you. Doubtless that would be a great evil for the dismembered parts; but this would be a great good for the body of the Nation.

If these retrenchments do not take place, I see only one means that can perhaps take their place and what is fortunate is that this means is already in the spirit of your institution. Let the separation of the two Polands be as marked as that of Lithuania: have three States united into one. I would like, if it were possible, for you to have as many of them as of Palatinates; to form that many particular administrations in each of them. Perfect the form of the Dietines, extend their authority in their respective Palatinates; but mark out their limits carefully, and act so that nothing can break the bond of common legislation among them and of subordination to the body of the Republic. In a word, apply yourselves to extending and perfecting the system of federative Governments, the only one that unites the advantages of large and small States, and hence the only one that can suit you. If you neglect this advice, I doubt that you can ever make a good work.

[VI] Question of the Three Orders.[24]

I hardly ever hear anyone speaking about government without finding that they go back to principles that appear to me to be either false or doubtful. The Republic of Poland, it has often been said and repeated, is composed of three orders: the equestrian Order, the Senate, and the King. I would prefer to say that the Polish nation is composed of three orders: the nobles, who are everything, the bourgeois, who are nothing, and the peasants, who are less than nothing. If one counts the Senate as an order in the State, why not also count as such the chamber of Deputies, which is no less distinct, and which does not have any less authority. Even more; this division, in the very sense in which it is given, is evidently incomplete; for it was necessary to add the Ministers, who are neither Kings, nor Senators, nor Deputies, and who, in the greatest independence, are nevertheless depositaries of all the executive power. How will they ever make me understand that the part which exists only from the whole, nevertheless forms in relation to the whole an order independent of it? The Peerage in England, considering that it is hereditary, forms, I admit, an order existing by itself. But in Poland, remove the equestrian order, there is no longer a Senate, because no one can be a Senator unless he is a Polish noble first. In the same way there is no longer a King; because it is the equestrian order that names him, and because the king cannot do anything without it: but remove the Senate and the King, the equestrian order and by it the State and the sovereign remain in their entirety and as soon as the next day, if it wishes, it will have a Senate and a King as it did before.

But for not being an order in the State, it does not follow that the Senate is nothing in it; and if it was not the depositary of the laws as a body, its members, independent of the authority of the body, would nonetheless be the depositary of legislative power, and to keep them from voting on the laws in plenary session of the Diet every time it is an issue of making or revoking laws would be to deprive them of the right they hold from their birth; but then it is no longer as Senators that they vote, it is simply as Citizens. As soon as the legislative power speaks, all return to equality; any other authority keeps silent before it; its voice is the voice of God on earth. Even the King, who presides at the Diet, does not have at that time, I maintain, the right to vote there unless he is a Polish noble.

Doubtless I will be told here that I am proving too much, and that if the Senators do not have a vote as such in the Diet, they ought not to have it as Citizens either, since the members of the equestrian order do not vote there in person, but only through their representatives, in the number of which the Senators are not. And why would they vote as private individuals in the Diet since no other noble can vote there unless he is a deputy? This objection appears solid to me in the present state of things; but when the planned changes are made, it will not be so any longer; because then the Senators themselves will be perpetual representatives of the nation, but ones who will not be able to act in matters of legislation except with the cooperation of their colleagues.

Let it not be said then that the cooperation of the King, of the Senate, and of the equestrian order is necessary to draft a law. This right belongs solely to the equestrian order, of which the Senators are members as are the deputies, but in which the Senate as a body enters for nothing. Such is or ought to be the law of the State in Poland: but the law of nature, that holy, indefeasible law, that speaks to man's heart and to his reason, does not allow the legislative authority to be restricted this way and does not allow the laws to oblige anyone who has not voted for them personally as the deputies do, or at least through his representatives as the body of the nobility does. This sacred law is not violated with impunity, and the state of weakness to which such a great nation finds itself reduced is the work of that feudal barbarity that causes its most numerous, and often healthiest part to be cut off from the body of the State.

God forbid that I believe I needed to prove here what a little good sense and innermost feeling is sufficient to make everyone feel! And from where does Poland claim to draw the power and the strength it is stifling at pleasure in its bosom? Polish Nobles, be more, be men. Then alone will you be happy and free, but never flatter yourself for being so, as long as you hold your brothers in chains.

I feel the difficulty of the project of freeing your people. What I fear is not only poorly understood interest, the amour-propre and the prejudices of the masters. Once this obstacle has been overcome, I would fear the vices and the cowardice of the serfs. Freedom is a hearty nourishment but requires strong digestion; very healthy stomachs are needed to bear it. I laugh at those debased peoples who, letting themselves be stirred up by conspirators, dare to speak about freedom without even having any idea of it and, their hearts full of all the vices of slaves, imagine that it is enough to be rebellious in order to be free. Proud and holy freedom! if these poor people could become acquainted with you, if they knew at what price you are acquired and preserved, if they felt how much more austere your laws are than the yoke of tyrants is harsh; their weak souls, slaves of the passions that would have to be stifled, would fear you a hundred times more than servitude; they would flee you with fright as a burden ready to crush them.

To enfranchise the peoples of Poland is a great and fine operation, but bold, perilous, and not to be attempted inconsiderately. Among the precautions to take, there is one indispensable one that requires time. It is, before everything else, to make the serfs one wants to enfranchise worthy of freedom and capable of bearing it. Below I will set out one of the means that can be employed for that. It would be reckless of me to guarantee its success, although I do not doubt it. If there is some better means, take it. But whatever it is, consider that your serfs are men like you, that they have in them the stuff to become everything that you are: first work to bring it into play, and do not enfranchise their bodies until after having enfranchised their souls. Without this preliminary, count on your operation succeeding badly.

[VII] Means for Maintaining the Constitution.[25]

Poland's legislation was done successively by bits and pieces, like all those of Europe. As abuses were seen, a law was made to remedy it. From that law were born other abuses that had to be corrected again. This manner of operating has no end at all, and leads to the most terrible of all abuses, which is to enervate all the laws by virtue of multiplying them.

In Poland the weakening of the legislation was done in a very peculiar, and perhaps unique manner. That is that it lost its force without having been subjugated by the executive power. At this moment the legislative power still preserves all of its authority; it is inactive, but does not see anything above it. The Diet is as sovereign as it was at the time of its establishment. Nevertheless it has no force; nothing dominates it, but nothing obeys it. This state is remarkable and deserves reflection.

What has preserved the legislative authority up to now? It is the continuous presence of the legislator. It is the frequency of the Diets, it is the frequent renewing of the Deputies, that have maintained the Republic. England, which enjoys the first of these advantages, has lost its freedom because it neglected the other. The same Parliament lasts so long that the

Court, which exhausted itself in buying it every year, finds it to its advantage to buy it for seven, and does not fail to do so. First lesson for you.

A second means by which the legislative power has been preserved in Poland is, first, the division of the executive power, which has kept its depositaries from acting in concert to oppress it, and in the second place the frequent passage of this same executive power into different hands, which has prevented every systematic usurpation. In the course of his reign each King made several steps toward arbitrary power. But the election of his successor forced the latter to move backward rather than pursuing; and at the beginning of each reign all the Kings were constrained by the *pacta conventa* to depart from the same point.[26] So that, in spite of the habitual inclination toward despotism, there was no real progress toward it.

It was the same for the Ministers and high Officials. All, independent of the Senate and of each other, had a limitless authority in their respective departments: but aside from the fact that these positions mutually balanced each other, since they did not perpetuate themselves in the same families they did not bring any absolute force; and all power, even usurped, always returned to its source. It might not have been the same if all the executive power had been either in a single Body like the Senate or in a family by the inheritance of the crown. Sooner or later that family or that body would have oppressed the legislative power, and hence put the Poles under the yoke which all nations bear, and from which they alone are still exempt; for I already do not count Sweden any longer. Second lesson.

This is the advantage; doubtless it is great, but here is the inconvenience which is hardly any less so. Divided among several individuals, the executive power lacks harmony among its parts and causes a continuous tugging incompatible with good order. Each depositary of a part of this power puts itself, by virtue of that part, above the magistrates and the laws in all respects. In truth it acknowledges the authority of the Diet; but since it acknowledges only that, when the Diet is dissolved it no longer acknowledges any at all; it disdains the tribunals and defies their judgments. They are so many petty Despots who, without precisely usurping the sovereign authority, do not fail to oppress the Citizens piecemeal, and to give the fatal and too often followed example of violating the rights and liberties of private citizens without scruple and without fear.

I believe that this is the first and principal cause of the anarchy that reigns in the State. In order to remove that cause, I see only one means. It is not to arm the particular tribunes with the public force against these petty tyrants; for this force, sometimes badly administered and sometimes surmounted by a superior force, could stir up troubles and disorders capable of proceeding gradually to civil wars; but it is to arm with all the executive force a respectable and permanent body such as the Senate, capable by its stability and by its authority of restraining within their duty the Magnates who are tempted to deviate from it. This means appears effective to me, and would certainly be so; but its danger would be terrible and very difficult to avoid. For as one can see in the *Social Contract,* every body that is a depositary of the executive power tends strongly and continuously to subjugate the legislative power and succeeds in doing so sooner or later.[27]

In order to provide against this inconvenience, some propose to you dividing the Senate into several councils or departments, each presided over by the Minister charged with that department, which Minister along with the members of each Council would change at the end of a fixed term and rotate with those of other departments. This idea might be good; it was the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's, and he developed it well in his *Polysynody.*[28] The executive power divided and transient this way will be more subordinated to the legislative, and the various parts of the administration will be gone into more deeply and better treated separately. Nevertheless, do not count too much on this means: if they are always separate, they will lack coordination, and soon, mutually counteracting each other, they will use up almost all their force against each other, until one among them has taken the ascendancy and dominates all of them: or if they harmonize themselves and cooperate with each other, they will really make up only the same body and will have only the same spirit, as the chambers of a Parliament do; and in any case I hold it to be impossible for independence and equilibrium to be maintained so well among them, so that there will always not result from it a center or home of administration where all the particular forces will always unite to oppress the sovereign. In almost all our republics Councils are distributed this way into departments which were independent of each other in their origin, and which soon ceased to be so.

The invention of this division by chambers or departments is modern. The ancients who knew better than we do how freedom is maintained were not at all acquainted with this expedient. The Senate of Rome governed half the known world, and did not even have the idea of these divisions. Nevertheless, this Senate never succeeded in oppressing the legislative power, although the Senators were for life. But the laws had Censors, the People had Tribunes, and the Senate did not elect the Consuls.

For the administration to be strong, good, and proceed directly toward its goal, all the executive power must be in the same hands: but it is not enough for these hands to change; they must act, if possible, only under the Legislator's eyes and the Legislator must be the one who guides them. That is the true secret for keeping them from usurping its authority.

As long as the Estates are assembled and the Deputies change frequently, it will be difficult for the Senate or the King to oppress or usurp legislative authority. It is remarkable that up to now the Kings have not attempted to make the Diets more rare, even though they are not forced, as those of England are, to assemble them frequently under pain of lacking money. Either things must have always been in a state of crisis that made the royal authority insufficient to provide for it, or the Kings must have been assured by their intrigues in the Dietines of always having the plurality of Deputies at their disposition, or because of the *liberum veto,*[29] they have always been sure of stopping the deliberations that might displease them and of dissolving the Diets at their will. Once all these motives no longer exist, it must be expected that the King, or the Senate, or both of them together, will make great efforts to free themselves from the Diets and make them as rare as they can. That is above all what must be forestalled and prevented. The means proposed is the only one, it is simple and cannot fail to be effective. It is very singular that, before the *Social Contract* where I give it, no one took it into his head.[30]

One of the greatest inconveniences of large States, the one which more than any other makes freedom hardest to preserve in them, is that the legislative power cannot show itself in them by itself, and can act only by deputation. That has its evil and its good, but the evil outweighs the good. In a body the Legislator is impossible to corrupt, but easy to fool. Its representatives are hard to fool, but easy to corrupt, and it rarely happens that they are not corrupted. You have before your eyes the example of the Parliament of England, and, by the *liberum veto,* that of your own nation. Now one can enlighten someone who is deceived, but how can one hold back the one who is for sale? Without being instructed about Poland's affairs, I would wager everything in the world that there is more enlightenment in the Diet and more virtue in the Dietines.

I see two ways to forestall this terrible evil of corruption, which makes the organ of freedom into the instrument of servitude.

The first is, as I have already said, the frequency of Diets which, by often changing representatives, makes their seduction more costly and more difficult. On this point your constitution is better than that of Great Britain, and once the *liberum veto* has been removed or modified, I do not see any other change to make, other than to add some difficulties to sending the same deputies to two consecutive Diets, and to keep them from being elected a large number of times. I will return to this item below.

The second means is to subject the representatives to following their instructions exactly and to giving a strict account to their constituents of their conduct at the Diet. On this point I can only wonder at the negligence, the carelessness, and I dare to say the stupidity of the English Nation, which, after having armed its deputies with the supreme power, does not add any restraint to them to regulate the use they can make of it for the seven whole years that their commission lasts.

I see that the Poles do not feel the importance of their Dietines enough, neither all that they owe to them, nor all they can obtain from them by extending their authority and giving them a more regular form. As for me, I am convinced that if the Confederations saved the fatherland, it is the Dietines that have preserved it, and it is there that the true Palladium of freedom is.

The Deputies' instructions must be drawn up with great care, with regard to both the items announced in the agenda and the other needs present in the State or in the Province, and this should be done by a commission presided over, if one wants, by the Marshal of the Dietine, but otherwise made up of members chosen by the plurality of votes; and the nobility ought not to break up until these instructions have been read, discussed and consented to in plenary session. In addition to the original of these instructions, given over to the Deputies along with their powers, a duplicate signed by them ought to remain in the records of the Dietine. It is on the basis of these instructions that, upon their return, they ought to give an account of their conduct to the Dietines in a session which must absolutely be reestablished, and it is based on this account that they ought either to be excluded from being deputies again afterward, or declared eligible for a second term if they have followed their instructions to the satisfaction of their constituents. This examination is of the utmost importance. It cannot be given too much attention nor its effect marked down with too much care. With each word that the Deputy says at the Diet, with each step he takes, he must see himself in advance under the eyes of his constituents, and feel the influence that their judgment will have both over his plans for advancement and over the esteem of his compatriots, which is indispensable for their execution: for in the end the Nation sends Deputies to the Diet, not in order to state their private sentiment there, but in order to declare the wills of the Nation. This check is absolutely necessary in order to constrain them within their duty and to forestall all corruption from whatever direction it might come. Whatever might be said about it, I do not see any inconvenience in this constraint, since the chamber of Deputies does not have, or ought not to have, any part in the details of administration, can never have any unforeseen matter to address: moreover, provided that a deputy does nothing contrary to the express will of his constituents, they will not make it into a crime for him to have stated an opinion as a good Citizen on a matter they had not foreseen, and based on which they had not settled anything. Finally I add that, if there were in fact any inconvenience in holding the Deputies subject to their instructions this way, that still would not be anything to weigh against the immense advantage of having the law never be anything but the real expression of the wills of the nation.

But also, once these precautions have been taken, there ought never to be any conflict of jurisdiction between the Diet and the Dietines, and when a law has been passed in plenary session of the Diet I do not grant the latter even a right of protest. Let them punish their deputies, if necessary let them even have their heads cut off if they have prevaricated: but, let them always obey fully, without exception, without protest, let them bear, as is just, the penalty for their bad choice; aside from making remonstrances as lively as they please at the next Diet if they judge it appropriate.

Since they are frequent, the Diets have less need of being long, and six weeks' duration appears to me very sufficient for the ordinary needs of the State. But it is contradictory for the sovereign authority to give itself shackles, above all when it is immediately in the nation's hands. Let this duration of ordinary Diets continue to be fixed at six weeks, fine; but it will always be up to the assembly to prolong this term by means of an express deliberation when business demands it. For in the end, if the Diet, which by its nature is above the law, says, *I wish to remain,* who is it that will say to it, *I do not wish you to remain.* There is only the sole case of a Diet that wanted to go on for more than two years, that it could not: its powers would end then and those of another Diet would begin with the third year. The Diet, which can do everything, can without contradiction prescribe a longer interval between Diets: but that new law could regard only subsequent Diets, and the one that passes it cannot take advantage of it. The principles from which these rules are deduced are established in the *Social Contract.*[31]

With regard to extraordinary Diets, good order indeed demands that they be rare, and convoked solely for urgent necessities. When the King judges them to be such, he ought, I admit, to be believed: but these necessities might exist and he might not acknowledge them; must the Senate judge about it then? In a free State one ought to foresee everything that can attack freedom. If the Confederations remain, in certain cases they can substitute for extraordinary Diets: but if you abolish the Confederations, there must necessarily be a regulation for these Diets.

To me it appears impossible for the law to be able to fix the length of the extraordinary Diets reasonably, since it depends absolutely on the nature of the business that has them convoked. Ordinarily they require speed; but since that speed is relative to the matters to be treated which are not in the order of ordinary business, one cannot give a ruling about them in advance, and one might find oneself in such a state that it would be important for the Diet to stay assembled until this state changed, or until the term of the ordinary Diets caused the powers of this one to expire.

In order to husband time, so precious in Diets, one should try to remove from these assemblies the vain discussions that serve only to waste time. Doubtless, not only rule and order are necessary there, but also ceremony and majesty. I should even like for particular care to be given to this point and, for example, for one to feel the barbarity and horrible indecency of seeing the display of arms profane the sanctuary of laws. Poles, are you even more warlike than the Romans were? Never in the greatest disturbances of their Republic did the sight of a sword soil the comitia or the Senate. But, while concentrating on important and necessary things, I would also like everything that can be done equally well elsewhere to be avoided. The Rugi, for example, that is to say the examination of the Deputies' legitimacy, is a waste of time in the Diet: not that this examination is not an important thing in itself, but because it can be done as well and better in the very place where they were elected, where they are best known and where all their competitors are. It is in their own Palatinate, it is in the Dietine that appoints them that the validity of their election can be better established and in less time, as is the practice for the commissioners of Radom[32] and the Deputies for the Tribunal. That being done, the Diet ought to admit them without discussion based on the Laudum of which they are bearers, and that not only to forestall the obstacles that might delay the election of the Marshal, but above all the intrigues by which the Senate or the King might disturb the elections and argue about the subjects who might be disagreeable to them. What just happened at London is a lesson for the Poles. I know very well that this Wilkes is nothing but a troublemaker; but from the precedent of his rejection the stage is set, and from now on, only subjects who suit the Court will be admitted into the House of Commons.[33]

One must begin by giving more attention to the selection of the members who have a vote in the Dietines. From that one would more easily discern the ones who are eligible to be deputies. The golden book of Venice is a model to follow because of the ease it gives. It would be convenient and very easy to keep in each Grod[34] an exact register of all the nobles who have met the required conditions to enter and vote at the Dietines. They would be inscribed in their district's register as they reach the age required by the laws, and those who should have been excluded from it would be crossed off as soon as they fall into that position, with the reason for their exclusion being noted. From these registers, which would have to be kept in an authenticated form, both the legitimate members of the Dietines and the subjects eligible to be deputies would easily be distinguished, and the length of the discussions on this item would be greatly shortened.

A better public order in the Diets and Dietines would assuredly be extremely useful; but, I will never repeat it too many times, one must not want two contradictory things at the same time. Public order is good, but freedom is worth more, and the more you impede freedom by forms, the more means for usurpation these forms will furnish. All those you make use of to prevent license in the legislative order, although good in themselves, will sooner or later be employed to oppress it. The long and vain harangues that cause such precious time to be wasted are a great evil, but for a good Citizen not to dare to speak when he has useful things to say is a much greater one. As soon as only certain mouths open in the Diets, and even they are forbidden to say everything, they will no longer say anything except what might please the powerful.

After the indispensable changes in the nomination of employment and in the distribution of favors, it is likely that there will be fewer vain harangues and fewer toadying speeches addressed to the King in this form. In order to prune the rigmarole and the rambling a little, every haranguer could nevertheless be obliged to announce at the beginning of his speech the proposal he wants to make, and, after having deduced his reasons, to give a summary of his conclusions, as the King's people do in the law courts. If that does not shorten the speeches, it would at least restrain those who want to speak only to say nothing, and cause time to be used up without doing anything.

I do not know very well what the established form is in the Diets for giving sanction to the laws; but I do know that for the reasons stated above, this form ought not to be the same as in the Parliament of Great Britain; that the Senate of Poland ought to have the authority of administration, not of legislation, that in every legislative case, the Senators ought to vote only as members of the Diet, not as members of the Senate, and that the votes ought to be counted by head in both chambers. Perhaps the practice of the *liberum veto* has kept this distinction from being drawn, but it will be very necessary when the *liberum veto* is removed, and all the more so since there will be one less immense advantage in the chamber of Deputies, for I do not assume that the Senators, let alone the Ministers, have ever had a share in this right. The *veto* of the Polish Deputies corresponds to that of the Tribunes of the people at Rome. Now they did not exercise this right as Citizens, but as Representatives of the Roman People. Thus the loss of the *liberum veto* is a loss only for the chamber of Deputies, and the body of the Senate, losing nothing in this, consequently gains from it.

This posited, I see one defect to correct in the Diet; that is that, since the number of Senators almost equals that of the Deputies, the Senate has too great an influence in the deliberations, and by its influence in the equestrian order can easily gain the small number of votes it needs in order to be always preponderant.

I say that this is a defect; because the Senate, being a particular body in the State, necessarily has corporate interests different from those of the nation, and which may even be contrary to them in certain respects. Now the law, which is only the expression of the general will, is very much the resultant of all the particular interests combined and balanced by their large number. But since if the group interests made up too great a weight this would disrupt the equilibrium, they ought not to enter into it collectively. Each individual ought to have his vote, no group whatsoever ought to have one. Now if the Senate had too much weight in the Diet, not only would it bring its interest into it, but it would also make it preponderant.

A natural remedy for this defect presents itself; it is to increase the number of Deputies; but I would fear that this might cause too much commotion in the State and might come too close to Democratic tumultuousness. If it is absolutely necessary to change the proportion, instead of increasing the number of Deputies, I would prefer to decrease the number of Senators. And at bottom, I do not see very well why, since there is already a Palatin at the head of each province, there is still a need for great Castellans there. But let us never lose sight of the important maxim of not changing anything without necessity, neither to cut back nor to add.

In my opinion it is better to have a less numerous Council and to leave more freedom to those who make it up, than to increase their number and impede freedom in deliberations, as one is always forced to do when this number becomes too large: to which I shall add, if I am allowed to foresee good as well as evil, that one must avoid making the Diet as numerous as it can be so as not to deprive oneself of the means for admitting into it some new Deputies without confusion some day, if one ever achieves the ennobling of Cities and the enfranchisement of the serfs, as is to be desired for the strength and happiness of the nation.

Thus let us seek a way of remedying this defect in another manner and with the smallest change possible.

All Senators are named by the King, and consequently are his creatures. Furthermore, they are for life, and by this title, they form a group independent both of the King and of the equestrian order which, as I have said, has its separate interest and must tend toward usurpation. And one ought not to accuse me of contradicting myself here because I allow the Senate as a distinct body in the Republic even though I do not allow it as an order constituting the Republic; for that is extremely different.

First, the naming of the Senate must be taken away from the King, not so much because of the power he thereby preserves over the Senators, which might not be great, as because of that which he has over all those who aspire to be Senators, and by them over the entire body of the Nation. Aside from the effect of this change on the constitution, there will result from it the inestimable advantage of stifling the courtier spirit among the nobility and of substituting the patriotic spirit for it. I do not see any inconvenience in the Senators being named by the Diet, and I see in it great benefits too clear to need being set out in detail. This naming can be done all at once in the Diet, or first in the Dietines by the presentation of a certain number of subjects for each vacant place in their respective Palatinates. The Diet would make its choice from among these elect, or it might well elect a smaller number of them from among whom one could still leave the king the right of choosing. But to go all at once to the simplest, why wouldn't each Palatin be definitively elected in the Dietine of his province? What inconvenience has been seen to arise from this sort of election for the Palatins of Polock, of Witebsk, and for the Starost of Samogitia, and what harm would there be if the privilege of these three provinces became a right common to all? Let us not lose sight of how important it is for Poland to turn its constitution toward the federative form, in order to set aside as much as possible the ills attached to the greatness or rather the extent of the State.

In the second place, if you make it so the Senators are no longer for life you will considerably weaken the corporate interest which tends toward usurpation. But this operation has its difficulties: first, because it is hard for men accustomed to handling public business to see themselves suddenly reduced to a private station without being blameworthy; second because the positions of Senators are united to the titles of Palatin and Castellan and to the local authority attached to them, and because disorder and discontent would result from the perpetual passing of these titles and this authority from one individual to another. Finally, this removability cannot extend to the Bishops, and perhaps ought not to extend to the Ministers whose positions—since they require particular talents—are not always easy to fill well. If the Bishops alone were for life, the authority of the clergy, already too great, would increase considerably, and it is important that this authority be counterbalanced by Senators who are for life as the bishops are, and who do not fear being removed from their positions any more than they do.

This is what I imagine as a remedy for these various inconveniences. I should like the positions of Senators of the first rank to continue to be for life. That would make, including all the Castellans of the first rank, eighty-nine unremovable Senators, aside from the Bishops and the Palatins.

As for the Castellans of the second rank, I should like them all to be for a term, either of two years, making a new election for each Diet, or of longer if this were judged appropriate: but always leaving position at the end of each term, aside from electing anew those whom the Diet would like to continue, which I would permit only for a certain number of times in accordance with the plan that will be found below.

The obstacle of titles would be weak, because these titles—giving almost no other function than that of sitting in the Senate—could be suppressed without inconvenience, and instead of the title of Castellans on the bench, they could simply bear that of deputy Senators. Since, for the reform, the Senate, being invested with the executive power, would have a certain number of its members perpetually assembled, a proportionate number of deputy Senators would be required always to be in attendance in rotation. But this is not the place for these sorts of details.

By means of this change that would hardly be felt, these Castellans or deputy Senators would really become so many representatives of the Diet who would make up a counterweight to the body of the Senate and would reinforce the equestrian order in the Nation's assemblies; so that the Senators for life, although they would have become more powerful, both from the abolition of the *veto* and from the reduction of the royal power and that of the Ministers which will have been partially blended into their body, could nevertheless not make the spirit of this body dominate there, and the Senate—half members for a term and half members for life—would also be constituted the best way possible for making an intermediate power between the chamber of Deputies and the King, having at the same time enough stability to regulate the administration and enough dependency to be subject to the laws. This operation appears good to me because it is simple and nonetheless has a great effect.[35]

I do not pause here over the manner of collecting the votes. It is not hard to regulate in an assembly composed of around three hundred members. They succeed at London in a much larger Parliament; at Geneva, where the General Council is larger still and where everyone lives in distrust; and even at Venice in the Great Council composed of around twelve hundred nobles where vice and double-dealing are enthroned. Moreover, I have discussed this matter in the *Social Contract,* and for anyone who wants to count my opinion for anything, he must look for it there.

To moderate the abuses of the *veto* it is proposed no longer to count the Deputies' votes by head, but rather to count them by Palatinates. One cannot reflect too much on this change before adopting it, although it has its advantages and is favorable to the federative reform. Votes taken by groups and collectively always proceed less directly to the common interest than do those taken separately by individuals. It will very often happen that among the Deputies of a Palatinate one will take ascendancy over the others in their private deliberations, and determine the plurality for his opinion, which would not happen if each vote remained independent. Thus the corruptors will have less to do and will know better to whom to address themselves; moreover, it is better for each Deputy to have to answer for himself alone in his Dietine, so that none use the others as an excuse, so that the innocent and the guilty will not be mixed up, and so that distributive justice will be better observed. Many reasons occur against this form which would loosen the common bond very much and could expose the State to being divided at every Diet. By making the Deputies more dependent upon their instructions and their constituents one gains just about the same advantage without any inconvenience. It is true that this presupposes that the suffrages are not given at all by ballot, but aloud, so that the conduct and opinion of each Deputy at the Diet can be known, and so that he might answer for it in his own and personal name. But since this matter of suffrage is one of those I discussed with the greatest care in the *Social Contract,* it is superfluous for me to repeat myself here.[36]

As for elections, at first there will perhaps be some perplexity over naming so many deputy Senators at the same time in each Diet and in general over the election of a great number out of an even greater number that will sometimes recur in the plan I am proposing: but for this item by having recourse to the ballot this perplexity is easily removed by means of printed and numbered cards that would be distributed to the electors on the eve of the election, and which would contain the names of all the candidates from whom election is to be made. The next day the electors would come in file to put all their cards into a basket, after each has marked on his own the ones he elects or the ones he excludes in accordance with the instructions at the top of the cards. In the presence of the assembly, these same cards would be read right away by the secretary of the Diet assisted by two other secretaries *ad actum* named on the spot by the Marshal for the number of deputies who are present. By this method the operation would become so short and so simple that the whole Senate would easily be filled in one session without dispute and without noise. It is true that a rule would still be necessary to determine the list of candidates; but this item will have its place and will not be forgotten.

It remains to speak about the King, who presides at the Diet, and who, by his position, ought to be the supreme administrator of the Laws.

[VIII] On the King.

It is a great evil for the Leader of a nation to be the born enemy of the freedom whose defender he ought to be. This evil, in my opinion, is not so inherent in this position that it cannot be separated from it, or at least considerably decreased. There is no temptation at all without hope. Make usurpation impossible for your Kings, you will deprive them of the fantasy; and they will put all the efforts they make now for enslaving you into governing and defending you. As Count Wielhorski has noted, the Founders of Poland have very much thought about depriving the Kings of the means of harming but not of the means of corrupting, and the favors they have to distribute give them abundant means to do this. The difficulty is that by depriving them of this distribution one appears to be depriving them of everything: that is nevertheless what must not be done; for it would be just as good to have no King at all, and I believe it is impossible for a State as large as Poland[37] to do without one; that is to say without a supreme leader for life. Now unless the leader of a nation is completely null, and consequently useless, he must be able to do something, and the little that he does must necessarily be for good or for ill.

At present the whole Senate is named by the King: that is too much. If he has no share in naming it that is not enough. Although the Peerage in England is also named by him, it is much less dependent on him, because—once given—this Peerage is hereditary, while the Bishops, Palatins, and Castellans, being only for life, return to the King for naming upon the death of each incumbent.

I have said how it appears to me that this nomination ought to be done, namely the Palatins and grand Castellans for life by their respective Dietines; the Castellans of the second rank for a term and by the Diet. With regard to the Bishops, it appears difficult to me to deprive the King of their nomination, unless one has them elected by their chapters, and I believe that one can leave it to him, except, however, that of the Archbishop of Giezno which naturally belongs to the Diet, unless one separates the Primacy from it, which ought be at its disposition. As for the Ministers, above all the great Generals and high Treasurers, although their power, which makes up a counterweight to that of the King, ought to be reduced in proportion to his, it does not appear prudent to me to leave the King the right of filling these places with his creatures, and I would like him at least to have the choice only from a small number of subjects presented by the Diet. I agree that, since he cannot take away positions once he has given them, he can no longer count absolutely on those who fill them: but they give him enough power over the aspirants—if not to put him in a condition to change the face of the government—at least to leave him the hope of doing so, and it is that hope above all that must be taken away from him at all cost.

As for the high Chancellor, it seems to me he ought to be named by the King. Kings are the born judges of their peoples: that is the function[38] for which they have been established, even though they might all have abandoned it, it cannot be taken away from them; and if they do not want to fill it themselves, the naming of their substitutes in this position is a part of their right, because they are always answerable for the judgments that are rendered in their name. The nation can, it is true, give them associates, and ought to when they do not judge by themselves: thus the Crown's court where, not the King, but the high Chancellor presides, is under the nation's supervision, and it is reasonable for the Dietines to name its other members. If the King judged in person, I hold that he ought to have the right to judge by himself.[39] In every sort of case he would always have an interest in being just, and iniquitous judgments have never been a good way to succeed in usurpation.

With regard to other dignities, both Crown's and the Palatinates', which are only honorific titles and give more brilliance than influence, one can do no better than to leave him the full disposition of them: let him be able to honor merit and flatter vanity, but do not let him be able to confer power.

The majesty of the throne ought to be maintained with splendor, but it is important that one lets as little as possible of all the expense necessary for this effect be made by the King. It would be desirable for all the King's officials to be on the Republic's payroll and not on his, and that all the royal revenues be reduced in the same proportion, so as to diminish as much as possible the management of money by the King.

It has been proposed to make the Crown hereditary. Rest assured that the moment this law is passed Poland can bid farewell to its freedom forever. They think they have provided for it sufficiently by limiting the royal power. They do not see that, over a length of time these limits posed by the laws will be broken by means of gradual usurpations, and that over the long term a system adopted and followed without interruption by a royal family must win out over a legislation which by its nature tends ceaselessly toward relaxation. If the King cannot corrupt the Great by favors, he can always corrupt them by promises of which his successors are the guarantors, and, since plans formed by the royal family are perpetuated along with it, people will have much more confidence in its engagements and will count much more on their accomplishment, than when the elective crown shows the monarch's plans ending along with his life. Poland is free because each reign is preceded by an interval in which the nation—brought back to all its rights and taking on a new vigor again—cuts off the progression of abuses and usurpations, in which the legislation rallies and takes back its first resilience. What will the *pacta conventa,* the aegis of Poland, become when a family established on the throne in perpetuity fills it without a gap, and leaves the nation, between the death of the father and the crowning of the son, only a vain shadow of freedom without effect, which will soon be annihilated by the pretense of the oath taken by all the Kings at their coronation, and forgotten forever by all of them the instant afterwards? You have seen Denmark, you see England, and you are going to see Sweden. Take advantage of these examples to learn once and for all that, whatever precautions one might pile up, heredity in the throne and freedom in the nation will always be incompatible things.

The Poles have always had the tendency to transmit the Crown from Father to son, or to the closest relative by way of inheritance, although always by the right of election. If they continue to follow it, sooner or later this inclination will lead them to the misfortune of making the crown hereditary, and they must not hope to struggle against the royal power for as long in the way the members of the Germanic Empire have struggled against that of the Emperor, because Poland does not have in itself any counterweight sufficient for keeping a hereditary King in legal subordination. In spite of the power of several members of the Empire, without the accidental election of Charles VII, by now the imperial capitulations would be nothing but a vain formula, as they were at the beginning of this century; and the *Pacta Conventa* will become even more vain when the royal family has had time to become stronger and to put all the others beneath it. To state my feeling on this point in one word, I think that an elective Crown with the most absolute power would be better for Poland than a hereditary Crown with almost no power.

In place of this fatal law which would make the Crown hereditary I would propose a very opposite one which, if it were accepted, would maintain Poland's freedom. It would be to ordain by a fundamental law that the Crown would never pass from father to son and that every son of a King of Poland would be forever excluded from the throne. I say that I would propose this law if it were necessary: but occupied with a plan that would have the same effect without it, I postpone the explanation of this plan to its place, and assuming that by its effect the sons will be excluded from their father's throne, at least immediately, I believe that a well-secured freedom will not be the only advantage that will result from this exclusion. From it will be born another even more considerable one: that is, by depriving the Kings of every hope of usurping arbitrary power and of transmitting it to their children, it will bring all their activity to bear upon the glory and prosperity of the State, the sole aim that remains open to their ambition. It is thus that the Leader of the Nation will become, no longer the born enemy, but the foremost Citizen. It is thus that he will make it his great business to make his reign illustrious by means of useful establishments that would make him dear to his people, respectable to his neighbors, that would cause his memory to be blessed after him, and it is thus that (aside from the means of harming and seducing that must never be left to him) it will be suitable to increase his power in everything that can contribute to the public good. He will have little immediate and direct force for acting by himself, but he will have much authority for supervision, and inspection, for restraining everyone in his duty, and for directing the Government to its genuine goal.[40] The presidency over the Diet, over the Senate, and over all the bodies, a severe supervision of the conduct of all the people in positions, a great care for maintaining justice and integrity in all the law courts, for preserving order and tranquillity in the State, for giving it a good situation outside, the command over its armies in times of war, useful establishments in times of peace, are the duties that pertain particularly to his office of king, and which will occupy him enough if he wants to fill them by himself; for, since the details of administration are entrusted to Ministers established for that, it ought to be a crime for a King of Poland to entrust any part of his activity to favorites. Let him perform his occupation in person, or let him renounce it. An important point about which the nation ought never to relax.

It is upon such principles that the equilibrium and the balancing of the powers that make up legislation and administration ought to be established. These powers, in the hands of their depositaries and in the best proportion possible, ought to be in direct ratio with the number who hold them and inversely with the time they remain in position. The parts composing the Diet will follow this better relationship rather closely. The chamber of Deputies, being more numerous, will also be the more powerful, but all its members will change frequently. The Senate, being less numerous, will have a smaller share in the legislation, but a greater one in the executive power, and its members, participating in the constitution of the two extremes, will be partially for a term and partially for life as is suitable for an intermediate body. The King, who presides over everything, will continue to be for life, and his power, always very great for inspection will be limited by the chamber of deputies as to legislation and by the Senate as to administration. But in order to maintain equality, the principle of the constitution, nothing ought to be hereditary in it but the nobility. If the Crown were hereditary, in order to preserve equilibrium the Peerage or the Senatorial order would have to be so also, as in England. Then the diminished equestrian order would lose its power since, unlike the House of Commons, the chamber of Deputies does not have the power of opening and closing the public treasury every year, and the Polish constitution would be overturned from top to bottom.

[IX] Particular Causes of Anarchy[41]

Well proportioned and well balanced this way in all its parts, the Diet will be the source of good legislation and good government. But for that, its orders must be respected and followed. The disdain for the laws and anarchy in which Poland has lived until now have causes that are easy to see. I have already noted the principal one above, and I have indicated the remedy for it. The other contributing causes are, 1st. The *liberum veto,* 2nd. The confederations, 3rd. And the abuse that private individuals make of the right that they have been left of having armed men at their service.

This last abuse is such that, if one does not begin by removing it, all the other reforms are useless. As long as private individuals have the power to resist the executive force, they will believe they have the right to do so, and as long as they have little wars among each other, how can the State be at peace? I admit that the fortified places need guards; but why are places that are strong only against the Citizens and weak against the enemy necessary? I am afraid that this reform might allow of difficulties; nevertheless I do not believe they are impossible to overcome, and if only a powerful Citizen is reasonable, he will consent without difficulty to not having armed men of his own when no one else has them.

I intend to speak below about military establishments; thus I put off to that item what I might say about it in this one.

In itself the *liberum veto* is not a vicious right, but as soon as it passes its bounds it becomes the most dangerous of abuses: it was the guarantee of public liberty; it is no longer anything but the instrument of oppression. The only way to remove this fatal abuse is to destroy its cause completely. But it is in man's heart to hold onto individual privileges more than to greater and more general advantages. Only a patriotism enlightened by experience can learn to sacrifice to greater goods a brilliant right that has become pernicious by its abuse, and from which this abuse is henceforth inseparable. All Poles must keenly feel the evils which this unfortunate right has made them suffer. If they love order and peace, they have no means for establishing both among them as long as they allow to continue to exist this right, that is good during the formation of the body politic or when it has all its perfection, but that is absurd and fatal as long as there are changes left to make and it is impossible for there not always to be some, above all in a large State surrounded by powerful and ambitious neighbors.

The *liberum veto* would be less unreasonable if it fell uniquely on the fundamental points of the constitution: but for it to take place generally in all the deliberations of the Diets, that is what cannot be allowed in any fashion. It is a vice in the Polish constitution[42] for the legislation and administration not to be well enough distinguished, and for the Diet—exercising the legislative power—-to mix parts of administration into it, to perform indifferently acts of sovereignty and of government, often even mixed acts by which its members are magistrates and legislators both at the same time.

The proposed changes tend to distinguish these two powers better, and by that very fact to mark out better the limits of the *liberum veto.* For I do not believe that it has ever fallen into anyone's mind to extend it to matters of pure administration, which would be to annihilate civil authority and all government.

By the natural right of societies, unanimity has been required for the formation of the body politic and for the fundamental laws that pertain to its existence, such, for example, as the first corrected, the fifth, the ninth, and the eleventh, enacted in the Pseudo Diet of 1768.[43] Now the unanimity required for the establishment of these laws ought to be the same for their abrogation. Thus there are points on which the *liberum veto* can continue to exist, and since it is not a question of destroying it totally, the Poles who, without much murmuring, have seen this right restricted by the illegal Diet of 1768, ought to see it reduced and limited without difficulty in a freer and more legitimate Diet.

It is necessary to weigh and meditate well upon the capital points that will be established as fundamental laws, and it is only on these points that the force of the *liberum veto* will be brought to bear. This way the constitution will be made as solid and these laws as irrevocable as they can be: for it is against the nature of the body politic to impose on itself laws that it cannot revoke; but it is neither against nature nor against reason for it not to be capable of revoking these laws except with the same solemnity it put into establishing them. This is the only chain it can give itself for the future. That is enough both to strengthen the Constitution and to satisfy the Polish love for the *liberum veto,* without exposing them later on to the abuses that it causes to be born.

As for those multitudes of points that have ridiculously been put into the number of fundamental laws, and which merely make up the body of legislation, as for the ones arranged under the title of matters of State, by the vicissitude of things they are subject to unavoidable variations that do not allow one to require unanimity in them. It is also absurd that in any case whatsoever a member of the Diet should be able to stop its activity, and the withdrawal or protest of one or several Deputies should be able to dissolve the assembly and break the sovereign authority this way. It is necessary to abolish this barbarous right and to impose capital punishment on anyone who might be tempted to avail himself of it. If there were cases of protest against the Diet, which cannot happen as long as it is free and full, it would be to the Palatinates and Dietines that this right could be conferred, but never to the Deputies who, as members of the Diet, ought not to have any degree of authority over it nor to challenge its decisions.

Between the *veto* which is the greatest individual force that the members of the sovereign power can have and which ought not to take place except for genuinely fundamental laws, and plurality, which is the smallest and which relates to matters of simple administration, there are different propositions upon which one can determine the preponderance of opinions in proportion to the importance of the matters. For example when it is a question of legislation, one can require at least three-quarters of the suffrages, two-thirds in matters of State, plurality only for elections and other routine and momentary business. This is only an example to explain my idea and not a proportion that I am settling.

In a State such as Poland where souls still have great resilience, perhaps this fine right of *liberum veto* could be preserved in its entirety without much risk, and perhaps even with advantage, provided that right was made dangerous to exercise, and had great consequences attached to it for the one who availed himself of it. For it is, I dare say, extravagant for the one who ruptures the activity of the Diet this way and leaves the State without recourse, to depart to enjoy tranquilly and with impunity at home the public desolation he has caused.

If, then, in an almost unanimous resolution, a single opponent preserved the right of annulling it, I would like him to answer for his opposition with his head, not only to his constituents in the post-comitial Dietine, but afterwards to the whole nation whose unhappiness he caused. I would like it to be ordained by law that six months after his opposition, he would be judged solemnly by an extraordinary court established for that alone, composed of everyone whom the nation has that is wisest, most illustrious, and most respected, and which could not send him back simply absolved, but would be obliged either to condemn him to death without any pardon, or to bestow on him a recompense and public honors for his whole life, without ever being able to take any middle course between these two alternatives.

Establishments of this sort, so favorable to the energy of courage and to the love of freedom, are too remote from the modern spirit for one to be able to hope that they might be adopted or relished, but they were not unknown to the ancients and by means of them their founders knew how to raise up souls and enflame them at need with a truly heroic zeal. In some Republics in which even harsher laws reigned, during the fatherland's peril generous Citizens have been seen to consecrate themselves to death in order to initiate an opinion that might save it. A *veto* followed by the same danger might save the State on occasion, and will never need to be feared very much.

Dare I speak here about the confederations and not share the opinion of learned people? They see only the harm they do; it would also be necessary to see the harm they hinder. Without contradiction confederation is a violent state in the Republic; but extreme evils make violent remedies necessary, and one must seek to cure them at any price. The Confederation is in Poland what the Dictatorship was among the Romans: both silence the laws in a pressing danger, but with this great difference that the Dictatorship, being directly contrary to the Roman Legislation and the spirit of the government, ended by destroying it, and the Confederation, on the contrary, being only a means of strengthening and reestablishing the constitution when it has been shaken by great efforts, can tighten and reinforce the relaxed spring of the State without ever being able to break it. This federative form, which might have had a fortuitous cause in its origin, appears to me to be a masterpiece of politics. Wherever freedom reigns it is ceaselessly attacked and very often in peril. Every free State where great crises have not been foreseen is in danger of perishing at each storm. Only the Poles have known how to draw a new means for maintaining the Constitution from these very crises. Without the Confederations the Republic of Poland would long ago have ceased to exist, and I am very much afraid that it will not last long after them, if it is decided to abolish them. Cast your eyes on what just happened. Without the Confederations the State would have been subjugated; freedom would have been annihilated forever. Do you want to deprive the Republic of the resource that just saved it?

And let it not be thought that, when the *liberum veto* is abolished and plurality reestablished, the confederations will become useless, as if their whole advantage consisted in that plurality. They are not the same thing. In extreme need the executive power attached to the confederations will always give them a vigor, an activity, a speed that the Diet—forced to proceed by slower steps, with more formalities—cannot have, and it cannot make a single irregular movement without overturning the constitution.

No, the Confederations are the shield, the refuge, the sanctuary of this constitution. As long as they continue to exist it appears impossible to me that it will be destroyed. They must be left, but they must be regulated. If all abuses were removed, the confederations would become almost useless. The reform of your Government ought to bring about this effect. It will no longer be anything but violent undertakings that make one need to have recourse to them; but these undertakings are in the order of things that must be foreseen. Thus instead of abolishing the confederations, determine the cases in which they can legitimately take place, and then regulate their form and effect very well in order to give them a legal sanction as much as possible without disturbing their formation or their activity. There are even cases the mere occurrence of which should cause all of Poland to be immediately confederated;[44] as for example at the moment when, under any pretext whatsoever and outside of the case of open war, foreign troops set foot in the State; because, in sum, whatever the subject for that entrance might be and even if the government itself has consented to it, confederation at home is not hostility toward others. When, by any obstacle whatsoever the Diet is prevented from assembling at the time set down by the law, when by the instigation of anyone whatsoever armed men are found at the time and place of its assembly, or its form is altered, or its activity is suspended, or its freedom is hindered in any fashion whatsoever; in all these cases the general Confederation ought to exist by the occurrence alone; assemblies and particular signatures are only the branches, and all the Marshals ought to be subordinated to the one who has been named first.

[X] Administration.[45]

Without entering into details of administration about which I lack both knowledge and views, I will venture only some ideas about the two parts of finance and war, which I ought to state because I believe them to be good, although I am almost certain that they will not be savored: but before everything I shall make a remark about the administration of justice that is a little less distant from the spirit of Polish Government.

The two estates of man of the sword and man of the robe were unknown to the ancients. Citizens were by profession neither soldiers, nor judges, nor priests; they were all out of duty. That is the true secret for making everything proceed to the common goal, for keeping the spirit of estate from taking root in corporate entities at the expense of patriotism and the hydra of chicanery from devouring a nation. The function of judge in both the supreme and local law courts, ought to be a temporary station of tests based on which the nation might appraise a Citizen's merit and probity, in order to raise him up afterward to the more eminent posts for which he is found capable. This manner of envisaging themselves can only make judges very attentive to sheltering themselves from all reproach and give them generally all the attentiveness and all the integrity that their position requires. In the fine times of Rome this is how one passed through the Praetorship to attain the Consulate. This is the means for justice to be well administered—with a few clear and simple laws and even with few judges—leaving to judges the power to interpret and to supplement the laws at need by the natural lights of rectitude and good sense. Nothing is more puerile than the precautions taken on this point by the English. In order to eliminate arbitrary judgments they have subjected themselves to a thousand iniquitous and even extravagant judgments: multitudes of lawyers devour them, eternal lawsuits consume them, and with the mad idea of wanting to foresee everything, they have made their laws into an immense maze, in which memory and reason alike get lost.

It is necessary to make three codes. One political, another civil, and another criminal. All three as clear, short, and precise as possible. These codes will be taught, not only in the universities, but in all the schools, and no other body of right will be needed. All the rules of natural right are better engraved in the hearts of men than in all the rubbish of Justinian. Only make them honest and virtuous and I will answer to you for it that they will know enough about right. But all Citizens and above all public men must be instructed about the positive laws of their country and about the particular rules based on which they are governed. They will find them in these codes which they ought to study, and all the nobles, before being inscribed in the book of gold which is to open the way to entrance into a Dietine, ought to undergo on these codes, and in particular on the first, an examination which is not a simple formality, and based on which, if they are not adequately instructed, they will be sent back until they are better instructed. With regard to Roman right and customs, all that, if it exists, ought to be removed from the schools and from the courts. One ought not to be acquainted with any authority other than the Laws of the State; they ought to be uniform in all the provinces in order to dry up one source of proceedings, and the questions that are not settled by them ought to be settled by the good sense and integrity of the judges. Count upon it that when the magistracy is only a station of testing to ascend higher for those who exercise it, they will not abuse this authority as one might fear, or that if this abuse takes place, it will always be less than the abuse from those crowds of laws which often contradict each other, the number of which makes proceedings eternal, and whose conflict equally makes judgments arbitrary.

What I say here about judges ought to be extended *a fortiori* to Lawyers. This estate, so respectable in itself, is degraded and debased as soon as it becomes a profession. The lawyer ought to be his client's first and most severe judge. His employment ought to be as it was at Rome and as it is still in Geneva, the first step for attaining the magistracies; and in fact the lawyers are highly regarded at Geneva and deserve to be so. They are postulants for the Council, very attentive toward doing nothing that draws public disapproval upon them. I should like all public functions to lead to each other this way; so that no one would arrange to stay in his own, would not make it into a lucrative profession for himself, and would not put himself above the judgment of men. This would perfectly satisfy the wish to have the children of opulent citizens pass through the estate of lawyer, made honorable and temporary this way. I shall develop this idea better in a moment.

In passing, I ought to say here, since it comes to my mind, that it is against the system of equality in the equestrian order to establish entails and Primogeniture there. Legislation must always tend toward diminishing the great inequality of fortune and power that puts too much distance between the Lords and the simple nobles, and which a natural progression tends always to increase. With regard to the Census by which one would settle the quantity of land that a noble ought to possess to be admitted to the Dietines, seeing good and evil in that, and not knowing the country well enough to compare the effects, I do not dare to settle this question absolutely. Without contradiction, it would be desirable for a Citizen who has a vote in a Palatinate to possess some land there, but I would not very much like the quantity to be fixed: by counting possessions for much, must one count men for nothing at all? What? because a Gentleman has little or no land, does he cease for that to be free and noble, and is his poverty alone a serious enough crime to make him lose his right as a Citizen?

Moreover, no law ought ever to be allowed to fall into desuetude. Whether it is indifferent, whether it is bad, it must be formally repealed or maintained in vigor. This maxim, which is fundamental, will oblige passing all the old laws under review, repealing many of them, and giving the most severe sanction to those[46] one wants to preserve. In France it is regarded as a State maxim to close one's eyes over many things; that is what despotism always requires: but in a free Government it is the means of enervating the legislation and shaking the constitution. Few laws, but well digested and above all well observed. All abuses that are not forbidden have no consequences. But in a free State, anyone who says law says a thing before which every Citizen trembles, and the King the first of all. In a word, put up with anything rather than use up the resiliency of the laws; for once this resiliency is used up the State is lost without resource.

[XI] Economic System.

The choice of the economic system that Poland ought to adopt depends on the object it proposes for itself in correcting its constitution. If you want only to become noisy, brilliant, formidable, and to have influence over the other peoples of Europe, you have their example, apply yourself to imitating it. Cultivate the sciences, the arts, commerce, industry, have regular troops, fortified places, Academies, above all a good system of finances which makes money circulate well, which thereby multiplies it, which procures you a lot of it; work to make it very necessary, so as to keep the people in a great dependency and for that ferment both material luxury and the luxury of mind, which is inseparable from it. In this manner you will form a people that is scheming, fervent, greedy, ambitious, servile and knavish like the others, always at one of the two extremes of misery or opulence, of license or of slavery with no middle ground: but you will be counted among the great powers of Europe, you will enter into all the political systems, your alliance will be sought after in all negotiations, you will be tied by treaties: there will be no war in Europe into which you do not have the honor of being stuck: if good fortune wishes it for you, you will be able to recover your former possessions, perhaps conquer new ones, and then say like Pyrrhus or like the Russians, that is to say, like children: "When the whole world is mine I will eat a lot of candy."[47]

But if by chance you prefer to form a free, peaceful, and wise nation which neither fears nor needs anyone, which suffices to itself and which is happy; then a completely different method must be taken, maintain, reestablish among you simple morals, healthy tastes, a martial spirit without ambition; form courageous and disinterested souls; apply your peoples to agriculture and to the arts necessary for life, make money contemptible, and, if possible, useless, seek, find more powerful and more certain springs to accomplish great things. I agree that by following this route you will not fill up the gazettes with noise about your festivals, about your negotiations, about your exploits, that philosophers will not flatter you, that poets will not sing about you, that they will say very little about you in Europe: perhaps they will even affect disdain for you; but you will live in genuine abundance, in justice, and in freedom; but they will not pick a fight with you, they will fear you without giving the appearance of doing so, and I answer to you for it that neither the Russians nor anyone else will come to play the masters among you again, or that, if for their misfortune they do come, they will be in an even greater hurry to leave. Above all do not attempt to unite these two projects; they are too contradictory, and to want to reach both by a mixed procedure is to want to fail at both of them. Choose, then, and if you prefer the first choice stop reading me here; for everything I have left to propose relates only to the second.

Without contradiction there are excellent economic plans in the papers I have been sent. The defect I see in them is that they are more favorable to wealth than to prosperity. As regards new establishments, one must not be satisfied with seeing their immediate effect; one must also foresee very well their remote but necessary consequences. For example the plan for the sale of the starosties[48] and for the manner of using its proceeds appears to me well understood and easily executed in the system established throughout Europe of doing everything with money. But is this system good in itself and does it attain its goal? Is it certain that money is the sinews of war? Rich peoples have always been beaten and conquered by poor peoples. Is it certain that money is the spring of a good government? Systems of finances are modern. I do not see anything good or great emerging from them. Ancient Governments did not even know this word *finance,* and what they did with men is prodigious. Money is at most the supplement of men, and the supplement will never be worth the thing. Poles, leave all this money to others, or satisfy yourselves with what they will need to give you, since they need your wheat more than you do their gold. It is better, believe me, to live in abundance than in opulence; be better than pecunious, be rich. Cultivate your fields well, without worrying about the rest, soon you will harvest gold and more than you need to procure the oil and wine you lack, since aside from them

Poland abounds or can abound in everything. In order to keep you happy and free, heads, hearts, and arms are what you need: that is what makes up the force of a State and the prosperity of a people. Systems of finance make venal souls, and as soon as all one wants is to gain, one always gains more by being a knave than by being an honest man. The use of money goes astray and hides itself; it is intended for one thing and employed for a different one. Those who handle it soon learn how to divert it, and what are all those watchmen one gives them but other knaves that one sends to share with them. If there were nothing but public and manifest wealth; if the movement of gold left an ostensible mark and could not be hidden, there would be no expedient at all more convenient for purchasing services, courage, fidelity, virtues; but given its hidden circulation, it is even more convenient for making plunderers and traitors, for putting the public good and freedom up for auction. In a word money is at the same time the weakest and most vain spring that I know for making the political machine move toward its goal, the strongest and the most certain for diverting it from it.

One cannot make men act except by their self-interest, I know it; but pecuniary interest is the worst of all, the most vile, the most suited to corruption, and even, I repeat it with confidence and will always maintain it, the least and the weakest in the eyes of anyone who is well acquainted with the human heart. In all hearts there are naturally great passions in reserve; when the only one left is the one for money, it is because all the others which ought to have been excited and developed have been enervated and stifled. The miser has properly no passion at all that dominates him; he aspires to money only out of foresight, in order to satisfy those that might occur to him. Know how to foment them and satisfy them directly without this resource; it will soon lose all its value.

Public expenditures are inevitable; I admit it again. Make them with any other thing rather than with money. In Switzerland one still sees officials, magistrates and other public employees paid in kind. They have tithes, wine, wood, useful or honorific rights. All public service is done by statutory labor, the State pays almost nothing in money. It will be said that it is needed to pay troops. This item will have its place in a moment. This manner of payment is not without inconvenience; there is loss, waste: the administration of these sorts of goods is more troublesome; above all it is displeasing to those who are burdened with it, because they find less in it to turn to their account. That is all true; but the evil is small in comparison with the crowd of evils it saves! A man would like to embezzle, but he cannot do so without it being apparent. The Bailiffs of the Canton of Berne will be raised as an objection to me; but where do their vexations come from? from the pecuniary fines that they impose. These arbitrary fines are already a great evil in themselves. Nevertheless if they could not exact them except in kind this would be almost nothing. The money they extort is easily hidden, storehouses would not be hidden the same way. In the Canton of Berne alone ten times more money is handled than in all the rest of Switzerland; also its administration is proportionately iniquitous. Seek in every country, in every government, and all over the earth. You will not find any great evil in morality and in politics in which money is not mixed.

Someone will say to me that the equality of fortunes that reigns in Switzerland makes parsimony in administration easy: whereas the many powerful houses and great Lords that are in Poland require great expenditures for their maintenance and finances to provide for them. Not at all. These great Lords are rich by their patrimonies, and their expenditures will be less once luxury ceases to be honored in the State, without distinguishing them less from inferior fortunes which will shrink in the same proportion. Pay for their services with authority, honors, high positions. Inequality in ranks is compensated for in Poland by the advantage of the nobility which makes those who fill them more jealous of honors than of profit. By graduating and distributing these purely honorific recompenses appropriately the Republic husbands a treasury that will not ruin it, and that will give it heroes for Citizens. This treasury of honors is an inexhaustible resource among a people that has honor; and please God that Poland might hope to exhaust this resource. Oh fortunate the nation that will find in its bosom no more possible distinctions for virtue!

To the defect of not being worthy of it, pecuniary recompenses join that of not being public enough, of not speaking ceaselessly to the eyes and hearts, of disappearing as soon as they are granted, and of not leaving any visible trace that excites emulation by perpetuating the honor that ought to accompany them. I would like for all grades, all employments, all honorific recompenses to be marked by external signs, for no man in office to be allowed to walk incognito, for the marks of his rank or his dignity to follow him everywhere, so that the people might always respect him, and so that he might always respect himself; so that he might always be able to dominate opulence; so that a rich man who is only rich, ceaselessly overshadowed by titled and poor Citizens, might not find either consideration or approval in his fatherland; so that he might be forced to serve it in order to shine there, to have integrity out of ambition, and in spite of his wealth to aspire to ranks toward which only public approbation leads, and from which blame can always make one fall. That is how one enervates the force of wealth, and how one makes men who are not for sale. I insist on this point very much, being well persuaded that your neighbors and above all the Russians will spare nothing to corrupt your people in office, and that the great business of your Government is to work at making them incorruptible.

If someone tells me that I want to make Poland into a people of Capuchin monks, I answer first that this is only a French-style argument, and that joking isn't reasoning. I answer also that one must not exaggerate my maxims beyond my intentions and beyond reason; that my design is not to suppress the circulation of specie, but only to slow it down, and above all to prove how much it matters that a good economic system not be a system of finance and money. In order to uproot cupidity in Sparta Lycurgus did not annihilate currency, but he made one of iron. As for me, I intend to proscribe neither silver nor gold, but to make them less necessary, to make it so that someone who does not have it might be poor without being destitute. At bottom money is not wealth, it is only its sign; it is not the sign that must be multiplied, but the thing represented. I have seen, in spite of the fables of travelers that in the midst of all their gold the English were not individually any less needy than other peoples. And what does it matter to me, after all, to have a hundred guineas instead of ten, if these hundred guineas do not bring me a more comfortable subsistence? Pecuniary wealth is only relative, and in accordance with relations that can change by a thousand causes, one can find oneself successively rich and poor with the same sum; but not with goods in kind, for since they are immediately useful to men they always have their absolute value which does not depend at all on an operation of commerce. I grant that the English people is wealthier than other peoples, but it does not follow that a bourgeois of London lives more comfortably than a bourgeois of Paris. From people to people, the one that has more money has the advantage; but that does nothing for the fate of private individuals, and it is not there that the prosperity of a nation resides.

Favor agriculture and the useful arts, not in enriching the cultivators, which would only be to incite them to leave their station, but by making it honorable and pleasant. Establish factories for the foremost necessities; ceaselessly multiply your wheat and your men without troubling yourself about the rest. The excess of the produce of your land, which is going to be lacking to the rest of Europe because of the increasing monopolies, will necessarily bring you more money than you will need. Beyond this necessary and certain produce, you will be poor as long as you want to have more; as soon as you know how to do without it, you will be rich. There is the spirit I would like to make reign in your economic system. To consider other countries little, to be little concerned with commerce;

but at home to increase both produce and consumers as much as possible. The infallible and natural effect of a free and just Government is population. Thus the more you perfect your Government, the more you will increase your people without even thinking about it. This way you will have neither beggars nor millionaires. Luxury and indigence will disappear together insensibly, and the Citizens, cured of the frivolous tastes that opulence gives, and of the vices attached to poverty, will put their efforts and their glory into serving the fatherland well and will find their happiness in their duties.

I would like one always to tax men's arms more than their purse; to have roads, Bridges, public buildings, service of the Prince and of the State be done by statutory labor and not at all at the price of money. This sort of tax is at bottom the least onerous and above all the one that can be least abused: for money disappears upon leaving the hands that pay it, but everyone sees what men are employed for, and one cannot overburden them at pure loss. I know that this method is impracticable where luxury, commerce, and the arts reign: but nothing is as easy among a simple people who have good morals, and nothing is more useful for preserving them this way: this is an additional reason for preferring it.

I return thus to the starosties, and I agree once again that the plan of selling them to put the proceeds to work for the profit of the public treasury is good and well understood as to its economic object; as to the political and moral object, this project is so little to my taste that if the starosties had been sold, I would like them to be bought back in order to make them into funds for salaries and recompenses for those who serve the fatherland or who deserved well of it. In a word I should like, if it were possible, for there to be no public treasury at all and for the internal revenue not even to acknowledge payments in money. I see that the thing is not strictly possible; but the spirit of the government ought always to tend to making it so, and nothing is more contrary to this spirit than the sale that is at issue. The Republic would be richer from it, it is true; but the spring of the government would be proportionately weaker from it.

I admit the administration of public goods would become more difficult and above all less agreeable to the administrators when all these goods are in kind and not at all in money: but then this administration and its inspection must be made into so many tests of good sense, of vigilance, and above all of integrity, for attaining more eminent positions. In this regard one will be doing nothing but imitating the municipal administration established at Lyon, where one must begin by being Administrator of the Charity Hospital in order to attain city offices, and one's worthiness for the others is judged from the manner in which one acquits oneself in that one. No one had more integrity than the Quaestors of the Roman armies because the Quaestorship was the first step for attaining the curule office. In the positions that might tempt cupidity, one must make ambition repress it. The greatest good that results from this is not the savings from knavishness; but making disinterestedness honored, and making poverty respectable when it is the fruit of integrity.

The Republic's revenues do not equal its expenses; I can very well believe it; the Citizens do not want to pay anything at all. But men who want to be free ought not to be slaves of their purse, and where is the State in which freedom is not paid for and even very dearly? Switzerland will be cited to me; but as I have already said, in Switzerland the Citizens themselves fill the functions that everywhere else they prefer to pay to have others fill. They are soldiers, officials, magistrates, workers: they are everything for the service of the State, and, always ready to pay from their person, they do not need to pay again from their purse. When the Poles want to act this way, they will not need money any more than the Swiss do: but if such a large State refuses to conduct itself on the maxims of small Republics, it should not look for their advantages, nor should it want the effect while rejecting the means for obtaining it. If, in accordance with my desire, Poland was a confederation of thirty-three small States, it would unite the force of large Monarchies and the freedom of small Republics; but for that it would be necessary to renounce ostentation, and I am afraid that this item might be the most difficult one.

Of all the manners of levying a tax the most convenient and the one that costs the least is without contradiction capitation; but this is also the most forced, the most arbitrary, and it is doubtless for that reason that Montesquieu finds it servile, although it was the only one used by the Romans and it still exists at this moment in several Republics, under other names, in truth, as in Geneva, where that is called *to pay the Guards,* and where only Citizens and Bourgeois[49] pay this tax, while the inhabitants and natives pay other ones: which is exactly the opposite of Montesquieu's idea.[50]

But since it is unjust and unreasonable to tax people who have nothing, property taxes are always better than personal ones. Only it is necessary to avoid those the collection of which is difficult and costly, and above all those that are eluded by smuggling, that produce nothing, that fill the State with smugglers and brigands, and corrupt the fidelity of the Citizens. The taxation has to be so well proportioned that the difficulty of fraud surpasses its profit. Thus never a tax on what is easy to hide, such as lace and jewels; it would be better to forbid wearing them rather than to forbid importing them. In France they freely encourage the temptation of smuggling, and that makes me believe that the Tax Office finds its advantage in having smugglers there. This system is abominable and contrary to all good sense. Experience teaches that the stamp tax is a singularly onerous tax on the poor, bothersome for commerce, increases chicanery to an extreme degree, and makes the people cry out everywhere it is established; I would not advise considering it. That on livestock appears to me much better, provided that one avoids fraud, for every possible fraud is always a source of evils. But it can be onerous to the taxpayers in that they have to pay in money, and the product of contributions of this sort is too subject to being turned aside from its destination.

In my opinion the best, the most natural tax, and one that is not at all subject to fraud is a proportionate tax on land, and on all land without exception as the Marshal de Vauban and the Abbé de St.-Pierre proposed; for in the end it is what produces that ought to pay. All possessions, royal, landed, ecclesiastic, and common ought to pay equally, that is to say proportionately to their extent and to their product, whoever the owner might be. This imposition would appear to require a preliminary operation which would be lengthy and costly, namely a general survey.[51] But that expense can be very well avoided, and even with advantage, by assaying the tax, not directly on the land, but on its product, which will be even more just; that is to say, by establishing a tithe in the proportion that would be judged suitable, which would be levied in kind on the harvest, like the ecclesiastical tithe, and in order to avoid perplexity of details and storehouses one would lease out these Tithes at auction as the priests do. So that private individuals would be held to paying the Tithe only on their harvest, and would pay it from their purse only if they preferred it that way, based on a tariff regulated by the government. Brought together, these leases could be an object of commerce from the sale of the commodities they would produce and which could go abroad by way of Danzig or Riga. This way one would also avoid all the expenses of detection and regulation, all those swarms of clerks and employees so odious to the people, so inconvenient to the public, and what is the greatest point, the republic[52] would have money without the citizens being obliged to give it: for I will never repeat enough that what makes the *taille* and all taxes onerous to the cultivator, is that they are pecuniary, and that he is first obliged to sell in order to be able to pay.

[XII] Military System.

Of all the Republic's expenses the maintenance of the Crown's army is the most considerable, and certainly the services that this army renders are not proportionate to what it costs. Nevertheless, someone will say right away, troops are necessary to guard the State. I would agree if these troops did in fact guard it: but I do not see that this army has ever safeguarded against any invasion, and I am very much afraid that it will not safeguard against them later on.

Poland is surrounded by belligerent powers who continuously have numerous perfectly disciplined standing troops, to which, even with the greatest efforts, it will never be able to oppose similar ones without exhausting itself in very little time, especially in the deplorable state in which the brigands who are devastating it are going to leave it. Moreover they would not let it act, and if, with the resources of the most vigorous administration, it wanted to put its army on a respectable footing, its attentive neighbors, intent on preventing it from doing so, would crush it very quickly before it could execute its plan. No, if it wants only to imitate them, it will never resist them.

The Polish nation is different in natural temperament, in government, in morals, in language, not only from its neighbors, but also from all the rest of Europe. I should like it to differ from them also in its military constitution, its tactics, its discipline, for it to be always itself and not someone else. Only then will it be everything it can be, and it will draw from its bosom all the resources it can have. The most inviolable law of nature is the law of the stronger. There is no legislation whatsoever, no constitution whatsoever that can exempt one from that law. To seek the means for safeguarding yourself from the invasions of a neighbor stronger than you are, is to seek after an illusion. It would be an even greater one to want to make conquests and to give yourself an offensive force; it is incompatible with the form of your government. Whoever wants to be free ought not to want to be a conqueror. The Romans were so out of necessity and, so to speak, in spite of themselves. War was a necessary remedy for the vice of their constitution. Always attacked and always victors, they were the sole disciplined people among barbarians, and became masters of the world by always defending themselves. Your position is so different that you will not even be able to defend yourself against anyone who might attack you. You will never have offensive force; for a long time you will not have a defensive one; but you will soon have, or to say it better, you already have the preservative force which, even if subjugated, will safeguard your government and your freedom in its sole and true sanctuary, which is the heart of the Poles.

Regular troops, the plague and depopulation of Europe, are good for only two ends: either to attack and conquer neighbors or to enchain and enslave Citizens. These two ends are equally alien to you: therefore renounce the means by which they are attained. The State must not remain without defenders, I know it; but its true defenders are its members. Every citizen ought to be a soldier out of duty, none ought to be one by profession. Such was the military system of the Romans; today such is that of the Swiss; such ought to be that of every free State, and above all of Poland. In no condition to pay an army adequate for defense, it must find this army in its inhabitants at need. Only a good militia, a genuine well-drilled militia is capable of fulfilling this object. This militia will cost the Republic little, will always be ready to serve it, and will serve it well, because in the end one always defends one's own possessions better than someone else's.

Count Wielhorski proposes raising one Regiment per Palatinate, and always maintaining it at the ready. This presupposes that the Crown's army, or at least the infantry would be dismissed: because I believe that the maintenance of these thirty-three Regiments would overburden the republic too much if the crown's army had to be paid in addition. This change would have its utility, and appears to me easy to do, but it also could become onerous and abuses will be hard to prevent. I would not be in favor of scattering the soldiers to maintain order in towns and villages; that would be bad discipline for them. Soldiers, above all those who are such by profession, ought never to be abandoned alone to their own conduct, and ought even less to be charged with any oversight over the citizens. They ought always to march and reside as a body: always subordinated and watched over, they ought to be nothing but blind instruments in the hands of their officers. However small the inspection with which one charged them might be, it would result in violence, vexations, numberless abuses; the soldiers and the inhabitants would become each others' enemies: this is a misfortune attached to regular troops everywhere: these regiments, always continuing to exist, would take on their spirit, and this spirit is never favorable to freedom. The Roman republic was destroyed by its legions when the remoteness of its conquests forced them to have them always at the ready. Once again, the Poles ought not to cast their eyes around them in order to imitate even the good that is done there. Being relative to completely different constitutions, this good would be an evil in theirs. They ought to look solely for what is suitable for them and not for what others do.

Why not then establish in Poland, instead of regular troops—a hundred times more burdensome than useful to every people that does not have the spirit for conquests—a genuine militia exactly as it is established in Switzerland where every inhabitant is a soldier, but only when he must be? The serfdom established in Poland does not allow, I admit it, for one to arm the peasants right away: arms in servile hands will always be more dangerous than useful to the State: but while waiting until the happy moment for enfranchising them has arrived, Poland swarms with towns, and their inhabitants put into regiments could furnish at need numerous troops whose maintenance would cost nothing to the State[53] aside from at these times. Since the majority of these inhabitants have no land at all, they pay their quota in service this way, and this service could easily be distributed in a manner that would not be at all burdensome to them, even if they were adequately drilled.

In Switzerland every private individual who gets married must be furnished with a uniform which becomes his festival clothes, with a rifle, and with the whole outfit of a foot soldier, and he is enrolled in his neighborhood's company. During the summer, on Sundays and festival days, these militiamen are drilled in accordance with their enrollment, first by small squadrons, then by companies, then by regiments, until when their turn has come and they gather in the countryside and successively set up small camps in which they are drilled in all the maneuvers that suit the infantry. As long as they do not leave their place of residence, they have no pay since they are turned away from their labors little or not at all, but as soon as they march in the field, they have soldier's rations and are paid by the State, and no one is allowed to send another man in his place so that each may be drilled and all perform service. In a State such as Poland enough can easily be drawn from its vast provinces to replace the Crown's army with an adequate number of militiamen always at the ready, who would change at least every year and be taken by small detachments for all the corps, which would hardly be burdensome to the private individuals whose turn would come hardly once every twelve to fifteen years. In this manner, the whole nation would be drilled, one would have a fine and numerous army always ready at need, which would cost much less, especially in peacetime, than the Crown's army costs today.

But in order to succeed completely in this operation, it would be necessary to begin by changing public opinion about a station that in fact will be entirely changed, and to make it so that in Poland a soldier will no longer be regarded as a bandit who sells himself for five sous a day in order to live, but as a Citizen who is serving the fatherland and who is doing his duty. It is necessary to return this station to the same honor it formerly held, and in which it still holds in Switzerland and in Geneva where the best Bourgeois are as proud in their corps and under arms as they are at the city hall and in the Sovereign Council. For this it is important, in the selection of officers, for one to have no regard to rank, to influence and to fortune, but solely to experience and to talent. Nothing is easier than to make into a point of honor the good handling of arms upon which everyone drills himself with zeal for service of the fatherland in the sight of his family and his relations; a zeal which cannot catch fire in the same way among the mob enlisted by chance, and which feels only the trouble of drilling. I have seen the time when the Bourgeois at Geneva performed maneuvers much better than regular troops; but since the Magistrates found that this caused among the Bourgeoisie a military spirit that did not go along with their intentions, they have tried to stifle this emulation and have succeeded only too well.

In the execution of this project one could without any danger restore to the King the military authority naturally attached to his position; for it is not conceivable[54] that the Nation could be employed in oppressing itself, at least when all those who compose it have a share in freedom. It is only with regular and standing troops that the executive power can ever enslave the State. The great Roman armies were not misused as long as they changed with each Consul, and until Marius it did not enter the mind of any of the Consuls that they could draw any use from them for enslaving the Republic. It was only when the great remoteness of conquests forced the Romans to keep the same armies at the ready for a long time, to recruit them from disreputable characters, and to perpetuate command over them to the Proconsuls, that these began to feel their independence and to try to make use of them to establish their own power. The armies of Sulla, of Pompey and of Caesar became genuine regular troops, who substituted the spirit of military for that of republican government, and this is so true that Caesar's soldiers considered themselves very offended when, during mutual discontent, he called them Citizens, *Quirites.*[55] In the plan that I imagine and that I shall soon finish tracing out, all Poland will become warlike as much for the defense of its freedom against the undertakings of the Prince as against those of its neighbors, and I dare say that once this plan has been well executed one could suppress the commission of high General and rejoin it to the Crown without the slightest danger for freedom resulting from it, unless the Nation allows itself to be duped by plans for conquests, in which case I would no longer answer for anything.[56] Anyone who dares to deprive others of their freedom almost always ends by losing his own; that is true even for kings, and much more true for peoples.

Why would the equestrian order, in which the republic genuinely resides, not follow a plan similar to the one that I am proposing for the infantry? In all the Palatinates establish cavalry corps in which all the nobility would be enrolled, and which would have its officers, its Staff, its standards, its quarters assigned in case of alarms, its times marked out for gathering together every year: let this brave nobility be drilled in squads, in making all sorts of movements, evolutions, in putting order and precision in its maneuvers, in acknowledging military subordination. I should not want it slavishly to imitate the tactics of other nations. I should want it to make one which would be its own, which would develop and perfect its natural and national dispositions, for it to be drilled above all in speed and nimbleness, in breaking apart, scattering, and coming back together without difficulty and without confusion; for it to excel[57] in what is called guerilla warfare, in all the maneuvers that suit light troops, in the art of flooding over a countryside like a torrent, of attacking everywhere and never being attacked, of always acting in concert even though separated, of cutting communications, of intercepting convoys, of charging rear-guards, of carrying off the vanguard, of surprising detachments, of harassing large corps that march and camp together; for it to adopt the manner of the ancient Parthians, like it in valor, and for it to learn like them to vanquish and destroy the best disciplined armies without ever giving battle and without leaving them a moment to breathe. In a word, have an infantry because it is necessary, but do not count on anything but your cavalry, and omit nothing to invent a system that puts the entire fortune of war in its hands.

The advice of having fortified places is a bad one for a free people; they do not suit the Polish genius at all, and everywhere they sooner or later become nests for tyrants. The places that you believe you are fortifying against the Russians, you will infallibly be fortifying for them, and they will become shackles for you from which you will never free yourselves. Pay no attention even to the advantages of fortified outposts, and do not ruin yourself with artillery: none of that is what you need. A sudden invasion is doubtless a great misfortune, but permanent chains are a much greater one. You will never succeed in making it difficult for your neighbors to enter your territory; but you can succeed in making it difficult for them to leave with impunity, and that is what you ought to put your efforts into. Antony and Crassus easily entered the territory of the Parthians, but for their misfortune. A country as vast as yours always offers its inhabitants refuges and great resources for escaping its attackers. All human art would not be able to prevent the sudden action of the strong against the weak; but it can provide ways to react, and, once experience teaches that departure from your territory is so difficult, people will be in less of a hurry to enter it. Thus leave your country wide open like Sparta; but like it build yourself good citadels in the hearts of the Citizens, and just as Themistocles took Athens onto its fleet, carry your cities away on your horses as needed. The spirit of imitation produces few good things and never produces anything great. Each country has advantages which belong to it and which its foundation ought to extend and favor. Husband, cultivate those of Poland, it will have few other nations to envy.

A single thing is enough to make it impossible to subjugate; love of the fatherland and of freedom animated by the virtues that are inseparable from it. You have just given a forever memorable example of this. As long as this love burns in hearts it will perhaps not protect you against a temporary yoke; but sooner or later it will explode, shake off the yoke and set you free. Work then without relaxation, ceaselessly, to carry patriotism to the highest degree in all Polish hearts. Above I have indicated some of the means suited to this effect: it remains for me to develop here the one that I believe to be the strongest, the most powerful, and even infallible in its success, if it is well executed. That is to make it so that all Citizens feel themselves incessantly under the public's eyes, that no one advance and succeed except by public favor, that no position, no employment be filled except by the wish of the nation, and finally that everyone from the lowest noble, from even the lowest peasant up to the King if possible, depend so much on public esteem, that no one can do anything, acquire anything, succeed in anything without it. From the effervescence excited by this common emulation will be born that patriotic intoxication which alone can raise men up above themselves, and without which freedom is only a vain name and legislation only an illusion.

In the equestrian order this system is easy to establish, if one is careful to follow a gradual progression everywhere, and to admit no one to the honors and dignity of State who has not previously passed through the inferior grades, which will serve as entrance and test to arrive at a greater elevation. Since equality among the nobility is a fundamental law of Poland, the career of public affairs ought always to begin there by subordinate employments; this is the spirit of the constitution. They ought to be open to every Citizen whose zeal brings him to present himself and who believes he feels himself in a condition to fill them successfully: but they ought to be the first indispensable step for anyone, great or small, who wants to advance in this career. Each is free not to present himself; but as soon as someone enters, he must either—barring a voluntary retirement—advance or be rebuffed with disapproval. Seen and judged by his fellow citizens in all his behavior, he must know that all his steps are being followed, that all his actions are being weighed, and that a faithful account of good and evil is being kept whose influence will extend over all the rest of his life.

[XIII] Plan for Subjecting All the Members of the Government to a Graduated Progression.

Here is a plan for making that progression gradual which I have tried to adapt as well as possible to the form of the established government, reformed only with regard to the naming of Senators in the manner and for the reasons deduced above.

All active members of the Republic, I mean those who have a share in the administration, will be distributed into three classes marked by so many distinctive signs which those who make up these classes will wear on their persons. The orders of chivalry which formerly were proofs of virtue, are now merely signs of the Kings' favor. The ribbons and jewels that are their marks have an air of baubles and feminine adornment that must be avoided in our foundation. I would like the marks of the three orders that I am proposing to be plaques of various metals, the material value of which would be in inverse proportion to the grade of those who wear them.

The first step in public affairs will be preceded by a test for young people in the positions of Lawyers, Assessors, even judges in subordinate courts, managers of some portion of the public funds, and in general in all the inferior positions that give those who fill them the opportunity to show their merit, their capacity, their exactitude, and above all their integrity. This condition of trial ought to last at least three years, at the end of which, armed with certificates from their superiors, and with the testimony of the public voice, they will present themselves to the Dietine of their province, where, after a severe examination of their conduct, those who are judged worthy of it will be honored with a golden plaque carrying their name, that of their province, the date of their reception and beneath this inscription in larger characters: *Spes-Patriae.*[58] Those who have received this plaque will always wear it either attached to their right arm or over their heart; they will take on the title of *Servants of the State,* and from the equestrian order only the Servants of the State can be elected Deputies at the Diet, Deputies to Courts, Commissioners of the chamber of accounts, or charged with any public function that belongs to sovereignty.

To attain the second grade it will be necessary to have been a Deputy at the Diet three times and each time to have obtained a positive report from one's constituents at the Dietines, and no one will be able to be elected Deputy a second or third time unless he is provided with that document for his preceding term as deputy. Service at the Courts or of

Radom in the status of commissioner or Deputy will be the equivalent of a term as deputy, and it will suffice to have sat three times in any these assemblies but always with approval to attain the second grade by right. So that, based on the three certificates presented to the Diet, the Servant of the State who has obtained them will be honored with the second plaque and with the title of which it is the mark.

This plaque will be of silver of the same shape and size as the preceding one, it will bear the same inscriptions, except that in place of the two words, *Spes Patriae,* will be engraved these two, *Civis electus.* Those who wear these plaques will be called *Citizens elect* or simply *Elect,* and can no longer be simple Deputies, Deputies at the Courts, or Commissioners of the Chamber: but they will be so many candidates for the positions of Senators. No one will be able to enter the Senate unless he has passed through this second grade, unless he has worn its mark, and all the Deputy Senators who, in accordance with the plan, will be immediately drawn from them, will continue to wear it until they attain the third grade.

It is among those who have attained the second that I should like to choose the Principals of the schools and inspectors of the education of children. They might be obliged to fill this employment for a certain term before being admitted to the Senate, and would be required to present to the Diet the approval of the College of administrators of education: without forgetting that this approval, like all the others, ought always to be endorsed by the public voice, which there are a thousand ways of consulting.

The election of the Deputy Senators will be done in the chamber of Deputies at each ordinary Diet, so that they will remain in position for only two years; but they can be continued or re-elected two other times, provided that, each time in leaving position, they have first obtained from the same chamber a document of approval similar to the one that must be obtained from the Dietines in order to be elected deputy a second and third time: for without a similar document obtained at each period of administration one will no longer attain anything, and in order not to be excluded from the government one's only recourse will be to begin again from the inferior grades, which ought to be allowed in order not to deprive a zealous citizen, whatever fault he might have committed, of every hope of effacing it and of succeeding. Moreover, one ought never to charge any particular committee with expediting or refusing these certificates or approvals; these judgments must always be passed by the whole chamber, which will be done without any trouble or loss of time if one follows for the judgment of the Deputy Senators leaving their positions the same method of cards that I proposed for their election.

Perhaps it will be said here that all these documents of approval given at first by particular bodies, afterwards by the Dietines, and finally by the Diet will be less accorded to merit, to justice, and to truth than extorted by intrigue and influence. To that I have only one thing to answer. I believed I was speaking to a people who, without being exempt from vices, still had some resilience and virtues, and with that assumption, my plan is good. But if Poland has already reached the point where everything is venal and corrupt to the core, it is in vain that it is seeking to reform its laws and to preserve its freedom, it must renounce these things and bow its head to the yoke. But let us return.

Every Deputy Senator who has been one with approval three times will pass by right to the third grade, the highest in the State, and its mark will be conferred to him by the King upon the nomination of the Diet. This mark will be a plaque of blue steel similar to the preceding ones and will bear this inscription *Custos legum.*[59] Those who have received it will wear it for the rest of their lives however eminent the posts they obtain might be, and even on the throne if they happen to ascend to it.

The Palatins and grand Castellans will be drawn only from the body of the Guardians of the laws, in the same manner that the latter were from the Citizens-elect, that is to say, by the choice of the Diet, and since these Palatins occupy the most eminent positions in the republic and they occupy them for life, in order to keep their emulation from going to sleep in positions in which they no longer see anything but the Throne above them, access to it will be open to them, but in such a manner that they still will not be able to achieve it except by public vote and by dint of virtue.

Let us remark, before proceeding farther, that the career that I give for citizens to proceed through in order to reach the head of the Republic gradually, appears rather well proportioned to the stages of human life so that those who hold the reins of the Government, having passed the fire of youth, can nevertheless still be in the prime of life, and so that after fifteen or twenty years of continuous testing under the eyes of the public they will still have enough years left to make the fatherland enjoy their talents, their experience, and their virtues, and to enjoy themselves the respect and honors they will have so well deserved in the primary positions of the State. Assuming that a man begins to enter into affairs at twenty years of age, it is possible that he will already be a Palatin at thirty-five; but since it is very difficult and it is not even appropriate that this gradual progression be made so rapidly, one will hardly achieve this eminent position before one's forties, and in my opinion that is the most suitable age for bringing together all the qualities that one ought to look for in a statesman. Let us add here that this progression appears as suitable as possible to the needs of the government. Calculating probabilities, I estimate that every two years there will be at least fifty new citizens-elect and twenty guardians of the laws: more than sufficient numbers to recruit the two parts of the Senate to which these two grades respectively lead. For it is easy to see that although the first rank of the Senate might be more numerous, being for life, it will have places to fill less often than the second, which, in my plan, is renewed at each ordinary Diet.

It has already been seen and it will soon be seen again that I do not leave the supernumerary *elect* idle while waiting for them to enter the Senate as deputies; in order not to leave the Guardians of the laws idle either while waiting for them to return as Palatins or Castellans, it is from their body that I would draw the college of Administrators of education about which I have spoken above. The Primate or another Bishop could be given as President of this college, while it is decreed in addition that no other Ecclesiastic, even one who is a Bishop and Senator, could be admitted to it.

There, it seems to me, is a progression graduated well enough for the essential and intermediary part of the whole, namely the nobility and the magistrates; but we still lack the two extremes, namely the people and the King. Let us begin with the first, up until now counting for nothing, but which is important in the end to count for something if one wants to give a certain force, a certain consistency to Poland. Nothing is more delicate than the operation in question, for in the end, even though everyone feels what a great evil it is for the Republic that the nation be in some fashion restricted to the equestrian order, and that all the rest, Peasants and Bourgeois, be nothing both in the Government and in the legislation, such is the ancient Constitution. Right now it would be neither prudent nor possible to change it at one stroke; but it might be both to bring about this change by degrees, to make it so that the most numerous part of the nation be attached by affection to the Fatherland and even to the Government without any tangible revolution. This will come about by two means: the first, a precise observation of justice, so that the serf and the commoner, never having to fear being unjustly bothered by the noble, will be cured of the aversion that they must naturally have for him. This requires a great reform in the law courts and a particular care for the formation of the corps of lawyers.

The second means, without which the first is nothing, is to open a door to the serfs to acquire freedom and to the Bourgeois to acquire nobility. If the thing is not practicable in fact, it must at least be seen to be so as a possibility; but one can do more, it seems to me, and do so without running any risk. Here, for example, is a means that appears to me to lead in this manner to the proposed goal.

Every two years in the interval between one Diet and another, a suitable time and place would be chosen in each province at which the *Elect* of the same province who are not yet Deputy Senators would assemble under the presidency of a *Custos legum* who is not yet a Senator for life, in a censorial or beneficent Committee to which one would invite, not all the Priests, but only those who are judged most worthy of this honor: I even believe that this preference, forming a tacit judgment in the eyes of the people, might also throw some emulation among the Village Priests, and protect a great number of them from the vile morals to which they are only too subject.

This assembly, into which they could also call the elders and notables of all stations, would be occupied by the examination of the plans for establishments useful for the province; it would hear the reports of the Priests on the condition of their parishes and the neighboring parishes, of the notables on the condition of cultivation, on that of the families of their canton; they would carefully verify these reports; each member of the Committee would add his own observations to them, and they would keep a faithful record of all this from which succinct memoranda would be drawn up for the Dietines.

It would examine in detail the needs of overburdened families, of the infirm, of widows, of orphans, and they would provide for them proportionately from a fund formed by the free contributions of the well-off of the province. These contributions would be all the less onerous since they would become the only charitable contribution considering that in all of Poland neither beggars nor workhouses would be put up with. Without a doubt, the Priests will cry out very much for the preservation of the workhouses, and these cries are only one more reason for destroying them.

In this same committee, which would never be occupied with punishments or reprimands, but only with benefits, with praise and encouragement, based on good information they would make up precise lists of the private individuals of all stations whose conduct is worthy of honor and of recompense.* These lists would be sent to the Senate and to the King in order to be considered as the occasion arises and always to place their selection and their preferences well, and it is upon the indications of the same assemblies that the Administrators of education would give the free places I have spoken about above.[60]

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* In these estimations it is necessary to have much more regard to persons than to some isolated actions. True good is done with little glitter. It is by a uniform and sustained conduct, by private and domestic virtues, by all the duties of one's station well fulfilled, in sum by actions that flow from his character and principles that a man can deserve honors, rather than from some great theatrical strokes that already find their recompense in public admiration. Philosophic ostentation loves glittering actions very much: but someone with five or six actions of this sort, very brilliant, very noisy, and very much extolled has for his goal only to lead one astray on his account and to be unjust and harsh with impunity his whole life. *Give me great actions broken up into small change.* This witticism from a woman is a very judicious saying.

But the principal and most important occupation of this committee would be to draw up, based on faithful memoranda and on well-verified reports of the public voice, a roster of the Peasants who distinguish themselves by good conduct, good cultivation, good morals, by the care of their family, by all the duties of their station well fulfilled. This roster would afterwards be presented to the Dietine which would select from it a number fixed by law to be enfranchised, and which would provide by agreed-upon ways for the compensation of the Patrons by making them enjoy exemptions, prerogatives, in sum advantages proportionate to the number of their peasants who were been found worthy of freedom. For it would be absolutely necessary to act so that instead of being onerous to the master, the enfranchisement of the serfs would become honorable and advantageous to him. It is well understood that, in order to avoid abuses, these enfranchisements would not be made at all by the masters, but in the Dietines, by judgment and only up to the number fixed by law.

When a certain number of families in a canton have been successively enfranchised, entire villages could be enfranchised, communes could be formed there little by little, property, communal land could be assigned to them as in Switzerland, communal officers could be established there, and when things have been brought by degrees to the point that the operation could be completed on a large scale without perceptible revolution, they could be given back at last the right nature gave them to participate in the administration of their country by sending deputies to the Dietines.

When all this is done, all these peasants who had become free men and Citizens would be armed, they would be formed into regiments, they would be drilled, and one would end by having a truly excellent militia, more than adequate for the defense of the State.

A similar method could be followed for ennobling a certain number of Bourgeois, and, even without ennobling them, reserve for them certain brilliant positions which they alone would fill to the exclusion of the nobles, and that in imitation of the Venetians so jealous of their nobility, who nevertheless, aside from other subaltern employments, always give to a townsman the second position in the State, namely that of the high Chancellor, without any Patrician ever being able to lay claim to it. In this manner, opening to the Bourgeoisie the doorway to nobility and honors, one would attach it by affection to the fatherland and to the maintenance of the constitution. Without ennobling individuals, one could also ennoble certain cities collectively, preferring those in which commerce, industry, and the arts flourish most, and where, consequently, the municipal administration was best. Like the imperial cities, these ennobled cities could send Deputies to the Diet, and their example would not fail to excite in all the others a lively desire to obtain the same honor.

The Censorial Committees charged with this department of beneficence, which, to the shame of Kings and of peoples, has never yet existed anywhere, would be, although without election, composed in the manner most suited to fulfilling their functions with zeal and integrity, considering that their members, aspirants to the Senatorial positions to which their respective grades lead, would be very attentive to deserve by public approval the votes of the Diet; and this would be a sufficient occupation to keep these aspirants on alert and in the public eye in the intervals that might separate their successive elections. Note that this would happen, nevertheless, without drawing them from the station of simple graduated Citizens during these intervals, since this sort of tribunal, so useful and so respectable, never having anything but good to do, would not be vested with any coercive power: thus I am not multiplying the magistracies at all here, but I am making use of the path forming the transition from one to another in order to turn to account those who are to fill them.

Based on this plan, graduated in its execution by a successive progression that one could speed up, slow down, or even stop in accordance with its good or bad success, one would advance only at will, guided by experience, one would kindle in all the inferior stations an ardent zeal to contribute to the public good, one would succeed in sum in enlivening all the parts of Poland, and in linking them so that they would no longer be anything but a single body whose vigor and force would be increased at least tenfold beyond what they can be today, and this with the inestimable advantage of avoiding every sharp and abrupt change and the danger of revolutions.

You have a fine opportunity to begin this operation in a dazzling and noble manner which ought to have the greatest effect. In the misfortunes that Poland just suffered, it is not possible that the confederates did not receive any assistance and marks of attachment from some bourgeois and even from some peasants. Imitate the magnanimity of the Romans, so careful after the great calamities of their republic, to heap with testimonies of their gratitude the foreigners, the subjects, the slaves, and even the animals who had rendered them some signal services during their misfortune. Oh what a fine beginning, to my taste, solemnly to grant nobility to these bourgeois and to enfranchise these peasants and to do so with all the pomp and all the display that can make this ceremony august, touching, and memorable! And do not stop at this beginning. These men, distinguished this way, ought always to remain the fatherland's favorite children. They must be watched over, protected, helped, sustained, even if they are bad characters. At any price they must be made to prosper for their whole lives, so that, from that example put before the public's eyes, Poland shows all Europe what should be expected from it in its success by anyone who dared to assist it in its distress.

This is a rough idea and only by way of an example of the manner in which one can proceed so that everyone might see before him the open route for attaining everything, so that, while serving the fatherland well everyone might gradually tend to the most honorable ranks, and virtue might be capable of opening all the doors that fortune is pleased to close.

But not everything is done yet, and the part of this plan that remains for me to expose is without contradiction the most perplexing and the most difficult; it attempts to surmount obstacles against which the prudence and experience of the most consummate political thinkers[61] have always failed. Nevertheless, it seems to me that, assuming my plan to be adopted, with the very simple means that I have to propose, all the difficulties are removed, all the abuses are foreseen, and in execution what seemed to form a new obstacle is turned into an advantage.

[XIV] Election of the Kings.

All these difficulties come down to that of giving the State a leader whose selection does not cause disturbances and who does not attack freedom. What increases the same difficulty is that this leader ought to be endowed with the great qualities necessary for anyone who dares to govern free men. A hereditary Crown prevents disturbances, but it leads to servitude; election maintains freedom, but with each reign it shakes the state. This alternative is distressing, but, before I speak about the way to avoid it, allow me a moment of reflection on the manner in which the Poles ordinarily dispose of their Crown.

First, I ask, why is it necessary for them to give themselves foreign Kings? By what singular blindness have they thus taken on the most certain means of enslaving their nation, of abolishing their customs, of making themselves the plaything of other courts, and of gratuitously increasing the storm of interregnums? What an injustice toward themselves, what an affront given to their fatherland, as if, despairing of finding in its bosom a man worthy of commanding them, they were forced to go look for one far away. How did they not feel, how did they not see that it was exactly the opposite? Open the annals of your Nation, you will never see it illustrious and triumphant except under Polish Kings; you will almost always see it oppressed and debased under the foreign ones. Let experience finally come to the support of reason; see what evils you are doing to yourselves, and what goods you are depriving yourselves of.

For, I ask again, how did the Polish Nation, having gone so far as to make its crown elective, not consider taking advantage of this law to cast among the members of the administration an emulation in zeal and glory, which by itself would have done more for the good of the fatherland than all the other laws put together? What a powerful spring over great and ambitious souls would be this crown, destined for the worthiest, and put in sight before the eyes of every citizen capable of deserving public esteem! What virtues, what noble efforts must not the hope of acquiring its highest prize excite in the nation, what leaven of patriotism in all hearts, if it was known that this is the only way to obtain this place which has become the secret object of the wishes of all private individuals, it depends on them alone to draw ever nearer to it by dint of merit and of services and, if fortune seconds them, to attain it completely in the end. Let us look for the best means for putting into play this great spring, so powerful in the Republic, and so neglected up to now. Someone will tell me that to remove the difficulties at issue it is not enough to give the Crown only to Poles: we shall see about that soon, after I have proposed my expedient. This expedient is simple; but at first it will appear to miss the goal I have just set myself, when I say that it consists in making a drawing of lots enter into the election of the Kings. I ask as a favor that I be allowed time to explain myself, or at least that I be reread attentively.

For if someone said; how can one make certain that a King chosen by lot has the qualities required for filling his position worthily, he is making an objection that I have already resolved; because for this effect it is enough that the King can be drawn only from the Senators for life; for since they themselves will have been drawn from the order of the *Guardians of the laws,* and they will have passed with honor through all the grades of the Republic, the test of their whole life and public approval in all the posts they have filled will be sufficient guarantees of the merit and the virtue of each of them.

Nevertheless, I do not mean that even among the Senators for life lottery alone decides the preference: this would be partially to miss the great goal one always ought to propose for oneself. Chance must do something and choice do a lot, in order, on the one hand, to subdue the intrigues and the maneuvers of foreign powers and, on the other, to engage all the Palatins by such a great self-interest that they will not relax at all in their conduct, but will continue to serve the fatherland with zeal in order to deserve the preference over their competitors.

I admit that the class of these competitors appears to me very numerous if one includes in it the great Castellans, by the present constitution almost equal in rank to the Palatins: but I do not see what inconvenience there would be in giving immediate access to the Throne to the Palatins alone. This would make a new grade in the same order which the great Castellans would still have to pass through in order to become Palatins, and consequently one additional means for keeping the Senate dependent on the legislator. It has already been seen that these great Castellans appeared to me superfluous in the Constitution. If, nevertheless, in order to avoid every great change, they are left their place and rank in the Senate, I approve it. But in the graduation that I propose, nothing requires that they be put on the level of the Palatins, and since nothing prevents it either, there is no inconvenience in deciding for the alternative one judges to be best. I assume here that this preferred alternative will be to open immediate access to the throne to the Palatins alone.

Immediately after the death of the King then, that is to say after the smallest interval possible and which will be fixed by law, the Diet of election will be solemnly convened; the names of all the Palatins will be put into competition and three will be drawn by lot with all precautions possible so that no fraud will corrupt this operation. These three names will be declared out loud to the assembly, which, in the same session and by the plurality of votes, will choose the one it prefers, and he will be proclaimed King the same day.

A great inconvenience will be found in this form of election, I admit it; it is that the nation cannot freely chose among the number of Palatins the one it honors and cherishes the most, and whom it judges most worthy of royalty. But this inconvenience is not new in Poland where it has been seen in several elections, and especially in the last one, that, without regard for those whom the Nation favors, it was forced to choose the one that it would have rebuffed: but for this advantage which it no longer had and which it is sacrificing, how many others more important does it gain by this form of election!

First, at one stroke, the drawing of lots subdues the factions and intrigues of foreign Nations which cannot influence this election, being too uncertain of success to put much effort into it, given that even fraud would be insufficient in favor of a subject whom the nation can always reject. This advantage alone is so great that it assures Poland's repose, stifles venality in the republic, and leaves election almost all the tranquillity of heredity.

The same advantage obtains against the intrigues of the candidates themselves. For who among them will want to put himself to expense to assure himself of a preference that does not at all depend on men, and to sacrifice his fortune for an outcome that has so many chances against it for one favorable. Let us add that those whom the lottery has favored are no longer in time to buy the electors, since the election has to be done in the same session.

The free selection of the Nation among three candidates protects it from the inconvenience of the lottery in the assumption that it would fall upon an unworthy subject; for in that assumption, the Nation will be careful not to select him, and it is not possible that among thirty-three illustrious men, the elite of the Nation, where one does not even understand how there can be found a single unworthy character, all three of those whom chance favored might be unworthy.

Thus, and this observation is of great weight, by this form we unite all the advantages of election to those of heredity.

For, first, since the crown does not pass from father to son there will never be any continuity of system for the enslavement of the republic. In the second place, in this form the lottery itself is the instrument of an enlightened and voluntary election. In the respectable body of the Guardians of the laws and of the Palatins who are drawn from it, the lottery cannot make any selection whatsoever that had not already been made by the nation.

But look at what emulation this prospect must cast into the body of Palatins and grand Castellans who, in position for life, might relax from the certitude that they can no longer be removed from them. They can no longer be constrained by fear; but the hope of occupying a throne that each of them sees so close to him is a new goad that keeps them ceaselessly attentive over themselves. They know that the lottery would favor them in vain if they are rejected at the election and that the only means of being selected is to deserve it. This advantage is too great, too evident, for it to be necessary to insist upon it.

For a moment let us assume the worst, that fraud cannot be avoided in the operation of the lottery and that one of the competitors happened to deceive the vigilance of all the others who are so concerned with this operation. This fraud would be a misfortune for the excluded candidates; but the effect for the republic would be the same as if the outcome of the lottery had been faithful: for there would nevertheless be the advantage of election, the troubles of interregnums and the dangers of heredity would nevertheless be prevented; the candidate whose ambition would seduce him to the point of having recourse to this fraud, would nevertheless, moreover, be otherwise a man of merit, capable, in the judgment of the nation, of wearing the crown with honor, and finally, even after this fraud, in order to take advantage of it he would not depend any less on the subsequent and formal selection of the Republic.

By this project, adopted in its entirety, everything is linked in the State, and no one from the lowest private individual up to the first Palatin sees any means for advancing except by the route of duty and public approval. The King alone, once elected, no longer seeing anything but the laws above him, has no other brake that restrains him, and since he no longer needs public approval, he can do without it without risk if his plans require it. For this I see only a single remedy which one must not even consider. This would be that the Crown be in some manner removable and that, at the end of definite periods, the Kings had to be confirmed. But, once again, this expedient cannot be proposed: keeping the throne and the State in a continuous agitation, it would never leave the administration in a solid enough position to be able to apply itself solely and usefully to the public good.

There was an ancient practice which has never been put into practice except among a single people, but it is surprising that its success has not tempted any other to imitate it. It is true that it is hardly suited to anything but an elective kingdom, although it was invented and practiced in an heredity kingdom. I am speaking about the judgment of the Kings of Egypt after their death, and of the decree by which the royal tomb and honors were granted to them or refused, according to whether they had governed the State well or badly during their lives. The indifference of the moderns about all moral objects and about everything that can give resilience to souls will doubtless make them regard the idea of reestablishing this custom for the kings of Poland as a folly, and I would not like to attempt to have it adopted by the French, by philosophers, but I believe that it can be proposed to Poles. I even dare to put it forward that among them this establishment would have some great advantages which it is impossible to replace in any other manner, and not a single inconvenience. In the present object, one sees that it is not possible that the integrity of an inevitable judgment would not impose on the King—aside from a soul that is vile and insensible to the honor of its memory—and put a brake upon his passions, greater or lesser I admit, but always capable of restraining them up to a certain point; especially if one joined to it the interest of his children whose fate will be decided by the decree issued about the father's memory.

Thus, after the death of each King, I would like his body to be laid aside in a suitable place until judgment has been pronounced on his memory; the tribunal that must decide it and bestow his burial to be assembled as early as possible; his life and his reign to be examined severely there; and after investigations into which every citizen would be allowed to accuse and defend him, for the well-informed trial to be followed by a decree issued with all possible solemnity.

In consequence of this decree, if it were favorable, the deceased King would be declared a good and just Prince, his name inscribed with honor in the list of the Kings of Poland, his body put with pomp into their tomb, the epithet of *glorious memory* added to his name in all public acts and speeches, a dower assigned to his widow, and his children, declared Princes royal, would be honored during their life with all the advantages attached to this title.

If, on the contrary, he were found guilty of injustice, of violence, of embezzlement, and above all of having made an attempt against public freedom, his memory would be condemned and stigmatized, his body, deprived of royal burial, would be buried without honors like that of a private individual, his name removed from the public record of kings; and his children, deprived of the title of Princes royal and of the prerogative that are attached to it, would return into the class of simple citizens without any distinction either honorable or stigmatized.

I would like this judgment to be made with the greatest display, but to precede, if possible, the election of his successor, so that the influence of the latter could not affect the sentence whose severity he would have an interest in softening. I know that it would be desirable to have more time to unveil hidden truths well, and inform the trial better. But I would be afraid that, if one delayed until after the election, this important act might soon become only a vain ceremony, and, as it infallibly would happen in a hereditary kingdom, more of a funeral oration for the dead King than a just and severe judgment about his conduct. It would be better in these circumstances to give more to public voice and lose some particular pieces of enlightenment in order to preserve the integrity and austerity of a judgment that would otherwise become useless.

With regard to the tribunal that would pronounce this sentence, I would like it to be neither the Senate, nor the Diet, nor any body vested with any authority in the government, but an entire order of Citizens, who could not be easily either fooled or corrupted. It appears to me that the *Cives electi,* better informed, more experienced than the *Servants of the State,* and less self-interested than the *Guardians of the Laws* already too close to the throne, would be precisely the intermediate body in which one would find the most enlightenment and integrity at the same time, the most suited to issue only reliable judgments, and hence preferable to the two others on this occasion. Even if it happened that this body was not numerous enough for a judgment of this importance, I would prefer that it be given adjuncts drawn from the Servants of the State rather than from the Guardians of the laws. Finally I would not like this tribunal to be presided over by any man in office, but by a Marshal drawn from its body and whom it would elect itself like those of the Diets and the Confederations: so necessary would it be to prevent any private interest from having any influence over this act, which can become very august or very ridiculous, in accordance with the manner in which it proceeded.

In concluding this point about the election and judgment of the Kings, I must say here that one thing in your customs appeared very shocking to me and very contrary to the spirit of your constitution; that is to see it almost overturned and annihilated upon the death of the King to the point of suspending and closing all the law courts, as if this constitution depended so much on this Prince, that the death of the one was the destruction of the other. Oh my god! it ought to be exactly the opposite. The King being dead, everything ought to go on as if he were still alive; one ought hardly to notice that one piece of the machine is missing, so unessential to its solidity was this piece. Fortunately nothing depends upon this inconsistency. One only has to say that it will not exist any longer, and nothing else must be changed: but this strange contradiction must not be allowed to continue to exist: for if it already is a contradiction in the present constitution, it would be an even much greater one after the reform.

[XV] Conclusion.

There is my plan sufficiently sketched out: I stop. Whichever is adopted, one should not forget what I have said in the *Social Contract* about the state of weakness and anarchy in which a nation finds itself while it is establishing or reforming its constitution.[62] In this moment of disorder and effervescence it is in no condition to give any resistance and the slightest shock is capable of overturning everything. Thus it is important at all cost to arrange for oneself an interval of tranquillity during which one can act upon oneself without risk and rejuvenate one's constitution. Although the changes to make in yours might not be fundamental and do not appear extremely large, they are sufficient to require this precaution, and a certain amount of time is necessary for the effect of the best reform to be felt and for it to take on the consistency that ought to be its fruit. One can consider the enterprise at issue only by assuming that the success will respond to the courage of the Confederates and the justice of their cause. You will never be free as long as a single Russian soldier remains in Poland, and you will always be menaced with ceasing to be free as long as Russia meddles in your business. But if you succeed in forcing it to treat with you as one Power to another Power and no longer as protector and protected, then take advantage of the exhaustion into which the war with Turkey will have cast it to finish your work before it can disturb it. Although I do not attribute any importance to the safety one procures for oneself externally by treaties, this unique circumstance will perhaps force you to lean as much as possible on this support, if only to know the present disposition of those who are dealing with you. But aside from this case and, perhaps at other times some commercial treaties, do not wear yourself out with vain negotiations, do not ruin yourselves as Ambassadors and ministers in other courts, and do not regard alliances and treaties as anything at all. All this is useless with the Christian powers. They do not know any other bonds than those of their self-interest; when they find it in fulfilling their engagements they will fulfill them; when they find it in breaking them, they will break them; it would be just as worthwhile not to make any. Still, if this interest were always true, the knowledge of what it is appropriate for them to do could make one foresee what they will do. But it is almost never reason of State that guides them, it is the momentary interest of a Minister, of a mistress, of a favorite; it is the motive that no human wisdom has been able to foresee that determines them sometimes for, sometimes against their true interests. What can one be sure of with people who have no fixed system and who conduct themselves only by chance impulses? Nothing is more frivolous than the political science of Courts: since it has no sure principle, one cannot draw any certain conclusions from it; and all this fine doctrine of the interests of Princes is child's play which makes sensible men laugh.

Do not depend, then, with confidence either upon your allies or upon your neighbors. You have only one upon whom you can count a little. That is the Sultan of Turkey, and you ought not to spare anything to make him into a supporter: not that his maxims of State are much more reliable than those of the other powers. There everything equally depends upon a Vizier, upon a Favorite, upon a Seraglio intrigue: but the interest of the Porte is clear, simple, everything is at issue for it, and generally it reigns there with much less enlightenment and subtlety, more uprightness and good sense. With it, as contrasted with the Christian Powers, one has at least the additional advantage that it likes to fulfill its engagements, and ordinarily respects treaties. You should attempt to make one with it for twenty years, as strong, as clear as possible. As long as another power hides its plans, this treaty will be the best, perhaps the only guarantee that you can have, and in the condition in which the present war will in all likelihood leave Russia, I estimate that it can be enough for you to undertake your work with safety; all the more so since the common interest of the powers of Europe and especially of your other neighbors, is to leave you always as a barrier between them and the Russians, and that by dint of changing follies, they must necessarily be wise at least sometimes.

One thing makes me believe that generally they will see you laboring upon the reform of your constitution without jealousy. That is that this work tends only to the strengthening of the legislation, consequently freedom, and that this freedom passes in all courts for a mania of visionaries, which tends more to weaken than to reinforce a State. This is why France has always favored the freedom of the Germanic body and of Holland, and today this is why Russia favors the current government of Sweden, and blocks the King's plans with all its force. All these great Ministers who, judging men in general based on themselves and those who surround them, believe they know them, are very far from imagining what resilience the love of the fatherland and the impulse of virtue can give to free souls. No matter how often they are the dupes of the low opinion they have of republics and find a resistance they did not expect there in all their undertakings, they will never reconsider a prejudice founded on the disdain of which they feel themselves to be worthy and based on which they appraise the human race. In spite of the rather striking experience that the Russians just had in Poland, nothing will make them change their opinion. They will always regard free men as they themselves must be regarded, that is to say as worthless men upon whom only two instruments have any grasp, namely money and the Knout. If they see, then, that the Republic of Poland, instead of applying itself to refilling its coffers, to swelling its finances, to raising many regular troops, is, on the contrary, considering dismissing its army and doing without money, they will believe that it is laboring to weaken itself, and persuaded that all they have to do in order to conquer it is to show up when they want to, they will let it regulate itself completely at its ease, while making fun of its labor among themselves. And one must agree that the state of freedom deprives a people of offensive force, and that by following the plan that I am proposing one ought to renounce every hope of conquest. But, in twenty years when your work is done, let the Russians attempt to invade you, and they will learn what soldiers these men of peace are for the defense of their households who do not know how to attack those of other peoples and who have forgotten the value of money.

Besides, when you are freed from these cruel guests, keep yourself from taking any half measures with regard to the King they wanted to give you. You must either have his head cut off as he deserves; or, without regard to his first election which is completely null and void, elect him anew with other *Pacta conventa* by which you will make him renounce the naming of high positions. This second decision is not only more humane, but also wiser; I find in it even a certain generous pride which perhaps will mortify the Court of Petersburg as much as if you held another election. Poniatowski[63] was doubtless very criminal; perhaps today he is no longer anything but wretched; at least in the present situation, he appears to me to be conducting himself rather as he ought to do by not meddling in anything at all. Naturally at the bottom of his heart he must ardently desire the expulsion of his harsh masters. Perhaps there would be a patriotic heroism in uniting with the Confederates in order to drive them out; but one knows very well that Poniatowski is not a hero. Moreover, aside from the fact that he would not be allowed to act and he is constantly under surveillance, owing everything to Russia, I declare frankly that if I were in his place, I should not want to be capable of that heroism for anything in the world.

I know very well that this is not the King you need when your reform is completed; but perhaps it is the one you need in order to make it tranquilly. If he lives for only eight or ten years, since your machine will have begun to go by then, and several Palatinates will already be filled by *Guardians of the laws,* you will not have to be afraid of giving him a successor who resembles him: but for myself I am afraid that by simply removing him from office you will not know what to do with him and you might expose yourself to new troubles.

Nevertheless, from whatever perplexity his free election might be able to free you, you should consider it only after you are completely sure of his genuine dispositions, and on the assumption that he still has some good sense, some sense of honor, some love for his country, some knowledge of his true interests, and some desire to follow them: for at all times and above all in the sad situation in which Poland's misfortunes is going to leave it, there would be nothing more fatal for it than to have a traitor at the head of the Government.

As to the manner of broaching the work in question, I have no taste for all the subtleties that are being proposed to you for taking by surprise and in some manner tricking the Nation about the changes that are to be made in its laws. I would only be of the opinion that in showing the full extent of your plan, you not begin its execution abruptly by filling the republic with malcontents, that you leave in office the majority of those who are there, confer employments in accordance with the new reform only as they become vacant. Never shake the machine too abruptly. I have no doubt at all that a good plan once adopted will change the mind even of those who have a share in the Government under a different plan.

Since it is impossible to create new citizens at a stroke it is necessary to begin by making use of the ones who exist and to offer a new path for their ambition is the means for giving them the disposition to follow it.

But if, in spite of the courage and the constancy of the Confederates and in spite of the justice of their cause, fortune and all the powers abandon them and give the fatherland over to its oppressors. . . . But I do not have the honor of being a Pole; and, in a situation similar to the one in which you are, one is allowed to give advice only by means of his example.

I have just fulfilled, and God grant that this be with as much success as ardor, in accordance with the extent of my forces, the task that Count Wielhorski has imposed on me. Perhaps all this is only a heap of chimeras, but they are my ideas; it is not my fault if they resemble those of other men so little, and it was not up to me to organize my head in a different fashion. I even admit that however peculiar one might find them, I myself see nothing in them except what is well adapted to the human heart, what is good, what is practicable, especially in Poland, having applied myself in my views to follow the spirit of that Republic, and to propose as few changes in it as I could in order to correct its defects. It seems to me that a Government set up on similar springs ought to proceed to its true goal as directly, as surely, for as long as possible, not being unaware, in addition, that all the works of men are as imperfect, transitory, and perishable as they are.

I have omitted on purpose many very important items about which I did not feel myself to have sufficient enlightenment to judge them well. I leave this care to men more enlightened and wiser than I am; and I put an end to this long hodgepodge by making my excuses to Count Wielhorski for having occupied him with it for so long. Although I think differently than other men do, I do not flatter myself with being wiser than they are, nor that he will find in my reveries anything that can be really useful to his fatherland; but my wishes for its prosperity are too true, too pure, too disinterested for my zeal to be increased by pride at having contributed to it. May it be able to triumph over its enemies, become and remain peaceful, happy, and free, give a great example to the universe, and, taking advantage of the patriotic labors of Count Wielhorski, to find and form in her bosom many Citizens who resemble him!

Notes

Collected Writings	Jean-Jacques Rousseau. *Collected Writings of Rousseau,* Volumes I–X. Edited by Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1991–.
Emile	Jean-Jacques Rousseau. *Emile; or, On Education.* Edited by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books, 1979.
Pléiade	Jean-Jacques Rousseau. *Oeuvres complètes,* Volumes 1–5. Paris. NRF-Editions de la Pléiade, 1959–1995.
Voltaire	Voltaire. *Mélanges.* NRF-Editions de la Pléiade, 1961.

INTRODUCTION

1. See 51 below.

2. See 60 below.

3. *Confessions,* Book VI, *Collected Writings,* V, 201.

4. *Collected Writings,* IV, 162.

5. For a very useful treatment of *Considerations on the Government of Poland* that compares Rousseau's analysis to that of Montesquieu, see Anne M. Cohler, *Rousseau and Nationalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

6. See 169 below.

7. *Collected Writings,* IX, 239.

8. See 170 below.

9. *Collected Writings,* IV, 188.

10. On this issue, see Richard Fralin, *Rousseau and Representation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978).

11. See 171 below.

12. See 99 below.

13. See 2 below.

14. For a contrary view, with a correspondingly different account of international relations than the one that will be developed below, see Grace G. Roosevelt, *Reading Rousseau in the Nuclear Age* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).

15. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan,* Part 1, Chapter XIV.

16. See 153 below.

17. See 211 below.

18. *Collected Writings,* III, 75.

19. See, for example, 139–140 and 209–216 below.

20. See 153 below.

21. *Emile* (Bloom ed.), 344–354.

22. Rousseau's most extended accounts of amour propre can be found in the *Second Discourse* (*Collected Writings,* III, 91–92) and *Dialogues* (*Collected Writings,* I, 9–10).

23. See 154 below.

24. *Collected Writings,* III, 155.

25. See 179 below.

26. On this point, see Pierre Hassner, "Rousseau and the Theory and Practice of International Relations," in Clifford Orwin and Nathan Tarcov, eds., *The Legacy of Rousseau* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 200–219; see esp. 207–210.

27. See 223–230 below.

28. *Collected Writings,* IV, 161.

29. See 174 below.

30. See 237 below.

31. See 57–60 below.

32. See 109 below.

33. See 62 below.

34. For an excellent account of Rousseau's analysis and the ambiguities of his position, see Hassner, "Rousseau and the Theory and Practice of International Relations."

35. See 53 below.

36. *Collected Writings,* V, 342. Rousseau quickly decided that even this project would be too dangerous for him to execute.

37. See 91–92 below.

38. See 170 below.

UNIVERSAL CHRONOLOGY OR GENERAL HISTORY OF TIMES

1. Rousseau is paraphrasing a remark by François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon, archbishop of Cambrai (1651–1715), the author of the novel *Telemachus.*

2. Rousseau's quotations are from Charles Rollin (1661–1741), *Histoire ancienne* (Paris, 1730–38).

3. Rousseau's footnote follows Rollin in citing *De Haruspicum Responsis,* chap. XIX, but the quotation is from chap. IX.

4. In the *Confessions* (*Collected Writings,* V, 194) Rousseau mentions reading *Conversations on the Sciences* by Father Bernard Lamy (1640–1715).

5. The *Treatise on Opinion* is by Gilbert-Charles Le Gendre, marquis de Saint-Aubin (1688–1746).

6. Rousseau is quoting the *History of Empires and Republics from the Flood until Jesus Christ* by the abbé Claude-Marie Guyon.

7. The manuscript ends here.

ON WEALTH AND FRAGMENTS ON TASTE

1. Chrysophile is "lover of gold." Rousseau also spells it "Chrisophile."

2. Suetonius, *Life of the Twelve Caesars,* "Titus," viii.2.

3. Aristippus (433–350 B.C.) is known for recommending seeking pleasure and flattering tyrants, while Diogenes (413–327) is known for his austerity.

4. Leibniz (1646–1716) and John Law (1671–1729) the Scot who was controller general of French finances. Law's policies led to a complete financial collapse.

5. Compare *Collected Writings,* III, 37–38.

6. This same quotation from Favorinus (second century A.D.) is also in Book II of *Emile* (Bloom ed., 81).

7. This can also mean "stupid person." Compare with the "Letter from Voltaire," *Collected Writings,* III, 102.

FRAGMENTS OF A HISTORY OF THE VALAIS

1. The Valais is a Swiss canton in the upper Rhone valley.

2. At this point in the manuscript a word is crossed out, but not replaced.

3. Rousseau now skips the number 11.

4. The remaining two items are written in the handwriting of someone other than Rousseau.

5. Until fairly recently, the Valais and other areas of Switzerland had unusually high rates of cretinism, presumably caused by iodine deficiency. In Diderot's *Encyclopédie* an article described the cretins in terms that call to mind Rousseau's accounts of natural goodness.

ON THE WRITINGS OF THE ABBÉ DE SAINT-PIERRE

1. Jean-François de Bastide (1724–1798) was the founder of numerous periodicals. In the *Confessions* Rousseau says that he gave him the manuscript of the *Plan for Perpetual Peace* only after considerable badgering (*Collected Writings,* V, 458–459). The publication led to some battles between Rousseau and the censors.

2. Charles-Nicolas Cochin was a well-known engraver who produced the frontispiece for one of the early editions of Rousseau's *Julie.*

3. Jean-Baptiste Pigalle (1714–1785) was a famous sculptor. In the *First Discourse* Rousseau calls him the "rival of Praxiteles and Phidias" (*Collected Writings,* II, 16) but indicates that the corruption of contemporary taste has caused him to waste his talent.

4. Prior to the French Revolution the title of *Monsieur* was not given to everyone. Rousseau declined to accept such a mark of distinction.

5. This epigraph, which is not in the manuscript, is from Lucan, *Pharsalia,* I, 60: "May the human race consult with itself, all weapons being laid down, and in turn may peoples all love one another."

6. The rough draft adds the following paragraphs:

> But before entering on that in greater detail in relation to us let us go back to some general principles which can enlighten us better on the state of our ills and on the (remedies of which they are susceptible) means of remedying them.
>
> In order to remove the contradiction that I just noted there is no form of government more advantageous than the confederative because it (removes

the disunion of States) unites peoples with ties similar to those which unite the individuals it comprehends.

7. The manuscript reads, “uniformity.”

8. In fact this was done by Caracalla, not Claudius, in 223.

9. The codes of Theodosius and Justinian date from 438 and 534 A.D. respectively.

10. Rousseau is referring to Turkey.

11. The manuscript reads, “this sect,” instead of “Christianity.” Both Bastide and Rousseau’s friend Charles Duclos objected strongly to the use of the term “sect” to describe Christianity. Rousseau wrote back, accepting the change, “I very much approve M. Duclos’s change. It is very apparent that the public would not take the word *sect* in the sense in which I had used it. Moreover this sense might be against the accepted use of the word, but it is not against my principles.”

12. The final sentence of this note does not appear in any of the editions prepared during Rousseau’s life. It was added in the 1782 edition. Bartholus (1314–1357) was an Italian jurist who wrote a commentary of the Code of Justinian.

13. The manuscript reads, “perhaps there would not be a single Prince in Europe who would not have to give back everything he has.” This softening of the passage was probably made at Bastide’s suggestion.

14. The rough draft continues, “until they believe they are in a condition to make the balance tip toward them, and then they no longer speak about it.”

15. The rough draft reads, “interests” rather than “intentions.”

16. The rough draft adds, “secretly.”

17. In the place of the rest of this sentence, the rough draft reads, “one would prove that the treaty of Westphalia is today even the support of a certain prince who does not think about it and who never became entangled with the empire.”

18. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) ended the Thirty Years’ War and settled the borders of much of Europe.

19. The rough draft adds, “from which it follows that they are less in a condition to subjugate them.”

20. In the *Dialogues* Rousseau reproduces this footnote, saying that he wrote the note in 1760 and the text in 1756, prior to the English victory in the Seven Years’ War.

21. In the rough draft up to this point this paragraph reads, “From what I have just established it follows that the powers of Europe are in precisely the necessary relation among themselves for the solidity of a confederative society. For in order (to form) for a confederation to be good and durable it is necessary for all the members to find themselves in such a mutual dependence that none be in a condition to resist all the others by itself and that particular associations harmful to the great one encounter there all the obstacles that can impede its execution.”

22. The rough draft adds the following paragraph:

> That posited I say that, once signed, ratified, and established, the Confederation of which the five articles are the basis, is sufficient to give a perfect security for the execution of past and future treaties and to give unalterable peace both outside and inside the European States.

23. In the manuscript this list is in the following order:
The Emperor of the Romans.
The Emperor of Russia.
The King of France.
The King of Spain.
The King of England.
The King of Denmark.
The King of Prussia.
The King of Portugal.
The King of Sardinia.
The King of Naples.
Sweden.
Poland.
The Sovereign of Rome.
The Elector of Bavaria and his Co-associates.
The Palatine Elector and his Co-associates.
The Ecclesiastical Electors and their Co-associates.
The Republic of Venice and its Co-associates.
The Estates General.
The Swiss and their Co-associates.

24. Joint vote.

25. At this point the manuscript proceeds, "unless its undertaking being at bottom more favorable than contrary to the common interest, the author hardly has to fear the entire body would want to act against it in earnest."

26. The manuscript reads, "so gentle power of expanding at the expense of his neighbors." The conclusion of this was restored in the 1782 edition.

27. The manuscript continues, "those ancient pretensions which draw their value from their obscurity, because one extends them along with one's fortune; you are making them renounce."

28. The manuscript reads, "painful privations" and the 1782 edition reads, "cruel privations."

29. The censor demanded that "I would not dare respond" be replaced by "I would dare respond." Rousseau objected, writing to Bastide, "I absolutely cannot say *I would dare* considering that it is not true that I would dare. But I propose an accommodation to you on that word: that *I would not dare* be left in the text and that one put *I would dare* in the errata. The text will be my thought; the errata that of the Censor." In the end Bastide left the text as Rousseau wished without errata. It is clear that the "accommodation" suggested by Rousseau would have aggravated precisely the implication objected to by the censor by calling special attention to the passage.

30. The manuscript reads, "are or ought to be."

31. The manuscript reads, "Let us leave to Makers of Harangues these speeches which have covered the Author and his projects with an ineffaceable ridicule in the chambers of Ministers." The edition of 1782 restores, "Let us leave to Makers of Harangues."

32. The manuscript reads, "this ferocious advantage."

33. The manuscript reads, "at the end of several generations."

34. The manuscript reads, "one must not speak reasonably at all with madmen, but stifle them as one's only answer."

35. The manuscript reads, "to acquire" (*acquérir*) rather than "to harden" (*aguerrir*).

36. The manuscript reads, "will."

37. Rousseau first wrote, "all change (changes) to new plans for government that, even if everything combined to favor them, whoever took it into his head to propose them will still pass for a visionary who must be."

38. Voltaire constructs a variety of comical adjectival forms out of Europe.

39. Narsingue is in Asia, but it has been suggested that Voltaire is making fun of Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698–1759).

40. The first edition reads, "his honorarium from the product of the seventy-three journals which are sold on the banks of the stream of the Seine."

41. Tien is sometimes considered as the principle of being and sometimes as heaven. It was sometimes identified with God by Christian missionaries to China.

42. Rousseau originally wrote, "this great man," and then "this beautiful soul."

43. Rousseau first wrote, "power."

44. Rousseau originally wrote, "to blind itself about the means for satisfying it and the passions go less directly to their goal when they tend toward it with the most ardor."

45. The edition of 1782 erroneously reads, "the government of each State is not any less settled by the European diet than by its boundaries." Rousseau had first written, "for one feels very well that (the boundaries) each State is not any less settled as to its government than by its limits."

46. Rousseau originally added, "so that one can hardly imagine any joy more idiotic than the one inspired."

47. Rousseau is referring to the unsuccessful attempt to legislate against dueling. He discusses this at detail in the *Letter to d'Alembert* (*Collected Writings,* X, 300–305).

48. The next sentence originally read, "An establishment of this importance which requires an almost unanimous agreement of so many sovereigns assumes in all of them dominant intentions that are related to the common interest, but it is almost impossible."

49. Henri IV (1553–1610 and Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully (1560–1641).

50. Rousseau originally wrote, "Henri the great."

51. Rousseau originally wrote, "the infernal mystery must be left in the shadows that suit it." The event is the assassination of Henri IV.

52. Rousseau first wrote, "Let us assume this great body established in accordance with the best form, it remains to know if it could endure, I mean endure like all other human institutions all subject to abuse and to perishing."

53. Rousseau originally added, "and the goodness."

54. Rousseau originally wrote, "human institutions, and I congratulate myself."

55. Rousseau originally wrote, "for him to devour them." He also uses this image in the *Social Contract,* I.iv (*Collected Writings,* IV, 134).

56. Rousseau first wrote, "devastated countryside, peoples in despair without refuge and without bread, I hear moaning similar to the howling of wolves, what tumult, what frightful cries pierce the skies! I approach, I see a battlefield, ten thousand slaughtered; crowds of dying crushed under the hooves of horses, everything the (horrible) image of death and agony. That then is the fruit of those peaceful institutions that banish pity."

57. Rousseau first wrote, "without having their advantages, and to whichever of the two he gives preference, his precautions are inadequate for maintaining himself there."

58. Rousseau originally wrote, "As to this fine name of the right of nations, about which so much commotion is made." Both here and in the text the term translated as "right of nations" is *droit de gens.* This could also be translated as "international law" or "law of peoples."

59. This sentence is incomplete and stops at this point at the end of a page. The next four paragraphs, set in brackets here, are crossed out in the manuscript.

60. Hobbes makes the derivation of the war of everyone against everyone from the right to everything in *De Cive,* I, x.

61. Rousseau makes the same claim in the *Second Discourse* (*Collected Writings,* III, 21–22).

62. This is the subject of Rousseau's *First Discourse.*

63. Rousseau contrasts the bourgeois with the citizen and the natural man in Book I of *Emile* (Bloom ed., 40–41).

64. Rousseau originally added, "There is the true progression of nature."

65. Rousseau originally wrote, "private individuals."

66. Louis IX outlawed private wars in France in the thirteenth century.

67. Rousseau originally wrote, "exempt (for observation) of the laws, he lives like his peers."

68. Reading "on ait pris" instead of "ont ait" as is found in Pléiade, II, 695.

69. According to legend, Minos, king of Crete, required the Athenians to send young men and women to be killed by the Minotaur. Theseus ended this practice by killing the Minotaur.

70. See Plutarch, *Life of Fabius.*

71. Aristodemus required that they bring up their sons as if they were girls.

72. For a reference to this, see above, 69.

73. Rousseau originally wrote, "at least as much as possible by (depriving it of) attacking its subjects, its goods, and its territory. I do not add its freedom because to deprive it of that is to destroy it (and that has already been said as I shall make seen in its place).

74. Plutarch states this, citing Aristotle as his authority, in his *Life of Lycurgus.*

75. The rough draft reads, "herd of cattle."

76. The manuscript reads, "human weakness" instead of "animal life."

77. The rough draft reads, "the choice of debauchery and idleness."

78. This expression could also be "the Emperor Augustus."

79. The manuscript draft reads, "He is named while they are obeyed."

80. In the rough draft Rousseau first wrote and then crossed out, "He sometimes knows whether he has money and Troops, whether he is at war or in peace; but whether his officers are honest and moderate, whether his subjects are happy and governed justly, this is what it is impossible for him to know." Then he wrote, "He never [knows] anything about what is being done but only what they want to tell him; and his court is never shared except by two sorts of men: people in positions who tell him what suits them and aspirants who do not dare to say anything that." The sentence is incomplete and the draft continues, "When a single man burdens himself with more business than a single man can do, he must necessarily sacrifice some to others; then guided by that puerile vanity that nourishes human greatness, he takes for himself display and vain ceremonies, and leaves the fate of his Peoples to the discretion of his subordinates."

81. The rough draft reads, "some great genius."

82. The rough draft reads, "Heirs to the throne whom one usually has raised by Priests."

83. Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619–1683) was Louis XIV's prime minister and François-Michel Le Tellier, marquis de Louvois (1641–1691) was his minister of war. They were great rivals as well as having divided responsibilities.

84. The rough draft reads, "great Fénelon." On Fénelon see 242, n. 1 above. His pupil was the duc de Bourgogne.

85. In the draft this sentence begins, "It is certain that each of these forms has its inconveniences and its advantages, and it is only by comparing each to the others that one can be certain of the one that deserves preference."

86. See the discussion in Rousseau's *Judgment,* 93 below.

87. The rough draft reads, "a good Minister."

88. The rough draft reads, "a great General."

89. The rough draft reads, "this new order." The term translated as "public order" here and elsewhere is *police.*

90. The rough draft reads, "distinguish themselves by their integrity, by their talents, by their application to business."

91. The rough draft reads, "form of precaution from that of reality." Precaution, here, could mean something comparable to euphemism.

92. This sentence occurs in neither the draft nor the manuscript, nor the first edition. Rousseau indicated that it should be inserted in later editions. In the edition of 1782 it was put at the end of the preceding paragraph. Modern editors are in agreement in putting it here.

93. On Rosni, or Rosny, see the note on Sully, n. 49 above.

94. This event is discussed in Book 8 of Sully's *Mémoires.*

95. The word translated as "substitutions" is *suppléments.*

96. The rough draft reads, "extinguishes itself in the end like a lamp that one has never (whose wick one constantly makes longer without ever renewing the oil).

97. The manuscript could also be read as saying, "these."

98. Rousseau first wrote, "did not lack delicacy and energy."

99. In the manuscript this sentence begins, "In fact it would be difficult to imagine that in forming and meditating upon an administration as wise as the

one he proposes (very wise in many respects) he did not notice the vices (the ridiculous things) of the one he honored with the same name and which he in appearance authorized (of the same name even though it was called then) but that was being called."

100. See note 94 to the *Polysynody.*

101. In the *Confessions* Rousseau asserts that the public outrage against his *Letter on French Music* was so great that it distracted attention from a serious political crisis and "perhaps prevented a revolution in the State" (*Collected Writings,* V, 323). For an excellent discussion of this affair, see Robert Wokler, "Rousseau on Rameau and Revolution," *Studies in the Eighteenth Century* 4 (1979): 251–283.

102. In the manuscript Rousseau first began the following paragraph with the following sentence: "That is what should first have been considered in relation to times and places. Let us move to the observations about the nature of things (let us pass to the thing itself)." He then crossed it out and put it at the end of the paragraph, only to cross it out again.

103. The Pléiade mistakenly reads "sonder" instead of "fonder" as is found in other editions.

104. The rough draft reads, "The Prince would never attend Councils without having already having (being already decided) made up his mind about everything to be debated there, or would never leave them without consulting again in his Chambers and with his favorites about the resolutions that had been passed. In the end, the councils would necessarily have to become (useless) contemptible, ridiculous, and totally useless or Kings would have to lose their (authority) power. What is at issue, then, for establishing a genuine polysynody? (Nothing other than) To persuade Kings that everything goes badly when they do everything according to their whim, that it is better for their peoples and for themselves that their will be more enlightened and less absolute and that they would be more (wise, great, and happy) powerful if they were a little less the masters. Now since one never speaks to (Kings) Princes about their affairs except by means of the mouth of their ministers, it is by means of them that one must do this: persuade this new maxim [*sic*]. Let one judge (whether it was reasonable) (about what could happen) of the success that (the Abbé de St. Pierre could hope) the Polysynody could have."

In the margin Rousseau wrote, "He uses great machines to produce some small effects by overturning so to speak the whole constitution of the State in order to (establish) some vain deliberations without force and without authority that the (women) favorites and women will render null whenever they want to."

105. In the rough draft this paragraph ends with the following sentence: "I am afraid that the execution of this fine project could be found to be simultaneously very possible and hardly profitable."

106. On the *Pacta Conventa,* see *Considerations on the Government of Poland,* 000 below.

107. "The one who rules is king." See Fragments, 000 below.

108. See *Social Contract,* Book III, Chapter 5 for the distinction between sovereignty and government. This footnote was obviously added after the completion of the *Social Contract.*

109. The manuscript reads, "his," while the sense seems to require "these."

110. The italicized sections in these fragments are direct quotations from the Abbé de Saint-Pierre.

111. Rousseau first wrote and then crossed out, "Hannibal." He also wrote and crossed out, "Thus not only does he propose to men and to Frenchmen the example of the Romans."

112. In the margin next to this passage Rousseau wrote "how much (it is to waste one's time) the vain seeking after durable forms for a state of things that always depends on the will of one man."

113. Rousseau first wrote, "the interest of the Prince and that of the State."

114. The words in parentheses are omitted by Rousseau.

115. Rousseau has condensed this passage and changed a few words from the original.

116. Rousseau has slightly altered the quotation.

117. Rousseau originally began this remark, "But entirely on the contrary it happens that only the small number knows how to keep from becoming impatient in a reading in which one proceeds in an orderly fashion."

118. Diderot's *Encyclopédie,* which ultimately employed many contributors including Rousseau, was originally meant to be a translation of an English encyclopedia written by Ephraim Chambers. Rousseau originally wrote, "Encyclopedia that Chambers had done by himself, without anyone blaming him for it and finding the enterprise reckless."

119. "The one who rules is king." See 98 above.

120. Rousseau first wrote, "one can have a very much superior mind and be nothing but a."

121. Rousseau first wrote, "it is up to the public."

122. Rousseau originally wrote, "can change anything that exists."

123. Rousseau originally wrote, "science."

124. Rousseau originally wrote, "secrets."

125. Rousseau originally added, "to which they serve as introduction. One should conclude from them, it seems to me, that because the things that are proposed in it have not at all been put into execution."

126. Rousseau originally added, "it remains to present them now to a more enlightened public than the one that disdained them, so that it might judge, after having read them, whether justice was done to them."

127. Rousseau originally wrote, "That is what I have not hesitated to do myself, as every private individual ought to."

128. "A friend of Plato, but a greater friend to the truth," a remark made by Aristotle, when disagreeing with his teacher.

129. Rousseau originally wrote, "simple and true"; he then added in the margin "upright," and then replaced it with "honest."

130. By Voltaire.

131. Rousseau originally wrote, "On Mme. de Talmont, thinking rather little but speaking with great precision."

132. Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657–1757) was one of the leading par-

ticipants in the so-called quarrel between the ancients and the moderns and wrote numerous works popularizing modern science and philosophy.

133. Aristarchus of Samothrace (third and second centuries B.C.) was a famous critic and editor. In breaking with Diderot, Rousseau referred to him as his Aristarchus (*Collected Writings,* X, 256).

134. Zenobia, a descendent of Cleopatra, was the queen of Palmyra in the third century A.D. It is said that she had sexual relations with her husband only for the sake of having children and stopped as soon as she became pregnant.

135. John Dryden (1631–1700) was poet laureate of England. Rousseau attacks the claim that men are big children in *Emile* (Bloom ed., 67).

136. Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban (1633–1707) was a famous military engineer.

137. Although the manuscript of this piece is not in Rousseau's handwriting, the marginal notes are.

138. In the margin Rousseau wrote, "an honor which did not keep him from making himself illustrious by himself as if he had needed to."

139. Rousseau added this sentence in the margin. Charles Marguetel de Saint-Denis, Seigneur de Saint-Evremond (1610–1703).

140. The *taille* was a tax that applied to all except the nobility, clergy, and a few other categories.

141. Unlike the preceding fragment, this one is in Rousseau's hand.

142. Rousseau originally added, "which was the only thing they attributed to him as a crime."

143. Rousseau originally wrote, "without which he preferred to be the martyr."

144. Antoine Furetière was dismissed from the Academy in 1685.

145. Rousseau originally wrote, "enemies, indignant at this ball."

146. Rousseau originally wrote, "men can never be half-way unjust, and in spite of oneself one is forced to hate those to whom one has done wrong."

147. Rousseau originally began this fragment, "I believe moreover that this event might be an example in history of something very singular and I do not believe that one finds any other example of a man who, for having preferred the present government under which he wrote to the one that preceded it (might be) received under this same government with impunity a public stigmatization for having preferred the present government to the one that had preceded it. An example . . ."

148. Rousseau originally added, "from which I conclude that in one manner or another the author is equally blameworthy and that his misfortune on this occasion ought to be turned into a reproach to him."

149. Luis Molina (1535–1600) was a Spanish Jesuit who gave a controversial defense of free will, opposing those who insisted that predestination opposed free will. The most prominent Catholic opponents of the Molinists were the Jansenists.

150. The parts of this fragment taken directly from Voltaire's *Age of Louis XIV* are in italics.

151. He actually died on April 29, 1743, at the age of eighty-five.

PLAN FOR A CONSTITUTION FOR CORSICA

1. Rousseau originally began, “If the Island of Corsica were entirely free and subject to its inhabitants alone, it could take advantage of its situation and of its advantages to put itself into a flourishing state and, following the example of the other powers of Italy, to form establishments which by industry, navy, and commerce, would make it cut a figure abroad.”

2. In one of the manuscripts Rousseau added the following as a note: “The Barbary pirates hardly harass the Corsicans at present because they know that there is nothing to gain with them, but as soon as the latter begin to carry on commerce and the exchange of merchandise they will rage. You will have them on your hands.”

3. Rousseau originally wrote, “The force of wealth (greatness) in the State consists solely in the number of its peoples. Money itself is only a means for having men.”

4. This memorandum was written by Mathieu Buttafoco who asked Rousseau to write this *Plan*.

5. The term translated as “county” is *pièves*.

6. In another version of this passage Rousseau wrote, “You should not hesitate at all to finish their work; while believing they are working for themselves they will be working for you. The means are the same only the end is very different: for that of the Genoese was to debase the nobility and ours is to ennoble the nation.”

7. It was the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle that put Corsica under Genoese control in 1748.

8. Land belonging to the community.

9. On this side and on that side of the mountains.

10. After this paragraph Rousseau originally wrote, “In order to arrive at this it is first necessary to know the national character of the people to govern and if it did not have one it would be necessary to give it one. Every man who does not wear, so to speak, the livery of his country in his soul cannot be a good citizen or a faithful subject and legislation does not consist in what all the laws in the world have in common, but in what they have that is different.”

11. This passage is from Terrasson’s translation of the *Universal History* by Diodorus Siculus.

12. In the manuscript, the footnote that occurs here comes after this paragraph. It is accompanied by the remark, “NB to place.”

13. In one of the manuscripts Rousseau wrote and crossed out, “Let us now see by what means one can render this fatal sign less necessary without harming. . . . The need of minted specie increases or decreases in a state to the extent that exchange becomes more or [less] necessary and government becomes more or less expensive. Thus without (commerce and without finances) business, private individuals would have no need of money and without public finances the State would not have any need for it either. (If private individuals had no business they would have no need for money. Remove business and exchanges, private individuals would have no need . . .)”

14. Rousseau first wrote, "Since no one (being able then) has any other interest in the trade of commodities from one province to another so that the necessities of these trades are always proportional to the need."

15. Reading "décourage" instead of "dérourage," which is found in Pléiade, III, 925.

16. Rousseau originally added here, "Since real abundance is the sole object of luxury, each will seek to distinguish himself by that luxury."

17. Rousseau was living at Môtiers at the time.

18. On *taille,* see n. 140, p. 25 above.

19. The vectigal was a payment of tribute.

20. For the story of Joseph, see *Genesis* 37:1.

21. Reading "ni" instead of "si" as in Pléiade, III, 916.

22. In the second century B.C. the Gracchi brothers sponsored controversial agrarian laws in Rome.

23. In the manuscript the following sentence follows but is crossed out, "They have never been able to make savages work because they do not desire anything. Europeans have never been able to attract them to their manner of living because they attach no importance to it."

24. Between this paragraph and the next one Rousseau wrote and circled the following, "from this mutual dependence which one believe to the bond of society is born all the vices that destroy it. —The English people does not love freedom by itself; it loves it because it produces money."

25. At this point in the manuscript occurs the following passage, circled, "It is then that it will be necessary to use the surplus on industry and the arts in order to attract from the foreigner what such a large people lacks for its subsistence. Also then will be born little by little the vices inseparable from these establishments and which—by degrees corrupting the nation in its tastes and in its principles—will finally corrupt and destroy the government. This evil is inevitable and since all human things must come to an end; it is fine that after a long and vigorous existence a state finish by excess of population."

26. Rousseau left a blank space where the amount would be.

27. Rousseau originally added, "because sermons do not make anyone act."

28. This quotation is the beginning of a proposal to reestablish the Corsican nobility.

29. The term used here is *Robins,* which has a derogatory connotation.

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND

1. One of the manuscripts reads, "virtues and vices."

2. One of the manuscripts reads, "and even a little those that border it."

3. One of the manuscripts reads "some reflections."

4. One of the manuscripts reads "continuously," and then substituted "mutually."

5. One of the manuscripts reads, "a thinking man."

6. One of the manuscripts reads, "preserved it."

7. One of the manuscripts reads, "institutions idle and frivolous."

8. On Moses, see the political fragments, *Collected Writings,* IV, 33–35.

9. One of the manuscripts adds, in pencil, "in the midst of his wars."

10. Note reads, "see the last chapter of the *Social Contract.*" See *Collected Writings,* IV, 216–224. This is, in fact, the penultimate chapter, followed by another of a single paragraph entitled, "Conclusion."

11. One of the manuscripts reads, "acclamations of the people."

12. Rousseau tells the same story in the *Second Discourse.* See *Collected Writings,* III, 57.

13. In one manuscript Rousseau added Italians to the list at this point.

14. One of the manuscripts reads, "patriotism and all the virtues that are inseparable from it to the highest degree of intensity they can have."

15. Confederations were assemblies of Polish nobleman that organized themselves in the midst of crises. Such a confederation met at the city of Bar in 1768 in favor of greater independence from Russia. One of the members of this confederation was Count Wielhorski who contacted Rousseau for advice about reform of the Polish government. The tradition of forming confederations is one of the features of Polish political life that was frequently criticized, but defended by Rousseau. See 205–206 below.

16. Rousseau is referring to Peter the Great who attempted to modernize Russia by making it more like western European countries like France.

17. *Patrie,* which we usually translate as "fatherland," is feminine in gender and, therefore, it is not uncommon to refer to it as a mother. We have translated it as "homeland" here to avoid confusion.

18. Where the fatherland is, there is the good. The statement, "Patria est ubicumque est bene" (The fatherland is wherever the good is) is from Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations,* V, 37.

19. One of the manuscripts reads, "The captive Kings were burdened with gold and precious stones, but they were chained: there is luxury well understood."

20. Reading "forme," instead of "force" as in Pléiade, III, 966. "Forme" occurs in all prior editions. In this we follow Gourevitch, *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings,* 313.

21. This is a play on words, since *licence* can mean either excessive freedom or an advanced degree.

22. One of the manuscripts read, "directed by foreign Priests."

23. Rousseau wrote and rejected two other titles for this chapter, "The State is too big. Remedy" and "Principal vice, remedy to be sought."

24. Rousseau originally gave this chapter the title "Sovereignty, where does it reside."

25. Rousseau originally entitled this chapter "On the Maintenance of the Constitution."

26. The *pacta conventa* was the set of laws that the king swore to uphold at his coronation.

27. See *Collected Writings,* IV, 186–188.

28. See 91–99 above.

29. The *liberum veto* gave every deputy the right to veto legislation in the Diet. In effect, it meant that every law had to be passed unanimously.

30. See *Collected Writings,* IV, 189–191.

31. One of the manuscripts reads, "All that is deduced very clearly from principles established in the *Social Contract.*" See *Collected Writings,* IV, 145–150.

32. The commissioners of Radom were Senators charged with overseeing state finances.

33. John Wilkes (1727–1797) was a controversial pamphleteer who was elected to the House of Commons a number of times and excluded by the House. In the *Letters Written from the Mountain* Rousseau makes a parallel between Wilkes and himself. See *Collected Writings,* IX, 289.

34. A Grod is essentially an electoral district.

35. The following paragraph is in one of the manuscripts, but not in the one sent to Count Wielhorski. It is also not in early editions. Pléiade includes it as a variant (Pléiade, III, 1769).

36. See *Collected Writings,* IV, 203–211.

37. One of the manuscripts adds, "where such great lords are."

38. One of the manuscripts reads, "This function which they neglect and they disdain."

39. One of the manuscripts reads, "If the King judged in person, he should doubtless have a Council, but I estimate that he would have the right to judge alone."

40. One of the manuscripts reads, "and to make the political machine proceed in accordance with its genuine destination."

41. Rousseau first wrote, "Authority of the Laws," and then changed this to "Particular causes of anarchy and remedies." He then struck out "and remedies."

42. One of the manuscripts reads, "The principal vice of the Polish constitution is that the legislation."

43. This Diet opened in October 1767 and was suspended in March 1768. The first law involved that statement that Poland was made up of three orders, the king, the Senate, and the equestrian order. Rousseau "corrects" this above, p. 184. The fifth required unanimity in the election of the king and excluded heredity. The ninth affirmed the unity of Poland as constituted at the time (including Lithuania). The eleventh guaranteed the equality of the members of the community having political prerogatives.

44. One of the manuscripts reads, "Far from abolishing them, regulate their form and effect in order to give them a legal sanction as much as is possible, without impeding either their formation or their activity. Once can fix the cases in which the Confederation can legitimately take place; there are even some by the mere occurrence of which, Poland ought to be immediately confederated."

45. Rousseau originally called this chapter "Details of Administration."

46. Following the early editions in reading *celles* rather than *celle* as in Pléiade, III, 1002. Gourevitch has noted this error in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings,* 315.

47. Pyrrhus (after whom the term Pyrrhic victory is named) defeated the Romans in the third century B.C. with heavy losses to his forces.

48. The starosties were lands belonging to the king.

49. In Geneva, the bourgeois or townsman were the class of foreigners who had been granted citizenship or children of citizens born abroad. They had most of the political rights of citizens. See *Collected Writings,* X, 242.

50. Montesquieu discusses this in *Spirit of the Laws,* XIII, xiv.

51. Rousseau had worked on such a survey in Savoy. See *Collected Writings,* V, 146.

52. One of the manuscripts reads, “State,” rather than “republic.”

53. One of the manuscripts reads, “republic,” rather than “State.”

54. We follow the early editions in reading “concevable” instead of “convenable” as is found in Pléiade, III, 1016. Gourevitch notes this error in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings,* 316.

55. See Tacitus, *Annals,* I, 42.

56. The following sentence is not in all the manuscripts, but occurs in most editions.

57. The early editions read “*excellât,*” rather than “*s’exercât*” as in Pléiade, III, 1017. Gourevitch notes this error in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings,* 316.

58. Hope of the Fatherland.

59. Guardian of the law.

60. See 180 above.

61. Following our normal practice we have translated *politiques* as “political thinkers,” but it should be noted that the meaning can range from politicians to political theorists.

62. See *Collected Writings,* IV, 161–162.

63. The king, Stanislas-August Poniatowski (1732–1795), was dependent on the Russians and opposed by the Confederation of Bar.

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