



THE NOTEBOOKS

VOLUME I

SIMONE WEIL

Commencement du livre. Le livre qui contenait ces pensées et beaucoup d'autres;

Il entra dans ma chambre et dit: "Maiséable, qui ne comprend rien, qui ne sait rien. Viens avec moi et je t'enseignerai des choses dont tu ne te souciais pas." Je le suivis.

Il m'emmena dans une église. Elle était neuve et laide. Il me conduisit ~~par~~ en face de l'autel et me dit: "À genouilles - toi". Je lui dis "Je n'ai pas été baptisé". Il me dit "Tombe à genoux devant ce Dieu ~~non~~ avec amour, comme devant le Dieu où existe la vérité." J'obéis.

Il me fit sortir et monter jusqu'à une mansarde d'où l'on voyait par la fenêtre ouverte toute la ville, quelques échafaudages de bois, à l'heure où on déchargeait des bateaux. Il n'y avait dans la mansarde qu'une table et deux chaises. Il me fit asseoir.

Nous étions seuls. Il parla parfois jusqu'à un entrain, se mêlant à la conversation, puis partait.

Ce n'était plus l'hiver. Ce n'était pas encore le printemps. Les branches des arbres étaient nues, sans bourgeons, dans un air froid et plein de soleil.

La lumière montait, ne paraissait diminuer, puis les étoiles et la lune entraient par la fenêtre. Puis de nouveau l'aurore montait.

THE NOTEBOOKS
OF
SIMONE WEIL

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH
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THE NOTEBOOKS

THERE are certain things which cause no suffering whatever by themselves, but make us suffer as *signs*. Signs of what? Of a state of things which, *by itself*, only rarely (or never?) makes us suffer, being too abstract by itself to constitute a woe. But the signs make us suffer from it, though not painful in themselves.

Thus the defeat (cf. Gide's *Feuilletons*) and the sight of a German soldier in uniform.

Thus the identity card at Renault's.

If there are many such signs every day, there is woe.

Other things are by themselves causes of suffering. Physical suffering in this case. Humiliation (that is a physical suffering).

Others again both by themselves and as signs (humiliation). These are the most painful.

Problem: the defeat, not felt as a pain at certain moments (beautiful day, beautiful landscape).

A man with a grey-green uniform is not a cause of suffering (e.g. before hostilities, military attachés . . .).

The defeat having taken place, a German soldier has only to appear in the landscape and suffering is created.

Pain born of the link (from sign to thing signified) between two things not painful when outside this link. And this pain is felt by the body (can go as far as tears).

Is it the same in the case of joy? Aesthetic sensation, fêtes . . .? Ornaments of a fête, for example.

Valéry, treatise on art of poetry. Begins by setting aside entirely all considerations of value (when really it is only a question of values), then describes. Very instructive process (but simply as a process) for revealing the imprint of value.

Reason of value?

[His definition of philosophy (not co-ordinated with the rest): values centred around the 'I'.]

His idea of an absolute universe of sounds (pure, combined) evoked by each fragment of music. This absolute universe can only be silence—Music starts from silence and goes back to it . . . creation and duration.

Why *pure* sounds? Produced at will.

Mehl: to conceive time it is necessary to conceive creation. That is true, but also unlimited duration. An opposite of God (or of good—Thaetetus) is required.

The analogue of silence for the plastic arts would be immobility (and the analogue of sound, movement).

The arts render sensible Time and Space.

A sunset renders sensible Time and Space.

Sensible in a certain way. What way? Feeling of *reality*.

Describe the difference between a beautiful thing (work of art) and the rest, setting aside beauty altogether. One would thus light upon something instructive.

Woe—defines itself: by physical pain—by symbolism (cf. page 1) —by the linking up of moments, the flow of duration.

Breaking up of time, the greatest evil we can do a man.

Beauty is the only criterion of value in human life. The only one it is possible to apply to *all men*. Otherwise there only remains well-being . . . The conditions of a full life are equivalent for all men, but under forms which are, of course, different.

Beauty—rootedness—pact between oneself and one's own conditions of existence—circle of time.

Make it so that time is a circle and not a line.

Sin: diversion—intoxication—licence.

Sin can also show itself in *terms of time*. Ex. licence=immediacy. Intoxication: state of suspension (passive) with regard to the near future, undefined desire, Danaids.

Evil has two forms, sin and woe. (Socrates recognized it [neither ἀδικεῖν nor ἀδικεῖσθαι]¹ and even the Stoics [preferable].) Sin, woe, good.

Connection between sin and others' woe. Essential or accidental?

¹ Do wrong, suffer wrong.

[Love thy neighbour *as* thyself. Opium-fiend who seeks to turn all his *entourage* into opium-fiends . . .] Sin is the *unlimited*, the *sub-jective* (co-ordinate that with its characteristics in relation to time). Others constitute a limit and an existence outside ourselves, the only one, for matter . . . 3rd dimension. Respect. $\alpha\tilde{\nu}\delta\epsilon\omicron$.¹

In the case of sin as in that of woe, don't we lose the same thing? That is to say, the world. How then distinguish them the one from the other? Don't they reproduce each other in a reciprocal cycle? Ambiguousness of the word slave, already in the case of the Greeks. A man loses half his soul . . .

(Zeus takes half his soul away from the man who becomes a slave.)

Punishment. It would seem then that, if there is to be a cure for sin, punishment must not be considered an affliction. A painful experience, yes, certainly. A breaking in. What sort of a breaking in?

How, to what extent, does triumphant sin resemble woe?

Inadequacy of the *Republic*. There Plato analyses sin, but not woe. Electra.

We aspire to escape from woe; we don't aspire to escape from sin; thus by transforming sin into woe we give the soul the desire for salvation; this would be the justification for punishment. But, when a certain degree of woe is reached, do we aspire to escape from it? Besides, that presupposes an evident, not accidental, link between sin and punishment.

Woe is an evil, but pain can be a good.

Is there always pain in woe? Slavery, prison.

In what case does imminent death, known as such (risk of death, certain death) constitute an affliction?

Malheur,² admirable word, without its equivalent in other languages. We haven't got all we could out of it.

Phèdre: ambiguousness between woe and sin.

What power has a man to extricate himself from woe? This power is necessarily physical. He can thus be deprived of it. The question is to know whether one can deprive him of it without killing him.

What power has he over his own duration?

What power over the symbolism which turns certain sensible things into signs of woe?

¹ Respect (*Iliad*, XXI, 74).

² Translated here by woe, affliction.

And over that which turns certain sensible things into signs of joy?

If I believe that man is not at the mercy of circumstances, I act upon others inconsiderately.

If I believe that man is at the mercy of circumstances, I abandon myself personally to them. Which brings about, amongst other things, the former consequence. Reciprocal action, moreover. These two beliefs lead to the same state. Therefore, *right* behaviour implies a contradiction.

It is not in the least true that good is without its contradictory side, that evil alone is contradictory. Virtue might well be, perhaps, less logical than sin.

Even, moreover, if I only consider myself . . . Stoics and 'préférables'.

*With bars they blur the goodly sun,
They mar the gracious moon.*

What contradictions are legitimate, and what are not? Quite a different logic . . .

Physical pains. Some of them make one 'lose' the world, whilst they last: e.g. dentist. Others constitute a contact with the world: e.g. gathering up sheaves full of thorns in one's arms.

The same with fatigue which comes from work; it is of two kinds.

The same with 'volupté'. *There are also two kinds of 'volupté' (of pleasure).*

Criterion: feeling of reality.

Two kinds of hunger.

Two kinds of obedience.

Two kinds of death. Etc.

HASDRUBAL

Object of art: make space and time sensible to us. Contrive for us a human space and time, made by man, which nevertheless are time *itself*, space *itself*.

Verses. They don't 'get across the footlights' unless they can create a new sort of time for the reader. And as in the case of music (Valéry), a poem starts from silence, returns to silence.

Creation, end of the world. Birth, death. Etc. Render space and time, *in a sense*, finite. Or group the indefinite around the finite. The statue in the surrounding space, like the poem in the silence.

Elements of the poem. A *time* which has a beginning and an end. To what does that correspond? Then the *flavour* of the words:

that each word have a maximum flavour. Which implies an accord between the meaning we give it and all its other meanings, an accord or an opposition with the sound of its syllables, accords and oppositions with the words coming before and after.

A picture—a finite space, limited by a frame: it is necessary the infinite should be in it.

Always a certain *relation*—a certain accord, a certain opposition—between the finite and the indefinite.

Examples of perfect poems, i.e. having a beginning and an end, and a duration which is an image of eternity. There are few of them. That of Sappho:

Ποικιλόθρον' ἀθάνατ' Ἀφρόδιτα,
παῖ Δίος δολόπλοκε, λίσσομαί σε,
μή μ' ἄσαισι μηδ' ὀνίαισι δάμνα,
πότνια, θῦμον.¹

The 2 strophes (or only the 1st?) of:

Ἔρως ἀνίκατε μάχαν.²

'Love' of Herbert. Marlowe perhaps: 'Come live with me and be my love . . .' Shakespeare's ditties: 'Come away, come away, death . . .' and above all, 'Take, O take those lips away . . .' In French, *nothing*, I think. Nor in German either. Nor in Italian either, as far as I know.

Valéry: '. . . Every piece of music is a way of moving out of silence and returning to it again, like falling water . . .'

'. . . But the opus will have eliminated as much as possible chance combinations; no doubt chance will always play a part in its composition, but solely to awaken in the mind of the musician a particular point in a system of sounds which in the opus itself pre-exists chance . . .'

The notion of *work* lies at the root of physics and governs it entirely. Why isn't there a book—a book of physics, not of philosophy—on 'work in the different branches of physics'? Why not

¹ Deathless Aphrodite of the many coloured throne,
Daughter of Zeus, weaver of spells, I entreat you.
Do not with grief and anguish
Tame my heart.

Sappho, *Hymn to Aphrodite*, tr. Read.

² Eros unconquerable in battle.

Sophocles, *Antigone*, 781.

eliminate hypotheses, set forth only the transformations of work in the various experiments?

Enumeration of all the experiments, from this point of view, with measurement of work supplied and work gained—Measurement, not in units of work, but by the results—Classification . . . Give experiments actually carried out, not interpolations—Catalogue of experiments (doubtless the subject-matter would be found in the periodicals).

There are also phenomena into which the notion of work does not enter: e.g. diffraction—spectrum. For these alone a hypothesis can be useful.

And the propagation of heat? (purely algebraical hypothesis; Fourier).

A catalogue of all the experiments in physics recognized as valid up to the present. With a minute description of the appliances for measuring. Experiments only.

‘Classical mechanics’ represents a certain relationship between work supplied and work restored.

There lies, evidently, the essential part of our pact with the world.

When different parts of the world exchange their work . . . The notion *expenditure of work* only has a meaning for man.

.
Science and work—What serves as a model to science and western technics, is work, but unskilled work, the most elementary, the simplest and the rudest form of work.

The human mind always models the universe on the relationship between the soul and the body, but chooses from among these relationships.

I want a match to be here and not there; I move it. In front of the piano, I think of a melody, and almost at the same time I hear it (my fingers have struck the keys without my even knowing it). The second sort of action demands an apprenticeship, the first not. Science has only retained the first.

In all veritable action, there is a mixture of these two forms.

A peasant who all the year round performs skilled operations in harmony with the regular changes of social life and of the world, and who thinks of the universe on this model . . . isn’t that perhaps Chinese thought?

Classical science (xviii, xviii and three-quarters of the xixth centuries). Reconstruction of the world on the model of the action by which I shift a pencil. Such a reconstruction has limits; for in such

a world man would not live. Moreover, certain categories eliminated from the scientific representation of the world remain present to the mind of the savant. Totality, finality [algebraical unity].

Granet, China: Time which gathers itself up into eternal moments, space which concentrates itself. The 'social' has nothing whatever to do in this. It is a need of the mind. The mind conceives the universe, space, time, etc., finite and infinite, homogeneous and heterogeneous, etc.

Crisis of the machine in Europe, on all planes (theoretical, economic . . .) and consequently Europe in crisis. People first of all wanted to reconstruct the world on the model of the simple machines (Descartes). Then they limited themselves to observing that in every phenomenon the relationship between the energy introduced and the energy restored is the same as in the case of a simple machine. Algebraical formulae indicated, then, the possibility of reconstructing phenomena with simple machines in as many ways as one desired. But, one day, the contrary was observed. Hence, what do algebraical formulae signify? What model can be taken for reconstructing the universe? The model of the algebraical formulae? But they don't constitute a model, they adjust themselves to any reality whatsoever (e.g. matrices). The model of *one* algebraical formula whose variations would embrace phenomena (it could be discovered empirically, by induction). Why this desire for unity? At any rate, it doesn't supply a direction.

Science at present *non-orientated*. Has it reached its limit? Surely it must have one.

[Pl. 'Ἀνυπόθετος¹; necessarily a gap between the first principle and the sciences.]

Principle of western science: absence of hierarchical order. The sufi (for example) and the idiot both find themselves under the same necessity of getting up and walking in order to take a chair and place it in front of a table. It is this necessity which Science takes as the object of its investigations, and, however far it develops, it is always the same thing. Representation of the universe, but an incomplete one. For in certain cases matter (the body being matter) obeys the sage in a way that it doesn't obey the idiot. Moreover, in certain cases, it is beautiful.

Beauty is absent from the representation of the world supplied by science, and yet the savant seeks it (e.g. analogies).

¹ Non-hypothetical (Plato, *Republic*).

In Greece, there was a bond between beauty and science; but in what did that bond consist?

Good and evil. Reality. That which gives more reality to beings and things is good, that which takes it away from them is evil.

The Romans *accomplished evil* by robbing the Greek towns of their statues, because the towns, the temples and the life of the Greeks had less reality without the statues, and because the statues could not have as much reality in Rome as in Greece.

Desperate, humble supplications of the Greeks in order to conserve a few statues. Supplication: a desperate attempt to make one's own notion of values pass into the mind of others. Understood thus, there is nothing base about it. But it is almost necessarily ineffectual. Duty to understand and weigh the system of value of other people with one's own, *on the same balance*—to forge the balance.

The non-hierarchical representation of the world (science) and the hierarchical representation are combined in the great works of the painters. Franciscan frescoes of Giotto. St. Francis, the father, the bishop, the gardener *exist on precisely the same grounds in space*. That is the significance of space in painting. The empty space (which Giotto more often than not places in the centre, procedure of extraordinary power) has itself just as much existence, and, from yet a third point of view, more existence. But, from another point of view . . . Whence the need for composition on several planes (which is perhaps the key to all the arts). Music. Poetry (measure).

[In poetry, if verses devoid of feeling have as much existence . . .]

Ceremony: I—who am the whole universe!—am, nevertheless, a part. And other people too are parts. They exist as I do. As much. Neither more, nor less.

Mathematics is an art (André)¹? But an art in which time plays no part. Nor space—nor composition. It is a different matter even for a work in prose. (?) Mathematical art can only render sensible unity and diversity, the one and the many, analogy.

With the Greeks—Pythagoras, Eudoxus, and again Archimedes—it must have been something else. It conjured up the world.

Greek science seems to have been above all the *science of generalized number*. Pythagoras—Plato—Epinomis (plane geometry and geometry in space). Archimedes: levers.

¹ André Weil, Simone's brother, and a distinguished mathematician. (Tr.).

Balance of Archimedes (balance rather than lever—cf. Egypt).
Equality. Number. Generalized number.

Notion of equilibrium in Archimedes: parabola—balance—floating bodies.

Relationship between the notions of equilibrium and of proportion.

Seafaring people. Equilibrium between a man and the world.
Fluid stone.

Equilibrium between the finite and the infinite. Parabolas.
*Δὸς ποῦ στῶ.*¹

Equilibrium and symmetry. Equilibrium and equivalence.

Algebra—is it an error concerning the human spirit?

One is only able to reflect on the particular (Descartes), whereas the object of reflection is, essentially, the universal. We do not know how the Greeks resolved this difficulty. The Moderns have resolved it by signs representing that which is common to several things.

My solution, had I been able . . . : analogy.

Science, derived from signs (and thus of religious origin) [numbers], not from labour and things. Why? Because it is only in signs that one can eliminate chance, the *ἄπειρον*,² and so make necessity appear—which itself, however, does not exist without this same *ἄπειρον*.

Superiority of the engineer over the workman: handling of signs, recognition of a problem. A problem: a finite number of data which contain the solution.

*νοῦς*³ and body. The body necessarily preponderates in the present; but the *νοῦς* embraces time. So pilot and boat.

Instead of crystallizing in one sign that which is common to several things, render analogy intuitive.

Differential calculus and resistance of materials—problem of the disruption of the chord.

$$2 - 4 - 8 \parallel 2 - \sqrt{e} - 3 \parallel$$

Archimedes' idea of floating bodies: a fluid mass in a state of equilibrium—divided into 2 by the mind—is assimilated to a balance. By taking away what is identical from either side, what is different is of equal weight.

Beginning of the great enterprise which lasted up to 1900 (Planck)—assimilate the whole universe to a combination of levers.

¹ Give me a fulcrum (Archimedes).

² The indefinite.

³ Mind.

(He had sought for a fluid balance for the tyrant's crown).

. . . Οἶδα, ὦγαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί . . . ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρός ὦν καλὸν καγαθὸν ὄντα.¹

The whole of the *Republic* is there to set forth πονηρός ὦν.² Yes, but how about καλὸν καγαθὸν ὄντα?³ There lies the whole problem. With regard to that, Plato didn't make any analysis which is able to serve as proof.

Tool and closed vessel.

If we choose to live—assuming the possibility of such a choice, at no moment of our life are we able to choose (except in certain cases as far as degrees of prudence are concerned). Given the circumstances and character at a particular moment, only one manner of reacting ensures the maximum preservation (1) of life, and (2) to the extent to which the preservation of life makes it possible, of character. An existence oriented towards life can never take, at any particular moment, but one particular direction—note that an existence oriented towards life can admit of risk or even the acceptance of death, but only for external reasons—reputation, sport.

It is not by chance that doctrines possessing a mystical content are more or less oriented toward death. Cathari. T. E. Lawrence.

Ambiguity of death. Death is the destiny of the limited being; the thought of death is a humiliation. 'They have made me see suffering and death.' θνητοῦ πέφυκας.⁴ But death is also the annihilation of the limited being.

Notes on Koestler's *Spanish Testament*.

Unreality of war—Pina⁵—Why?

Time. Future. The 'Spanish Testament': resolve to die in 12 hours and serenity (12 hours' respite?).

(autobiography: lack of character).

¹ I know, my good Callicles, for I am not deaf . . . He will put a man to death if he pleases, but it will be a villain slaying a good man and true (Plato, *Gorgias*, 511 b, tr. Lamb, Loeb edn.).

² Being bad.

³ Being 'fine and good.'

⁴ Thou art of mortal born (Sophocles, *Electra*, 1171).

⁵ Pina: village in Aragon where a small group of militiamen belonging to the column of Durrutti, of which Simone Weil formed part, crossed the Ebro during the Spanish Civil War (August 1936).

T. E.¹ 'All attempt at reasoning caused me physical pain.'

—'astonishment concerning my own reactions'—

Rapid flight of time in the prison and complete lack of incident (rapid once it had gone by).

'Alone is unforgettable time during which one forgets time.'

'In spite of being fully conscious of my own dignity, I do not manage to prevent myself from considering my gaolers as beings of a superior order'—Slaves.

(Rebels, Richelieu, d'Aubigné.)

'I did not know how quickly one can become accustomed to consider a privileged class as a superior biological species and to regard its privileges as being legitimate and natural.' [was arrested on the 9th February 1937; wrote this on the 15th March: 5 weeks].

Can one die conscious? Does disbelief in death increase with its nearness? Disinfection of the morphine needle. Socrates?

'I have, while writing this, the impression that it is a theoretical dissertation and one that does not concern me directly.' Once a day (at least) believes for a minute in death; then animal fear.

'... how my own self-confidence has increased since I had some money.'

'... Death, that is the frozen present.'

Sleeping that night when ... whereas Carlos ...

'In prison, situations and thoughts are perpetually reproducing themselves. You live inside a circle.'

flowers and leaves.

to begin counting my buttons again and dancing on the edge of the flagstones.

Liberated on 12th May

militiamen of the patio 'They were chary of demonstrations toward each other, without any sentimentality whatsoever and sometimes even without pity.' Invented victories. 'They lied to themselves in order to die.' 'Could not bear the idea of dying for a lost cause.'

'the common law prisoners ... curiously resembled one another for the most part ... The prisoner changes colour and form and adopts those which the better enable him to obtain the maximum number of advantages possible within the social framework of the prison ... Here people fight for a cigarette, for permission to go and walk about in the yard, to possess a pencil. It is a struggle for the most trifling objects, but it is a struggle for life ... The prisoner

¹ T. E. Lawrence: *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*.

can only develop in one single dimension: cunning . . . Into his eyes there creeps a prudently restrained, insolent and servile look; his lips become narrower, razor-like, Jesuitical; his nose becomes leaner and sharper with bloodless, ever-searching nostrils; his knees sag, his arms lengthen and hang down like those of a gorilla.'

'They would ask why . . . We would all ask ourselves, waiting [for death] in trembling, who was being served, who was being honoured by our being made to suffer in this fashion; what was the evident and secret meaning of all this . . . We would rack our brains . . . ' [Answer (*Iliad*): why not?]

Everything which agitates man agitates him in his feeling of time. Control over oneself=control over one's manner of feeling time: e.g. the future. If one is to be shot on the morrow, to know how to alter the dimensions of duration in such a way as still to have a future to *fill up*.

There is another method, that is to think of the future of something other than oneself. Those who die for something else, for something which they *feel* must endure and prevail, manage to do so easily: e.g. 'Long live the Emperor.' But this shows a certain baseness, seeing that this 'something else' is less than the complete universe.

Let life be similar to a perfect piece of music or to a poem—in spite of the fact that events are partly brought in from outside, and without rhythm—but how? That is the whole problem. To make time a moving image of eternity, for it is not so naturally.

Solitude. In what does its value actually consist? For we are in the presence of ordinary matter (even the sky, the stars, the moon, trees in flower), of things of lesser value perhaps than a human spirit. Its value consists in the superior possibility of attention. If one could be attentive to the same degree in the presence of a human being . . . (?)

Proportions giving the feeling: (1) that this can be prolonged to infinity—(2) at the same time, that this is $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{limited} \\ \text{closed} \end{array} \right]$ —Is that the secret of plastic art among the Greeks?

A poem too—

scale=succession and circles.

Narcissus. Isn't it this to which lovers aspire? To be one, to make the beloved enter into oneself, to make the beloved become oneself. Well, Narcissus had that, and was still more unhappy—still farther

away from what he loved; there lies the paradox. He loved a body without a soul, because you cannot love your own soul. Or is it necessary, perhaps, that the whole universe, the sky, the stars, the sea, should be the corresponding body? (It isn't then your own soul.)

Stars and fruit-trees in blossom. Complete permanency and extreme fragility alike give the feeling of eternity.

.....

Spirit torn, broken up into pieces, crucified *upon* space [Manichaeans]. And is not the cross the symbol of space? Similarly, time.

That is why unity in space is such a deep consolation. A closed space is the symbol of the world, of which the spirit is the possessor.

Greeks—conditions of order—relation between the space upon which the spirit is crucified and the space which is possessed by the spirit.

Art: to render each of them alike sensible.

So also music: time.

Passage in *Philebus* on music. Analogy between the numerical correspondences contained in the intervals and chords, and those implied by the rhythm and measure.

Very important—compare the lines in *Philebus* on the use of number and the theory of aggregates—Bourbaki.¹

.....

entropy.

Inequality of mankind in time, seeing that a man is able in a few seconds to determine for twenty years ahead the life of another man; 'such is the breath of kings'. Image of the irreversibility of human works, by which the passage from one state to another state costs less trouble than the passage back from this latter state to the former one. A passage of the first type is nearly always (or always?) analogous to destruction, of the second type, to construction; all that is necessary, then, is to make a monopoly of those of the first type.

If with a sudden movement I upset a pile of books, I need time and an expenditure of effort to build it up again; the possibility that I may be condemned to twenty years' imprisonment is a form of the same necessity, resulting from the nature of time.

¹ Nicolas Bourbaki: name given to a fictitious exponent of mathematical science and serving as pseudonym for some of the liveliest mathematical brains in France ever since 24th November 1923, when nine *Normaliens* (Science students at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, in Paris) joined together to form a 'brains trust', this association being known thereafter as 'Bourbaki'. (Translator's note.)

Cretan scholium. 'The sword and the stout shield . . . it is with them that I reap the harvest, with them that I gather in the sweet vintage.'

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La Tenquita

A bird one of whose feet gets frozen up by the snow, just as it was setting out in search of food for its young.

'Snow, why art thou so wicked as to freeze up my little foot?'

—'The sun is still more wicked since he causes me to melt.'

—'Sun, why art thou so wicked as to melt the snow?'

Man: ask the Lord who created me.

Finally, God:

'Lord, why [only here the words 'art thou so wicked' are omitted] hast thou created man?'

Man made the knife, the knife kills the ox, the ox drinks the water, the water puts out the fire, the fire burns the stick, the stick beats the dog, the dog chases the cat, the cat eats the mouse, the mouse pierces the wall, the wall stops the wind, the wind disperses the cloud, the cloud hides the sun, the sun melts the snow, the snow freezes up one of my feet.'

And the *tenquita* weeps.

The Lord says to her: Go in peace, *tenquita*, and look after your little ones who must be cold and hungry.

The *tenquita* obeys, and, when she reaches the nest, her foot is healed.

[Christian distortion?]

See Anaximander.

Araucanian tales

Tales '*de nunca acabar*'¹: *The little wreath of smoke—*

(Very beautiful)

A prince, from the sight of a portrait, falls in love with a princess bewitched by a sorceress who has hidden her in a hut from whence there issues a little smoke. He finds the sorceress, and asks her where the princess is. She merely says that the princess is in a hut from whence, etc.; if he finds her, the spell will be broken. He walks for months and months, finds himself in front of such a hut, questions an old woman at the door.

¹ Tales '*de nunca acabar*': tales which never have any ending.

‘No, milord,’ replies the old woman, ‘but it is possible she may be in the hut from which there rises that little wreath of smoke which you can distinguish from here.’

‘The prince continued walking for several days, for the house was very far away, and when he arrived there, he saw an old woman sitting at the door, and he said to her . . .’

and so on.

[N.B. In tales concerning the dead, the distinctive characteristic of dead people—apart from a horror of personal contact and of the light—is that they can no longer pronounce words: *t’angeren* for *wangelen* (stars), *kui* for *kuyen* (moon), *koi* for *ko* (water), etc.]

I set out from Córdoba one day
And passed by Santa Fé,
And on the way I found
A notice and it said . . .
—What did it say?
—I set out from Córdoba one day,
etc.

The wife of the dead man.—A cacique goes against the Spaniards, and is killed. His wife weeps for months and months, stays by herself, doesn’t remarry.

One night the husband enters, doesn’t want any one to touch him, doesn’t want any fire brought. Leaves at dawn. She feels very tired.

Following night, the same thing. At dawn, unable to get up.

Consults a sorceress who tells her that her husband has died from loss of blood, and sucks her blood in order to gain strength. If she doesn’t cut off his head, she will die.

She returns home, makes ready a big knife, and the following night, whilst her husband is asleep, cuts off his head. Blood flows from the head, but the body is a skeleton.

After that, she lives in peace.

Dead individual without any flesh.—‘There was once a great battle between the Indians and some men who had come from the North; of iron were these men, their legs were of iron, and their arms and their head also; they were wholly made of iron, so it is said, and had great, long iron knives . . . The Indians didn’t want to give up their land to these iron men, so it is said, and they fought each other.’

Young girl with a head like a skull.—(Her betrothed runs away

from her—she has to go away, wander about alone, because she is repugnant to everyone—weeps for joy because she is not repugnant to a lion whose paw she has healed.)

The Cheruvius's daughter.— . . 'each time the Cheruvius (fire spirit—volcano?) saw the cloud overhead, it stamped its feet, shouted and vomited, and once more the Cloud would weep and the water descend and descend.'

The Snow which comes out of the grotto and climbs up the mountain. Her mother, the Cloud, wants to protect her from the sun, but is unable to; is borne away by the wind. The Sun wants to give her a kiss.

WOMEN'S SONG

(*Araucanian*)

This woman being married,
A man carried her off,
Away towards a distant land.
He took her to Huinfali.
On arriving there she sang.
This is what she said in her song:
'I come from a distant land.
Blue is that land, O so blue!
I have come weeping,
I have not ceased to shed tears.
I come, said this woman,
From a very distant land.
I have lost my friend, yem!'

'Give me again my blue sky, old man with the white face. Give me again my white cloud, old spirit with the white locks.

Give me again my warm sun, in the middle of the sky, old spirit.'

'Atlantis', Frobenius.

Upper Kasai—Fidi Maikullu calls together the sun, the moon, the Pleiades and man and sends them off to extract palm-wine. The sun returns with some, without having drunk any of it. Fidi questions him; he says he hasn't drunk anything. Fidi sends him down into a trench; he says he will return on the following day,

and does so. The same happens in the case of the moon; she returns at the end of one month. The same in that of the Pleiades, the latter returning once the drought has come to an end. Then man's turn comes. He returns with some wine; he has drunk some of it. Fidi questions him; he says he hasn't drunk anything. Fidi sends him down into the trench, but he doesn't return. [In other tribes, id., but bananas; in yet others, man has eaten the fruit of a tree which didn't belong to him.]

Fall of Kucha (Kordofan).—The king is killed ritually after reigning a few years, at a moment appointed by the priests. One king has a slave sent from the East, from beyond the seas (India?), who saves him through his talent for telling stories. In order to listen to him, the priests neglect the study of the stars. This king breaks the custom. Very prosperous reign. After him, the slave reigns. Still more prosperous reign. But at his death the neighbouring people, jealous of this prosperity, invade the country, which is overcome.

Moussa.—Very strong man, and very rich, numerous family. Some thieves slay his family, steal all his goods. Fleeing from a lion, he falls into an elephant trap. There he is discovered, in rags, filthy, trampled on, wounded, and having lost an eye.

A man says: 'This fellow Moussa once killed a relative of mine. Then Moussa was rich and I could do nothing. Now that he is poor and miserable, I want to kill him. You fellows here, give Moussa to me as a prisoner!' The other men turned away and said: 'Take your prisoner! We shan't stop you!' And so it is that Moussa became a slave . . . The man said to Moussa: 'To-day you shall live as a fettered slave, to-morrow I will kill you.' [Moussa's fellow-prisoner wants them to flee together] Moussa says: 'No, I shall not flee. What would I care about life if I had fled?'

The fellow-prisoner, having pinioned and gagged Moussa, forces him to flee; then he is devoured by a lion. Moussa goes in search of a rich Arab, headman of a village. 'He had lost all his goods, his family had been slain. His name was sullied, and around his foot he wore the iron ring made for prisoners.' He implores him to take him on as his servant. The Arab—who has not recognized him—consents to do so. Later on, suspecting him to have once been a rich man, he gives him his sister's hand in marriage. Later on still, he gives him some flocks and enough to establish himself on his own account.

Just before this, however, Moussa, while guarding the flocks, had by mistake killed the Arab's son returning from a journey. No one knew it was he who had done it. He has a son; when he is grown up he sends him to the Arab, confessing everything and begging him to kill the young man. But the Arab gives the latter his daughter and sends him back loaded with presents. Then the Arab goes to see Moussa.

Some horse-stealers attack the Arab; Moussa puts them to flight. The Arab goes on his way. Then Moussa, remembering all he has received from this man, says to himself: 'I have done him evil, and he has always requited me with good. I don't know what to do any longer. I can no longer leave him alive. I've got to follow him, I've got to kill him.'

Moussa catches up the Arab on horseback and says to him: 'You have done me nothing but good, but you have done me so much good that it would be impossible for me to repay you, even if I were to work for you the whole of my life as your servant. That is why I can no longer bear the sight of you. That is why I have got to kill you.' The Arab tries in vain to reason with him; disarms him, then hands him back his lance, but Moussa says: 'I cannot let you live any longer, you have already done me too much good.' The Arab takes to flight, tells the village the whole story. The men of the village capture Moussa and bring him bound to the Arab, who, finding him still in the same frame of mind, decides to put him to death in order to preserve his own life.

Moussa's wife vainly implores her brother and her husband. She unties Moussa's bonds, but he refuses to flee. 'I may not flee, I may not depart from here without having first killed your brother, for he has done me so much good that I cannot let him live any longer.' Finally, the wife sends for her brother, tells him that Moussa wishes to speak to him. Although he is suspicious, he comes. Moussa kills him at once. The following day the villagers kill Moussa and take all the flocks and all the goods of the two dead men.

'Moussa's children were sold. Sherifia (his wife) covered herself with rags, and thenceforward until the end of her life she wandered begging from place to place.'

(2000 B.C.):

'I have created the four winds so that every man should be able to breathe like his brother; the great waters so that the poor man should be able to make use of them in the same way as his lord;

I have created every man like unto his brother. And I have forbidden them to commit iniquity, but their hearts have undone that which my word had ordained'.

Upanishads.

The Ātman—let the soul of a man take the whole universe for its body. Let its relation to the whole universe be like that of the collector to his collection, or that of one of the soldiers who died crying out 'Long live the Emperor!' to Napoleon. The soul transports itself outside the actual body into something else. Let it therefore transport itself into the whole universe.

It is not only its duty, but also its nature. Demonstration: one loves whatever it may be solely for oneself (the *I* is the only value). [Hence] the *I* cannot be finite, its dimension is that of the world.

The *I* is as big as the world; all sounds meet in the ear, etc. (An orchestra, and single line of the gramophone; but the tympanum . . .)

One should identify oneself with the universe itself. Everything that is less than the universe is subjected to suffering [being partial and consequently exposed to outside forces].

Even though I die, the universe continues. That does not console me if I am anything other than the universe. If, however, the universe is, as it were, another body to my soul, my death ceases to have any more importance for me than that of a stranger. The same is true of my sufferings.

Let the whole universe be for me, in relation to my body, what the stick of a blind man is in relation to his hand. His sensibility really no longer resides in his hand, but at the end of the stick.

[Reading]

An apprenticeship is necessary.

It is a question, in fact, of losing perspective. (Don't Chinese preoccupations with levitation and aerial perspective in painting correspond also to that?)

But how, then, does one continue to act as an individual? Theme of the *Gītā*.

Suffering actually makes us lose the universe (for example physical suffering). But we know that it continues to exist. We know it, but we are not sure about it. It is a question of becoming such that we *are* sure about it. Nothing more. That is enough.

'Desires which are reality are veiled by unreality; they *are*, but unreality hides them. Thus it is that a man, when a member of his

family dies, is no longer able to see him. But all the members of his family, living or dead, all his unfulfilled desires, all that, he will find by going down into himself; for it is there that desires which are reality, but which are veiled by unreality, have their existence.'

If we go down into ourselves we find that we possess exactly what we desire.

If we long for a certain being (who is dead), we desire a particular being, therefore a mortal; and we long for that special being 'who' . . . , 'whom' . . . , etc., in short, that being who died at such and such a time on such and such a day. And we have that being—dead.

If we desire money, we want a medium of exchange (institution), something which can only be acquired by . . . , by . . . ; so we desire it only 'in the measure that' . . . Well, in that measure we have it.

In such cases suffering, emptiness is the mode of existence of the objects of our desire. We only have to draw aside the veil of unreality and we shall see that they are given to us in this way.

When we see that, we still suffer, but we are happy.

Find the Ātman 'involved in the dark complexities (?) of the body'.

'There is no such thing as plurality.

Whoever thinks he sees plurality in the universe

*Only runs from death to death.'*¹

Greece.

Plato's words: 'we must not make the One *too quickly*' are also applicable to the search for Good (for God, the ātman, the Tao, etc.).

We must not make the One without first recognizing the *ὁπóσα*.² In India too, certainly, recognition of the *ὁπóσα*.

What does this represent?

'That space which is within the heart—it is there that He dwells, master of all, sovereign of all, lord of all. He does not make himself greater by good actions or make himself less by bad ones.'

Beyond good and evil. This must no doubt be interpreted according to the Taoist principle: He who possesses the true virtue has not got any virtue, and thus it is that he possesses virtue. He who possesses an ordinary virtue has got some virtue, and thus it is that he does not possess any virtue.

¹ *Brhad-Ā-U.* IV, 4, 19.

² How many . . . , what number (Plato, *Philebus*, 16 d, *et seq.*).

We should detach ourselves also from virtue—lose consciousness of it.

A *negative* sovereign good.

Danger of another interpretation (toward which certain texts seem to tend). [What seems altogether absent is the idea of passion. The incarnation.]

One loves a husband, a wife, etc., all things *for oneself*. Fundamental idea:

To restrict one's love to the pure object is the same thing as to extend it to the whole universe.

It is the same notion as that of the Stoics (I carry away with me **everything** that I possess).

Precious things are, quite rightly, *μεταξύ*.¹

To change the physical relationship between oneself and the world (is 'physical' the right word?), in the same way as, through apprenticeship, the workman changes the physical relationship between himself and the tool. (The sailor, between himself and the ship.) Physical injury: this is the trade entering into the body. Let all suffering make the universe enter into the body.

The tool makes you lose one mode of feeling, replaces it by another mode. You do not feel your fatigue, your suffering; you feel the fraise pressing down on the piece of metal, the way in which it is pressing down. All trades are based upon transferences of feeling. A lever—as you bend down, you feel you are lifting.

Habit, skill: a transference of the consciousness into an object other than the body itself.

Let this object be the universe, the seasons, the sun, the stars.

Let one feel space—

Brahma is space—

Giotto—

The relationship between the body and the tool changes during apprenticeship. We must change the relationship between our body and the world.

Changes in respect of duration.

We do not become detached, we change our attachment. We **must** attach ourselves to the All.

What we now hate, we shall manage to be able to love. We must feel our hate up to the hilt; know what it is we hate.

Through each feeling, going downwards, to join up with the **Ātman**.

¹ Intermediaries.

Who is it that hates?

It is not I who am here. It's true. It is not I. It is not I who am on this particular point in space.

Through and beyond each sensation, we must feel the universe. What does it matter then whether it be pleasure or pain? If our hand is shaken by a beloved being whom we have not seen for a long time, what does it matter that he should squeeze it hard and hurt us?

On reaching a certain degree of pain we lose the world. But afterwards comes peace, when we find it again. And if the paroxysm returns, so does also the peace which follows it.

If we realize this, that very degree of pain turns into an expectation of peace, and as a result does not break our contact with the world.

This contact is joy.

Rhythm. In every mode of life there is a rhythm to be loved. Every life, however artificial it may be, is bound up with the daily revolution of the heavens and with the seasons, otherwise we should die. Through this rhythm, we remain linked with the sun and the stars. We must feel them through the medium of this rhythm, as though through the stick of a blind man.

We do not choose our sensations. But we do choose (subject to an apprenticeship) what we feel through their medium. A good deal of choice. Examples.

Important rule—not to leap over the *μεταξύ* too soon. We either forget that they are *μεταξύ*, or else we leap over them too soon.

Pain is a *μεταξύ*.

Death . . . (a certain way of believing in immortality takes away its efficacy as a *μεταξύ*).

Everything that wrenches.

We must not fight *against*, quite the reverse. Thus love in *Phaedrus*.

Ex. A Frenchwoman receives a letter saying: 'Your son has been killed.'¹ If she does not understand English, her first sight of the characters has one sort of effect upon her; if she does understand it, another sort of effect (e.g. she faints). Thus, by essays in apprenticeship, we change the power possessed by sensations to modify us.

A confused mass of drawings may seem to have something nightmarish about it in the absence of any meaning whatsoever, and quite otherwise once they have been so arranged that they have a meaning.

Knowledge of the 3rd kind= reading.

¹ English in text.

Space and time are, in a sense, only thoughts, and yet at the same time they constitute that which fetters the thinking being beyond any possibility of liberation.

Effective liberation as regards the body; the blind man's stick furnishes the key to it. Hence Spinoza's principle: 'He whose body . . .'

Illusion. Force, war, and the seven flics. War reigns supreme over all things; by it some are made free, others slaves; some are made men, others gods. And the law of war: the seven flics.¹

*Reading.*² All we are ever given (in a sense) is sensations, and whatever we may do about it we can never, never think anything else (in a sense) but sensations. But we can never actually think sensations; we read through them, as through a medium. What do we read? Not just anything at all, according to inclination. Nor, of course, something which does not depend in any way whatever on ourselves.

The world is a text containing several meanings, and we pass from one meaning to another by an effort—an effort in which the body always participates, just as when we are learning the alphabet of a foreign language this alphabet has got to enter into our hand by dint of forming the characters.

Apart from that, any change in the manner of thinking is illusory.

The relationship between *I* and the world. I am such and such a star, in the sense that, when I write, the pen is a part of my body, and in the sense that, when I press the fraise down on to the metal it is at their point of contact that the centre of my existence lies, and in the sense that, when I look at a picture, . . . and in other ways besides. But what of the relationship between *I* and other men? I am he who sees this cube from a certain point of view, but also he who sees it from a certain other point of view (from which I do not see it). I am he who reads sensations according to one law, and also he who reads them according to some other law.

To love our neighbour as ourselves does not mean that we should

¹ The seven flics: from one of Grimm's Fairy Tales, *The Valiant Little Tailor*.

² With Simone Weil this word, in this and similar contexts, means: emotional interpretation, the concrete judgment of value. For instance, I see a man climbing over a wall: instinctively, and perhaps wrongly, I 'read' in him a robber. (*Editor's note.*)

love all people equally, for I do not have an equal love for all the modes of existence of myself. Nor does it mean that we should never make them suffer, for I do not refuse to make myself suffer. But we should have with each person the relationship of one conception of the universe to another conception of the universe, and not to a part of the universe. A man standing ten paces away from me is something separated from me by a distance (ten paces), but also another point of view under which all things appear. The relationship between me and another man can never be analogous to the relationship between the blind man and his stick, nor to the inverse relationship either; that is why slavery is contrary both to nature and reason.

War is a way of imposing another reading of sensations, a pressure upon the imagination of others.

Sensations are imposed on us from outside, and we are also able to offer some to ourselves—always, in any situation—in a non-immediate manner.

The reading of sensations, what we read by and through them, is also imposed; but there again we have a non-immediate power over them through the effort and custom furnished by the body.

But in this regard we need to distinguish between two powers, that of finding ourselves or not in a given situation (e.g. standing before a machine, in a prison, with a knife held at our throat, or in our hand, with or without money in our pocket, etc.) which depends on us in a certain measure, but only in a certain measure; and that of, when actually in a certain given situation, reading in such a way or in such another way.

There are certain phrases (combinations of words) which a man of superior type does not pronounce, only a man of inferior type. There are others which both a man of superior type and a man of inferior type pronounce, but while giving them a different meaning. There are probably not any, strictly speaking, which only a man of superior type is able to pronounce, except for the first time (for other men can always repeat what they have heard).

Exactly the same thing applies in the case of actions—but with a difference due to the fact that action is both unique and indefinitely varied.

There are two ways of changing for other people the way in which they read sensations, their relationship to the universe: force (that kind of which the extreme form is war) and education. They are two actions exercised over the imagination. The difference

between them is that people do not associate themselves with the former (they only react), whereas they do associate themselves with the latter.

One may be able, by the use of force, to degrade other people, or prevent them from being degraded; but one can only raise them up by means of education.

There is a third way, beauty (example).

May one combine the first with one of the other two?

It is (perhaps) only permissible to make a negative use of force.

Difference between the spirit of the *Bhagavad-Gîtâ* and that of the story of Joan of Arc, a fundamental difference: he makes war although inspired by God, she makes war because inspired by God.

(To think on God, to love God, is nothing else than a certain way of thinking on the world.)

War is the supreme form of prestige. The handling of arms may have as its object putting an end to prestige (Marathon), or establishing a durable prestige (Roman Empire)—In the former case there is an internal contradiction, in the latter case, not—Once the sword has been unsheathed, the domination of prestige is set up; non-resistance is not a means of avoiding it; Christ himself was for a moment deprived of God. Contact with force, from whichever end the contact is made (sword handle or sword point) deprives one for a moment of God. Whence the *Bhagavad-Gîtâ*. The *Bhagavad-Gîtâ* and the Gospels complete each other.

That is why there is something essentially false in the Old Testament (certain parts), as also in the story of Joan of Arc: her voices are bound up with prestige. So also is Jehovah.

However just the cause of the conqueror may be, however just that of the conquered, the evil caused, whether by victory or by defeat, is none the less inevitable. It is useless to hope to escape from it. That is why Christ did not come down from the Cross, and did not even remember, at the moment of supreme anguish, that he would return to life. That is why the other one¹ did not lay down arms and stop the battle.

Is it not perhaps true that conquest is nothing other than a bad way of seeking for the *Ātman* identical with *Brahma*? Man needs to be alone in the universe in order to be identical with the universe. (But if he is alone thanks to suppressing others, his is the only perspective.) I have the right to appropriate all things to myself, but others are an obstacle in the way. I must take up arms to get rid

¹ Arjuna, the hero of the *Bhagavad-Gîtâ*.

of this obstacle. But this appropriation can be regarded as infinite—or as finite, if something finite, for example a field, furnishes the equivalent of the universe. In the latter case, I have no reason for not wanting others also to possess the universe in the shape of a finite object, seeing that such finite objects are to be in harmonious relationship toward one another. I, therefore, only want to inflict a limited damage upon the enemy; but I am unable to do this, for the use of arms necessarily carries with it the unlimited.

The infinite that is in man is at the mercy of a little piece of iron; such is the human condition; space and time are the cause of it. It is impossible to handle this piece of iron without suddenly reducing the infinite that is in man to a point on the tip, a point on the hilt, at the cost of a harrowing pain. Impossible not to handle it. The whole being is stricken for a moment; there is no place left for God, even in the case of Christ, for whom the thought of God is at any rate no more than one of deprivation. This stage has to be reached if there is to be incarnation. The entire being becomes deprivation of God: how proceed beyond this? There is nothing after this, except the resurrection. To get as far as this the cold touch of naked iron is necessary.

On taking up arms, we should think of all we shall lose if we are beaten, and that, if we win, we shall make others whom we love as ourselves lose exactly the same. To take this loss upon ourselves, let the enemy have a free hand, is inadmissible. Christ did so, but in the position of a simple individual condemned by the legitimate authorities. But if we feel the cold touch of the iron, we shall limit ourselves, even at the cost of serious risks, and we shall lay it aside again as soon as the threat has been a little removed.

At the touch of the iron there must be a feeling of separation from God such as Christ experienced, otherwise it is another God. The martyrs did not feel themselves separated from God, but it was another God, and perhaps it was better not to be a martyr. The God from whom the martyrs drew joy in torture or death closely resembles the one who was officially adopted by the Roman Empire and afterwards imposed by means of exterminations.

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'He in whose wake the year unfolds its days.'

The stuff of which the world is woven is time, and what is time outside of my own thoughts? What would present and future be without me who think them? And if they are both nothing, the universe is

nothing, for what does being for a single instant represent? How then could I be otherwise than associated with creation? But it is necessary that I should think time as a co-creator. And how am I to do that?

Affliction: Time bears the thinking being in spite of himself towards that which he cannot bear and which will come all the same. 'Let this cup pass from me.' (Each second which passes brings some being in the world nearer to something he cannot bear.)

Infinite difference between three hours spent at a machine on piece-work, and three hours spent in front of a fresco of Giotto's. The relationship between time and me is the stuff of which my life is woven, and it is possible to establish an infinite difference therein. A Bach fugue is a model.

With the Greeks, the science of nature was itself an art, with the world for material and the imagination for instrument, and consisted, as do the other arts, in a combination of the limited and the unlimited. Whence the agreement between science and art. With us, opposition, because our science analyses.

To make of the universe the work of God. To make of the universe a work of art.

That is the object of Greek science.

That of classical science is to 'make us masters and possessors of nature' (assimilation to God, very different from the former one) by means of a knowledge that we find in ourselves. (Reconstruction *a priori*, analogous to the deciphering of a code message in an unknown code.)

That of contemporary science: to express in algebraical terms the regularities of nature, in order to make use of them.

Getting lower and lower.

Where there is progress, the level is necessarily low. '*Ars longa, vita brevis.*'

Woe is unlimited, cruelty also. Tragedy captures this unlimitedness as in a net; it is necessary that it should remain unlimited and yet cease to be so. Relationships of force have got to appear in lightning fashion in the midst of which man loses himself, God, the universe, everything. *Phèdre* is like this, and nothing else in the French theatre. *Lear*, *Othello*.

Chândogya-Upanishad, VIII, 3.

These desires are real things behind a veil of falsity; the reality of such real things is veiled by falsity. He who has lost one of his dear ones by death is no longer able to see him. Yet those among his dear ones who are living and those who are dead, and everything that he longs for and cannot seize—all this he finds by going there, there where are his desires which are real things behind a veil of falsity.

A weaker one balances a stronger one through the *dharma kstrasya ksatan*.

—To lose somebody: we suffer at the thought that the dead one, the absent one should have become something imaginary, something false. But the longing we have for him is not imaginary. We must go down into ourselves, where the desire which is not imaginary resides. Hunger; we imagine different foods; but the hunger itself is real; we must seize hold of the hunger.

The loss of contact with reality—there lies evil, there lies sorrow. There are certain situations which bring about such a loss: deprivation, suffering. The remedy is to use the loss itself as an intermediary for attaining reality. The presence of the dead one is imaginary, but his absence is very real; it is henceforth his manner of appearing.

Human life is a composition on several planes.

We should imitate the abandonment to time of inert things.

Time does us violence; it is the only violence. 'Another shall gird thee and carry thee whither thou wouldest not'; time carries us whither we do not wish to go. Though I be condemned to death, I shall yet not be executed if, in the interval, time comes to a stop. Whatever frightful thing is to happen, can we desire that time should stop, that the stars should be stayed in their courses? Time's violence rends the soul: by the rent eternity enters.

To escape from time—that is a sin.

Earthly paradise; not to eat of the apple is like not thinking of the polar bear.¹ Obsession. Negative virtue; thought directed away from obsessions. We have but to be filled for a moment with ob-

¹ The legendary ferocity of the polar bear for long haunted the imagination of those inhabiting or visiting northern latitudes: cf. 'big bad wolf.' (Tr.)

session, and we lose paradise, we are driven forth, naked, by the sword of the angel.

Mathematics in Greece and detachment.

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contemplation of a mathematical figure while setting in motion the relationships.

(‘identification’—man lifting up a stone and lever.)

<there is here a hidden relationship with beauty>.

Is not algebra the cause of this loss of mathematical efficacy? Is it not for this reason that the Greeks did not have any?

Purification by Space . . .

Analogy between *Oresteia* and the story of the murderer returning over and over again to life.

Writing—like translating—negative operation—setting aside those words which conceal the model, the silent thing which has to be expressed.

Acting, just the same. *Σύ τοι σεαυτήν, οὐκ ἐγώ, κατακτενείς*.¹ Such is non-intervention. Action which springs from a situation, which expresses it. How to define it? Beautiful action. Action which concludes, suspends the indefinite dialogue between the unbalanced elements that respond to each other, and establishes the unique balance corresponding to the given situation. Action in which the person behind it does not appear.

But fanaticism imitates this very well: how make a distinction?

Πατὴρ δὲ γὰρ αἶσα τόνδε σοῦρῖζει μόρον.²

Ἔοικα θρηγνῆν ζῶσα πρὸς τύμβον μάτην.³

Things, symbols of justice.

A right action—is it the one which we imagine we should do when we imagine a given situation? Surely not.

Not ‘I would do it again if I had it to do’, but: ‘I cannot do other-

¹ It is thou, not I, who wilt kill thyself (Aeschylus, *Choephoroi*, 923).

² The fate meted out to my father condemns thee to death (*Ibid.*, 927).

³ I seem to sing a requiem at my tomb, foolishly though I am still alive (*Ibid.*, 926).

wise': c.g. Lawrence returning to look for the Arab who had lost his way.

The 'I' is absent also from crime, but in another way.

A particular situation meets with a particular consciousness: the result is a change in the situation.

(indiv. project?)

Geometrical figure, model?

Let all the aspects of a situation be brought to mind, let the latter ponder them all equally, with an equal attention, equal as the light of the sun; then let a balance be struck; and then let the attention be directed above all towards the chosen aspect, so that the action may be carried out.

Louse and archer.¹

War being an action upon the imagination, the first difficulty is to free oneself from the effects of imagination, have at one's disposal (as for a problem in geometry) the various means of combining the constituent parts, the data. Let a concrete situation appear in a different relationship. (Free oneself from the effects of unreality: *in the imaginary world, one single system of relationships.*)

World. various simultaneous readings. partition.

Others. Look upon each human being (image of oneself) as a prison inhabited by a prisoner, surrounded by the whole universe.

The existence of the dead in Homer is an *imaginary* existence.

Is there such a thing as a life—in the world, not in solitude of some kind—that is pure, beautiful and complete like a Greek statue? Or a single action that is so?

The behaviour of Socrates before the Courts?

[Socrates's rule in life: not to defend justice, truth; but not to do injustice, not to betray truth. Nor to cease either, it is true, from pursuing his own vocation.]

¹ Ref. to Taoist technique of attention. 'To destroy locusts in full flight, it is enough simply to see in the whole universe the particular locust aimed at and nothing more: you cannot then fail to hit it. To become an archer, you should lie for two years under a loom and not blink your eyes when the shuttle shoots back and forth; then for three years, with your face turned to the light, make a louse climb up a silk thread. When the louse appears to be larger than a wheel, than a mountain; when it hides the sun; when you see its heart, you may then shoot: you will hit it right in the middle of the heart.' (Lao-Tse.) [Text found among Simone Weil's notes.]

St. Francis throwing his clothes at his father?

There are certain actions that are easy to imagine, but difficult to do, like that of the Roman who gave himself up so as to stop his slaves being tortured. There were only two possibilities before him: remain hidden or give himself up. No inventive effort required.

The judgments of Solomon on the other hand are acts resulting from inventive effort.

The clemency shown by the father of the Gracchi, in Spain . . . (?)

Pure *and* efficacious. 'The will is free, and at the same time efficacious', two meanings.

David?		Râma killing the Shûdra?
Law-givers		

On the stage. The slow maturing of an act, with the universe around—Then the act precipitated into the world.

Proportion arrests¹ the course of the dyad.

The proportional mean— $3 \times 12 = 6 \times 6$. Whence, whether always using 12 as a multiple, or always dividing 3 by 2, two infinities are established, but forced to submit to a finite relationship.

Can this be translated in concrete fashion?

A square and all the possible rectangles: is that propounded? . . .
(It is necessary that the square should not be drawn.)



Other—Maximum: sum of a product.

If the contradiction between the large and the small, the heavy and the light, calls for *διάνοια*,¹ why should not the contemplation of the essential contradictions of the human condition be the exercise of the highest faculty?

Science has not the right to place in doubt primary hypotheses (in Plato's sense); that is not its rôle; it is below this level. Ex. continuous space (hence energy); if it is felt, imagined as much as, or rather than, conceived, that is what is wanted at this level;

Far Eastern idea of the successful outcome of virtue (China, India).

¹ Discursive thought, reasoning.

Contrary idea in the Middle East (Persia, Egypt, Greece, Christianity).

War

Contact with force is hypnotizing; plunges one into a dream. Oneself should suffer force wide awake, handle it wide awake—but beware! for there is, among other aspects of the state of slumber, an illusion of extreme lucidity which is not wakefulness—As for other people, plunging them into a dream, one should take care that it is the distressing sort of dream which provokes the longing to awaken from it (but not horrible enough to take away even that longing) and that a possibility of so awakening is left to them.

thought, like action: indirect preparation through concentration without an object or on another object

Criterion: fear and the taste for killing. Avoidance of each of these—How? In Spain, this seemed to me a heart-breaking effort, impossible to maintain for long. Make oneself such, then, that one is able to maintain it.

Just as when composing a piece of music or poetry you have in view a certain inward silence of the soul and you dispose the sounds or the words in such a way as to render the ardent desire for this silence perceptible to others—so in the case of arms and the longing for peace.

The art of arms in this way is an art.

‘War is the continuation of a peace policy by other means.’ The use of arms has an end; it should be modelled upon that end.

1. This end is made up of one of three things. Either to create among the enemy a disposition to obey the wishes of the particular State in question, always, whatever these wishes may be (war for the extermination of the enemy, after the Roman style).

2. Or to obtain certain limited and definite advantages that one has not been able to obtain by negotiation; the combat then represents but a moment in the negotiation, should cause the enemy more harm than the loss of the disputed advantages, without provoking terror or an inexpiable resentment (xixth century wars, Sadowa, 1870?).

3. Or to create among the enemy the desire for peace (defensive war).

One easily passes from 3 to 1 (sometimes from 2 to 1); one must not.

To change the mind of the enemy is the object; death is only a means. *To kill as little as possible.* (Lawrence.)

Let war be only one of the means of persuasion (in all three cases).

The desire for peace, for security, for life—One can apply thereto 'satyāḥ kāmāḥ anṛtāpidhānāḥ'.¹ Not to renounce this, even if one is almost certain of being killed: one should regret the latter, but abolish in oneself the longing after, the dream of security; go right down into oneself to the true desire. Then, courage without cruelty . . . Similarly in the case of the need for killing; but here, great danger.

To keep the love of life intact within us (not like Achilles); never to inflict death without accepting it for ourselves.

Supposing the life of a certain person were linked with our own to the extent that the two deaths had to be simultaneous, would we still wish that that person should die? If with our whole body and soul we desire life, and if nevertheless, without lying, we can reply 'yes', then we have the right to kill that person.

Not otherwise.

But is that sufficient? We must also desire that the other person should live, although necessity be opposed thereto.

According to whether we are in case 1, 2 or 3, the method of making war is not the same. So we have not got to copy the enemy.

My essential idea of 1934: It is not the end which matters, what matters are the consequences implied by the mechanism itself of the means put into operation.

That is true, if the means are not, in their structure, in their mechanism, adapted to their end.

But they have got to be.

E.g.: a victory of N°. 1 type will not be lasting unless one is prepared to exercise over the enemy country a domination as of master towards slave. To obtain it, therefore, is not a success. Hannibal. 1918?

If one is in case 3, tactics and strategy of category 3 are what is wanted.

Cause of wars: There is in every man and in every group of men a feeling that they have a just and legitimate claim to be masters of

¹ *Chândogya-Upanishad*, VIII, 3, 1: desires which are realities are hidden behind the veil of unreality.

the universe—to possess it. But this possession is improperly understood, because they do not understand that each one has access to it (in so far as this is possible for a man on this earth) through his own body; (through the *finite* part of himself).

Alexander and a peasant proprietor, like Don Juan and a happily married husband.

Human relations. All those which have something infinite about them are unjust. Now, although everything connected with man is finite and measurable, nevertheless, after reaching a certain degree, the infinite comes into play.

[e.g. if all the food two men have per day is in the one case 1 lb. of bread and in the other case 18 oz., the difference is finite; if one of them has $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. and the other one 6 lb., the difference is infinite, for what is everything for one is negligible for the other.]

As in physics, the notion of the negligible forms the passage between the finite and the infinite.

Defensive tactics are not what Ch.¹ thought they were. Offence is a means of defence, but *another sort* of offence than that which serves the purpose of conquest. Besides, the method should draw its inspiration from the particular situation, and it is impossible to devise a *passe-partout* model.

If contradiction is what pulls, draws the soul towards the light, contemplation of the first principles (hypotheses) of geometry and kindred sciences should be a contemplation of their contradictions.

Why do we suppose pure straight lines, pure motives? etc.

The opaque, the shadowy, that is contradiction.

[fire, the sensible evidence of it?]

Good alone is without contradiction, but dazzling. The mind can only let its gaze rest on contradiction, lighted up by good.

H., mistaken assumption with regard to good, which he thinks is situated in a thing (the blood, transmitted by heredity). Analogous misconception in the case of progress: good, situated in chronological sequence.

[The figurines are the objects (six-sided cube), the shadows their outward aspects.]

How does good become incarnate?

¹ Probably the philosopher Chartier, more commonly known under the name of Alain. (Tr.)

Courage. We more or less tend to be afraid. We must not try to suppress fear, but to direct it. A coward will perhaps stand an injection, an operation, etc., better than a more courageous man, if his mind is sufficiently absorbed by the fear of dying from a disease.

Similarly in the case of a soldier, for fear of being punished or simply of disobeying ['I felt that whatever I was ordered to do I would do it, since I was a private soldier, but I would not have done anything voluntarily; I just *could* not']. The training of soldiers is based on this mobile quality possessed by fear which renders it transportable. We should use this effect on ourselves, consciously. Choose that which we want to fear. But choosing is not enough: we must bring ourselves to fear that particular thing.

Certain things which are not immediately qualified to provoke fear do, nevertheless, immediately cause fear (reading, blind man's stick). We should reach the state where the things that we want to fear do immediately cause fear, while the other things do so far less.

A sick or wounded man who is very afraid of dying, but who is being subjected to very painful treatment, may, after a certain degree has been reached, after a certain time has elapsed, forget his fear of death and wish only to be left alone. [He is not sufficiently afraid.] Previously, on the other hand, his fear of death neutralized his fear of pain.

To bring the body to the point where it fears dishonour (in the most intimate sense of that word) more than death, mutilation, pain, etc.—and that in an immediate fashion.

Plato. Comparison with vision. Mathematics themselves, in the deliverance of the soul, should probably be contemplation, not discursive reasoning (knowledge of the 3rd kind?). The intuition of Descartes?

The axiomatic method of modern mathematicians: what are they after? They concoct mathematical theories without knowing what use to make of them.

(Must ask A.¹: does he experience the joys of success, or aesthetic pleasure?)

[beginning of the *Bṛhad-Ār.-Up.*: there is good and evil in the voice, the breath (prāṇa), the vision, the hearing, the manas, but not in the breath which is in the mouth (āsanyam prāṇam); the asuras, wishing to make evil penetrate it, perished; by it death has been

¹ See footnote, p. 8. Most likely same reference. (Tr.)

banished to the ends of the earth. Then it transports the voice beyond death; whence fire; the breath; whence the wind; the vision (eye); whence the sun; the hearing, whence the regions of space; the manas, whence the moon.]

No action being either good or evil in itself, but depending on circumstances, at any given moment whatever, through sensory appearances of whatever kind, one can always imagine (read) a situation with respect to which (if only it existed) such and such an action would be just. Later on, one reads differently, but the action has been accomplished.

Thus, without control over the imagination, one can do anything whatever.

How, in view of what, in virtue of what shall it be controlled?
The fault does not lie in the action, it lies in the reading.

To become conscious of the fact that one is reading: already very difficult. To aim at reading well—and what does that signify?

To read in such a way that what is desirable seems well.

To read in such a way that what is well seems desirable.

When one rises to the notion of reading, arbitrariness appears.
Here, of course . . . ?

There are certain forms of effort that are exhausting, there are others that supply new energy; where lies the origin of the former?

The mechanism by which too difficult a situation debases is that the energy supplied by lofty sentiments is—generally—limited; if the situation requires that we should go beyond this limit, we have to have recourse to base sentiments (fear, cupidity, desire to beat the record, outward honours), richer in energy (find out why?).

This limitation is the key to a good many reversals.

Infinite richness of the notion of energy as applied to human existence: source as yet unexplored.

Feeling—relationship between the world and the mind: it comes from the world, immediately, with the sensations, and like them, but varies in accordance with the displacements of energy in the human being—

Let this energy become a means of exploring the world—a blind man's stick? . . .

Is not mathematical contemplation, in Plato, a mixture of the finite and the indefinite? (Single, finite, indefinite.)

The shadow of the pyramids.

Multiple shadows of one single object.

The relationship between the forms of appearance of a box and the box itself is that between mathematical propositions and . . . (and what?) Divine shadows, representations of that which is.

Loci. The locus of the points which . . .

The locus of the points the product of whose distances . . .

Algebra enables us to dispense with this kind of knowledge—(can one have it in the case of algebra itself?)

Algebra: procedure for reducing the functional notion of knowledge of the 3rd kind to knowledge of the 2nd kind.

[Why should not the distinction between intuition and discursiveness be of the first importance, since: 1. time is the essential bondage, 2. the inner silence . . .]

[composition of a poem: thought without language, for the choice of words takes place without the help of words.]

.
If the Greeks were so attached to geometry, is it not because they thought by *drawing lines, without words?* And yet (or for that very reason?) perfect axiomatic quality. Postulates of Euclid, of construction. To limit that which one allows oneself to draw.

.
If the Greeks had a special and not a general geometry (Auguste Comte), it is because they reserved the general for a type of knowledge of the 3rd kind, thus falling into the special as soon as they wrote down demonstrations. They refused to make use of algebra. Only true, of course, in the case of the greatest among them; the rest had not even got the idea of the general. Is this one of the secrets of Plato's teaching?

The chain in the cavern is *Time*.—To look at one thing only at a time.

Effort in order to grasp the ellipse, similar to that made in the contemplation of a work of art.

To reach the point of reading in mathematics.

Pure reading (for Berger¹: on the notion of Reading)—

Problem. What shape must be given to a sheet of paper or metal in order that, whether folded or rolled, it can form . . . (a cone, truncated cone, etc.)

¹ Gaston Berger, a specialist in the philosophy of Husserl, presumably.

The shadow of a circle is an ellipse.
Geometry by the study of shadows.
Reading of shadows.
Spinoza and Rousseau.

Measure: the even
flow of time—
the stars which
revolve.

Unique form of an object, different shadows of which one sees passing many times in front of one.

Captives have not even the idea of the relation object-shadow.

In such and such a situation, you act in a manner of which, afterwards, you are ashamed; you promise yourself not to begin over again. But when a similar situation arises, you do not recognize the resemblance; because it does not resemble the recollection you have of the other one; it resembles the other one.

Only afterwards . . .

What is the remedy? First of all to know in what the situation and the recollection (or expectation) of it differ. [Reading.]

Greek geometry. If by means of axioms and postulates one defines constructions and not successions of words, one can have a rigorously exact intuitive geometry.

(further examination required)

The straight line is what I draw when thinking of the purely straight. Truth is what I think—what I read in appearances—when desiring the purely true. This desire is 'Thy will, not mine, be done'. One does not want to change that which is.

Not to read what we fear or what we desire.

The beautiful: that which we do not want to change. The good: not to want to change it, in fact (non-intervention). The true: not to want to change it in one's mind (by means of illusion).

The good—not to want to change what? My place, my importance in the world, limited by my body and by the existence of other souls, my equals.

To return a deposit?

To expose oneself to death?

Problem; not to read the solution in the figure, but the difficulties?

[Palan. Two causes of error: automatism and desire.]

To introduce time also.

Evil cannot be contemplated: darkness. Nor good either: sun. Only the opaque—combination of the two.

Not to want to change. Desire: always to arrest or hasten the flow of time.

Music—time that one wants neither to arrest nor hasten.

Necessity.

To accept to be subjected to necessity and to act only by handling it. War. *Gîtâ*.

To fight while thinking equally of defeat or victory?

Balance. Sun.

To accept to suffer within Time and to act within Time—indirectly.

He who appropriates to himself a deposit wishes that this deposit were not a deposit. He has received it as such. He could not have received it otherwise, for it would not have been given to him.

One man reads therein a deposit, another man does not. We must reach a unity in the reading thereof.

To read in outward aspects something which another person, differently situated, differently affected, is able to read—by making the same effort.

A king led in triumph to Rome. Those of his followers who accompany him (likewise in chains) see in him their king: the Romans, a conquered man. No amount of effort will enable the former to read in the same way as the latter, and vice versa—but a joint effort can enable them all to arrive at a third reading, the same for all.

Reading of the sack by the soldier of Magdeburg and the pastor clinging on to his cloak.

To regard one's own reading and that of another person as equivalent (like the perspectives).

That is still another criterion.

Inner silence	Not to change
check	Time
immobility	Others
?	

and still another:
doubt. What one thinks
while saying to oneself:
what I think is perhaps
absolutely false. But to
read doubt in all out-
ward aspects.

To want to make one's dream read by others. H.
Confusion of level. Legitimate for a true reading.
Yes, but . . .

Others can read truly only by their own efforts.

So then, use of force?

Use of force to check a dream, not to impose another one on the top of it. Negative.

Not to want to change one's own weight in the scales of the world—the golden scales of Zeus.

We possess a limited force. We should want to make full use of it—but not go beyond.

What exact significance to give to this?

Boat.

Greek statues, motionless beings made by motionless beings.

To read in all outward aspects that the world exists.

To read in all outward aspects—God.

Nothing less.

What you draw while thinking of a straight line makes you think of a straight line when you look at it. The same applies to art. The same applies to action. Miracle.

Gítá. Two possible meanings? To kill in oneself teachers, friends, parents? Inward death.

To kill is always to kill oneself. Two ways of killing oneself, suicide (Achilles) or detachment.

There is a third way of killing, which is not to know that those one is killing exist—except it be as things-to-be-killed. (Rest of the *Iliad*; Spain.)

To kill in thought everything that one loves; only way of dying. But only that which one loves.

Not to desire that that which one loves should be immortal.

Those whom you are going to kill are mortal.

Standing in front of a human being, whoever it may be—not to wish him either immortal or dead.

To make of the first reading a blind man's stick. The true reading: the second one.

Can it be said that what makes the readings of several men very different is bad? (military victory [defeat] (not even a single name!)—oppression—slavery).

For things outside our power, 'Thy will, not mine, be done' is clear. But for things within our power?

Not to regard them as such. To read the obligation as a necessity.
*cf. St. John of the Cross, whom I had not read when I wrote that.*¹

To act in a certain sense while not reading a single motive for acting thus. This is the most distressing. Extreme anguish. 'Why hast thou . . .' Yet it is the sole lever (one of the levers?) for changing level—Remedy for the inward desolation.

—When the result of an action is a situation which imposes a way of being such that one can no longer read the motive for the action from outward appearances . . .

Very difficult not to confuse with the arbitrary, sterile and inexperienced form of asceticism. It is necessary to *have had* a reason.

Detachment with regard to what one has been (*προτετύχθαι εἰδόμεν*²) and to what one will be. To wait for what one will do, how one will behave, as something instructive about oneself.

Text, modification of the text. Our body. We must study a reading very closely, and above all clearly distinguish between the reading of an existing situation and recollection (also expectation).

E.g. such and such an action condemned by law (but which we judge to be honourable) which we do at the risk of going to prison, and knowing the fact. We can read honour in the circumstances of the action, at the moment when it is accomplished (among which circumstances the thought of the prison), but, later on, shame in the aspect of the prison.

In order to re-establish the continuity broken up by the changes of text, we need to lie to ourselves. We are saved the necessity of such a lie when we know what reading actually represents.

[TO READ IN OUTWARD APPEARANCES THE NOTION OF READING?]
[To read in outward appearances one's own reading as such, and the necessity—in the sense of mechanical necessity—for this reading.]
[yes, but at other times . . .] [*not to read* is better]

train music statue . . .

Voluntary change of text. Analogy with illusions, figures in double-relief, etc. Analogy moreover inadequate, it would seem, but in what respect?

¹ Added subsequently in the margin by Simone Weil.

² Let the past remain the past (*Iliad*, XVI, 60).

[Purification corresponding to Greek columns . . . , founded on what? Look up treatises on architecture.]

[Moon on the horizon. You do not see, but you read. You think you see. This belief is a fact, like colour.]

To build in accordance with what you wish to be read.

What is needed is a *precise* description of the hierarchical order of the states of the soul, without that . . .

Not to read. Possible only for brief moments.

Not to read.

To read, and read at the same time one's own reading, the notion of reading, the mechanical or quasi-mechanical necessity for that particular reading, at this moment, in this place, in this state.

multiple perspectives, composition on multiple planes.

[O's remark about the body. That is what is lacking with Chartier.]
<two remarks of O. That one and—in a lesser degree—the one about children>.

[To read, and doubt what you read, but in an abstract way, without *reading* the doubt.]

(degrees) To read, and believe what you read.—
at the very lowest: to believe altogether.

Struggle against such and such emotions left by [conversation, etc.], inferior level. In view of such and such data which I apprehend clearly, according to them, what ought I to do? You then read in the situation (as far as you are able to make it out, i.e. from the data) the only type of conduct possible (possible in a particular sense: the only one which corresponds to the data).

[remember—O.—the influence of the body on [the feelings and] the thoughts comes from the fact that the body is quicker than the lower intelligence, and so has already responded to the new situation while the intelligence is working; the intelligence is only able to register. But the higher intelligence is quicker than the body: e.g. moments of very great lucidity in extreme danger. What must we think of this?]

[But perhaps one can create A HABIT OF PREVENTING THE BODY FROM RESPONDING PREMATURELY? One can also not believe it, but that is an inferior procedure, because of the phenomenon of reading.]

Association. Repetition (in ancient texts, Homer, Upanishads, etc.), rhyme, measure—is not this a purification of association? To give it its share. Its legitimate share.

Folklore. The wife of the dead man. *Tales de nunca acabar*¹ (smoke—I set out from Córdoba). Tenquita.

[cf. talc: who is the most powerful? (circle).]

Why, in science, does the concept of cause occupy such a prominent place? (why, if it is not because of the technical aspect!) Why not *conditions of existence*?

One reads, but also one *is read* by others. Interpositions of such readings. To force somebody to read himself as you read him (slavery). To force others to read you as you read yourself (conquest).

Mechanism?

More often than not, dialogue between the deaf.

Value of moments of intuition (e.g. pure music). On the supposition that one knows how to discern differences in value between the states of discursive thought; if the discursive thought which follows upon such moments is of a superior level (of lucidity, etc.) compared with the preceding one, is not that a proof?

Justice. To be continually ready to admit that another person is something other than what we read when he is there (or when we think about him). Or rather: to read in him also (and continually) that he is certainly something other than what we read—perhaps something altogether different.

'I have not turned a deaf ear to just and true words.'²

Every being silently clamours to be read otherwise.

Not to be deaf to such cries.

The 'breath of the mouth' (in the Upanishads), not shot through and through with evil like the breath of the nose (sense of smell), speech, sight, hearing, thought (manas), is it not that which is active—(playing the part of effort with Maine de Biran³)?

In what way can an action which one accomplishes do harm or good to oneself? Indirect power over oneself, of oneself in the present, over oneself in the future.

An act which makes it so that one afterwards lies to oneself. Ex.?

Is it the act or the situation resulting therefrom?

¹ Cf. footnote, p. 14.

² *Egyptian Book of the Dead*.

³ French philosopher of the spiritualist school (1766-1824).

Lying to oneself springs from a vital necessity, when one has not made up one's mind to die.

Square of white surrounded with black. One of the secrets of composition, especially in poetry and prose.

An author should play with the imagination of the reader as coldly as a coquette does with the imagination of the man she wants to seduce—and he is himself the reader—but at the same time be in the grip of a violent, intense feeling, which is not affected by the game, only possible term of comparison for judging the efficacy of the game. When either of the terms is lacking, or when they are mixed up together, what is written is of the second—or *n*th class.

Equivalence between things that are different and even opposed, but which remain at one same level, expressing the same necessities in different ways. Hundreds of examples in the life of a human being. In the composition of a written work. In social communities. Ex. the system of big factories, and on the one hand disorder, decomposition, subversive propaganda, and on the other totalitarian order.

	The present only. Moments of
the highest,	pure music (listening carefully to Bach, etc.).
the lowest,	Doing piece-work in a factory.
	Two extremes.

Notion of lever applied to the inner life (in accordance with notion of energy)—For want of a lever, instead of transforming in the direction of a higher value, we change at the same level.

Lever and blind man's stick.

Breathing (controlled), lever *and* blind man's stick at the beginning of the *B.Ā.U.*¹?

To look for examples of *vital* necessity for lying to oneself. Vital necessity for reading in a certain way.

To read in the stars that one is mortal.

Controlled breathing with a view to inner silence; meaning of the beginning of the *B.Ā.U.*?

Silence of the brahmin during the sacrifice, certainly also inner silence. Need for an apprenticeship to attain thereto.

Not to read. When one is obsessed by a certain analogy, in a geometrical problem, which checks one's thought—to manage to

¹ See Index to Sanskrit terms.

look at the figure, for a moment, without reading, so as afterwards to read other analogies.

The same applies to Greek or Latin versions. (Whence their educative value.)

To suspend one's judgment: not to read.

{ Not to read.

{ Not to speak.

Supplementary (extra-vital) and roving energy, key to human life. (One may, if one likes, call it sexual—Flows abundantly in youth, diminishes later on.) Relation to object—Arnolphe and Agnès.¹ Harpagon and his treasure-casket (profound significance of the scene about the casket's beautiful eyes).

Lever. How does one displace this energy?

To read in outside things what we carry within ourselves—inevitable. How manage to escape it? Or even turn it into a means of reading truly? Possible resource: ANALOGY.

Chinese painting, non-human perspectives (of bird, insect). Teaching, purification, *μεταξύ*?

To see each human being as a bottle in which there is a genie. The bottles shift about (and sometimes meet, knock against each other), through the incoherent movements communicated to them from inside.

Teaching of geometry, not as a sum of knowledge, but as a purification from error through imagination. Plato's procedure?

Objective, universal: contradiction, the knots of necessity and impossibility (Why?) E.g. number and continuousness.

Why? central point from which one beholds as it were like perspectives *all possible opinions on a subject*.

DIALECTICS Not exactly discursive thought. The opposition between discursive thought and intuitive thought requires thorough re-examination.

Truth: many readings at once? but *readings*, not just opinions
an infinite number? or thoughts. [e.g. art of war?]

¹ Characters in Molière's *L'Ecole des Femmes*.

Each human being: genie in a bottle. The bottles move about, meet, touch, knock against each other (without doing any harm to the glass, which is unbreakable, but to the being who is inside), according to the confused impulsions communicated from the inside.

Art of moving about in the bottle: like apprenticeship to a trade. To make of it an instrument, a tool, a blind man's stick.

The two essential things in Platonic dialectics: *contradiction* and *analogy*. Both are a means of emerging from the *point of view*.

If one follows the allegory of the cavern, one should see on the wall of the cavern a shadow of oneself corresponding to the light of the fire—and, having emerged from it, but still looking at the ground, a shadow of oneself, but produced by the light of the sun (evil in itself? necessity in itself?) and an image of oneself in the water (level of the *μεταξύ*, of mathematics and of love). On lifting up one's head, one sees nothing more of oneself.

To create oneself, by one's actions, a screen (an additional screen) between oneself and reality. What is the mechanism?

Or, on the contrary, actions which are as levers towards greater reality. What is the mechanism?

Through insignificant actions, where there is a certain scope, a certain free energy; not through important ones, where what one does is a faithful interpretation of what one is. Is that it?

Ex. the way in which a father spends an hour with his little daughter, aged a few months, smiles to her, lends himself to her coquettish ways. Of the first importance both for him and for her.

Irreparable quality about insignificant actions.

['breath', 'breath which is in the mouth' in the Upanishads; yoga technique of breathing (about which I know nothing); is it a form of the same idea?

To associate the rhythm of the life of the body (breathing measures the time of such rhythm) with that of the universe (rotation of the stars); constantly to feel this association (feel it, not simply know it), and feel also the perpetual exchange of matter whereby the human being bathes in the universe.

What nothing can take away from a human being, as long as he lives—in the way of movement over which the will has control, breathing (apart from that, either organic changes over which, save exceptions, the will has no control, or movement of the bodily members which chains can impede); in the way of perception, space

(even in a dungeon, even with his eyes put out, his ear-drums pierced, as long as he lives, he perceives space).

To attach thereto the thoughts which you desire that no circumstance whatever can possibly deprive you of.]

To feel that your own continuance in time is also the time of the universe.

To ponder the idea (in the Upanishads) of the merit for deeds which becomes exhausted (merit corresponding to good actions only). These cause one to rise, but the ascension is limited, and at the end of a limited time, descension.

The real moral difficulties never resemble the abstract or imaginary ones, because in the case of the latter there are not several readings, the data being furnished by hypothesis.

Real difficulty, choosing from among the readings.

Mundaka. Om: bow—Ātman: shaft—Brahma: target—(bow, i.e. *μεταξύ*).

Like the spokes in the hub, at the exact spot where the channels meet on the inside . . . (so is the ātman).

Syllable om. One single *pure* sound, key to all things.

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Importance of geometry in space, perspectives, projections, etc.—for purification in the Platonic manner.

A centre from which may be seen the different possible readings—and their relationship—and our own only as one among them.

Several readings—not through sentiment alone. The little shepherdess cries when her favourite lamb is taken to the butcher's, but continues to rear lambs for the butcher. The followers of Cortés wept because of the Emperor's humiliation. The Romans and Carthage. Vain and impure pity—it is not without its delights. It contains a justification.

No, we should transport ourselves to that centre of thought from which the other person reads values; contemplate the values destroyed by what we are going to do.

How reconcile ourselves to the contradiction between accepting in advance every possible thing, without exception, in the event of its taking place—and, at a given moment, in a given situation, going almost beyond the limit of what we are capable of in order to prevent some particular thing from taking place?

The key is certainly to be found in the distinction between present

and future. Real events move no faster than do the stars in their courses. The duration which separates an event in the future from the present is real.

We prepare ourselves to accept one day such and such a possible future woe when it shall have become the past, but we do not confuse it with the past.

A being whom I love; he is mortal. Something inside me must be prepared to accept his death when it has become inscribed in the world, not in so far as it is his death, but in so far as it is something inscribed in the world. But supposing he is in mortal peril and that by stretching out my hand I can save him? This power that I possess forms part of reality, of matter (situation of my body in space, mechanical energy which it contains). As for him, it is his life, not his death, which is a fact. My desire that he should live is also a fact.

Is this a desire which I have been right in allowing to grow up inside me, though without attaching myself thereto? On detaching ourselves from desires, some of them are tolerated at their lower level, others are not. The same question poses itself.

Limited desires are in harmony with the world; desires which contain the infinite are not.

A limited desire that can be in consonance with my other desires and with the desires of other men (their limited desires).

To desire that a human being should live is to desire that oneself should be limited. A good desire if it is not unconditional.

To desire the death of a human being—this desire nearly always (or always?) contains the unlimited.

We should place ourselves at the centre from whence the unlimited commands all values—Read our own system of values—Detach ourselves from it. And thence (being the unlimited in thought) desire our own death. Can one then legitimately . . . ?

But inquisitors, perhaps, in the case of heretics . . . ?

No.

What is it evil to destroy? Not that which is base, for that doesn't matter. Not that which is high, for, even should we want to, we cannot touch that. The *μεταξύ*. The *μεταξύ* form the region of good and evil.

If we create for ourselves *μεταξύ* in organic life itself, then we cannot lose them so long as we remain alive. Yes, but . . .

No man should be deprived of a single one of his *μεταξύ*. Is this possible—when many people have some that are, in fact, mutually

exclusive? For example, a human being who represents *μεταξύ* for several other human beings?

One is perhaps obliged, finally—but never too late—to have recourse to considerations of quantity. Where a choice has to be made between two human beings, the one who is likely to receive the greatest amount of benefit (from the point of view of *μεταξύ*). This, in turn, is likely to be of benefit to a greater number of human beings.

Or else, is there some providential harmony? It would seem not. To refuse to allow oneself to want to know this.

Unless one happens to be a hermit living in the woods and not dependent on any human being for the necessities of life, it is useless to try to raise oneself above the *μεταξύ*, one remains in the sphere of good and evil through the relations established with those of the other people who are there too. It is impossible, therefore, for the problem of good and evil to disappear in the movement of ascent.

The sound om should be well sung.

Dharma. But . . . ?

In a given situation, every possible action contains a certain proportion of good and evil, or rather, since the proportion cannot be measured, a certain mixture. Dharma is a Law for choosing the mixture that is suitable for man. Thus in the case of Râma, doing harm to his wife rather than to his people, though well aware that his wife is in the right and the people in the wrong, because he is king. The same Law causes him to kill the shûdra.

If he thinks it wrong to kill the shûdra, he must find out if it is possible to establish little by little another sort of stable equilibrium in which a shûdra is able to act thus without being punished. In the meantime, it is his duty to kill him.

But that is only suitable in a stable society. Those people did not draw up rules for unstable societies.

What becomes of dharma in a conquered country? And what are the duties toward the conquerors? (Must find out.)

If the people had wanted Râma to sacrifice, on the strength of a false accusation, some worthless man? No.

What is, in India, the central notion lying within each *μεταξύ*? Flavour in the case of poetry. What in the case of military art?—of burglary?

Râma. Non-intervention. It is not he who acts when driving out his wife, when slaying the shûdra, it is the people. A king has to

accommodate himself to the imagination of the people. Yes, but to what extent? Within what limits?

If the carrying out of dharma involves injustices—which is always the case—one must then be prepared to deal equally unjustly for the sake of dharma, with what one loves the most.

The clear insight into evil contained in dharma acts as a limit to such evil. But is it enough?

One must suffer from such evil, suffer to the point of physical exhaustion.

Gītā. Must we conclude from this that the flight from the world of aged brahmins is not liberation from dharma; that it is simply their dharma, and consequently mixed up with evil, like all the other dharmas? Only this evil does not defile them; nor kings either, at the same level.

If Râma's wife were not at the same level as he, this evil would attach to her, although innocent—and not to him.

Māṇḍūkya Upanishad. Four states. Four in Plato also. But, apparently, nothing in common.

Wakefulness, consciousness directed toward outward things |
Dreaming, consciousness directed toward inward things | deep sleep,
without desire or dreaming, consciousness absorbed in self |
conscious neither of outward nor inward things nor of the two
together; neither conscious nor unconscious, solely conscious of the
self (???)—out of range: the *Ātman*.

Represented by A. U. M. and a combination of the 3.

If wakefulness is a combination of the practical ties with the world, regulated by personal needs; dreaming, passion, desire and anger; 'deep sleep', the intuitive intelligence; and the 4th state, a balance of the three—then there is harmony.

The reference to temporal goods in the Upanishads (O that I may be able . . . !)

—He . . . (the one who knows thus), is he a means of turning vital energy toward that which is best?

| man / shadow | that / this | *Ātman* / *prāna* |

Food.

Taittirīya—casting evil back inside one's body.

Nowadays, analogy between breathing and combustion. In ancient India, between breathing and sacrifice. It is the same analogy, the same bond between man and the world—but what a difference!

Wheel, spokes and hub.

Orion, etc., heroes in constellations; what meaning lies at the back of this? Negro legend concerning the creation (fân). It is the eyes of the dead which make the evening star shine brightly.

Valéry—adherence of painful thoughts (comparison with a burn). So much the better. It makes them real. Let the love of good adhere in this way. See to it that the love of good passes through such a process.

Acts which raise and lower like the movements of the elevator on an aircraft, indirectly. But what do we know about it? As we know that geometry has a technical application, by experience?

Yes, but a singularly limited experience. For I am not going to begin, for example, stealing, in order to see what effect stealing has on the soul.

The observations carried out by other people must supply the deficiency, but it is a difficult matter.

What, in all this, is *a priori*, and what is *a posteriori*? Kant offers but feeble assistance in coming to a conclusion. The Upanishads are hardly of any help. Nor the *Gîtâ* either, for dharma . . .

I have the right to perform an action if I am able to perform it without lowering myself. Yes, but supposing I thereby do harm to others?

But, precisely, to know (know with one's whole soul!) that others actually exist constitutes what is most precious and most desirable.

One shuts oneself up in the bottle by limiting one's efforts to the struggle against inner phantoms or by according it first place. These phantoms are only veils.

Levels of readings, superimposed readings.

By what dispensation of Providence do we suppose that those actions of mine that cause harm to others (in the form of affliction) cause harm to me also (in the form of sin)?

My actions increase or reduce the thickness of the veil which separates me from the universe and from other people. Like the sort of movements that I make when handling a tool.

We should translate into acts, immediately if the opportunity presents itself, as often as possible (but within certain limits), the glimpses which the mind receives of the veritable existence of the world and of men. Such actions represent the use of the blind man's stick.

We should abstain if possible from all action at those times when a thick veil surrounds the bottle; wait for a more favourable oppor-

tunity, as in order to look at a Greek statue. Or again—second expedient—if possible, act in that case in accordance with thoughts which we have had in better moments, although they be no longer present to the mind and that we advance into the dark, against the dictates of our own heart, against the evidence before us. When neither form of action is possible, we should act knowing full well that we are acting wrongly and prepared to repent for it.

Several very different kinds of sins. Catalogue of such?

This kind—complete unconsciousness. Taking part quite naturally and unconcernedly in some recognized act of injustice. What remedy?

This kind—words spoken to oneself in the exercise of the watch, open box, polar bear,¹ original sin, etc.—In the nature of obsessions; attraction exerted by something forbidden, even if oneself has forbidden oneself the thing. Remedy?

This kind—powerlessness to find in oneself a source of energy for the performance of an action which demands energy. Also, the feeling that one cannot. And yet the energy is doubtless there, if one knows how to assemble it in oneself, dexterously to furnish oneself with the necessary motives. (Idleness, etc.)—Another sin: drawing energy from an inferior source, to which one's thoughts are made to conform. Related species, cowardice in the face of time; allowing time to flow by without resolution impinging on a moment of it. Faulty relationship to time. Remedy?

This kind—lying to oneself; adapting one's action to the necessities inherent in preserving physical life and individual character, adapting one's thought to such action. Only remedy, real and perpetual consent to death and to the loss of all perishable possessions without exception.

Other kinds?

It is impossible for us to think without movement. Consequently, we kill in ourselves the thoughts which we do not express by acts every time that it is possible to express them so. Since the body at any given moment can have but one single attitude, each one of our acts is a slayer of thoughts, for each act excludes an infinite number of other acts and makes it impossible at that particular moment for the thoughts corresponding to them to reach a state of existence. We must refrain from killing thoughts that are precious, refrain from bringing into the world thoughts that are vile, base and defiled by unreality.

¹ Cf. footnote, p. 28.

Such and such a thought which implies a contact with reality. I am unable to express it without doing myself harm—i.e. diminishing my vital energy, material prosperity, personal esteem, chances of . . . , of . . . , or even endangering or putting an end to my life. I must weigh up together this harm and what I stand to lose by killing this particular thought, and, having done so, act.

And what if it is a question of doing harm to other people? Does the same apply?

We should give real thoughts a real existence, keep imaginary thoughts within the bounds of empty imagination. It is therefore always a question of reading.

And if there are two real thoughts? We should contemplate them together, weigh them in a true balance, then act. (E.g. Râma.)

Inward balance. By what art can it be rendered true?

Action is like elevator on an aircraft. But perhaps it is only able to lower or not to lower, and is unable to raise? Perhaps only attention is capable of doing the latter?

(The same applies to use of force towards other people.)

Acts likely to make the inward balance a true one. To place oneself as far as possible in a situation in which it may be a true one.

[cf. Rousseau and legal testaments.]

'It is not the Ātman which acts, it is nature.' Every action that has really taken place may be reduced to a play of necessary causes, without leaving any residue at all representing the share taken in it by the 'I' (perhaps?). But either one has understood this play, or else one hasn't.

He who has understood acts otherwise. Several combinations of play.

If Lawrence had not pondered in his tent . . .

The wind, the current, the waves, the rudder, the sails—alone determine the progress of the ship. But the one whose steersman has understood moves otherwise across the waters.

Looking at the ship, you cannot say for certain that the steersman has understood, but if certain circumstances arise, you can say for certain that he has not understood.

Gîtâ. The explanation is perhaps that he no longer has the choice. The two armies are facing each other. His responsibility towards his own people forbids him to leave them to their fate at the hands of the enemy (why?) His desire not to fight is utterly unreal, cannot (can no longer?) impinge upon the real in the form of action.

In a given situation, certain desires (certain thoughts) can, by taking the form of action, impinge upon the world; others cannot, but can only have consequences other than the ones aimed at. (e.g. not simply not fighting at all, but fighting badly.)

Look for examples (there are many such).

There should never be any deliberation except between the former. The others are to be cast back into the realm of the imaginary (real only in that place where are real desires behind a veil of falsity). But then Retz: it is the sign of a great mind to know how to distinguish 'the extraordinary from the impossible'.

The situations of which Retz speaks, in which, he says, you only place yourself by your own fault, but in which, once you find yourself in them, whatever you try to do, you can only do evil. The *Gītā* is, apparently, to do with a situation of this kind. It teaches that even in such a situation, there is where your salvation lies, if, whilst you are acting, you cast the action beneath you, and if you love Krishna.

Krishna hardly spends any time proving to Arjuna that he ought to fight, because before ever the talk between them takes place, there is no possible doubt at all that Arjuna will fight. Inward deliberation, of which there are many examples. The moment of choice for Arjuna has gone by. Which is the moment of choice?

Nearly always, the moment of deliberation does not coincide with the moment of choice. We deliberate when we have already made our choice, or perhaps, more rarely, when we are not yet in a position to make a choice.

It is not thou, it is Nature which kills these people. (Perhaps all there has been is bad steersmanship?) We must not draw from that the conclusion: everything is permissible. (Why?)

Are there certain actions that we can do without desiring success, and others that we cannot do in that fashion? Does this criterion enable us to distinguish between actions? It is not so certain.

We can attribute a share to limited injustice, required by the social order. But how large a share? That is the whole question.

Kama (Negro) tale. The wet season and the dry season argue together to decide which of them is the elder, each claiming to be the elder because the other follows after it.

Cf. Heraclitus, etc., Taoists, etc.; purificatory power of the play of contraries.

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As in the case of error and clear and distinct thought, there are

certain thoughts of action which, if we allow the soul to fix its gaze upon them, vanish like bubbles (they can have no influence on the movements of the body except in the dark recesses of the soul); others which, on the contrary, pass then into reality by impinging upon reality through the medium of the body.

[There are degrees in the clarity and fixity of gaze of the soul; the above is therefore a résumé.]

Arjuna's sudden access of pity, at the very moment when it appeared in his soul, was apparently of the former kind.

He is torn between pity and the necessity for the battle. After seeing Vishnu in his true form (and he would not, it seems, have seen him if he had not been so torn), the latter kind of thought alone remains. What other criterion?

Gîtâ and the legend of Joan of Arc. To fight the English was Joan of Arc's dharma, although a woman and a shepherdess (if we do not take the caste system in a strictly social sense), but it was Nature which infused her actions (*prakṛti*), not God (*Ātman*). (*Gîtâ*, xiii, 29.) One may not debase God to the point of making Him a partisan in a war. The same applies to the Old Testament. There God is a partisan. In the *Iliad*, the gods are partisans, but Zeus takes up his golden scales.

Will a pure act (the purity in action being apprehended thus, as in the case of thought) do no harm at all to other people? (Just as Râma did none at all to the shûdra by killing him.) Nothing is less certain. A providential arrangement would be necessary. Why suppose such a thing? All we can say is that the intention—using that word in its strongest sense—is to do as little harm as possible, everything considered, and taking into account the necessities of the situation. A harmful action which I cannot avoid accomplishing, except by accomplishing another even greater one—it is not I who accomplish it, it is Necessity. [It is not given to man to do good; it is only given to him to set aside some evil.]

The crux lies in the comparison between different sorts of evil. Inward balance. A true balance—how to achieve this?

But for Arjuna the moment when one weighs in the balance had gone by. On the field of battle, this moment had been outrun by the flight of time.

Golden balance of Zeus, symbol serving two ends. Symbol of blind Necessity, symbol of the decision of the just man. Union of these two symbols—remains a mystery.

The spirit in its supreme manifestations imitates in some sort

matter; is absent from its own thoughts and works. Supreme mystery.

Purity in action and in time—the moment. To thrust the tip of action into the flow of time.

Example of action completely *good*. Browning and Elizabeth. The true difficulty, not to do what is good when one has seen it, but to see it with such intensity that the thought passes automatically into action; as when one reads a piece of music, and the notes which enter through the eyes come out in the form of sound at the tips of one's fingers—as when one sees a Rugby football, and there it is in one's arms. Not to take one's eyes off the thought, although the risk—the risk that one may have made a mistake—is infinite.

And if Elizabeth had died?

If, contemplating the thing which seems good and contemplating no less fixedly the infinite risk, the action is carried out—is not the action a good one?

Hamlet does not know how to contemplate in this way.

'... is sicklied o'er', that is not true thought.

On the other hand, Orestes, in Sophocles.

Antigone.

Eteocles.

Gîtâ. Note that the dharma, since it depends on caste, therefore on birth, therefore on previous incarnation, depends on an antecedent choice. It is not that one has not the choice, but that, if one situates oneself at a given moment in time, one no longer has the choice; it is useless to dream of doing something else; but it is a good thing to rise above what one is doing at the time. By that means one chooses, for later on, something better.

Arjuna's moment of pity—it belongs to the order of dreams. His display of weakness before proceeding to kill is comparable to the display of weakness at approaching death. *At a given moment* one is not free to do anything whatever. And one must accept this internal necessity; accept what one is, at a given moment, as a fact, even one's shame.

Theatre. The theatre should render external and internal necessity sensible to the mind.

—We should orientate ourselves, not towards another mode of life, but towards death.

Gravity.

The vertical alone gives a meaning to the angles. Direction *par excellence*.

And yet the earth is round. To embrace both facts in thought at the same time . . .

Gravity, prototype of all forms of constraint.

Life and death of others. To be happy that there are thinking beings other than oneself; essential form of grace. To desire the death of a human being is to reject this form of grace (cf. Creon).—But to be happy, also, to be mortal, that they are mortal; both for oneself and for them, to the same degree. Never to desire one's own death, but to accept it.

Suicide is only licit when it is but apparent, when there is constraint and one is fully conscious of such constraint. Similarly in the case of the use of force. It is constraint, not grace; *prakṛti* not *Ātman*.

Illusory choice. When we think that we have the choice, it is because we are unconscious, compassed about by illusion, and we are then but toys. We cease to be toys when we lift ourselves above illusion right up to Necessity, but then there is no longer any choice; a certain action is imposed by the situation itself, clearly perceived. The only choice left is that of proceeding upward.

Browning had not got the choice.

Necessity in both cases, but not the same sort.

An action carried out in this way acts as a lever. It is *possible* that it may lead to better conditions—in which duty is less mixed up with evil. Only possible.

We are not defiled by actions from which we are absent in this fashion (in this fashion, for there is another way of being absent), in spite of the fact that they are mixed up with evil.

We must likewise be absent from good.

Act not for a certain object, but *because we cannot do otherwise*.

A true balance: it is the body which is the balance, for each moment it can perform but one action. It is a true balance when the attention is uniform.

The maintenance of peace represents a methodical action over the imagination of men. When this action has not been carried out, peace no longer exists, and our desire for it is a false desire, unless it be situated in that part of our being in which are real desires shrouded in falsehood. The only question is what attitude we shall take up in the matter. That attitude depends on karma.

It is easy here to make a mistake, just as it is easy to place the wrong word at the culminating point of a poem; and the error brings about a new form of karma.

He who is present in the evil which he does will be present also in the evil which he suffers. He who is not present in the evil which he does will in a certain sense be absent from the evil which he suffers, even while sweating drops of blood, imploring in vain, and in the agony of being abandoned.

To suffer evil is atrocious when one is present in it. Ovid. Hell.

The converse is also true: he who is present in the evil which he suffers will be present also in the evil which he does.

We should give our mind to the public good in the same way as we give our mind to a geometrical figure. Lawrence. Plato. True city; not dream city (nightmare city).

The same Necessity which makes it so that there is evil, without our being able to hold it against God, also introduces evil into all the actions of the most upright man.

Retz's idea that we always place ourselves through our own fault in situations in which, whatever attitude we adopt, it is a bad one—doesn't that correspond to karma?

Râma was able to kill the shûdra without doing evil (in a sense), because he had got rid of his wife.

—A remark worth remembering—The Blacks—M. 'It is because of them that we have had this war.'

Emerald Table—'That which is below is like that which is above, and that which is above like that which is below.' Upan.: tree upside down. Seal of S.: inverted triangles.

The same thing inverted?

(?) Chartier : The higher supports the lower,
cf. ← - the lower supports the higher.

Something which does not exist and to which are suspended an infinite number of things which do exist. Example: The proportion between incommensurable quantities (Eudoxus). Look for other mathematical examples. (One can also say: something which has no meaning and to which are suspended an infinite number of things which have a meaning.)

Illusion—The portion of moon which seems larger on the horizon than at the zenith: in a sense the whole universe only exists in this way.

Headaches—At a certain particular moment, less pain by projecting it into the universe—but an impaired universe; sharper pain, once brought back to its seat of origin, but something no longer suffers and is in contact with an unimpaired universe. Passions, does the same apply? Make them descend, bring them down to a point, and take no more notice of them. Treat all forms of pain, more particularly, in this way. Prevent them from approaching actual things.

Joys, on the other hand?

Powerful effect of draperies on Greek statues; transposition, analogy, multiple readings.

Law of the transposition of autobiographical matter in literary composition; similar application.

Greek draperies, also presence of gravity around the upright human figure. Human figure, rising from base to top, drapery falling from top to base; opposition, correlation, subordination.

In the nude, the downward movement of the flowing expanses produces the same effect.

‘Not to think of the polar bear.’ Any thought whatsoever which imposes itself, which returns again and again . . . can serve as polar bear—if it is a thought of such a kind that one wants to set it aside, and not on the contrary to ponder it more deeply.

Thus pain, humiliation, blows to self-esteem, wounded feelings—all vain sufferings can, by their very vanity, serve as polar bear, which represents a manner of using them.

Obsessions are necessary in order to be set aside (there is an optimum point in this connection; cf. Es.); that is why one creates an obsession by saying: ‘Don’t think of the polar bear.’ [That does not alter the fact that they should be avoided (?)]

We need have no fear of being without a polar bear, and *they are all much of a muchness*—The wrenching of the soul which accompanies the ceasing to think about something is the prototype of good.

Illusion—It is not so much that things make us believe that they are real, for in a sense they are real. But they make us believe that they are real otherwise than as they actually are.

Especially do they make us believe that some exist to a greater or lesser extent than others.

May the whole universe, from the pebble at my feet right up to the remote stars, with all that lies between, exist for me unceasingly as much as did Agnès for Arnolphe, or the treasure-casket for Harpagon.

Second body—The blind man's stick is one example; Harpagon's treasure-casket another.

May the whole universe become for me a second body in both senses.

But one only attains to this by a methodical transformation of oneself.

It is through action—a certain non-immediate type of action, requiring an apprenticeship—that the blind man's stick becomes a prolongation of the body.

It is through desire (*ἐρως*) that Harpagon's treasure-casket becomes a prolongation of the body.

Unsated desire, insatiable by itself. The impossibility of satiating it is the truth about it, the hope of satiating it is falsehood. Beautiful things make this impossibility strike home to our hearts. To possess the whole universe and each thing like Harpagon his treasure-casket while remaining unsatiated by them. We then possess non-satiety. (And at the same time to possess the whole universe and each thing like the captain of a ship his ship.) The essential form of non-satiety consists in a contact with another reality, a possession of another order.

Each desire if we give it our attention, whether satisfied (relatively) or no, is a road leading towards non-satiety.

'Then tremendous shouts made themselves heard, and all beings, and all desires.'

Īśa Upanishad.

'Over and above the darkness', to attach ourselves to that which is not this world, and believe we conceive it, to conceive something while speaking of it, when all the time we do not read it in this world—that is a greater night.

'Through non-knowledge we pass beyond death', because we undergo, in our flesh and in our soul (the living soul), not death properly speaking, but an equivalent, a wound inflicted by Necessity which makes us experience the fact that we are mortal. We must die—not commit suicide, die, be killed, not literally,

but nearly so, feel through the fact of external things the chill of death.

‘Through knowledge we nourish ourselves with immortality.’ Resurrection. When we have felt the chill of death—unless we make haste to forget it, or it leaves us numbed—we pass on beyond, and this universe itself becomes a draught of immortality.

Non-becoming and becoming. Same opposition reversed (if these terms have been rightly translated). [cf. Ch. U. The universe was first of all non-being; then it became being; then it developed: samabhavat]—Becoming is the positive side of ignorance, non-becoming the negative side of knowledge. More night through attaching oneself to knowledge alone than through having no access to it. More night through attaching oneself to becoming alone than through having no access to it.

Through dissolution having traversed death.

Through becoming he partakes of the immortal. Becoming itself is his immortal food.

It is because we believe in this illusion that we suffer death. By consciously suffering death we dissipate the illusion, and we then find once again reality.

from ignorant suffering to the knowledge of illusion

from dissolution to becoming

.

Crosses over death partakes of the immortal

from illusion to mortal suffering.

from mortal suffering to the consciousness of illusion

from dissolution to

becoming

crosses over death

partakes of
the immortal

Double movement. Circle. Return to the lower transfigured.

The world is his immortal food.

Double passage of death. Deprivation of fellow creatures; deprivation of the separated being, absence of God. ‘My God, why hast thou forsaken me?’ Death through non-knowledge, death through non-becoming.

Those who kill the Ātman. Whoever wishes that that which is should not be (Marcus Aurelius). What else besides? All desires kill the Ātman.

Past, present and future—the three eyes of Shiva—

Against atomism—No void other than the non-manifested—Chuang-Tse. 'While doing nothing, there is nothing which He does not do.'

He who knows is not he for whom all things have become the ātman, but, on the contrary, he for whom the ātman has become all things.

Shankara. 'Action, not being opposed to ignorance, is unable to remove it; but knowledge dissipates ignorance just as light dissipates darkness.'

Right action does not lead to knowledge, but springs from it. (?)

A. U. M.—The 4th, if it is not expressed by a letter, is it because it is inexpressible, or isn't it rather because it represents the relation between the three? (Plato, justice.) The three states correspond *perhaps* fairly well to the hydra, the lion and man.

Since the highest is beyond the reach of thought, in order to conceive it we must conceive it *through* that which is within the scope of thought. A link is necessary. Mathematics supply us with a model of such a link.

Shankara, ignorance: link between the passions, earthly affections — exactly as with Plato. These are the veils (clouds) in the absence of which the Ātman shines afar off with its own splendour.

Arjuna *paused* before acting. That is why his action is a good one. To pause is not to hesitate. Two ways of pausing.

Mohammedan esotericism — fanâ — extinction (nirvāṇa), and higher up fanā-el-fanāi, extinction of extinction. Is this the return to the world?

'Imagining himself first of all to be the living soul, man becomes frightened like some one who mistakes a piece of rope for a serpent; but his fears are removed by the certainty that he is not, in reality, this living soul, but Ātman itself.'

bâla, state comparable to that of a child (Eden) [concentration of the individual being's powers].

pañḍitya (teaching), mauna (solitude). Cf. Br. S.¹

Things differ through designation, accident and name, like earthenware utensils which are only different forms of clay—Ch. vi. 1, 4, 6.

Change of level. Not more love, but another kind of love; not more knowledge, but another kind of knowledge, etc.

This is because at a given level the human being is limited. For example, he is unable to contain more than a certain number (as it were) of physical notions. We only get beyond this limit by raising

¹ Commentary on *Brahma-Sūtras* by Shankara.

ourselves *or else* by degrading ourselves. For example, instead of such notions, summaries of things known by other people. Or, on the other hand . . . (here it becomes difficult).

In the same way, everything concerning man, taken at a certain level, is subject to a certain limit, and anyone who wants to go beyond that limit must either raise himself up—or else degrade himself.

We degrade ourselves if we have regard to quantity. By apprehending with attention both the level and the limit we can burst open a ceiling.

Brahma and space—Several meanings.

The heavens which suddenly recede—but after an effort of attention—in moments . . .

Without name and without form. Consideration of the starry heavens. To see the mass of stars, a formless mass—that doesn't mean anything. But to see forms is yet a lower form of perception. It is to see an order without form. Hence, to see the forms is a degradation. The same applies to the names of stars and of constellations.

That which is above is like that which is below.

Not to read. To read the non-reading.

Highest art, order without form or name. Negation of form in all great art. Reason for? Analyse it. Form in Michael Angelo, not in a Greek statue. Reason for this?

Poetry. Images and words that reflect the mental state without images or words. Music. Sounds that reflect the mental state without sounds. Words and sounds equivalent to silence. But in what way?

They reflect from the sole fact that they follow on, through the similarity of human nature in all men; the same mystery as that of the straight line.

But how does this apply in Greek statues?

Each part is there on its own account and not in order to link up other parts together.

These are linked up together by way of addition.

Composition on several planes, connection with order without form?

Several planes | non-reading (without name or form) | presence—

The without-name-or-form and the reading of relationships.

What connection?

Reading on several planes, connection with order without form?

The unity of several forms is not a form.

The presentation of several forms in the same object lifts the spectator (the reader) above form.

By that means one obtains the without-form which is above form; for there is always the danger of falling below form.

That which is below is like that which is above—in a reverse sense. Each state is a *μεταξύ* towards a state similar to the one below the first, only transposed—

Thus, indifference with regard to human beings.

Seconds of pause, whence all the rest derives its value, in music, dancing, etc. (image of . . .). On the other hand, uninterrupted rhythm in factory work.

Placing of silences in music; they have got to be at the centre of something. In what way? Do we mount up towards them? do we descend again from them? But we descend again with inflections which suggest the presence of the high in the low (passages of Mozart and Bach).

To arouse a state of expectation. To wait for a sound which shall fill to overflowing—and let this sound be a silence. Let that which follows on conjure up a being filled to overflowing and yet at the same time suffering deprivation—and that, by what means?

Imitation (but with a small number of pure and clearly defined sounds) of the human voice when it cries toward something, etc. And yet one has got to conjure up movements of the soul which are always silent, at any rate outwardly so.

Great difficulty in art, transitions—or modulations. Between two richly flavoured words, between two notes, between two planes of the body (brow and cheek), between two attitudes for the dance, etc.—So that the intermediate space does not jumble up the flavour, but brings it out, whether by means of continuity, or by means of contrast.

To descend without lowering oneself.

Intermediate space necessarily occupies a place. E.g. measure and rhythm, grammar and meaning in the case of poetry. Image of the necessity imposed by time on life. (It even occupies a place by reason of several forms of necessity.)

That is the difficulty and true value of art.

Time, moving image of eternity; therein lies the whole problem.

Karma and Nemesis. Nemesis, at once the outward image of and (by that very fact) the remedy for karma. Whoever has killed will kill. Whoever has killed shall be killed. Both are true. The latter is a remedy for the former. Mobile image of balance.

There should be several readings of the universe, as of works of art. Otherwise, how would one create a work of art? If classical

science [as for the contemporary kind . . .] forms one reading, we must establish the relationship between this reading and the others. μεταξύ for the West.

δύ' αἰτίας εἶδη διορίζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ θεῖον.¹

Plato: assimilation—India: identification.

Timaeus—respiration—² . . . Τὰς γὰρ τῶν προτέρων καὶ θαπτόνων οἱ βραδύτεροι κινήσεις ἀποπαυομένας ἤδη τε εἰς ὁμοιον ἐληλυθίας. . . .

'This principle will also explain why sounds, which present themselves as high or low in pitch according as they are swift or slow, are as they travel sometimes inharmonious because the motion they produce in us lacks correspondence, sometimes concordant because there is correspondence. The slower sounds, when they catch up with the motions of the quicker sounds which arrived earlier, find these motions drawing to an end and already having reached correspondence with the motions imparted to them by the slower sounds on their later arrival. In so doing, the slower sounds cause no disturbance when they intrude a fresh motion; rather by joining on the beginning of a slower motion in correspondence with the quicker which is now drawing to an end, they produce a single combined effect in which high and low are blended. Hence the pleasure they give to the unintelligent and the delight they afford to the wise, by the representation of the divine harmony in mortal movements.'

Correspondence between ascending and descending movements of sound and the quick and slow pace of the rhythm; relationship between sharp sounds and quick ones?

Does this text mean that the prolonged sound descends and that the sound which follows . . . ?

δύ' αἰτίας εἶδη, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ θεῖον, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον ἐν ᾧ αἰσιν ζητεῖν κτήσεως ἕνεκα εὐδαίμονος βίου. . . . τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνων χάριν, λογιζόμενους ὡς ἄνευ τούτων οὐ δυνατὰ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα, ἐφ' οἷς σπουδάζομεν, μόνα κατανοεῖν οὐδ' αὖ λαβεῖν οὐδ' ἄλλως πως μετασχεῖν.³

¹ To distinguish between two kinds of causes, the necessary and the divine (Plato, *Timaeus*, 68 e).

² Plato, *Timaeus*, 80 a-b.

³ We must accordingly distinguish two kinds of cause, the necessary and the divine. The divine we should search out in all things for the sake of a life of such happiness as our nature admits; the necessary for the sake of the divine, reflecting that apart from the necessary those other objects of our serious study cannot by themselves be perceived or communicated, nor can we in any other way have part or lot in them (Plato, *Timaeus*, 68 e-69 a, tr. Cornford).

Without necessity it is impossible to conceive the divine alone, or grasp it or participate in it in any other way.

We must seek the divine cause with happiness as the object, and the necessary cause with the divine cause as the object; reproduce a movement which we have conceived, such as we have conceived it.

But at the level of art one conceives an absence of movement, of attitude, and the movement, the attitude imitate this absence. But in what way?

When something seems impossible to obtain, however hard one tries, that indicates an insuperable limit at this particular level and the necessity for a change of level, a break in the ceiling; consequently, to exhaust oneself in trying at this level degrades. It is better to accept the limit, contemplate it and taste all the bitterness of it.

Mal. and R.: watertight compartments. We should not weigh everything on the same balance; what we need is *one single* balance. Great temptation to take away something from the balance; results in injustice. Not to recognize the same things in different places, because of the difference in names and forms; one must get above names and forms.

One selfsame thing, upholding all that. This table, this book, that itself is the non-manifested, the void.

And I, do I take away anything from the balance?

War. Like sounds which constitute an imitation of silence, a war which should be an image of peace; how so?

'Out of immobile eternity an eternal mobile image.'

'Out of immobile eternity, one and unique, an eternal image, mobile according to number, which we call time.'

Curve equivalent to straight line according to system of reference (e.g. train). [Straight line, projection of parabola.] This requires thinking about.

Experiment carried out by Michelson and Morley, one might conclude therefrom that the earth is motionless. And what about the others? It is Galileo's system breaking down. But the crystallization of three centuries around Galileo has prevented it from being allowed to break down. Movement of uniform rotation . . .

[What ought one to think of the rotation of a sphere upon itself?]

Generalized relativity. 'Whatever their movements may be [and not only if they are uniform] all the systems of reference K , K' are equivalent from the point of view of the expression of the laws of nature.' Readings and translations. That is, a system in which there

are only bodies in repose or in uniform movement. If we relate it to a system of reference in uniformly accelerated movement, a field of gravitation is produced in the former. This is a very attractive point. Couldn't it be isolated from the rest?

Restricted relativity. The speed of light is measurable, but equal in all directions (i.e. infinite). *N.B.* that the constancy of the speed of light (in space) forms the basis of the electro-dynamics of Maxwell-Lorentz. This contradiction transposed makes up the whole theory. No simultaneity. Maximum speed in the case of which length and mass are cancelled out. [Naturally, the formulae have been established with that object.] At which the clock ceases to tick, an infinite time separating two ticks. (The eternal enters in there, in the 'manifested', like space in the case of the atomists.)

We ought to examine afresh the methods for measuring the speed of light in space, and see especially what would be explained by supposing the earth to be motionless. [cf. Poincaré.]

Remarkable example of crystallization: Einstein doing away with the notion of simultaneity and respecting that of uniform movement. Monstrous.

Co-ordinates of Gauss. Constructing the two-dimensional geometry of the surface of an ellipsoid without making use of the fact that this surface belongs to a three-dimensional Euclidean space. (Admirable.)

Find an infinite number of curves such that one and one only passes through each point. (u)

Another group possessing the same attribute (v).

To each point there correspond two *co-ordinates* whose difference is infinitely small for points infinitely close together. s being a distance:

$$ds^2 = g_{11} du^2 + 2g_{12} du \cdot dv + g_{22} dv^2 \quad (g_{11}, g_{12}, g_{22})$$

representing magnitudes which depend in a fixed manner on u and v .

(for this it is necessary that fairly small parts of the continuum studied should be able to be looked upon as Euclidean, i.e. as continua in which $ds^2 = du^2 + dv^2$.)

If we choose ict for time variable (c , speed of light), we have:

$$ds^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2 - c^2 dt^2$$

constant if we pass from one system of reference (Galilean) to another, according to restricted relativity— ds , distance in the four-dimensional continuum. Euclidean continuum in restricted rela-

tivity; non-Euclidean in generalized relativity, where the speed of light depends on the co-ordinates in the case of a gravitational field, and where the unit of length, if it is regarded as constant whatever may be its position and orientation, does not bear out Euclidean geometry.

[Note. Einstein having calculated the deviation of light required by theory, and consequently the deviation of the fixed stars in the neighbourhood of the sun during total eclipses as compared with their position in the sky when the sun is differently placed—the rays being deviated through the proximity of the sun—photographs, taken during the eclipse of May 30th, 1929, confirmed such a deviation.]

By making 4 NUMBERS WITHOUT IMMEDIATE PHYSICAL SIGNIFICANCE correspond to each point (event) of the four-dimensional continuum (it is not necessary that 3 of them should correspond to positions and the 4th to time), but which satisfy the condition formulated by Gauss, we can say: 'All Gauss's systems of co-ordinates are in principle equivalent for the general expression of the laws of nature.' (Principle of generalized relativity.) All equations must be transformed into equations having the same form through some substitution or other of the variables of Gauss x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4 .

But to interpret intuitively, we can imagine a system of points each of which is in irregular movement, and regarded as motionless; of clocks with an irregular movement (but whose indications differ infinitesimally if they are close together) each of which is regarded as a measurement of time. Each of these systems is equivalent to all the rest for expressing the laws of nature.

2 experimental facts: curvature of the rays in the proximity of the sun—trajectory of Mercury.

For a limited gravitational field and limited speeds, Newton's theory forms a first approximation, accompanied by slight differences, one of which is confirmed in the case of the trajectory of Mercury.

A. U. M. In mathematics to try to discover units that cannot be expressed. Eudoxus. That is certainly what Plato used to do.

Thought not subject to the imagination and to time.

What is good and healthy and what is limited and unhealthy about the concern to maintain contact with the intuition shown by savants in the XIXth century (except already in the case of the

mathematicians). One must maintain contact, but not remain at the same level.

Not much would be required (yet a lot in a certain sense) to bring us back from contemporary science to an equivalent of Greek science.

Luminous rays and perception. The straight line.

Inexpressible analogy between inexpressible things. Analogy between inexpressible analogies, and so on. Analogy between all possible forms of analogy. To every infinity there is a corresponding unity. Inexpressible correspondence between analogy and unity. —Platonic dialectics.

One breaks away from sensible representations. One also breaks away from 'hypotheses', in the sense that one simply regards them as 'hypotheses' and only takes into account analogies.

In this sense, didn't Plato have prescience of non-Euclidean forms of geometry, but understood in quite another way?

The example supplied by Gauss is admirable to think upon. If one considers this geometry, without reference to the 3rd dimension—if one considers a plane surface where the effects of heat on the measuring instruments play an analogous rôle—using the notion of solids that will not lose their shape, the Euclidean and non-Euclidean forms of geometry are at the same level. (?)

The eminent position occupied by Euclidean geometry, by which one cannot do otherwise than begin, lies in the fact that in day-to-day actions it is applicable to what are regarded as solids that will not lose their shape—and also in the fact that it meets other requirements too.

Science of Hindu words. Correspondence between words—which have nothing to do with etymological sources—and represent truths. But these correspondences are recognized. Coincidence between recognized resemblances and truths in relation to which they are as sign to significance in a symbol. Nevertheless, such correspondences are recognized. A foreigner, possessed of metaphysical knowledge, hearing the word *sâman*, cannot know that one of the syllables of this word is the feminine personal pronoun. All we know is that, generally speaking, in all language (especially of a sacred kind?) such correspondences exist. Likewise in the case of cosmology. (?)

In the same way when we pick up a book, we know that we shall find there words and phrases, though we do not know which ones.

Gîtâ—will attached to fruits: rajas. Delivered up to the emotions: tamas.

Arjuna's question.¹

. 'He who possesses the light, how does he talk? How does he sit down? How does he walk?'

That is the real question.

[Sensible objects disappear first of all, then sensibility itself disappears.]

Observe that it is said of the yogi that he should treat friends and enemies with the same consideration, etc., not that he should not have either friends or enemies.

Bh. G. VI, 20—When through yoga a suspension of thought takes place, and when man discovers the ātman, finds his satisfaction in his own self.

It is always *Time* which occupies the forefront.

. Each time the restless, mobile manas attempts to express itself, each time it must be curbed and brought back to a state of submission within the self.

. having obliged the manas to remain in the ātman, one must no longer think of anything else?

or: [one must,] shutting oneself up in the self, no longer think.

. imprisoning in the self the faculty of perceiving (?), holding back in the self the vital breath . . .

Not to read? [meaning of manas?]

images of the sun trembling in the water without affecting each other, or the sun—

Whatever form of existence may be conceived by a man at his death, that is the one which he lives—one day of Brahma, a thousand yōgas.

Two Puruṣas, one destructible, the other indestructible; a third one is superior to both.

'Thou shalt see all beings in thyself, then in me.' Refusal of the object as μεταξὺ towards the reality of the object, which reality is not vouchsafed.

What is the secret which Nature is on the point of communicating when one looks at her as one looks at a Greek statue? It is not what

¹ *Bhagavad-Gîtâ*, II, 54.

science teaches, and yet it is not unconnected with the teaching of science.

Each thing reflected, transposed in every other thing.

Positive science and other points of view. Notion of *coincidence*, to be elucidated. Strictly speaking, has a meaning only in relation to the human will. *This notion of coincidence is, together with that of the negligible, the most important with respect to science.*

Why should not a representation of the world according to the relation symbol-sign be as legitimate as a representation according to the relation means-end is in the sphere of work? Everything that is without significance would then be coincidence.

Or do we admit that nothing . . . ? But something which combines the two together—that would be better.

But why should one not be able to discover a representation such that by making use of *continuous* probability one could restate the formula for the proportionality of energy at R (inverse of the second derivative of entropy in relation to energy); for small values of energy and small wave-lengths, at \sqrt{R} in the contrary case? All that is necessary would be to discover a certain structure . . . And, of course, the constant h would play a part, but a different part.

Of course, if in $h\nu$ h represents something infinitely small . . . But one can conceive something else.

.

Time, strictly speaking, does not exist (except the present, as a limit), and yet it is that to which we are subjected. Such is our condition. *We are subjected to that which does not exist.* Whether it be a question of duration passively endured—physical pain, waiting, regret, remorse, fear; or of time actively handled—order, method, necessity—in either case, that to which we are subjected does not in fact exist. But our subjection exists. Really bound by unreal chains. Time, itself unreal, covers everything, ourselves included, with a veil of unreality.

The fundamental analogy between the world and thought is the relationship between the high and the low depending on gravity. Gravity is the outstanding example of force—and is there, strictly speaking, any other kind? Everything suggesting an upward movement suggests an increase in value.

From an elevated spot one commands a vast expanse; places which he who is in the plain can only see successively, he who is on the heights can take in at a glance, at the same time. That is literally true; non-literally so too. By what coincidence?

The third dimension also has a curious far-reaching character.

Energy is an ability to rise (even a ball on a table, by falling, would cause another ball to rise).

Lever. Raising while lowering. Perhaps this is the only way of rising given to us.

The sight of birds, a moving one, because . . . ?

These correspondences are essentially related to beauty, but in what way?

Gravity, in architecture, in sculpture. Also the 3rd dimension—The 3rd dimension in painting—High and low (and 3rd dimension?) in music—

Sculpture—Each thing descends in accordance with gravity (fluid stone) and yet the whole rises upward.

Man standing up.

Water and gravitational force—Taoists—

Light in painting, rendering the 3rd dimension sensible—

'Degradation of energy', this term implies the analogy to the opposition between high and low.

Gravity is the constraint to which we are subjected, the chain; to rise is supernatural; the sky, that is where we don't go.

From the sky we should see all things, but without being able to distinguish anything (Taoists).

Distance—significance of distance.

The sword is a simple instrument (like the nail), concentrating the energy for the blow in an extremely small surface (blade); you strike from above downwards; gravity transformed by a simple instrument. Such is the difference between the armed man and the unarmed man, Achilles and Lycaon. And the soul *under* gravity, what becomes of it? Like somebody on a rock-face who is afraid of falling. Total suspension of thought.

Speed, effect of gravity. (But what about compression, elasticity? . . .)

He who suspends gravity over other people has a feeling of elevation. Illusion of elevation. False exaltation (power, murder, sexual possession)—[story of T.]. Temptation to possess all worlds.

Gravity and time—Gravity inseparable from time—In what way?

Application of the notion of energy to human life, energy analogous to that which is related to gravity.

Analogy between the world and values through the medium of gravity, which makes the order of values sensible to us. If the order of values were not sensible to us by analogy, we should not conceive it at all.

Low motives contain more energy than do high ones (queues—just as it is easier to forget something under the shock of pain or pleasure than it is not to 'think of the polar bear,' etc.)—Just as the kinetic energy of a falling body increases—We should direct the energy of the low motives from above; mould the low motives so that they carry us whither we want to go. Pressure on the reins or the rudder—(reins, manas, horses, ten faculties of sensation and of action, car, body). But we should know that it is they which are carrying us—

The world is necessarily such that we are able to conceive everything that is purest by analogy—

Another analogy with evil: impurity, defilement, mixture—

Impurity and baseness. Purity of the stars, of the sky. It happens that . . . Purity and void, void and sky—Clouds and veil—[Purity of water . . .] [water and light].

Like one who is moved by the highest form of music without knowing it, so the peasant and Nature . . . Like one who gives his attention to music, so . . . (so who . . . ?)

In the world interpreted symbolically, the subject is not absent.

Falling movement and rapidity. Rising movement and slowness. But rhythm in the succession of aspects above and below.

Music, pace and slow-sharp movement.

High tonality and immediacy.

Two immediacies, one of which follows a rising movement.

Working upon and raising—Construction—Defiance of gravity in architecture, through gravity itself.

Disorder and descent, order and elevation. Building which is falling down—

Top and the whole, bottom and the parts.

Descent, time endured; ascent, time handled—Monotony of the Gregorian chant. A chant which is repeated every day several times a day has got to be monotonous, otherwise it would be intolerable (value of this monotony → eternity)—Melodies which create obsessions (contemporary song-writers aim at this systematically). Similarly in the case of forms.

From above, one discerns vast distances—frozen periods of time—

Political attitudes of people—equivalences—it would seem as though we found greater strength to resist a certain form of evil by depending upon another (equivalent, almost identical) form of evil

than by depending upon Good (which has the disadvantage of not existing).

Perception. connection between forms. Forward movement of the arm—shaping, etc.—form of the hills, valleys and plains—Rembrandt's drawings . . . ?

conic → circle → straight line → point—analogy . . .

circle and straight line—hyperbola (parabola) and circle.

Four states in Plato and four states in the Vedânta—*εἰκασία*¹ corresponds apparently to wakefulness—*πίστις*² to dreaming (?)—*διάνοια*³ has not any equivalent in the Hindu system (?)—*νοῦς*,⁴ at the same time *prajñā* (being, one, truth, light) and fourth state (idea of Good, which is beyond truth, the latter corresponding to being)—*διάνοια*, starting from hypotheses and directed toward consequences—*νοῦς*, directed toward the unconditioned—

Gravity, time, evil—When you fall you cannot stop yourself—Therein lies the constraint—No stop in the time of a fall—From the top of a mountain you behold slopes and plains where you read at a glance the hours past, the hours to come, several possible sorts of hours to come.

What is the use of talking about force in general, when in reality it is a question of gravity? Number, weight and measure.

Limit. 'Quantity becomes changed into quality.' All development results in a change; nothing pursues its course without encountering a limit. That is a law of the universe which the hypotheses concerning the constitution of matter leave out of account, law analogous to a law of human life. What kind of certitude have we of this? I know that no quantity in the world, defined in whatever way one may choose, is able to increase indefinitely.

[and what about speed? Einstein] [in this sense, why not?]

Neither the heat of a liquid, nor the pressure of a gas, nor . . . , nor . . . What is the nature of this *necessity*?

Upsettings and compensations. 'Things suffer injustices at one another's hands and undergo expiations.' Distinguishing of 'things', arbitrary. Several *simultaneous and different systems of distinguishing are instructive*. But true, perhaps, for all systems of distinguishing—Balance and proportion; upsetting of balance, upsetting of pro-

¹ Conjecture.

² Belief.

³ Discursive thought, reasoning.

⁴ Understanding.

portion. *πλεονεξία*¹—something exceeds—no—tends to exceed the limit beyond which that thing cannot exist, and is destroyed—During its previous accretion, it had naturally destroyed (consumed). In every change, destruction in one respect, accretion in another, and then destruction in the former one.

Is that not as interesting as speeds and positions?

Science and technique. One can also conceive a science of nature directed towards a technique of inward perfection.

Studying the world, always analogies with man to be found. How should it be otherwise? Is it not our world? How childish to think one succeeds in eliminating time and qualities. Doesn't man reappear in the criterion of simplicity of algebraical formulæ?

Hence, man is present. But why only the slave who draws water from a well? This slave is necessary. But why he only?

To read in the world the necessities to which man is subjected. This can be done: is not man the soul of the world?

We do not know why there are symbols in the world. But nor do we know why Euclidean geometry is applicable.

Science should be a participation in the world and not a veil.

In science, when there is something which *doesn't fit in*, we should contemplate it instead of trying to get round it.

Difficulty at the very source, if the *only* real uniform movement is one of rotation, and if the notion of uniform movement is that of movement in a straight line.

(N.B.—Must find out. *How does classical mechanics interpret the daily rotation of the earth?*)

Creates a (centrifugal) force; but of what is it the result?

To every force there *necessarily* corresponds—but what is the nature of this necessity?—something which prevents it from exercising itself except within a certain measure.

Is Geometry, in a certain sense, an image of that? 'You forget geometrical equality.' What is this equality?

Diseases cured under one form and reappearing under another form (Hippocrates). Very profound conception. Equivalent in the soul—Equivalent in the difficulties of a doctrine or of a science; having been eliminated, they reappear elsewhere under another form. Equivalent in society. Equivalent in art—One replaces a word, an image, a verse by another one; same imperfection. How is what is not that, what constitutes a passage towards the best, carried into effect?

¹ Desire to have more.

In a man, tendencies (directed energy) which coming up against exterior limits—circumstances and essential necessities—withdraw, twist themselves about in all sorts of ways. He becomes something else. Equivalences—Degradation, in what case, in what way? Choice? One way alone, in each situation, to preserve one's *jivâtma* to the greatest possible extent.

Appearance and reality. This world, kingdom of appearance; e.g. factory, need to look as though one were just about to start working when the machine ceases to function for a quarter of an hour. Boxes, of which officially there is an adequate supply—etc.

Planck's pretensions, etc. Why, after all, should algebra be looked upon as being any less 'human' than colour, sound, heat, etc.?

The three *guṇas* and the three dimensions of space—

[Relationship of these three dimensions to the conception of uniform and accelerated movement . . .]

The two aspects of karma, inward one (whosoever kills will kill), outward one, equivalent to Nemesis (whosoever kills shall be killed); complementary aspects; the latter alone compensates for the former and provides a possibility of salvation; cannot be separated.

Action and reaction, complementary modifications—(Anaximander—*Mîmâmsâ* of Jaimini).

In a triangle, increase of one angle, reduction of another angle.

In all change (whatever may be the extent of that part of the universe carved out by the mind), there is permanency. Hence a constant (which cannot be grasped by sensible intuition) through which conditions of variation, limiting conditions are defined. Consequently, with respect to this constant, unchanged balance, modifications which mutually compensate each other.

Wherever there is a limit, actions are compensated by reactions. Wherever there are 'beings', there is a limit.

Circle—

on condition that . . . in so far as . . . with regard to . . . as far as . . . 'Non-dualism'—Contemplation of *all* the contradictions which draw the soul towards unity. Unity which does not resolve the contradictions, of which the contradictions represent the absence. Rejected duality—

Duality means opposition, contradiction; what else could it mean? If there is a *second thing*, we do not know what it is. For us, it is not even a part of nothingness.

Balance and permanency. Change, upsetting of the balance.

Endlessly, as in the case of the pendulum. In matter, society, thoughts (feelings).

Change would represent destruction were it not circumscribed by limits. Limits imply compensatory phenomena. The study of becoming is the study of such compensation [and yet, ordered time . . .].

E.g. : conservation of energy in a closed system—increase of kinetic energy and decrease of potential energy—Then the reverse (?)—Conservation of live forces; in the case of the compound pendulum, speed greater here, less there than in a state of freedom—

Changes in a closed system, internal compensations.

Closed system subjected to external actions; wider system comprising both the former and these actions. Internal compensations.

The unlimited is *impossible* in the world
the unlimited is *the evil* in the soul } socially . . .

Theory of wholes, notion of a group and of a constant, in the forefront.

Revolving disk. A fixed point—Revolving sphere—A fixed axis. If a thought were to take this axis as its embodiment it would escape modification.

Love—limited to a given level—by going beyond this limit one engenders hatred—(And the reverse? That is quite different, it would seem.)

Art—*necessary harmonizing* of expressive parts.

Timaeus—Change in the universe—Things once removed from their place tend to return thither, and they push each other forward circular-wise because no way lies open (no attraction, only a pushing forward). So endless pendulum movement. So breathing in and breathing out.

Bodies which rise and descend (heavier or lighter than air), same explanation; and the same with sounds which seem rapid and slow, sharp and deep, now an unharmonious transference through the dissimilitude of the movement brought about in us by them, now concordant (*ξύμφωνοι*) through the similitude of this movement. (?)

Sounds push each other forward.

Every change brings with it a compensatory phenomenon. Example—sliding on a plane surface, friction. (Whence energy, entropy; but the contrary of entropy, which compensates, is also necessary.) A compensatory phenomenon which assigns in advance a limit to change.

Every change tends toward reproducing itself (inertia). But

since it is bound to meet with a limit, it also contains a tendency toward changing its nature. [in two ways?]

[In a certain sense it would be possible to assimilate rajas to the principle of inertia, tamas to that of entropy, and sattva to life—within the realm of matter.]

China—at the centre of the universe ('tree of the world') that which is perfectly straight gives no shade.

Shade—

Light and shade, good and evil—*images, in the world, of the correlation of contraries*—Contraries for us. If one conceives atoms, light and shade are not contraries. And that itself is an image of another truth—

.
Difficulty in understanding things that are evident.

Geometry provides an example.

So also: work manufactures objects, not money—one can easily understand this at once with a very superficial part of the intelligence—but *only with difficulty with one's whole soul*. So also, etc.

Social and pedagogical applications.

Dark night.

Dark night in apprenticeship. The apprentice who tells himself that he will never make the grade. Matter needs studying.

Perhaps man has (each time, up to the highest state?) to pass through the ordeal of perpetual duration (hell) before being able to enter into eternity?

'Through ignorance having crossed over death, through knowledge he partakes of immortality.'

'Through non-becoming having crossed over death, through becoming he partakes of immortality.'

To cross over death through ignorance, does that indicate perhaps the dark night? Is it perhaps this feeling of everlasting evil?

Manual labour. Time entering into the body. Let it be regular and inexorable. But varied, like the days and the seasons.

Through work man turns himself into matter, like Christ does through the Eucharist. Work is like a death.

We must needs pass through death—that the old man may die. But death is not a suicide. We have got to be killed—to endure the

gravitational force, the weight of the world. When the universe is weighing upon the back of a human being, is there anything surprising in the fact that it should hurt him?

Work is like a death if it is without an incentive. To act while renouncing at the same time the fruits of action. The shûdra can do this also.

To work—if one is worn out—means becoming subjected to time in the same way as matter is. The mind is compelled to jump from one instant to the next. That is what constitutes obedience.

Obedience and death—'Obedient unto death'. Matter obeys. We are matter. Pythagoreans: since we are in a place of punishment, let us be punished.

Joys parallel to toil—sensible joys. Eating, resting, Sunday pleasures (in the old days). But not money.

Nor the indefinitely increased possession of land.

Song of the Volga boatmen.

Exhaustion in the course of labour. Complete absence of hope. Condition for charity.

Joy in the course of work. 'The desire for sweet nourishment.' There should not be any of any other kind. Let the poor at least be poor. Immediate joys. Joys of participation in the world.

No poetry concerning the people is genuine if fatigue does not figure therein—and hunger and thirst brought about by fatigue.

Tell them: Christ suffered from fatigue.

He who has to labour every day feels in his body that time is inexorable.

To work. To undergo time and space.

Titles. 'Work as a spiritual exercise.' 'Work as a mystical experience.' 'Work as poetry.'

Science (like every human affair) is situated on several vertical planes. Algebra puts everything on the same plane.

The practice of algebra, as of everything else, is *limited*, and is rendered useless by overstepping the limit.

The suffering which degrades and that which ennobles are not the same. Two different kinds of suffering. (?)

Father J. (Lorrainer). The human being modifies itself under affliction in such a way as to preserve itself as much as possible, in such a way as to leave the centre inviolate—that centre through which grace could pass. It invents for itself fictions and a certain

ordered system of time so as not to look upon itself as being unhappy. And that has a degrading effect. Why?

Crucifixion. God has expiated creation, and we who are associated in it expiate it also.

A man *fearing* God. What does that signify?

Mauriac's Thérèse D.¹ The picture he draws of evil is defective; in that part where the culminating point of contact between self-deception and good is reached, he has made a muddle of things, has not rendered sensible the difference at the same time as the resemblance.

Very nearly a great book (but, in fact, a trivial one). Something monstrous about the conception of life of those years (1918-1940).

What is lacking is the colour of evil, the monotony and facility of it, the feeling of emptiness and of nothingness.

Money. He conceals the rôle played by this factor in this crime. He is its accomplice.

But worthy of note: the way in which the crime begins and develops, and 'it was like a duty' (Thus evil immediately takes on the monotony of duty) [*That is what ought to have been depicted*]—Cf. Marlowe.

Lanza's Gilles²—Spain—

In thinking that crime conceals a form of grace, they take away whatever grace lies therein, for if it does, in fact, conceal a form of grace, this can only be in the form of a dark night.

Logic

Frequent cases (to be enumerated, and classified) in which by asserting a truth on a certain plane you destroy it. As soon as you have announced it (or announced it on a certain plane) it is no longer true. It is only true behind (above) the contrary assertion. It can therefore only be perceived by minds capable of grasping simultaneously several superimposed rows of ideas. It is incommunicable in the sense that language is one-dimensional or at the most two-dimensional (two-dimensional if it is written, but the page forms a limit). Such is the raison d'être of esotericism. Eurydice. Truths which are seen to be false as soon as you examine them.

¹ Thérèse Desqueyroux.

² Gilles de Rais, by Lanza del Vasto.

Gu.—The achievement of the 'Great Peace' represented under the form of a sea-voyage (ship, symbol of the Catholic Church), a war [*Gītā*? jehad? (Mohammedan holy war)]—Walking upon the waters, domination over forms and over becoming—Vishṇu Nārāyaṇa, he who walks upon the waters—(???)

The beautiful is that which we can contemplate. A statue, a picture which we can gaze at for hours.

The beautiful is something on which we can fix our attention.

Gregorian music. When the same things are sung for hours each day and every day, whatever falls even slightly short of supreme excellence becomes unendurable and is eliminated.

Statues. The Greeks looked at their temples. We put up with the statues in the Luxembourg because we do not look at them.

A picture such that you could place it in the cell of someone condemned to solitary confinement for life without this being an atrocity, on the contrary.

Art and duration. Posterity represented duration.

Finality. With respect to mechanical causality finality appears as a *coincidence*, and vice versa. The notion of coincidence—inexhaustible. Must study.

Images (including those which concern the whole of the supernatural) *in the world of the truths concerning the human condition.*

Gravity.

Elevation. Elevated spot whence one can see simultaneously—albeit indistinctly—that which from below one can only see successively.

Heights, mountains.

Gravity, force, necessity, constraint.

[High, pure, luminous, incorruptible.

[Low | mixed | , dark, changeable.
| defiled |

oppositions which correspond in the world.

The light comes from on high. Light analogous to look from the eyes.

Sharp and deep sounds.

Light-shade, good-evil. Images, in the world, of the correlation of contraries. If one represents to oneself particles, then light and shade are no longer contraries—(Also lights, through their interference, produce shadow). And that also is an image, image of one plane—and even of two—from where the opposition of contraries

disappears. The universe from the point of view of science forms part of the imagery of the world, of the system of images.

Gravity and three dimensions. 3 guṇas—ascend—descent—horizontal expansion—

One could make correspond thereto, in the study of matter, life, entropy, the conservation of energy (inertia).

Every change has in it a tendency to prolong itself and in so far as it is bound to come up against a limit a [double?] possibility of assuming another nature.

In the case of man—Love tends to go ever farther and farther. But there is a limit. When the limit is crossed, love turns into hatred—It is necessary, in order to prevent such a change, that love should become other.

It is the contemplation of this limit which makes it become other. The ignorance of this limit makes it turn into hatred.

If, with regard to any subject whatever, we know too many things, our knowledge changes into ignorance—or else we have got to raise ourselves up to another kind of knowledge.

Nothing analogous in the case of physics; a change in quantity leads, in final analysis, to a change in condition—but to one only, not to two.

(this has certain connections with so-called materialistic dialectics.)

And yet not so. On closer inspection, there are always two possibilities—For example, you compress a gas with the aid of a piston—either the gas turns liquid, or else the piston breaks; a change of condition in one, a quantitative change in the other of the two terms.

[Confusion of mind on reaching a certain point in mathematical research—very image of aberration. Impossible to concentrate on a particular point; wavering of the mind. It has got to withdraw into absence of thought.]

Creation (or manifestation) is the act of God; preservation that of man. To destroy constitutes evil. It is necessary to destroy in order to preserve. (. . . ?)

The void is God, the void is primordial.

This is full, that is full.¹

To proportion destruction to preservation, while bearing in mind in the relationship between them not only the things respectively destroyed and preserved, but also the risk. Similar to a balance one

¹ Quotation from *Upanishads*.

of the arms of which remains fixed while the other, from an equal length onwards, shortens indefinitely, this length which diminishes representing the element of risk. One may destroy—and yet, only in certain cases to be defined—in order to preserve something a little superior to what one is destroying, and which, without such destruction, would inevitably perish. If what one wishes to save, without such a destruction, would perhaps perish, the value of what one wishes to save must outweigh by far what is destroyed—for what is destroyed is destroyed absolutely—and all the more so as the risk is less great.

But the comparison of values is only legitimate if it has been done at the same time from the point of view of what is to be preserved, from the point of view of what is to be destroyed, and from a third point of view.

The destruction is still only legitimate if what is to be destroyed is directly, and not by chance or by a conjunction of circumstances, the cause of the danger threatening that which one wishes to save.

That is extremely difficult to define.

The destruction, the degree of destruction, must be proportional to that which is endangered (the danger to which renders the destruction necessary), to the degree of risk, to the more or less direct relationship between the thing to be destroyed and the danger—3 distinct relationships to be considered.

(Justice and mathematics . . .)

According to that, the total extermination of a people is perhaps never legitimate. (Surely never, it would seem.)

Saul.

There is an infinite quality about the total extermination of a people. In a sense, it is true, the thing has something disinterested about it, seeing that there is neither booty, nor slaves, nor person subjected, nor person benefited. But there is a sort of all-powerfulness, the destruction in a single moment of centuries upon centuries.

‘Through a necessity of nature, every being whatsoever, as far as it is able, exercises all the power at its disposal’—Rajas. Terrible pronouncement.

In given circumstances, a being reacts in such a way as to preserve and expand itself to the maximum extent. There is no choice.

Developing one’s being, existence and character (try to give a meaning to this expression)—On running up against a limit, to retract them, first so as to preserve existence, and then the maximum amount of character. But as far as the preservation of one’s existence

is concerned, it is not a question of a calculation. It is a question of what is equivalent to calculation at the level of sensibility; so that error often creeps in.

When you retract yourself thus, you descend.

But when you expand yourself, don't you descend, often at any rate?

Facile illusion, mistaking expansion for height, because in both cases wide spaces lie before one.

Force imitates thought very well.

Reality. Reality is never given. Something is given, but what is given is not real. What is real is not given. And yet what I construct is not real either. The real is that which has a certain relationship to what is given. Yes, but what relationship?

Valéry: 'The proper, unique and perpetual object of thought is that which does not exist.'—'A thing understood is a thing falsified'—'A difficulty is a light. An insuperable difficulty is a sun.'

Height and depth. Two metaphors which are both connected with the extension of the base of a cone on a horizontal plane; or something of the kind; correspond to a horizontal expanse. The height is connected with a form of knowledge, the depth with a form of influence. From a height one sees a lot, from an underground place one acts a lot. And can one at the same time . . . ? The same thought in us can it see from above and act from below?

A deep love changes a life. Changes a great number of superficial things. What is deep is related to what is superficial, what is high is related to what is low; the low and the superficial are on the same level. He loves violently, but in a low fashion. A possible phrase. He loves deeply, but in a low fashion. An impossible phrase.

One of the vices of the Freudian metaphor of the subconscious. Repression is in reality an excellent thing. What is bad is repression coupled with inward lying. To send evil thoughts down to the bottom of the self is to take away their evil content—to consign them to the place where are the desires which are reality. But we keep them on the surface while covering them up with a veil of lies.

St. Thomas on the suffering of Christ. Justice in Plato. Suffering must not prevent the intelligence from seeing. But it is preferable also that (in affliction) the intelligence should not prevent the sensible part from suffering. We must not seek consolation in what is best in ourselves—The task of pure intelligence is not to console—The conformity of the lower to the higher must be of another order. Not conformity, but balance—

The suffering must not be less, but of another kind.
One can say as much of pleasure.

Valéry ' . . . The secret of many forms of conduct lies in the policy of preservation with regard to physiological habits, cravings odd enough at times and, although acquired cravings, sometimes more powerful than natural cravings, veritable parasites on neurovisceral life, prime instigators of dissimulation and of extraordinary stratagems. Nothing depicts a 'personality' better. But it is an aspect which is relatively little treated in the novel. Even in the case of Balzac. It is true that this subject quickly rejoins the ignoble, the foul and the comic. Inconceivable practices which have something of superstition, convulsive habit and magic about them, and which become obligatory, sort of intoxicated states of habit and monstrous deviations within the sphere of action. There is a teratology of functional phenomena.'

(Of the first order.)

'Optimists write badly.'

'Anthropophagy, become psychophagy, chronophagy . . .'

' . . . If this vanity were to be taken from him as if by magic and another more subtle kind did not come to take its place, all that would remain for this self-disillusioned being to do would be to blow out his brains. He defends himself from non-being as well as he can.'

'Criticisms and praises induce us to believe that somebody is able to give us much more than he possesses.'

'Homo scriptor . . . To cause something of commonplace time to pass into organized time—that of deeds.' Seriousness and ideas (incompatibles) (?)

'Aphrodite needs to have a visage and a bodily shape—and we need to direct towards her the greatest possible number of our senses, and our steps, and our thought.'

Study of motives—Queues, etc.—Why is it easy to do a difficult action when inspired by a low motive?

In the last analysis, there is nothing which is not rendered easy by necessity. It is easy to be on the cross when you are nailed to it. What meaning then attaches to the feeling: I can't go on?

Valéry—'At its highest point, love is a determination to create the being which it has taken for its object.'

'The anxious individual seeks anxiety. The fearful individual seeks something to fear. The tooth . . .'

'If the soul were all-powerful at a given moment, we should perish the following moment.'

'Just as the hand is unable to let go of the burning object against which its skin melts and sticks, in the same way the image, the idea, which makes us mad with suffering is unable to tear itself away from the soul, and all the efforts and flights of the mind to shake it off result in carrying it along with them.'

'Men secretly treat their particular form of sensibility with consideration, and in that lies the whole secret of the eccentricities of their behaviour. When walking, they do their utmost not to put any weight on the sensitive part of the foot; when eating, to spare an irritable tooth. Thus they have hidden thorns about them, and in each case variously situated. These are of divers origin—childhood, sex, etc.

The distribution schemes are very different.'

'There are only a few bodies that finish off what all minds in general have begun.'

Man and animals. '. . . Man does a little bit of everything; does it less well as regards detail than does the specialist animal; but he makes up for it on the whole put together.'

Philosophy of retention—c.g. respiration.

'In the long run there has never been anything.'

'This calm and this cold represent enduringness and time which breaks free from everything.'

Attention! 'Man takes the form of a thing. It is better not to be anything than to be inferior.'

'There is some one in us concerning whom all the circumstances of his generation and all the peculiarities of his individual self are the product of chance.'

'What one does not do; what one would never do—that depicts your visage for you . . . We are made up of a number of impossibilities, many of which are not eternal.'

Soul and body—'They have not the same joys, or at any rate they seldom have them together. It is the supreme attainment of art to provide them with such.'

'Monsieur P. was stirring his sugar in his coffee . . .'

and what follows on—

Valéry—Taking one's left hand in one's right hand—The latter belongs to me, the other is unfamiliar—

Parallel of the blind man's stick. (reversed)

Black slaves of America, Epictetus (the master's old hand).¹

'... The world N^o nought ... People say that it is the real world, but it is only a surface of equilibrium and the place where the lowest points of I know not what corporal and spiritual system are found. The roses in the carpet spring to life again, and things, setting aside the things which they were, become again specialized beings adorned with substantives: piano, armchairs, persons speaking ...'

Taylorization.

Story. 'There was once a man who became wise. He learnt how to no longer make a single gesture or take a single step which were not *useful*. Shortly afterwards, they shut him up.'

Valéry— '... Dreams, states in which there are no *ifs*—no hypotheses—for were they to be formed, they would at once drive away that which in dreams takes the place of reality, in order to take away from it the privileged place it occupies.'

Collaboration of No and Ti '... One having to think without saying anything, and the other to write without thinking anything.'

Executive duty. '... This archangel's task is executed by devils.'

One must be pre-eminently conscious to study the semiconscious in oneself (cf. Chartier), one must be very pure to do evil. And if one is pure doing evil is torture. Lawrence. What remedy exists? A good deal of constraint is necessary, and few beings are sufficiently pure to be able to handle force.

The waking world, even from the most ordinary angle of perception, is a plurality of systems of possibilities. Dreaming is one of them (that which is below is like that which is above). Conscience and reality are proportional to the multitude of simultaneously grasped systems of a single operation of the mind. In the last analysis, an infinity, and something which is in relation to this infinity as the number of points of a segment is in relation to that of the whole of space, and something which ... and beyond that again the void. But let all that still be thought of as a whole, by structural layers: the void, and its superimposed infinities glimpsed abstractedly, and the systems really grasped and read in outward aspects sensible to the mind, and the feeling of unique existence continually underlying.

[Description of the 'dream state' in the Upanishads; the *puruṣa*

¹ Sic. (Tr.)

is king, or . . . , or . . . ; that shows clearly that here it is not a question of dreaming.]

All these stages grasped at the same time represents om.

In a general way, one form of good consists in the domination of the lower parts of the being by the upper.

A higher good consists in their balanced superposition.

Desire and illimitability. There is always some illimitability in desire. To conquer only the terrestrial globe? To live only a hundred years? To make only 40% profit on the money one has invested?

Desire is illimitable by nature, and this is contrary to nature, because infinity is not in its right place at the level of desire. In the world of objects of desire, which is the world manifested, the infinite does not exist. It is there that the good and the true meet. 'You forget geometrical equality.'

There is nothing illimitable either in the 'subtle manifestation', which is the reason why there exists the need to try to formulate in 'psychology' principles analogous to the conservation of energy and entropy. In sociology also. It is in this sense that they can become sciences. To look for these principles. They have not been clearly formulated.

Limits at each level.

Limitation—and consequently action and reaction, upsets of the balance which compensate one another, relationships, condition—is the law of the world manifested.

The supreme good, passing into the body, is subjected to distance, gravity, etc.—In the soul, it is subjected to the laws of 'subtle manifestation'; in so far as it is subjected to these laws, it is one state of the Ātman among others, a syllable. In so far as it represents good, it is non-characterized.

It is useless to coerce the body and the soul (jīvâtma) into a conformity with good, all that is necessary is to *withdraw from them the infinite*. They must not meddle with what in man is in contact with the infinite. In one sense, therefore, they remain what they are—but in another sense they do not. Without the infinite, they behave otherwise.

Analogy between the moment of death and the pole.

Through dharma, the weak man triumphs over the strong. Through dharma alone (not through any one of the castes) Brahmin makes himself manifest.

Example of absurd form of reasoning concerning the past. 'At that time . . .', instead of looking out for what *differences in condition* have arisen.

We compress a gas with the aid of a piston. After reaching a certain degree of heat, either the gas becomes liquid or the piston breaks. As it is a question of a human action, it is possible to assimilate these two cases to a raising and a lowering (the broken piston represents a greater form of disorder).

And how about in natural phenomena? In those that are connected with life, one can doubtless find . . . (if one places life higher than death)—And in the others? To find an example of limitation involving two possibilities.

One should become detached from the three *guṇas* (even *sattva*). Action for action's sake, not for its fruits (even the fruit of inner perfection)—

The series of successive detachments with regard to good things each of which seems of the utmost value is the equivalent of the 'shall be added unto you' of the Gospels.

[*Gītā*.¹ 'Whose mind is not shaken by adversity, who does not hanker after pleasure'—II, 56—There are therefore adversity and pleasure.]

[62 'Thinking of objects, attachment to them is formed in man']
65 'the intellect of him who is tranquil-minded is soon established in firmness.'
66 'No knowledge (of the Self) without meditation'—
69 'That which is night to all beings, in that the self-controlled man wakes. That in which all beings wake, is night to the Self-seeing Muni.'

sacrifice 70 'As into the ocean—brimful and still—flow the waters, even so the Muni into whom enter all desires, he, and not the desirer of desires, attains to peace.'
to act like God.

III, 27 'The *Guṇas* of *Prakṛti* [*forces*] perform all action.'

29 'Men of perfect knowledge should not unsettle the understanding of people of dull wit and imperfect knowledge'—One must not cause a scandal. That is why, perhaps, *dharma* is fighting? (habits and customs . . .)

It is desire, which is the cause of sin (III, 37)—By it the whole universe is enveloped, truth is hidden. Desire, insatiable fire.

¹ Translations are adapted from Swami Swarupananda. *Srimad-Bhagavad-Gītā*, 5th edition, 1933. (Tr.)

V, 8-9 'Though seeing, . . . walking, . . . speaking, . . .—convinced that it is the senses that move among sense-objects.'

25—'engaged in the good of all beings' (?)

27 ' . . . steadying the eyes between the eyebrows, restricting the even currents of Prâṇa and Apâna inside the nostrils'. VI, 17 'To him who is temperate . . . Yoga becomes the destroyer of misery.'—19 'a lamp in a spot sheltered from the wind'.

VI, 20 It is necessary that thought should cease for the Ātman to appear; for thought represents the object.

(No intellectual intuition.)

32—'He who judges of pleasure or pain everywhere, by the same standard as he applies to himself.'

VII, 8—'I am the sapidity in waters; I, the radiance in the moon and the sun; I am the Om in all the Vedas, sound in Akâsha, and manhood in men. I am the sweet fragrance in earth, and the brilliance in fire am I . . . I am desire in beings, unopposed to Dharma. And whatever states pertaining to Sattva, and those pertaining to Rajas, and to Tamas, know them to proceed from Me alone.'

25 'Veiled by the illusion born of the congress of the Guṇas . . .'

28 'Those men of virtuous deeds, whose sin has *come to an end*, freed from the delusion of the pairs of opposites.'

VIII, 3 'The offering in sacrifice which causes the genesis and support of beings.'

10 'He who, at the time of death, full of devotion, with the mind unmoving, and also by the power of Yoga, setting well his life force in the centre of the eyebrows . . .'

18—'At the approach of day, all manifestations proceed from the unmanifested state; at the approach of night, they merge verily into that alone, which is called the unmanifested.'

IX, 10 'By reason of My proximity, Prakṛti produces all this, the moving and the unmoving; the world wheels round and round because of this.'

15 'Others, too, sacrificing by the Yajña of knowledge (i.e. seeing the Self in all), worship Me the All-Formed, as one, as distinct, as manifold.'

Distinction between those who serve Krishna in order to gain heaven and those who serve him for himself (pure charity).

26—'Whoever with devotion offers Me a leaf, a flower, a fruit, or water, that I accept . . .' 'Whatever thou doest, whatever thou eatest, whatever thou offerest in sacrifice, whatever thou givest away, whatever austerity thou practisest, O son of Kuntī, do that as

an offering unto Me—Thus shalt thou be freed from the bondages of actions, bearing good and evil results.'

34—'be my devotee' (?)

X, 17—'How shall I, O Yogin, meditate ever to know Thee? In what things, O Bhagavan, art Thou to be thought of by me?'

20—I am . . . the Ātman . . . Viṣṇu . . . the Sun . . . the Moon . . . the Sâma-Veda of the Vedas . . . of the senses, Manas; [intelligence in living beings (?)] . . . of the Vâsus, fire . . . of mountains, Meru—among waters, the ocean—among words, Om . . . in sacrifice, prayer . . . among mountains, the Himâlaya . . . the Aśvattha among trees . . . among men, King . . . love, the god of generation . . . Yama [god of the dead] among potentates . . . kâla (time) among everything that is measured . . . among beasts, the lion . . . among purifiers, the wind . . . among warriors, Râma . . . of letters, the letter A . . . death and birth . . . among months, Mârgaśīrṣa . . . among seasons, the Spring. Among all fraudulent dealing, I am gambling . . . of the Pāṇḍavas, I am Arjuna . . . the power of rulers, the statesmanship of conquerors . . .

XI, 29 ' . . . men rush precipitately into Thy mouths only to perish'—

31 'Tell me who Thou art, fierce in form . . . I desire to know Thee, O Primeval One. I know not indeed thy purpose.'—32—I am the mighty world-destroying Time, here made manifest for the purpose of infolding the world. Even without thee, none of the warriors arrayed in the hostile armies shall live . . . 33—Verily by Myself have they (these warriors) been already slain; be thou only an apparent cause, O Savyasâchin (Arjuna).'

[Arjuna, with palms joined to do homage?]

55 'He who does work for Me alone and has Me for his goal . . . and bears enmity towards no creature—he entereth into Me.'

XII, 4 ' . . . engaged in the welfare of all beings' (?) ratâḥ, attached.

6 ' . . . resigning all actions in Me'—

12—Outweighing everything is 'renunciation of the fruit of action'.

13 'He who hates no creature, and is friendly and compassionate towards all . . . ' (?)

15 'He from whom the world does not shrink and who does not shrink from the world . . . ' (!)

19 ' . . . he who is . . . homeless, steady-minded, full of devotion—that man is dear to Me.'

XIII—Kṣetra and Kṣetrajña——: 'The body (?) is Kṣetra'—

2: 'Me do thou also know . . . to be Kṣetrajña in all Kṣetras.'—
In the enumeration of in what Kṣhetra consists, there are ahaṁkāra,
buddhi, manas, mind (?)

7—'Humility, uprightness . . . that is declared to be knowledge'—
14—Brahma 'devoid of Guṇas, yet their experiencer' 16—'Indivisible, yet It exists as if divided in beings.' 17—'is said to be dwelling in the hearts of all'. 'Knowledge, and the One Thing to be known, the Goal of knowledge.'

19—Of Prakṛti are born all vikâras (modifications) and Guṇas.

20—From Prakṛti proceeds all activity, from Puruṣa all experience.

21 'Puruṣa seated in Prakṛti, experiences the Guṇas born of Prakṛti; the reason of its birth in good and evil wombs is its attachment to the Guṇas.'

22—Even in the body, where its rôle is that of passive spectator, supporter, experiencer (?), it is the Supreme Puruṣa.

24—meditation? effort of the mind? effort by means of action???

31—ātman devoid of guṇas—remains in the body, but does not act—

33 'As the one sun illumines all this world, so does He who abides in the Kṣetra illumine the whole Kṣetra.'

XIV—'My womb is the great Prakṛti; and I the seed-giving Father.'

5 'Sattva, Rajas and Tamas—these Guṇas, born of Prakṛti, bind fast in the body the indestructible embodied one.' 6 'Of these Sattva, from its stainlessness, luminous and free from evil, binds by attachment to happiness and by attachment to knowledge. Rajas is of the nature of passion, giving rise to thirst and attachment; it binds fast by attachment to action. Tamas binds fast by miscomprehension, indolence and sleep.'

11 'When through every sense in this body the light of intelligence shines, then it should be known that Sattva is predominant'—

14 'If the embodied one meets death when Sattva is predominant, then he attains to the spotless regions'—

16 '. . . the fruit of Rajas is pain, and ignorance is the fruit of Tamas'—

18 'The Sattva-abiding go upwards; the Rājasika dwell in the middle; and the Tāmasika, abiding in the function of the lowest Guṇa, go downwards.'

20 '. . . the three Guṇas out of which the body is evolved'—

XV, 5 ' . . . liberated from the pairs of opposites'—7 'An eternal portion of Myself having become a living soul in the world of life . . .'

Inner sense and Manas in the Jiva like scents in the wind—

10 Jiva 'while experiencing, or when united with the Guṇas'
13—Kṛishna is the 'Soma' (moon), the supreme 'infuser of sap',
(cf. the sacrifice of king Soma, origin of rain)—He is 'the fire abiding in the stomach' and the breath, he 'digests the fourfold food'.

16—The three Puruṣas.

According to XII, those who only know the indestructible are those who are attached to the abstract (5)—They therefore remain at the second stage—The Puruṣottama (Highest Puruṣa) is not abstract. It is Kṛishna.

XVI, 7—' . . . they know not what to do and what to refrain from'.

8—"They say, "The universe is without truth, without a basis, without a God, not brought about in regular causal sequence [does this refer to action and reaction according to Apūrva?], but caused solely by desire(?)]"

??? 9—They arise 'as the enemies of the world for its destruction'.
—'Filled with insatiable desires'—13 'This is mine, and this wealth also shall be mine in future'—14 'That enemy has been slain by me, and others also shall I slay. I am the lord, I enjoy . . . '— 15 'Who else is equal to me?'

18 ' . . . these malignant people hate Me in their own bodies and those of others'. egoism ??? 19—' . . . malicious and cruel'—'I hurl them perpetually into the wombs of demons only'.

Therefore, *hell*—Paradise is eternal, hell is situated in Time.

21—"Triple is this gate of hell: lust, anger and greed (?)."

XVII—Three sorts of faith, corresponding to the three Guṇas.

5 'Those men who practise severe austerities not enjoined by the Shâstras, given to ostentation and egoism, possessed with the power of lust and attachment, 6—torture, senseless as they are, all the organs in the body, and Me dwelling in the body within; know them to be demoniac in their resolves.'

Three sorts of food—bitter, sour, saline, excessively hot, pungent, dry and burning foods are liked by the Râjasika—That which is stale, tasteless, stinking, putrid, is the food liked by the Tamasika.

The sacrifice performed seeking for fruit is the product of Rajas—
The kind performed needlessly, the product of Tamas.

austerity of action . . . chastity, respect for life.

[There is a redoubling—the sacrifice in which no fruit of any kind is sought, but only duty, is a product of Sattva— . . . And what lies beyond the Guṇas? Not even the satisfaction of having performed one's duty.]

austerity of mind . . . *silence*

19—'That austerity which is practised out of a foolish notion, with self-torture or for the purpose of ruining another, is a product of Tamas.'

(three forms of austerity, three forms of giving, etc.)

[Giving in response to benefits previously received, Rajas.]

Tamas: doing something without heed—*Tamas, aberration.*

28 ' . . . Whatever act is accomplished without Faith is called *asat* (unreal): om, tat, sat.

XVIII—Distinguish between: abstaining from acts inspired by desire—acting without desire—non-attachment either to the acts or to their fruits—

Three sorts of renunciation | renunciation of obligatory action (Tamas) | relinquishment of an action from fear of bodily suffering (Rajas) | non-attached form of action (Sattva).

11 'It is indeed impossible for any embodied being to abstain from all actions.'

Knowledge of unity in all beings: Sattva | of multiplicity in all beings: Rajas | confined to one single object as if it were the whole: Tamas. |

Action performed *with much effort*, through desire or from an egoistical motive, Rajas undertaken blindly, without considering the means or the consequences, Tamas.

55—'Then when he knows Me in reality, what and who I am, he forthwith enters into Me.'

63 'Ponder carefully My wisdom declared unto thee, then act as thou likest'—

64 ' . . . supreme word, the profoundest of all . . . 66—Relinquishing all Dharmas, take refuge in Me alone.'

(*Mahābhārata*—100,000 strophes—*Gītā*, 760.)

Deliberation—momentary silent contemplation of the various courses to adopt from every possible angle, simultancously. Prior to that, momentary non-operation of the mind. Intellectual intuition in deliberation. The body is here transformed into a balance.

Represented by a Greek statue?

Momentary non-operation of the mind, pole, insertion of eternity into time.

The manner in which things receive the light at dawn—time—patient waiting for the light, docility.

Newton's question; why doesn't the moon fall? If there was simply gravity, everything would already have fallen and nothing would exist.

A river as it proceeds on its course comes across rocky ground; it either bores through it, or else it is deviated—Several possibilities, but no hierarchical ordering. (Nevertheless, one can if one wants . . .)

Tamas is at the same time aberration—chance, fragmentation of portions of time, lack of foresight, non-adaptation of means to ends—and *fatigue*, passivity. Necessarily the province of the *śūdras*.

Matter is non-foresight and passivity. The *śūdra* imitates matter by which he is oppressed.

Rajas is that supplementary force possessed by man and which is concentrated in the highest degree among the *Kṣatriyas*. (Kinship between love and war.) It is energy.

Sattva is something in nature which enables the supernatural, in a certain sense, to exist. But it is something inside nature.

[Sentimus experimurque nos aeternos esse,¹ and the 'feeling of immortality', the 'primordial state'.]

The conditions of existence of Good make it possible to conceive a hierarchy in nature. With respect to the Good (albeit supernatural) of men, animal life is one of the primary conditions. The absorption by plants of luminous energy is another one. Therefore luminous energy itself is one of them. (Man eats the sun.) Plato: the sun causes existence and renders visible. Mechanical energy and luminous energy are both of them non-degraded, but one of them is a principle of organic chemistry, the other not; thus the two are *essentially* different—(Has the difference been duly noted in the domain of pure physics?)

Incidentally: why should not man, instead of making the decomposition of organic syntheses in minerals pass into mechanical energy, be able in certain cases to make it pass into radiating energy? (accounts of yogis who make the plants grow; alchemy). There would be nothing miraculous about this.

Attention surely implies an expenditure of energy, since it is limited in duration—What kind of energy? Mechanical? This is

¹ We feel and experience that we are eternal (Spinoza, *Ethics*, V, 23).

not impossible. But perhaps of a different kind. Possibly without an analogue among natural phenomena—or possibly not without an analogue—

Energy which arrests. The power to stop—

Can one draw up a hierarchical order of all the different states of matter in terms of the conditions of existence of Good?

The lower: that to which we are borne by fatigue.

Aristotle, tendency towards the lower—It is putting inertia into the fall—Why not? Some strong reasons for that—

It is significant that physics should have come up against some insoluble difficulties in the study of radiation.

A science in which *participation* would never be interrupted. Is it possible? Why not? It is this lack of participation—this veil which knowledge of the 2nd kind constitutes—which used to disgust me with science.

Let no activity—physical labour or study—be an obstacle in the way of seeing the ātman in all things—

Let every activity have at its centre some moments of interruption.

There is *tamas* in *buddhi*. It is fatigue which degrades and limits the higher form of attention.

There is *sattva* everywhere in *prakṛti*. There is no ceiling-limit.

Obedience is the supreme virtue. To love necessity. Necessity and *dharma* are but one and the same thing. *Dharma* is necessity that is loved—Necessity is whatever is lowest in relation to the individual—coercion, force, 'harsh necessity'—universal necessity delivers from it. To consider *dharma*, not as duty, but as necessity, is to raise oneself above it.

Giving free play to one's faculties for action and for suffering. Parallelism between Arjuna and Christ.

He will fight because he cannot stop this war, and because, if it takes place, he cannot do otherwise than take part in it. (It has already begun.)

To do only that which one cannot do otherwise than do. Non-active action.

He would like not to fight and is overcome by his feelings of pity. But if he asks himself fairly and squarely: 'Is it possible for me not to fight?', he cannot, at this moment, in this situation, reply Yes.

Non-violence is only good if it is effective. Hence the question put by the young man to Gandhi concerning his sister. The answer ought to be: use force, unless you happen to be such that you can defend her, with as much probability of success, without resorting

to violence; unless you radiate an energy (that is to say, a potential efficacy in the strictly material sense) equal to that contained in your muscles.

Certain people have been like this. St Francis.

To strive to become such that one may be able to be non-violent.

That *also* depends on one's adversary.

To strive to substitute *more and more*, in the world, effective non-violence for violence.

(Nothing ineffective is of any value.

(The seduction of force comes from below.

This presents a terrible difficulty.

Arjuna is wrong, because he allows himself to be overcome by pity instead of fairly and squarely weighing up the problem: can I refrain from fighting? He has forgotten his pair of scales.

Every man must imitate Zeus and bring out his golden scales. They are the scales of dharma.

Not to think that one kills—or that one saves, naturally. Not to think that one wields any power. Prakṛti with its guṇas does *everything*—even good—even evil—both good and evil, everything.

Man has no power whatever, and yet he does have a responsibility.

The future corresponds to responsibility, the past to powerlessness. And all that which is to come will become the past.

If Krishna did not intervene so as to enlighten Arjuna, Arjuna would still fight, but badly.

The body is always a balance for motives, a perpetual balance, perpetually in motion. What we call 'I', 'me' is only a motive.

But the supernatural lies in this, that for a moment the balance stops moving and remains in suspension. After the stoppage, the same forces act upon it, only now it is more exact.

There must be an optimum rhythm—an optimum duration and frequency of such stoppages.

This stopping also necessarily implies expenditure of energy—but an *essentially different* sort of energy.

How does something come to a stop?

In the case of inert matter, a moving body comes to a stop through degradation of mechanical energy into calorific energy.

In the case of man, apparently, transformation of energy in the reverse sense.

Why should there not be in the exchanges and modifications of the organic tissues, especially the nervous tissues, a form of energy

which is to movement and radiation as movement and radiation are to heat?

However, the mystery remains the same. Those are the *guṇas* of *prakṛti*. There is something in the world with which the supernatural is related, to which it is specially linked. What? What is this link?

If Good—or the Supreme Principle, or whatever expression one uses—is manifested by the whole universe, but more particularly by certain things, it is manifested in a lesser degree by the other things, and consequently the latter must be relatively contrary to Good: *ὑπεναντίον ἀγαθῷ*.¹

Disequilibrium. Equilibrium is immobility. The void. The non-manifested. The states of disequilibrium which compensate one another represent a second form of equilibrium. Non-compensated disequilibrium is the veritable disequilibrium; it is the illimitable; it is only an illusion of the mind. No disequilibrium in the natural phenomena of the physical world. In the human body, only with regard to . . . (to what? to the effect on the soul?) Disequilibrium in the desires and in the relationships between human beings—and in . . . (in what else?)—But not in point of fact.

If a man can help another to emerge from ignorance (teaching), he can also cause ignorance to thicken around others. Such is the case of those who cause pleasures, pains, stupors.

What more appalling than to cause ignorance to thicken around a human being just at the very hour of death? than to kill? (Unless it be in the way in which *Râma* kills the *shûdra*.)

Good is manifested in certain things in the world and in the whole world. Equilibrium, image of the void. Compensated states of disequilibrium of the whole world, image of equilibrium. Partial states of equilibrium, images of that of the world. To look for them. Closed vessels.

Closed vessel, microcosm. Let *my* world be in equilibrium.

Reason—that of the second order—can never provide this equilibrium, but only bring about a redressing of the inner balance by means of stoppages that are sufficiently long and frequent, but not exaggeratedly so.

Plato—*Timaeus*—He gives a double explanation of the world, first as the result of a divine cause, secondly as the result of a necessary cause. There is not a single gap in the explanations and they do not overlap each other. Good—degraded by stages—and Necessity are each a sufficient cause of the selfsame effect.

¹ A contrary of Good (Plato, *Theaetetus*, 176 a).

Art is an imitation of this.

Action in conformity with virtue is an imitation of this. It is entirely caused by Good and entirely caused by the exchanges of mechanical energy or its equivalent in the tissues.

In order that Good may pass into existence, Good must be able to be the cause of what is already entirely caused by Necessity.

Geometry, science should be an imitation of this.

Superimposed significations in the same text.

The world can possess an infinity of them.

READINGS.—co-ordination in Time and with the readings of others. Co-ordination between simultaneous and successive readings. In the immediate present, and individually, everything is equally true. Why should such a co-ordination be necessary? Because here Good enters into the picture. I have got to be in accord with others and with past 'I', future 'I'.

This accord represents reality. Others constitute a conjecture; past 'I', future 'I' do not. The accord is essentially unverifiable.

Plenary accord: identity, eternity.

From solipsism to Supreme Identity via the world.

To seize hold of reality. Where?

Catholic communion. God has not only made himself flesh once; every day he makes himself matter in order to give himself to man and be consumed by him. Conversely, through fatigue, affliction, death, man is made matter and consumed by God. How refuse this reciprocity?

[In the form of wheat, we devour the sun, and, at the same time, the human spirit.]

The rain, sacrifice of the veritable soma by the gods, passes into the food; thus the divinity and man are daily bound together by a reciprocal sacrifice. (*Upanishads.*)

If men could feel continually the fatigues of labour and of life as a reciprocal form of communion . . .

To know oneself to be limited in so far as one is other than God. In the *in-so-far-as* lies the difficulty.

'Through dharma, the weak balances the strong' (*B.Ā.U.*, I. 4, 14).

Dharma, a balance with unequal arms. The balance representing

justice is, decidedly, with unequal arms. *It also represents relationship, condition and proportion. Are the concern for proportion and the concern for justice, among the Greeks, related by this means? Architecture, geometry—are they images of dharma?*

Relationship, negation of the absolute. Desire projects the mind into the absolute as into the illimitable.

Desire is evil and deceitful; and yet without desire we should not seek the truly absolute, the truly illimitable. We have got to have passed by way of desire. Affliction of those beings who are deprived by fatigue of that supplementary energy which is the source of desire.

Affliction also of those who are blinded by desire.

We must hitch our desire to the axis of the poles.

.
Movement ceases through the transformation of mechanical energy into heat. In the same way desire, and every activity which proceeds from desire, ceases through fatigue. Desire is thus contradictory, unlimited in its object, limited in its principle. All men bitterly experience this contradiction at every turn, and never cease lying in order to conceal it from themselves.

Lying is the way the human mind has of taking to flight when faced with an essential, irremediable contradiction.

Everything which through violence—for here violence is necessary—compels one to look the contradiction in the face acts as a remedy against lying—remedy which is always painful. Beautiful things, a picture, a statue, a song, a poem, so obviously eternal that at the first touch of the beautiful in them we want to fix our attention on them for evermore, yet we know at once that we shall get tired of them; inexhaustible, yet we know that contemplation becomes exhausted—And by what mystery does he who makes them, making them in a time that is limited, with an attention that is finite, manage to put into them the inexhaustible?—Love (Lucretius)—[Mathematics, in what way?—Death.

If one understands the use of death for man, one should understand how it should be submitted to and how it should be inflicted.

Fear, like desire—which is to desire as pain is to pleasure—contains the illimitable—Abhaya, non-terror (non-anguish), attribute of Brahma. Or rather, it contains the absolute, the false absolute. Of the order of *tamas*, it transforms into matter. Desire contains an illusion of all-powerfulness; fear, of a fundamental powerlessness. When desire encounters its limit, fear makes its appearance. Anguish,

mixture of desire and fear, in hunger for example. Fear in the slaves of Plautus: *perii, nihil sum*.¹ Denial by a being of its own existence; this also contains a contradiction. Wretched tossing between desire and fear. Fear disappears when once more the inner energy (mechanism from whence desire proceeds) is reassembled. Beings who nearly always go in fear; slaves.

How place a human being face to face with death without making him afraid? People are more afraid of death at the hands of men than they are of death in its natural form. Is it possible to surround it with forms such that it makes people less afraid; turn it into a ceremonial?

The view of Necessity is a remedy both for desire and fear.

Death should appear to man as being a result either of a blind mechanism or of karma. The arbitrary expressions of volition on the part of other men appear as a blind mechanism for those who know, not for those who do not know. It is a crime to thicken the ignorance surrounding such as do not know. Death by violence if it be permitted should only be for them their own violence visited upon themselves, either as a result of a judicial condemnation, or else in a war when their attack is repulsed. This is not the case in the Old Testament.

The first objections formulated by Krishna to Arjuna. One should not perform an action such that, in the given circumstances in which it is carried out, it is bound not to be understood by anybody. This is thickening the surrounding ignorance. The significance of an action, like the flavour of a poem, should be perceived.

In civil society, penal death, if death is used as a punishment, ought to be something beautiful. Religious ceremonies would be necessary for it to be made so. And there ought to be something to make it be felt that the man who is being punished, on receiving death, accomplishes something great; contributes, as far as he is able to in the situation in which he has placed himself, to the orderly state of the community.

Let him remain in his cell until such time as he himself accepts to die?

Is it licit, generally speaking, to make use of terror, to inflict terror on men? Can one do without it?

[Read over again in Herodotus the account of the battle of Marathon.]

. . . That thy mercy for stay and support—

¹ I am dead, I am nothing.

Every one that doeth evil hateth the light—*πᾶς ὁ φαῦλα πράσσων μισεῖ τὸ φῶς*.

Extermination as a remedy, belief in occult qualities. Belief that you can suppress idolatry by killing the idolaters. What you really suppress is whatever there is which is unique, precious and irreplaceable . . .

Killing men who do not think as you do. In the last resort, you remain alone. Imitation of the solitude of God; that is the worst form of idolatry.

Moses, Joshua, Samuel. The point at issue was to forge, without a conception of the Incarnation, a whole monotheistic people, thinking on God in his entirety, without any intermediary. Thinking on God, and yet without any 'metaphysical realization', for such is not vouchsafed to a whole people. Thinking on God with *manas*. That is a violent state, contrary to nature. Extreme violence alone could manage to attain to it. For want of *μεταξύ*, the sword played the part of *μεταξύ*; terror and expectation, horrible and bloody deeds, and the flowing of milk and honey. There was no possibility of its being otherwise. They were trained by the massacres they were called upon to carry out as they were by those that were inflicted on them personally.

Severity and licentious customs play a part in this story.

The relationship of God to civil society, of God to the people, is a problem which was raised by all the societies of antiquity and which they all solved in different ways. Problem which bears an analogy with that of the *μεταξύ* in the case of the individual.

The idea of dharma, of Nemesis, is absolutely lacking (?) in the Old Testament.

Monotheism. Christianity solved the problem through the Incarnation (and, in addition, the Virgin and Saints). But how about the Mohammedan religion? Intermediate between the two; which is why paradise is more perceptible to the senses. But how do they manage it? It is an extraordinary success. The acceptance of suffering is perhaps the *μεταξύ*. Does the slightest sexual constraint play any part? At any rate, there is a Mohammedan esotericism. There must also be a Christian influence by way of Byzantium. But that does not explain the matter. The Mohammedans did not fall back into idolatry after the manner of the Jews. They made converts, not without a certain amount of violence. Practically the only thing

the Hebrews did was to exterminate, at any rate prior to the destruction of Jerusalem.

'Let them be one as we are one—I in them and thou in me.

'As my Father hath loved me, even so have I loved you.'

Γινώσκω τὰ ἐμὰ καὶ γινώσκουσί με τὰ ἐμὰ καθὼς γινώσκει με ὁ πατὴρ καὶ γὰρ γινώσκω τὸν πατέρα.¹

and a host of similar definitions. Mediation: proportional mean between man and God. Μεταξύ.

He came into Israel—and his disciples were spread abroad in the Roman world—because up to then Israel and Rome had been denied any veritable revelation (?).

The *two* sorts of karma in the *Iliad*—For the wrath of Achilles urges him on to greater wrath. Even by the XXIVth canto he hasn't recovered from it, since Priam flees from him in the middle of the night. Death alone will put a stop to it. Still, the certain knowledge that he is going to die has a certain pacifying effect upon him.

Death is the most precious thing that has been given to man. That is why the supreme impiety is to make an improper use of it. Dying amiss. Killing amiss. (But how escape at the same time both from suicide and murder?) After death, love. (Similar problem: neither an improper gratification, nor an improper deprivation.) War and ἔρως² are the twin sources of illusion and falsehood among men; (their mixture constitutes the greatest form of impurity).

Desire limited in advance by fatigue. To hook one's desire on to what does not become fatigued. What does not become fatigued is to start with the Immobile Mover. It is the axis of the poles. It is in the universe the movement of the sky with the fixed stars, and in man what is analogous to this. What, then? The wandering desires must hook themselves on to it like the planets to the sky with the fixed stars.

As for the body, everything which in man is cyclical and uninterrupted—circulation of the blood, respiration, all the vital exchanges known and unknown—corresponds, on the plane of mortal individuals, to the rotation of the fixed stars. (The body does not become fatigued, except in so far as it becomes older, if . . . (if what? . . .)).

¹ I know my [sheep] and am known of mine. As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father . . . (John x, 14-15).

² Eros.

Rhythm and alternation of forces expended and recuperated. Partakes, can also partake of harmony. But on what conditions? Depending to what extent upon the self?

The Lord opened her eyes and she saw a well of water (Gen. xxi, 19).

To Moses: 'I am the Lord: and I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob by the name of God Almighty; but by my name JEHOVAH¹ was I not known to them.'

Seventh day. Decree. || I give you the herbs of the field and the trees bearing seed.

Curse. Woman: pains of pregnancy and of childbirth, desire, subjection. Man: pain of labour, death ||

The fruit of the tree of life, isn't this amṛta? It was not forbidden before the Fall. The prohibition comes later on . . . Thus infinite distance separating innocent man from God, not so redeemed man from God—'Become like unto one of us', through the knowledge . . . (? . . .)

To Noah: 'And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand of every man; at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made he man.'

Babel. ' . . . that they may not understand one another's speech'. The first bloodshed of which mention is made after Noah is the war undertaken by Abraham to go to the rescue of Lot, after which he is blessed by Melchizedek; there is no question here of massacres—Nothing else until Moses. (Yes; the story of the circumcision (Levi and Simeon)) [only, the women presented as sisters, and Joseph's policy in Egypt . . .]—Murder of an Egyptian by Moses—Moses' exultation over the fate of the Egyptian army in the Red Sea—Battle (defensive) fought against Amalek—'Write this for a memorial in the Book . . . I will utterly put out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven.'

Golden calf and order to the Levites to massacre brothers, friends, parents—3000 dead—True name (Adonai) revealed to Moses. On the same day: 'Take heed to thyself, lest thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land whither thou goest, lest it be for a snare

¹ ' . . . en ma qualité d'Etre immuable . . . ' in the French translation used by Simone Weil, edited by M. Zadoc Kahn, Chief Rabbi, Paris 1930.

in the midst of thee: but ye shall destroy their altars, break their images . . . Write thou these words.' | By God's command, a man who has gathered sticks on the sabbath day is put to death. | The earth swallows up 250 human beings who have turned against Moses | The following day, plague which kills 14,700 | Edom refuses to give right of passage, and Israel turns aside | Defensive war against the Canaanites (consigned to perdition) | Amorites, id. | Bashan, id. | —Israel settles down peaceably among the Midianites (Moses' first wife's people). Some are tempted by the latter to practise idolatry; a plague causes 24,000 deaths; the daughter of a Midianite nobleman is killed; God commands Moses to punish the Midianites; all the males are slain, including Balaam; then, the rest having been taken captive, Moses causes them all to be slain except for the virgin girls.

Moses' exhortation (Deut., xx, 10-18)—'When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be, that all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee. And if it will make no peace with thee, but will make war against thee, then thou shalt besiege it. And when the Lord thy God hath delivered it into thine hands, thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword. But the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, shalt thou take unto thyself. Thus shalt thou do unto all the cities which are very far off from thee, which are not of the cities of these nations. But of the cities of these people which the Lord thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth: but thou shalt utterly destroy them . . . as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee; that they teach you not to do after all their abominations, which they have done unto their gods.'

Jericho shuts its gates. Complete extermination (except for a courtesan who had betrayed); city is accursed. Attack on Ai; complete extermination (12,000); king taken captive and hanged. | The Gideonites, feigning to come from afar, bind the Hebrews by oath and submit to becoming hewers of wood and drawers of water. | Battle against 5 kings; Joshua makes the sun stand still so as to have more time to wipe out the vanquished; he takes the kings, has them stretched out on the ground, and orders his military commanders to place their feet upon the necks of them; he then hangs them. | Altogether, 31 kings killed (and nations wiped out).

Samuel says to Saul: 'Thus saith the Lord of hosts, I remember

that which Amalek did to Israel, how he laid wait for him in the way, when he came up from Egypt. Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass.'—Saul spares Agag, king of the Amalekites, and some cattle. God repents him of having made Saul king. Agag is killed by Samuel—The divine spirit abandons Saul.

Joshua and Samuel die happy—especially Joshua.

No statue used to be erected to Jehovah; but Israel is the statue of Jehovah. This people was fashioned, like a wooden statue, with blows from an axe. An artificial people. They were a tribe when they entered Egypt; they became a nation whilst in bondage. (In the course of $4\frac{1}{2}$ centuries, they were unable to be assimilated.) Held together by a terrible violence.

Non-assimilable, non-assimilatory.

Brhad-Ār.-Up. I, 4, 2—What is there to be afraid of, when one is alone? If one passes from solipsism to the knowledge of reality only by passing through God, as in Descartes, where is evil able to penetrate? Non-duality is at the same time non-terror, non-anguish.

One is afraid when one is alone, but it is a mistaken fear. The fear is of something else. Absolute solitude is without terror, *Who* would do me evil? Abhaya, non-terror, non-anguish, peace, happiness.

Love your enemies, the wicked, the ungrateful, etc., *like* your heavenly Father (not otherwise); compare with Chinese non-action.

*"Ὅπως γένησθε υἱοὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὅτι τὸν ἥλιον αὐτοῦ ἀνατέλλει ἐπὶ πονηροὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς καὶ βρέχει ἐπὶ δικαίους καὶ ἀδίκους.*¹

*"Ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τέλειός ἐστιν.*²

There is also a similitude to be drawn between non-resistance and non-action.

St. Thomas on the suffering of Christ. Not to seek not to suffer, or to suffer less (in affliction), but to seek not to be affected by suffering.

¹ That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust (Matt. v, 45).

² Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect (Matt. v, 48).

We must suspend desire on to that which is not exposed to fatigue, consequently on to that which is cyclical. Connection between Galilean mechanics and faulty present-day conceptions (e.g. belief in progress). This suspension can only be accomplished through rhythm, for desire that is limited in advance is deprived of interest, and its value lies in the alternation between desire and the satisfaction of desire. Regular recurrences according to times and seasons. A desire, and therefore an activity, no longer possesses any value except in relation to the whole. Each activity is limited, but the succession of activities is not.

This alternation, when the rhythm is taken away from it, constitutes hell. The Danaids, Sisyphus.

Rhythm increases the length of the effort, retards fatigue; in the long run, could suppress it altogether? Source of physical energy; in what way? But first of all BY WHAT CAN RHYTHM BE DEFINED? It cannot be defined by regularity. The ticking of a clock has no rhythm. *It is defined by the pauses.*

A momentary emptiness of the mind, with an extreme attention, increases the power and raises the quality of the thoughts which follow in the domain of knowledge of the second order. In the same way, a momentary immobility of the body in the case of movements.

Act of running. Immobility of the trunk and head; cyclical movement of the arms; moment between successive acts of touching the ground.

A great runner appears to run slowly, because of these pauses.

Rhythm as *μεταξύ*. Point of contact between non-existent reality and becoming. Something which is sensible and the reality of which lies only in relation. Wholly composed of past and future, and alone giving the present. Uniformity and non-recurrence. Source of energy which raises.

Equilibrium as a moment, as a limit between two states of disequilibrium.

Science and the beautiful. Fundamental problem of physics—which has never been raised (?)—how do we recognize that a phenomenon, a variable (or stable) portion of the universe can be regarded as a closed vessel? Balance, image of the universe. *All closed vessels, equivalent to the balance.*

Man—a mind tied to a body—is only able to exist if this same body is an image of the universe, and if the limited portions of matter to which he has access are—some of them—images of the universe.

So also finite portions of time have got to contain an image of eternity. Moments, but also finite portions.

Sculpture should represent the human body as being an image of the universe, that is to say, as something in equilibrium.

Πᾶς ὁ φαῦλα πράσσων μισεῖ τὸ φῶς. It is not evil.¹ It is what is insignificant. Whosoever occupies himself with mediocre things hates the light.

Does evil, such as one conceives it to be when one isn't doing it, exist? Doesn't the evil one does appear to be something simple, natural and unavoidable? Isn't evil analogous to illusion? Illusion, when one is in the midst of it, is not felt as illusion, but as a fact. The notion of illusion is illusory. One only conceives as illusion that which one does not believe in, which therefore does not deceive one. The presence of illusions that have been abandoned, but are present to the mind, is perhaps the criterion of truth. The same is true, perhaps, of evil. Evil, when one is actually immersed in it, is not felt as evil, but as a necessity or even a duty. *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*;² I do not do the good that I love, but the evil that I hate; in such states, it seems that one conceives the good, and one does so in a sense, *but one does not conceive the possibility of it.*

But there is a lower degree of evil, in which evil appears as duty and good as temptation. Spain; *Rid.*; Marlowe's *Faust*; Gilles de R.—L.³: diabolical grace. Search for purity in evil. The natural inclinations upon which virtue rests, being separated from the will, are like temptations, and during certain periods disappear—periods of plenitude. The state in which a human being is then is equivalent to a certain form of virtue, a form of virtue from which evil is absent.

What is essentially other than evil is only virtue accompanied by a clear perception of the possibility of evil, and of evil appearing as a good.

Good as the contrary of evil is the equivalent of it, in a sense, as is the case with all pairs of contraries.

A common agreement between several men contains a feeling of reality. It also contains a feeling of duty. Any divergence with respect to such a common agreement seems in the nature of a sin.

¹ Every one that doeth mediocre things hateth the light (John iii, 20).

² I see what is good and approve it, but pursue what is bad (Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, VII, 20).

Cf. footnote, p. 80.

In that way *all* reversals are possible. Samson and ogres of folklore. A state of conformity is an imitation of grace.

In all inner conflicts, just as in all conflicts between men, it is possible to portion out the evil and the good *indifferently*, placing the good on one side or the other, the evil being that which is opposed to it. 'No one is wicked voluntarily.' The true good stands above the conflict—and yet takes part; supreme mystery.

In the case of evil, there is a compulsion which goads on and a desire to know which attracts, the presentiment of some secret. He who opens the box (Psyche) is not capable of virtue. Power and knowledge, double temptation. (But preservation, essential motor force of sin perhaps?) Double temptation the terms of which are related. Degraded image of good, which is, in a sense, power and knowledge.

A certain virtue also (inferior) is a degraded image of good, of which one has got to repent, and of which it is more difficult to repent than it is of evil. (Pharisee and publican.)

He who murders some children (Gilles¹) and he who looks after some orphans are on the same level, if both of them are forgetful of the fact that each of these children exists—is the whole universe. The latter, if he is aware of it, is not always aware of it, and consequently, while doing good, keeps on falling back on to the level of the former; only manages to raise himself above it momentarily. If he is aware of this too, his virtue is genuine.

Christ allowed each human function to have full play in himself, also all that which in man is capable of sin (though he himself was without sin).

READING.—Evil, other reading. Passage from evil to good, like when you turn a book over on to its other side.

On the non-supernatural plane, society is what separates us from evil (from certain forms of evil) as though by a barrier; a society of criminals or vicious people, even if composed of only a few men, abolishes this barrier.

But what is it that induces people to enter such a society? Either necessity, or thoughtlessness, or, more often, a mixture of the two; they do not recognize that they are pledging themselves, for *they do not know* that, apart from the supernatural, society *alone* prevents one from drifting quite naturally into the most horrible forms of vice or of crime. They do not know that they are going to become other,

¹ Cf. footnote, p. 80.

for they do not know just how far in themselves extends the domain of what can be modified by external surroundings. They always pledge themselves without knowing it.

Even to allow one's imagination to dwell on certain things as being possible (which is quite a different thing from forming a clear conception of their possibility, an essential element in the case of virtue) is to have pledged oneself already. Curiosity is the cause of this. We should refuse to allow ourselves [not to conceive, but to dwell on] certain thoughts; we should not think *about*. People suppose that thinking does not pledge them, but it alone pledges us, and licence of thought contains every form of licence. Not to think *about*—supreme faculty. Purity, a negative virtue. If that which is highest can only be expressed in our speech through negation, so likewise we can only imitate it in negative fashion. If, having allowed one's imagination to dwell on something bad, one meets with other men who render that thing objective through their words and deeds (when one has already entered into social relations with them) and thus abolish the barrier erected by society, one is already almost lost. And what is easier? No sudden break of any kind; by the time you see the ditch, you have already jumped it. In the case of Good, it is the reverse; the ditch is seen at the moment when it has to be jumped, at the moment of wrenching apart and anguish. You do not fall into Good. The word 'baseness' [*bassesse*] expresses this property possessed by evil.

Curiosity and desire for power—*Rajas*; tendency towards enlarging oneself. Appears innocent. Evil is not apparent in the movement of thought which lies at the origin of evil. To allow the imagination to dwell on what is evil implies a sort of cowardice; one hopes to receive enjoyment, knowledge and increase through the unreal. (There is also the fact that not to think *about* is an *art*, and one that is very little known.)

Even when accomplished, evil retains this characteristic mark of unreality; whence comes perhaps the simplicity of criminals; everything is simple in the dream state. (Simplicity which forms a pendant to that which characterizes supreme virtue.)

[*Characteristic mark of flow of time in evil*, to be studied. Instability of criminals and prostitutes, coupled with obsessions.]

Conceiving the notion and possibility of evil without imagining evil; this is the significance behind Ulysses bound and his crew with their ears full of wax.

Such is not the case (?) with Good. If you clearly conceive it, and

clearly conceive the possibility of it, you carry it out. Such is the grace accorded to man.

This difference constitutes a criterion of Good (?), a criterion only applicable if one knows what it is to conceive without imagining. READINGS.

Artists—A human being gifted for a particular art attains to a degree of excellence in it *exactly* in proportion to his ability not to think *about*.

The same is true of this art which is life.

(Gilles¹—Not-to-think-about seems to him too difficult, and appears as his only possibility of salvation, since it happens that on several occasions misfortunes arise which correspond to his own evil thoughts. But through what anguish of mind does he finally attain to it in the end? For he has got to have several days without evil thoughts.)

If you clearly conceive two ways of acting as possible, with the mind suspended for a moment between the two to a higher point of support, the one you carry out represents the Good (if you conceive them clearly—from an infinite number of points of view at once—and as possible, really possible).

Just as sequence brings about in the realm of knowledge the passage from the limited to the infinite—from earth to heaven—so in like manner does rhythm in the realm of desire and of action. Relationship between sequence and rhythm. The two, union of the immobile and the mobile.

Polc. Plumb-line. Balance.

Impossible to penetrate the secret of this grace, but it can be circumscribed. We have here an irreducible fact, something formally ascertained, a matter of experience.

Obsessions—their recurrence. Story of Moussa.² Whatever leaves a mark on the human being sets up reactions and the will to self-preservation involves the search for circumstances which correspond to these reactions, even if this represents woe. The mark left on man by what he does and what he endures—what is its nature?

Man is only real, in his innermost self, when he forms the connecting link between the past and the future. Whoever deprives him of either of these (or of both) does him the greatest possible injury. To abolish completely what I have been means: uprooting, social degradation, slavery; and, as far as the future is concerned, sentence of death. (And yet the possibility of both these developments repre-

¹ Cf. footnote, p. 80.

² See pp. 17-18.

sents a good.)—To wipe out past centuries by the destruction of a whole city, more horrible still.

The possibility of evil is a good.

Possibility, unfathomable notion.

Amṛta. To drink immortality. (State of childhood, *bâlya*, cf. Lamartine.) Draught of immortality. It is composed of rhythm and proportion (and sequence), or rather of these points of emptiness and equilibrium . . . Fatigue and hunger are the mark of our mortal condition day in day out. In the last analysis, a perfectly harmonious system of exchanges between the body and the world would abolish death ('long life?'). Taoists: a good blacksmith does his work without thinking about it and doesn't tire himself. Immobile thought (attention), pole of cyclical movements.

In all physical activity, compensatory movements, the problem concerning which being that they should take place without hindering the speed or efficiency of the particular action—Transformation of the circular movement into a straight movement. Act of running. Always the problem of the two causes—necessary and final; harmonizing in art, etc.; multiple composition.

Fatigue arises from the fact that composition is only done with a view to the transformation to be effected—an external and violent composition; compensations are not brought about. All effort has to be compensated by a return to the primitive state; to the limit, then fatigue is evidently nil.

[Virtue in man and society. Equivalences: a repressed tendency takes on another equivalent form. Among all the forms that are possible, one has only to choose the one which does the least harm to the higher values and follow it up.]

In the activities of the body, we should use gravity and pendulous phenomena to the maximum extent; in a general way, simply direct the particular forces—which are all of them pendulous, for any upsetting of the balance is always compensated. We should use them for a continuous movement. Transformation of the circular movement into a straight movement. Meanwhile maintaining the mind in a sort of void, a state of pure attention.

Superior dignity of the art of arms, partly due perhaps to the fact that the movements are modelled upon one's fellow-man.

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Death turned itself into fatigue.

Death forms the limit.

Those ones (word, eye, ear, etc.) Death, having become fatigued, subjugated them, seized them, and having seized them, paralysed them. That is the reason why speech becomes fatigued, sight becomes fatigued, hearing becomes fatigued. But this, death does not seize—this, which is the central breath.

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Among the divinities, Vāyu is the one which knows no rest. (Therefore Vāyu also represents the daily rotation of the heavens.)

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. ∴

From whence the sun rises,

whither he goes on setting,

that, the gods have made Dharma,

such (it is) today and such (it will be) tomorrow.

(it is Prāṇa

or Vāyu)

Whence: prāṇyāc caivāpanyāc ca: nṇ mā pāpmā mrtyur
āpnuvad iti.¹

This is triple: nāma rūpam karma, word, eye, ātman.

triple and one: the ātman is this triad.

. immortal which the real [veils?]

. the breath is the immortal.

(Therefore the act . . .)

Jaffier.² Gilles. One must reach the point of giving for a moment the feeling that it is good which is something abnormal. And, in fact, such is indeed the case, in this world. We are not conscious of it; let art give us the consciousness of it. Abnormal, but possible, and constituting good.

One must also make evil appear as vulgar, monotonous, dreary and boring.

‘That which is below is like that which is above.’ Extinction of movement and non-movement. Perpetual movement, *μεταξύ*.

Creation of the world through death-and-hunger, . . . ∴
unfathomable idea—Related to Manichaeism—Everything
that it produced, it would eat up. Sa yad yad eva asṛjata, tat tad

¹ The quotation is drawn from the *B.Ā.U.* I, 5, 23, and signifies ‘one must breathe out and in, so as to avoid being gripped by death, (that is to say) by Evil.’

² Chief character in *Venise sauvée*, an unfinished play by Simone Weil.

attum adhriyata. In the world there is only food and eater, soma and agni.

. One sole divinity, death—But āsanyam prāṇam, the breath which is in the mouth¹ drives away death, banishes it to the other end of the world, and, transporting the voice, the breath, the sight, the hearing and Manas beyond death, creates agni, vayu, the sun, the moon and space.

He who knows that death is the sole divinity, death becomes his ātman—(?), death cannot reach him.

Πᾶς ὁ φαῦλα πράσσω μισεῖ τὸ φῶς.

Φαῦλα is the best word for evil.

As soon as one does evil, evil appears as a sort of duty. Most people have the feeling of duty in the case of certain evil things and in the case of certain good things. The same man feels it to be a duty both to sell for as dear as he can and not to steal, etc.—For such people, good is on the same level as evil, a good deprived of light—The kind of evil that is not depraved, but is always capable of becoming so.

If it be true that the same suffering is much more difficult to put up with through a high motive than through a low one—the people who used to stand, quite still, from 1 a.m. to 8 a.m., in winter, would have found it very difficult to do so to save a human life or for the benefit of the country; they did it more easily for the sake of an egg—a low-placed virtue is perhaps from certain points of view better able to cope with difficulties, temptations and misfortunes than a high-placed one. This is evident in the case of courage. Napoleon's soldiers. (Hence the use of cruel methods to maintain or raise the morale of soldiers.) Not to be forgotten in connection with moral failing.

It is a particular instance of the law which generally places force on the side of what is low. Gravity is like a symbol of this.

Two forces reign over the universe, light and gravity. Over the universe in so far as it is matter, first of all.

'God has done everything using quantity, gravity, and proportion.'

Light and sound. Relationship between light and rhythm.

Luminous and mechanical energy do not become transformed into one another except through the medium of food. (? to be studied.)

¹ B.Ā.U. I, 3, 7.

Mechanical force has a natural connection with gravity.

In order that what is high may weigh as much as what is low, a balance with unequal arms is necessary—Dharma (in the social sense); and society ceaselessly tends toward, ceaselessly lapses into according power to what is low. Tamas in society. Rajas in society is fairly apparent. And how about Sattva? The place of intelligence in society, balance, the law; no society without this factor also.

‘There is Sattva when Sattva dominates,’ etc., i.e. the three Guṇas are always present, but one of them dominates.

Natural relationship between power and what is low; on the other hand, law; an unstable equilibrium is an image of Good in society and in the soul,

Anaximander’s formula, foundation of all science. To define everywhere an equilibrium such that the compensated upsettings of this equilibrium constitute phenomena. Also in a human soul; when a motive goes too far, a compensation is produced. In society just the same. In nature, matter, the difficulty is to define by abstraction the different balances which are combined and their combinations. Thus all bodies are at the same time heavy and lighted up. There is no reason to want to find mechanical equilibrium everywhere; if there was only mechanical equilibrium, there would not be any mankind. In matter itself there are necessarily certain essential differences corresponding to the relations of matter to life and of living matter to thought. To circumscribe them; define various sorts of equilibrium. Even in a single phenomenon already delimited by abstraction; for instance, colours; why should there not be at the same time a balance proper to the vibrations and the mixtures of light and shade? Several theories at once, but not in the sense in which that is understood today in undulatory mechanics; not fitting into each other, but being superimposed on to each other. All states of equilibrium, analogous to a balance, not identical with it. NOTION OF A CONSTANT; CONSTANTS AND GROUPS, THAT IS TO SAY CYCLES. Space and Time, accepted as being such as they appear to be to common sense, but with their irreducible paradoxes, for they have only been able to seem without contradiction through a voluntary blindness on our part; but not to introduce therein any further contradictions. On the contrary, to consider all difficulties that arise in relation to these clear and essential contradictions—

Static states of equilibrium—

Dynamic states of equilibrium—here the paradoxes of Zeno

introduce insoluble difficulties. (*Not to try to resolve what is insoluble, instead to circumscribe it.*)

States of equilibrium	{	of radiations	{ calorific
			{ luminous and of similar kind
		chemical	{ inorganic chemistry
			{ organic chemistry

The irreducible difference between organic and inorganic chemistry corresponds to an irreducible difference between radiations and movements.

In a general way, to establish correspondences between irreducible differences.

TWO PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE, AND TWO ONLY: EQUILIBRIUM AND GUNAS.

Rippling of the water, transition between movement and radiation (the same for elasticity); and yet, irreducible difference. Now, we can imagine the movement, but not the radiation, because there exists a certain correspondence between the human imagination and mechanical energy, due to the fact that we are only able directly to command ourselves movements—not any heat, radiation, or electricity.

Where lies, finally, the difference between a movement caused by inertia and a movement caused by force? Inertia is perpetual. One imagines a force—by analogy with human effort—commencing at a certain particular moment. But one then abandons such dreaming: forces do not make their appearance, do not destroy one another; they become transformed. Exactly like inertia in the case of movement. The same is also true in the case of human effort.

The only difference which remains is between types of movement. Even so, the change of acceleration represents more than the change of speed.

Why not also a constant with respect to the change of acceleration?

Closed system: the ground—a smooth plane tangential to the ground at a certain point—an elastic ball at a height of 1 m. The void. The ball falls and rises again without stopping. Cycle. Inertia and force combined.

Another closed system—A smooth horizontal plane between two vertical planes limiting it. On this plane, a little elastic ball. Moves indefinitely from one vertical plane to the other—What difference, except that the speed is constant in the one case and not in the other?

In the other case, something else is constant, since there is a cycle—This other thing is the distance between the ground and the point of origin (as, in the case of the little ball, that between the two planes), or, in other words, the sum of half the square root of the speed and of the space to be travelled multiplied by the acceleration (???)—or again, of the space to be travelled and of half the speed multiplied by the time taken to fall (???), product equal (?) to the space travelled.

Does every force imply a cycle? Gravitation, resilience. Elasticity. Magnet—electric circuits—chemical transformation—Does non-degraded energy always imply a cycle? Centrifugal force; it is not properly speaking a force, it is inertia; centripetal force is a force.

In every closed system, acceleration increases the kinetic energy, consequently diminishes the potential energy; thus cycle—Inertia alone admits of the unlimited in space—Energy, unlimited in Time.

Cycle—Formula for energy, of the second degree $\frac{1}{2}mv^2$ —What connection? $\frac{1}{2}x^2 + \frac{1}{2}y^2 = c^{te} \mid x^2 + y^2 = c^{te}$.—What curve?

In what respect is heat a degraded form? In the sense that it contains a principle of rest. When everything is at an equal temperature, rest, equilibrium. (That which is below is like that which is above.)

Symbolical virtue of water: it naturally tends towards equilibrium.

[Poetry; virtue of rhyme (and of measure, of all restraints), to stop, break up associations by violence.]

[Poetry, remedy for the necessity of the two dimensions which limits the written language, for that of the single dimension which limits the spoken language, because of the manifold links between the words.] [Music, themes, voices, etc.—is it the same? Surely.]

The notion of force is linked with that of emptiness—The Cartesian plenum constitutes a sufficient limit for inertia—No other force possible in the plenum than instantaneous impulsion.

'Nature is composed of the unlimited and the limiting' (?)

*Ἡ φύσις ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀρμόχθη ἐξ ἀπείρων τε καὶ περαιόντων καὶ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα.*¹

The unlimited must be essentially the *tendency to pass beyond the limit*.

Mixture of unlimited and of limit, in a sense continual (?) In a sense, the action of the limit makes itself felt continually—E.g. a road which goes up, as one is going up it, becomes a road which

¹ Nature in the world has been composed of things unbounded and things bounded, both the entire world and everything in it (Philolaus, fragment 1).

goes down. (But the same does not apply in the case of a ball which rebounds (?))

'Being born again'—St. Paul: εἰ δὲ ἀπεθανόμεν σὺν Χριστῷ, πιστευόμεν ὅτι καὶ συζήσομεν αὐτῷ.¹

Μηδὲ παριστάνετε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν ὄπλα ἀδικίας τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ.²

Music—Plato (*Timaeus*, *Philebus*). Does the secret lie in the relationship between rhythm and height? Imitation of celestial harmony; the successive skies over the course of a year are like the sky on any one night—The movements produced in us by rhythm (ta ta ta ta) are perhaps related to vibrations brought about by height?

Pythagorean definition of harmony: thinking at one go what you think separately—

δίχα φρονεόντων συμφρόνησις.³

Τὰ μὲν ὦν ὁμοῖα καὶ ὁμόφυλα ἁρμονίας οὐδὲν ἐπεδέοντο.⁴

Uniform movement, the only kind which you do not see. Upon it rest all forms of science. Therein lies the secret of science.

Practical problems (cases of conscience); it is preferable to resolve them before they present themselves, at leisure, rather than in the dark when time is short; but the best thing is to contemplate them simply in advance and resolve them when they, in fact, present themselves, on condition that one knows then how to maintain an inner purity and clarity; for thus alone does one think on them completely.

Everything which is an act of the intelligence is intuition.

Movement of the heavens with the fixed stars. Upon it rests the whole of science. It measures everything, but we cannot measure it. It is the best proof that what must be propounded in science, before (?) the question of truth, is the question of *fitness*, as in theology (St. Thomas).

Platonic theory of music in *Timaeus*, 67 b and 81.

¹ Now if we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him (Rom. vi, 8).

² Neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin (Rom. vi, 13).

³ Philolaus, fragment 10.

⁴ Things that are similar and of the same family are in no wise in need of harmony (Philolaus, fragment 6).

... Φωνήν . . . δι' ὧτων ὑπ' αἴρος ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος μέχρι
ψυχῆς πληγὴν διαδιδόμενην.

'The voice is a blow transmitted through the ears by the air, the brain and the blood, right to the soul. The movement produced by this blow, beginning at the head, and ending at the seat of the liver, is audition.'

80, a, b—harmony—with reference to the cyclical movement of the respiration. It is in this way (i.e. by cycles) that we must explain sharp sounds and deep sounds, now in harmony, now out of harmony.

When the first movements, the quicker ones are about to come to an end, the slower ones, which follow after, catch them up, but without disturbing the movement.

A sound produces an emotional disturbance which is carried from the brain to the liver and (apparently) returns to the brain, and so it goes on, the cycles succeeding one another all the more rapidly in proportion as the sound becomes sharper, but slowing down in time. There is thus a natural tendency for sounds to descend the scale.

Two sounds, the second of which is deeper; when it arrives, the movement produced by the first one is still going on, but at a slower tempo, and its speed at that moment corresponds to the second one.

Thus there should be some relationship between the duration of sounds and height. (At the same time, these periods of duration are related to one another.)

Philebus, 17 c-d.

... Τὰ διαστήματα ὅποσα ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς ὀξύτητός τε
πέρι καὶ βαρύτητος . . .

'How many intervals of height there are in the voice—that is to say, what number of intervals—which they are, and the limits of the intervals, and their combinations which are called harmonies; and similar qualities that are innate in the movements of the body, which are measured by numbers and are called rhythms and measures.'

The descending notes would seem to represent in music balance, even-ness (if they descend in a certain way); the rising notes, and even when held, breaking up of the balance, tearing asunder.

Thus the calm which follows the tearing asunder is represented, not by one same note held or repeated, but by a slow descending movement.

The measure should have an affinity (what affinity?) with these cycles in the body. 'A modification comparable to the intervals of height, which takes place in the movements of the body, and which, measured by number, is called rhythm.'

Poetry; passing through words into silence, into the nameless. Mathematics; passing through forms into the formless.

Macrocosm-microcosm. Possessing the universe by imitating it.

Limit. Of two kinds. Continual recommencement. Passage to another quality.

You set light to a heap of wood. The fire continues until it has destroyed that which produces it.

Montesquieu: despotism and the savage who cuts the tree down.

Fire heats water until it reaches the point (100°) where it can no longer heat it. It then changes it into steam, until it reaches the point where there is no longer anything to change into steam.

Renunciation. Renunciation of material goods; but are not some of these the conditions for obtaining certain spiritual goods? Do we think in the same way when we are hungry, or exhausted, or humiliated and no respect is paid to us? We must then renounce these spiritual goods also. What is left when we have renounced everything which is dependent upon external things? Nothing, perhaps? That is then really and truly renouncing oneself.

Spiritual nakedness—

The Guṇas of Prakṛti.

{ I am nothing.

{ I am everything.

Correlative truths.

Humility with the object of assimilation to God; what pride does not stay below? [I cannot bear to be less than God;] but in that case I have got to be nothing; for all that I am is infinitely less than God. If I take away from myself all that I am, there remains . . .

The relationships between contraries, correlation, the passage from one into the other, etc., are of several different types—

[Two? one below and one above?]

Limits—E.g., what one must give, receive, etc.—Nothing which enables one to indicate a limit, but a limit is necessary—This applies to everything. A limit is necessary, one cannot do without it, and yet no limit at all is given.

An ensemble is healthy if the effects which automatically result

from a disequilibrium are such that they repair (or compensate) the disequilibrium; unhealthy, if they are such that they aggravate it.

Condition of existence of a state of equilibrium in duration.

The notion of condition of existence combines those of causality and finality; represents what there is intelligible in each of them. Always applicable.

The notion of finality has a universal application, for it possesses a meaning with respect to every given ensemble. An arm has a finality with respect to this ensemble of material points which constitutes the human body. A chain attached to the feet of a slave has no finality with respect to this slave, but has one with respect to a bigger ensemble, a society. What is without finality with respect to a certain particular ensemble has a finality with respect to another one (frog and parasite); for everything produces effects, each thing is a condition of existence with respect to other things which enter into an order. The notion of finality is reduced to the notions of order and condition of existence.

Now, the composition of an ensemble starting from the parts is something that is purely human. In nature, the ensemble is not posterior to the parts—nor anterior to them; such a thing does not even make sense. The *condition of existence* contains just this simultaneity, cutting across a posteriority and an anteriority that are outstripped and repudiated.

Crisis 1930-1934—Public relief was a right, remunerated work a favour. Profound absurdity, inversion of the terms, as in the case of a good many aspects of present-day existence. To set them in a proper light.

To discover and formulate certain laws about the human condition, many profound remarks regarding which illustrate particular cases.

Thus: that which is altogether superior reproduces that which is altogether inferior, only transposed.

Relationship of evil to force, to being, and of good to weakness, nothingness.

And at the same time evil is deprivation; elucidate this way that opposites have of being true.

Method of investigation: as soon as one has thought upon a certain matter, to discover in what sense the contrary is true.

Truth—Among men [except in the case of supreme forms of saintliness and of genius?] that which gives the impression of being true is almost necessarily false, and that which is true almost necessarily gives the impression of being false.

It needs a lot of labour to express what is true—and a lot also to receive what is true. One can express and receive what is false, or at any rate what is superficial, without any labour.

It is the triumph of saintliness or of genius when what is true seems to be at least as true as what is false. Thus we have St. Francis, who used to make his listeners weep exactly like any common and theatrical preacher.

(Cf. previous page.)

Human mechanics: balance of forces.

It is dangerous to give to a human being, a cause, etc., more than one is able to naturally and without effort. If this limit is overstepped, one runs the risk of coming to hate them. Also of becoming dependent on them, for one expects an equivalent return for what has been given in excess—an equivalent return which can only come from the person or object receiving such gift. (In this way ingratitude does real hurt to the benefactor.) The person to whom one gives can then become a tyrant, for one goes on giving more and more in the hope of finally ending up by receiving in return—a thing which never happens. We always need to receive an equivalent for what we give.

This limit must never be overstepped; we must work upon ourselves to push it back.

How?

Law of indirect working upon the self.

Human mechanics. Whoever is suffering seeks to communicate his suffering—either by ill-treating another or by provoking pity—so as to lessen it, and really does lessen it in this way. Where there is somebody who is absolutely inferior, with whom nobody commiserates, who is powerless to ill-treat any one (if he has not a child or some human being who loves him), his suffering remains inside him and poisons his existence.

This is as irresistible as gravity. How does one escape from it? How does one escape from that which resembles gravity?

Dark night—applications in all domains.

Non-active activity—non-intervention, id.

Food queues—The selfsame action is easier to accomplish if the motive is a low one than if it is a high one—Low motives contain more energy than do high ones.

Problem: how to transfer to the high motives the energy contained in the low ones?

Immobile motor, non-active activity. The existence, at a certain level (particularly a social one), of a being who does not act—

[Tolstoy, *War and Peace*—English aristocracy—Lady in chivalric love . . .]

Man needs to have an object outside himself. Human sentiments, which alone constitute motives, are all turned towards the outside.

What is an egoist?

The 'me' which is outside me: the Ātman.

To have the self for object, very low or very high self (it is not the same 'self').

Force is naturally below, towards the lower; gravity.

Appearance is below (vulgar flattery, Celimène,¹ H., etc.).

What one is proud of is *always* that of which one can be deprived by circumstances. Therefore pride is a lie. In the apprehension of this lie consists the virtue of humility. (Nakedness of spirit.)

The gifts of grace alone escape the power of circumstances, and of such gifts it is impossible to be proud—at any rate at the moment they are received.

One should look upon one's own virtues as being solely the product of circumstances and of one's past history, which no longer belongs to one.

One's deficiencies too, the which does not lessen one's personal feeling of deficiency, but on the contrary renders it more acute.

Pride, belief in occult qualities.

Belief that one possesses rights, id.—How believe it in a world in which anything is able to kill us? This is to forget that men form part of the universe.

Transposition (indefinite transpositions of this kind); belief that one is advancing higher because whilst preserving the same low tendencies (e.g. desire to excel over other people) one has supplied them with elevated objectives.

(On the contrary, one would advance higher by attaching elevated tendencies to low objectives. *Reading*.)

There are certain forms of effort which have the contrary effect to the purpose aimed at (e.g. pious but embittered women, false asceticism, certain kinds of self-sacrifice, etc.). There are other forms that are always useful, even if they do not meet with success.

How distinguish between them?

Perhaps there are those which are accompanied by a denial (a false one) of inward wretchedness, while in the case of the others

¹ Cf. Molière's *Misanthrope*. (Tr.)

the attention is continually fixed on the distance separating what one is from what one loves.

Such and such a thing has *got* to be done. But *where* is the energy to be found for the task? A virtuous action can degrade if there is no available energy at the same level. (E.g. war. Plays—Play by G. Marc.—*Journey's End*.)

So, according to the particular case: either not to carry it out (if one can do this without causing irreparable harm), or else to accept the degradation.

The object of an action and the level of energy which nourishes it—two distinct things.

Reward.

A parapet reaching only as high as the waist; a decoration. Importance of such things. The imagination, supplier or stealer of energy: of *real* energy.

To make systematic use of this quality for oneself, in order to bring oneself to do what one wants to do. But how?

Need of appreciation shown by cooks.

You always need to receive in one form or another the equivalent of what you expend.

A purely imaginary recompense (a smile from Louis XIV) is the exact equivalent of what has been expended, for it has exactly the same value as what has been expended—contrary to true recompenses which, as such, are, save by chance, either above or below. Consequently, *imaginary advantages alone supply the energy required for unlimited efforts.*—But it is necessary that Louis XIV should really smile; if he doesn't smile, unspeakable deprivation. [*Reading*]—(A king can only pay in recompenses that are for the most part imaginary ones, otherwise he would be insolvent.)

Equivalent form in religion at a certain level. For want of a smile from Louis XIV, we manufacture for ourselves a God who smiles on us.

Or yet again, we praise ourselves. There has got to be an equivalent recompense. As inevitable as gravity.

Detachment from the fruits of action. Escape from this fatality. How is it to be accomplished?

Acting not *on behalf of* a certain object, but *as a result of* a certain necessity. I am unable to do otherwise. This is not action, but a sort of passivity. Non-active action.

The slave serves in a sense as a model. (The lowest . . . The highest . . . ; same law always.) Matter serves in a sense as a model.

Transporting the motives for one's actions to the outside, outside oneself. Being pushed. For this purpose it is necessary *really* to transform the imagination within oneself. How does one accomplish this? That is what the saints understand by obedience.

The subordination practised in the religious orders is only the image of this.

The imagination is something real. In a sense the chief reality. But *in so far as it is imagination.*

Water of the Taoists.

—To act at the level of one's present degree of virtue, or even a little lower, not to try to go beyond it; but with this single proviso, not to do or omit to do anything which would compromise the future. Often very difficult; but this conception, if one considers it attentively, elevates by itself alone (it contains a force?).

Otherwise, by trying to go beyond this level, one necessarily has to draw upon a lower source of energy (*reversal*).

The absolutely pure motives appear as *external* (or the vilest do—always the same law).

To act, or abstain from acting, for others or for oneself in the future, not for oneself in the present.

Time. Resources it contains. A balance-sheet of them should be drawn up.

To seek after what is absolutely good, not what is good from such and such a point of view and bad from another one. One thing only: a certain form of attention—It does not have any immediate effects; whence the 'dark nights' and the free gifts.

Intuition being immediate can only be preceded by a 'dark night', contrariwise to discursive thought.

Everything which is unlimited is bad [cf. definition of sin given to Mme P.: placing the infinite in desire or the pursuit of pleasure]. Innumerable applications. To note down some of them.

Reversals. To count oneself for nothing, while counting the great object to which one devotes oneself as everything. State (Richelieu), God—or a beloved being—etc., etc. That *can* mean: to count oneself for everything. Apparent elevation, which in fact consists in an absolute licence accorded to the lower motives. (Crusades, basest examples of war) [Ugolino]—Other examples?

Correlation in certain cases (need defining) between elevation and baseness; or rather always, but of different types; need to define, distinguish, discover examples.

(To watch the level on which one places the infinite. If one places it on the level on which the finite alone is suitable, it does not matter very much what name one happens to give it.)

[Conception of Th. with regard to me, you, him—In a sense, yes. In a sense, it is the contrary. In what sense? Analogous cases?]

[In a sense, two beings are identical only in God; in a sense, God forms the insuperable distance between them (respect).]

Sin in me says 'I'.

To be only an intermediary between the uncultivated land and the ploughed field, between the data of a problem and its solution, between the blank page and the poem, between the wretch with an empty stomach and the wretch with a full one.

It is the picture which is beautiful. It is the bread which tastes good; the water which is clear. It is the universe which is one.

False problem, and yet at the same time one which has a meaning—but a different meaning . . .—like the problem of the real presence in the Eucharist. The true meaning of the problem is related to the quality of attention— (as in the case of the real presence).

(How do we recognize such problems? And how do we recognize the contradictions which are true taken together as distinct from those which mutually exclude each other?)

I am all. But this particular 'I' is God—And it is not an 'I'.

Evil causes the distinction, makes it impossible that God should be equivalent to all.

It is my wretchedness which makes it so that I am 'I.' It is the wretchedness of the universe which makes it so that, *in a sense*, God is 'I' (i.e. a person).

If I say that $7+8=16$, I am mistaken; in a certain way, I make it so that $7+8=16$. But it is not I who make it so that $7+8=15$.

A new mathematical theorem; a beautiful verse; reflections of this great truth . . .

I am absent from everything which is true, or beautiful, or good.
I sin.

And yet, when considering sin, in the order of the world, under the aspect in which it is a good, it is not I.

[In another sense, when looking at it as an evil, it is not I, for I condemn it; but the other form of expression is the truer one.]

There are two sorts of atheism, one of which is a purification of the notion of God.

—A good many similar cases: find examples.

Perhaps everything which is evil has another aspect, which is a purifica-

tion in the course of progress towards good, and a third one which is the higher good (cf. higher up). Three aspects to be carefully distinguished, for it is very dangerous for thought and for the effective conduct of life to confuse them. (Examples?)

That which is the direct opposite of an evil *never* (perhaps) belongs to the order of higher good. Often scarcely any higher than evil.

Why? (bad reasons are often given for this).

Ex. theft and the bourgeois respect for property, adultery and the 'respectable woman', savings-bank and wasting, bourgeois conservative spirit and revolutionary spirit (promoter of civil war), chauvinist and defeatist, etc.—false addition and addition according to rule . . . lying and 'sincerity' . . .

It is not good which evil violates, for good is inviolate: only a degraded good can be violated.

But that is not the true reason. Good is essentially other than evil. Evil is multifarious and fragmentary, good is one; evil is apparent, good is mysterious; evil consists in action, good in non-action or in non-active action, etc.—Good considered on the level of evil and measured against it as one opposite against another is good of the penal code order. Above, there is a good which, in a sense, bears more resemblance to evil than to this low form of good—(But perhaps still higher up a good which, in a sense, bears a resemblance to this low form of good?)—This opens the way to a great deal of demagoguery and a great many tedious paradoxes.

Good which is defined in the way in which one defines evil should be rejected. Evil does reject it. But the way it rejects it is a bad one.

[Cases of true contradictories: God exists; God doesn't exist. Where lies the problem? No uncertainty whatever. I am absolutely certain that there is a God, in the sense that I am absolutely certain that my love is not illusory. I am absolutely certain that there is not a God, in the sense that I am absolutely certain that there is nothing real which bears a resemblance to what I am able to conceive when I pronounce that name, since I am unable to conceive God—But that thing, which I am unable to conceive, is not an illusion—This impossibility is more immediately present to me than is the feeling of my own personal existence]—

Being and having—Man has no being, he has only having. The being of man is situated behind the curtain, on the supernatural side. What he is able to know about himself is only what is made available to him by circumstances. I is hidden in my case (and in that of other

people): is on the side of God . . . is in God . . . is God (Ātman). To be proud is to forget that one is God . . . The curtain—that is human wretchedness: there was a curtain even in the case of Christ.

There are two forms of wretchedness which we ought to receive into our consciousness, the one which makes it so that we are so far from Christ (and, to a lesser degree, from the saints) and the one which we share in common with Christ—human wretchedness. But the two are related: the former, when regarded in a sufficiently penetrating way, reduces itself to the latter. To understand and feel them as being identical is to be a saint. (?)

Nothing belongs to me except my wretchedness.

Nothing belongs to me, even my wretchedness; it belongs to my flesh.

If one understands this (if one has known how to teach it to one's body [Mme de S.]—but how?) one can endure suffering without desiring alleviation from it, hunger without desiring to eat, etc. [One has reached the place where 'desires are reality'] Humiliation without desiring honour.

—Tendency to spread evil outside oneself; I still have it. Human beings and things are not sufficiently sacred to me—May I never defile anything, even though I were to be entirely transformed into mud. Never to defile anything even in thought. I would not destroy, even in the worst moments, a Greek statue or a fresco of Giotto's; (insh'Allah!)—Why then anything else? Why, for example, an instant in the life of a human being who could be happy for an instant?

How to escape from this effect of gravity? A method must be sought.

To localize the physical or moral suffering in oneself. (One suffers more, inevitably.) Can one do it?

. . . 'I, I am not like that'. One should catch oneself out in all reactions of this kind.

One trains the body through suffering. Every time you catch yourself out in one of these wretchednesses, if it makes you suffer, the body learns something. Only you have got to fix your attention on it and suffer from it, not stiffen yourself and make resolutions, an alibi which diminishes the suffering and consequently the effect of the training. The attention should always be directed towards the object (in this case the fault), never towards the self (archer of the Taoists¹); it comes from the self—The only real thing one can do after committing a fault is to contemplate it; all stiffening is imagi-

¹ See footnote, p. 30.

nary. If you punish yourself for it, let it be only in order to contemplate it with a completer form of attention.

If I felt with greater intensity that each of my little faults would some day be punished, in decisive circumstances, by a great big fault of a similar kind—I should never commit any.

Gravity—The effect the position in the social scale has upon the imagination of men is *almost* without exception (or, in a sense, completely?) irresistible like gravity—The same is true of relations of dependence.

Thus the gratitude due (considered as being due) for some favour received is generally inversely proportional to such favour, because great favours lift in the social scale, whereas small ones only lower in it. So it is with a man who, though unimportant, happens to be a personal friend of the Prime Minister and who, by placing a certain politician in contact with him gets this politician made a minister; who, furthermore, finds for some poverty-stricken working-woman a few hours of hard and ill-paid work as a char. He will expect the char to show him—and very often she will do so—infinitely greater marks of respect and gratitude than the minister; while in regard to the latter he will with difficulty escape being in the position of some one under an obligation. [The minister has only to place his name on a Legion of Honour list, and that is the position he will be in. Or, better still, if that does not happen, but he lives in the hope that it is going to.] In the same way, we expect far greater marks of gratitude for a gift of sixpence than we do for a loan (even when unrepaid) of sixty pounds, because we only give sixpence to a needy person.

Must look out for authentic examples.

All men are subjected to gravity, in spite of the fact that, in the case of certain sages or saints, we hear tales, whether true or not, of levitation or of walking upon the waters.

The same is true in the case of moral gravity, which fact is, generally, either ignored or forgotten.

Try
to enumerate
their effects.

In myself, things physically almost irresistible. |
anguish produced by gravity | loathing for certain
kinds of food | inability to grasp melodies, accents,
mechanisms of machines, etc. | apprehension about
giving injections, etc.

War and prestige. Valiant little tailor,¹ etc.—To enumerate . . .

Amor fati. To extend it to one's own past and future acts. I have never disturbed, I will never disturb the order of the world. In that case, what does my fate matter?

But I am disturbing it at this very moment in myself by not loving it sufficiently completely.

One writes just in the way that one gives birth; one cannot do otherwise than make the supreme effort. But one acts in the same way too. I need not be afraid of not making the supreme effort—provided only that I do not lie to myself and take suitable care.

If I have the feeling of being able to choose between two or several different actions, even in the case of the smallest things (getting up, lying down at such and such a moment; at such and such a moment writing a letter, reading a particular book, or a newspaper; at such and such a moment smoking or not smoking a cigarette, eating or not eating a piece of bread), such a feeling corresponds (and is proportional) to some inward failing which later on will suddenly reveal itself in the failure of some important matter.

Always to look upon small things as the prefiguration of great ones; thus one avoids being both careless and over-particular.

Order of the world. Macrocosm and microcosm (*amor fati*, bridge between the two). An ordered universe is a *condition of existence* for an ordered body, and an ordered body for a spirit united to flesh.

Not only do I ponder the universe which oppresses me, but I love it.

Two ways of renouncing material goods.

To deny them to oneself in view of some spiritual good.

To conceive and feel them to be conditions of spiritual goods (c.g. hunger, fatigue, humiliation, etc., cloud the intelligence and hinder meditation) and nevertheless to renounce them.

This second species of renunciation is alone nakedness of spirit.

Indeed, material goods would scarcely be dangerous if they were to appear by themselves and not linked together with spiritual goods.

To renounce everything which is not grace, and not to desire grace.

Different types (at least two) of correlations and passages between opposites.

¹ See footnote, p. 23.

E.g. between the infinite and nothingness.

The same words can perhaps express both of them. Terrible danger of confusion.	Through humility—while counting oneself as nothing—to assimilate oneself to God. Through pride—idolizing of the self—to lower oneself down to nothingness.
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Through a total devotion to some great object (including God), to give the lower motives complete licence within oneself.

Through the contemplation of the infinite distance between oneself and that which is great, to make of the self (the I) an instrument of greatness.

By what criterion are they to be distinguished?

The only one, I think, is that faulty correlation renders unlimited that which ought not to be so.

Must find other examples.

If one suddenly discovers in oneself feelings of self-satisfaction about certain actions good in themselves (e.g. giving, restricting oneself, etc.), to cease to perform them until further notice.

Genius is—perhaps—nothing other than the ability to go through 'dark nights'. Those who have not got any, when on the edge of the dark night, become discouraged and say to themselves: I cannot; I am not made for that; it is all incomprehensible to me.

(So are those who say: I like poetry, but every time I have tried to write some it was always so bad that it made me sick.)

That is why talent is generally—almost always—in practice always—a condition of genius. To have already equalled or surpassed the best representatives in any particular branch (the best of one's contemporaries) before reaching the dark night is a powerful defence against the belief that one is incapable and against discouragement.

Time leads us—always—whither we do not wish to go.

To love time.

Vocation [of thinker, etc.] or happy life? Which is worth more? We do not know. Incompatible vocations (after reaching a certain degree of greatness onwards). [To choose a happy life, for whoever has a vocation incompatible with such a choice is unable to stick to it in any case.]

Everything has to be paid for; but, conversely, everything has its compensations. Both, however, at a level which is either a lower, an equal, or a superior one. And what do we know about it?

Fire destroys that which feeds it. Were the smoke to condense into wood, it would be otherwise; there would then be a cycle, as in the theoretical system of a ball which rebounds.

All change is either limited or cyclical.

It would also be otherwise if there were wood piled up in infinite quantity. But . . .

Attraction; force destroys itself by being exercised, for at the earth's centre a body no longer weighs anything. Repulsion would appear to be unlimited—but it is not a question of that.

Inertia—Movement by inertia destroys itself as it is proceeding, through friction. As soon as it is finished, there is no longer any friction.

The same applies to the cycle of the ball which rebounds—No difference at all. [The stars?]

Theaetetus—astonishment—cf. dark night.

Society—Social phenomena are outside the grasp of the human intelligence. The human mind is, by its nature, incapable of seizing upon this whole of which it is a part. Still, it is possible to recognize certain laws (Machiavelli and Machiavellian writings). How, and within what limits?

(This mystery creates an apparent relationship between the social and the supernatural, and excuses Durkheim up to a certain point)—

Rajas, expansion in space [and, or] in time (e.g. cycle)—Inertia and conservation of energy—

Hierarchical systems [from spirit to flesh and] from life to matter—
from superior to degraded forms of
energy—from order to disorder—

[Probability and quasi-irreversibility of the passage from order to disorder.]

Death and decomposition—passage from life to matter—

Food—passage from matter to life.

Plants transform inert matter into living matter. When I consume plants, part of the living vegetable matter which I absorb becomes

living human matter; another part becomes inert matter (carbonic gas) while liberating mechanical energy, equivalent to the radiating energy of the sun (and some caloric energy?).

How represent to oneself potential energy and kinetic energy in the human body? (in the bodies of animals, first of all).

Reading	dark night	double correlation of contraries	
gravity	equilibrium	imagination	unlimitedness and limit
resemblance between the lowest and the highest			reversals
void		vertical hierarchy	

Intellectual cycle—The notion of *labour*, as taken from human experience, transformed in order to become a physical notion, coming back, so as to explain it, to human labour.

[*Monograph on the notion of labour—would be interesting to do.*]

Fire spreads itself; expansion. From wood to ashes; descending movement.

Relationship (but how define it?) between the descending and ascending movements and the limit of expansion.

Descent is limited (centre of the earth); ascent is not (leaving this centre), but, on the other hand, is impossible, except by artifice. What artifices?

For a grain of wheat to become inert matter, it has only to fall to earth and perish. For it to become human flesh, it has to be eaten by a man (Aristotle, act preceding power) [whence proof of the existence of God].

Latent energies. You turn a piece of hard wood round in a piece of soft wood. The movement is transformed into heat. The heat lights the wood. You throw the lighted wood into a kitchen stove filled with wood on which there is a large saucepan full of water. The water boils. The steam lifts up the lid of the saucepan. The effort may be greater than the one used for turning the wood round.

But when all the wood has been burnt, it is all over.

The same with petrol in an aeroplane.

Little ball which moves up an inclined plane through inertia; comes down again. But if there is a hollow in the top part of the inclined plane and the little ball gets lodged there, it stays up there. IN THIS CASE LABOUR

ACCOMPLISHED WITH AN INFINITELY SMALL EXPENDITURE OF FORCE; WHEREAS LABOUR HAS A DETERMINATE MAGNITUDE (WEIGHT \times HEIGHT).

Gratuitous labour—but limited—Cannot serve as principle for a 'machine in perpetual motion' [avoid this obsession!].

Not to think *about* . . . , the most difficult and most fruitful thing of all in all domains. Negative virtue (in all domains, including the intelligence). Connection with the 'dark night'? There is one, but what is it?

Non-reading.

Suffering—The universe which enters into the body. Not to forget that.

Thought is fettered by things which are the opposite of thought, and yet are themselves only thoughts (space and time).

Imagination and society—War—

The link existing between progress and the lower level of things (because that which a generation is able to continue carrying on from where its predecessor left off is necessarily of an external nature) is an example of the relationship between force and the lower motives—(Also of the limit) *Pyramid*.

Man who lifts up a stone directly (effort) and by means of a lever; connection with the contemplation of arithmetical and geometrical correspondences; with virtue; with beauty; I have not yet got out of this image all that it contains—Connection with the 'occult qualities' and 'identification'.

'The will is both free and effective'—Correlation between force and value; two correlations. The bad one: Success as criterion of value. The good one: Everything which is imaginary is bad.

True contradictories: There is a relationship between force (being) and evil. But that which is imaginary—is not real—does not exist—has not a certain force—is bad—To have really tried is to have succeeded a little.

What succeeds in this world cannot be virtue; but neither can it be what does not succeed at all. 'He took the form of a slave'; but he became incarnate.

Herds of cattle. Commanding is an animal thing.

Other pairs of contradictories. It is necessary that offences should arise, but woe to him through whom they arise.

Temptations are the test of virtue. But 'lead us not into temptation.' We must love suffering, but we must not seek it out, etc.

.....
.....
'They have their reward.' Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀπέχουσιν τὸν μισθὸν αὐτῶν. . . .¹

. . . . Τῷ πατρὶ σου τῷ ἐν τῷ κρυφαίῳ, καὶ ὁ πατήρ σου ὁ βλέπων ἐν τῷ κρυφαίῳ ἀποδώσει σοι.²

Need of a reward, for the sake of balance; need to receive the equivalent of what one has given (cf. higher up); but if, doing violence to this need, powerful as gravity, we leave a void, there takes place as it were an inrush of air, and a supernatural reward supervenes. It does not come if we receive any other wages; it is this void which causes it to come.

(And yet, probably, we ought not to have desired it).

The same applies to the 'forgiveness of trespasses' (which concerns not only the evil which others have done us, but also the good which we have done them). There again, we accept a void in ourselves.

The acceptance of a void in oneself is a supernatural thing. Where find the energy for an act without any counterpart? The energy has to come from elsewhere. And yet there must first of all be a tearing asunder, something of a desperate nature, so that a void may first of all be produced—Void: dark night—

Admiration, pity (a mixture of the two especially), etc., supply a real energy. But one must do without it.

'Claude' by Geneviève Fauconnier.

One has to be for a certain time without any reward at all, natural or supernatural—Dark night.

Conrad's 'Nostromo'—The man who, having resisted torture beyond his powers of endurance, proceeds to degrade himself more than the others (and never gets over it).

That happens when one looks for the energy in oneself: once it is exhausted, revulsion.

[*Father de Foucauld's successor and the Arabs*] So even while praying . . .

Where to look for it?

Outward necessity or inward need as imperative as the act of breathing. 'Let us become the central breath.' Even if a pain in the

¹ Verily I say unto you, they have their reward (Matt. vi, 2).

² . . . Unto thy Father which is in secret: and thy Father, which seeth in secret, shall reward thee openly (Matt. vi, 18).

chest renders breathing extremely difficult, still one breathes; one cannot do otherwise.

To know (in each thing) that there is a limit, and that one will not pass beyond it without supernatural aid, or, if one does, only a very little way, and by paying for it afterwards with some terrible form of degradation. At all events, not to forget that.

Πάτερ ἡμῶν ὁ ἐν [τοῖς] οὐρανοῖς — τὸν ἄρτον ἡμῶν τὸν ἐπιούσιον δὸς ἡμῖν σήμερον.¹

One has to go by oneself up to that limit. There one touches the void. ('God helps those who help themselves'.)

To forgive. [Valéry] One is unable to. When somebody has done us harm, reactions are set up in us. Voluntary forgetting. The desire for vengeance is a desire for balance. To accept the lack of balance. To see therein the image of the essential lack of balance. To seek for balance on another plane, or (and) within a wider compass.

Transference and voluntary void (not to think about . . .) two distinct things—(Not so distinct perhaps?) Distinct for a moment.

One mode of purification: to pray to God, not only in secret so far as men are concerned, but while thinking that God does not exist. (*Reversals towards Good; there are two kinds of reversals.*)

Piety with regard to the dead, image (Electra). To do everything possible for that which does not exist.

Sophocles: limit always somewhat overstepped.

'I have no more strength; I can no longer go on.' Philoctetes: ὦ σπέρμ' Ἀχιλλέως. . . .²

The anguish caused by the death of others; it is this anguish of the void, of lack of balance—Efforts henceforth without any purpose, gifts going unrewarded. . . . ἀνωφελήτου . . .³—If the imagination fills the breach, degradation. 'Let the dead bury their dead.'

And is not the same true where one's own death is concerned? The object, the reward, lie in the future. Deprivation of a future, void, lack of balance. That is why 'to philosophize is to learn how to die'—That is why praying is like dying (Father B.⁴).

¹ Our Father which art in heaven . . . give us this day our bread, that bread which is supernatural (Matt. vi, 9, etc.). Cf. *Waiting on God*, p. 148.

² O seed of Achilles (Sophocles, *Philoctetes*, 1066).

³ Fruitless . . . (Sophocles, *Electra*, 1144).

⁴ P. Brückberger, *Rejoindre Dieu* (Gallimard).

Acceptance of the void—Is found under a good many forms—

[Thirst, hunger, chastity—carnal privations of all kinds—in the search for God. Sensible forms of the void. The body has no other way of accepting the void. (To hunger and thirst after God—and 'mio bien', 'mio sposo', etc.—same range of significance; at once literal and metaphorical.)]

Abraham's sacrifice. What could be more complete as regards void?

The void produces an anguish, a desperate revolt, followed, as a result of exhaustion, by resignation; but with a loss of the sense of reality, involving partial death, often inward untruthfulness, and a dispersal, a cutting up of time.

Void. When Ovid had degraded himself to the point of making the most servile supplications so as to obtain a mitigation of his exile, all he could do was to go on doing so until his death, even after having found out how useless it all was. For he could not accept the fact that he had degraded himself to no purpose. He was bound to go on pursuing an illusory object by dint of ever more and more pitiful grovellings.

(To pay particular attention to actions the unsuccessful outcome of which we should find unbearable.)

Ovid. The longed-for clemency took on, over and above its own intrinsic value, another value equivalent at each moment to the amount of self-abasement up to that moment.

If Augustus had recalled Ovid at the end of a year or two, Ovid, after the first transports of gratitude were over, would have hated him (whereas he went on loving him right up to the end). For he would have had the same life as before, only less good—and what compensation would he have had for his sufferings and self-abasements? *Gravity. Reversal.*

(Impossible to forgive any one who does us harm if this harm degrades us. We must think that it has not degraded us, but has revealed our true level.)

Ovid. Thus certain actions contain in themselves, from the very outset, a principle of unlimitedness. Evil.

In the same way Augustus (if he followed the above form of reasoning) was bound to continue to show himself pitiless.

Supposing Ovid had practised self-amputation? If thine eye offend thee . . . But Cato also paid in the form of sclerosis, inflexibility and harshness.

Grace.

To practise self-amputation to the quick and to be as a little child.

Lauzun in Saint-Simon. Post of captain of the guards.

Gravity.—One loves the being on whom one depends absolutely and from whom one expects good or some alleviation from evil (even if he be the author of the evil, and unjustly so). Thus moderate favours which leave the person obliged in a powerless and dependent position with respect to the benefactor provoke gratitude; a favour which is sufficiently great to lift one above any such dependence does not provoke any, or only of a very transitory kind, and runs the risk of provoking a grudge, because the obligation implies the necessity to go on giving indefinitely without ever receiving anything in exchange, or in other words a *void*. (*Lack of balance*, in this case, between the time the favour lasts, that is to say a moment, and the time the gratitude lasts, which is indefinite; whereas, on the other hand, the favour which is less in amount, but prolonged indefinitely in time, for the imagination, by the possibility of fresh favours, does not carry with it such a lack of balance.)

G. Herbert. Giving to beggars *irregularly*.

Everything (or almost everything?—requires examination) we term baseness is a simple phenomenon of gravity. Moreover, the word baseness [*bassesse*] is itself an indication of this.

On the other hand, ingratitude produces a *void* in the benefactor.

He has lost a piece of property. (Ibn Saud and his uncle.) Like a master one of whose slaves has run away.

Ingratitude of sovereigns.

Lear.

(Lear, a tragedy of *gravity*.)

Gravity. When the favour comes from the lower and is directed towards the higher, the subordination which it creates subordinates the benefactor to the person benefited.

Gravity. Devotion of the slave who, having nothing, places his all in his master; if he is given something of his own, that will change matters—(*reversal*). As in the case of Napoleon's marshals towards the end of his reign—Cf. higher up.

Gravity. Generally speaking, what we expect of others depends on the effect of gravity upon ourselves; what we receive from them depends on the effect of gravity upon them.

Sometimes (by chance) the two coincide, often they do not.

Beliefs at different levels. E.g. belief that God exists, in me, at such—such—and such a level; that he does not exist, at such—and such a level, etc.—

There has not to be any choice made from among the opinions (except in certain cases); they should all be entertained, but arranged vertically and lodged at suitable levels.

Thus chance, destiny, Providence.

Entropy—All closed systems tend to descend. The energy which causes things to rise comes from outside (e.g. radiating energy of the sun). [Is this true whatever may be the dimensions of the closed system? Who knows?]*—Expansion only becomes transformed into an ascending movement up to a near limit.*

Digestion of vegetable matter and respiration. We swallow uncoiled springs which become coiled inside us and cause us to run.

Why does modern science represent the downward tendency by overheating (entropy) and not by gravity? No doubt because it first of all tried to do away with the latter.

Degradation in chemistry. All transformations of matter which take place accompanied by a giving off of heat entail a raising of entropy, consequently a degradation: e.g. wood turned into ash.

[Death?]

Conversely . . .

(Mechanism of ice-boxes to be investigated.)

Gravity—The void (non-accepted) produces hatred, harshness, bitterness, malice. The evil one desires should happen to the thing one hates, and which one imagines, re-establishes the balance.

The imagination (when uncontrolled) is a producer of a balanced state, a restorer of balances and filler-up of voids.

[Find out whence comes the term 'compensation'?]

Gravity—Story of Moussa—1. Ingratitude. 2. Need of affliction for any one who has once been marked by it (his reactions to affliction stand in need of an object, else they take place *in a void*; then again the thought of past affliction is intolerable, entails a *void*. Requires further study.)

A long-drawn-out affliction kills the desire for deliverance, and makes even the thought of it practically unbearable [in my case, applies to headaches, end of 1938]*—Why is this? If one is delivered (unless one is more than one was before), it seems as though all the affliction one has gone through is as it were useless. With such*

thoughts, all the years of affliction pile themselves up so as to form one single weight which has no counterweight.

And what is the mechanism of resignation? (natural resignation) Exhaustion. What else?

The wretch who thinks that ill-treatment is his due—Form of the notion of rights (*droit*).

[*The notion of rights is connected with gravity.*]

The search for balance is bad because it is imaginary. Revenge. Even if one, in fact, kills or tortures one's enemy, it is, *in a sense*, imaginary.

It may happen that the things which one, in fact, undergoes or accomplishes are in a sense imaginary.

|| certain acts of heroism or voluntary ordeals

E.g. war

|| certain involuntary ordeals, etc.

To be studied; definitions to be sought.

A being who has such and such a character, such and such a past, in such and such circumstances; his imagination operates in such a way as to fill up the voids and restore the balances, and he acts in accordance with what he imagines.

Dangerous mechanisms. Compensating a future (therefore imaginary) effort by a present relaxation. [Reversal; good as label giving licence to evil.] To be avoided even in regard to small things, or at any rate to be severely limited.

The licence which one accords oneself in the present sometimes prepares the forces required for future efforts; sometimes impedes them. How are these two sorts of licence to be distinguished?

Another sort: compensating too great efforts made in one sphere by licence in several other spheres. (War—'respectable women'.) Here again, the label of good covers the licence for evil, although it is a question of efforts effectively carried out. Here again, a certain form of this mechanism is necessary and good; while another form is absolutely bad. How distinguish between them?

In what circumstances, in what measure must one allow oneself licence? Without licence, stiffness, the opposite of grace (marvellous word). Licence ought to be limited; but how? Just one more little piece . . . another little piece . . . another little piece . . . The process is unlimited.

'Designs in Scarlet';¹ imaginary evil is romantic and varied, real

¹ *Designs in Scarlet*, by Courtney Ryley Cooper (Boston, 1939).

evil dreary, monotonous, barren and tedious. *Why?* On the other hand, imaginary good is tedious.

Just as there is such a thing as an exact combination of attention and inattention, so also there is one of severity and licence.

To keep a little below what one is capable of.

Not to apply certain expressions (in certain cases, words, even spoken inwardly [e.g. resolution]; certain attitudes; certain ways of behaving) to certain precious things which would be weakened by being expressed thus; not to omit those expressions which lend them force. How distinguish and discern the particular cases?

It is bad both to offend against sacred things, even in a joking way (while thinking one is joking), and to pay them homage at a certain level. Nor must they be altogether passed over in silence.

Always a vertical hierarchy.

Better to sin than to take oneself seriously—in a sense. And yet . . .

Allow oneself licence in the case of things which require licence, but not in the case of anything else. Make only what is highest in oneself conform to what is highest, and so on, at all the different levels.

If one does not respect the *vertical hierarchy* in oneself, one is a hypocrite, even while wishing to be sincere.

Gravity. A too great affliction places a human being beneath pity; provokes disgust, horror and scorn. (In Paris, in 1939, Prefecture, 4th floor). The very person—if there be one—who brought this affliction upon them bears them just as much ill-will on account of it.

Tragedy (Sophocles; *Phèdre*) is just on the borderline.

St. Francis and the leper. He also felt disgust, horror and scorn.

Mantegna's Christ foreshortened.

Pity goes down to a certain level but not below it.

What does charity do in order to descend lower?

Have those who have fallen so low pity on themselves?

Pity is changed into hostility if its object passes either above or below a certain level of affliction.

Faithfulness and death. Living between the two. Resemblance between the highest and the lowest.

The resemblance between the highest and the lowest has a connection with the relationship between weakness and non-existence.

[In a sense] what is imaginary does not exist—God does not exist.

Reversal—Imaginary good, and evil. 'Hell . . .'

Contrary correlations: | union and distinction | separation and mixture |

Non-intervention of the Taoists applied to oneself; in what sense?

Existence and perfection are incompatible on one plane and identical on another. It is because there are these two planes that there is creation or manifestation.

Style—Search for effect. Covers up sometimes the emptiness of the thought. Sometimes found also in the case of one whose instrument is below the standard of what he wants to express (particularly so in the case of all beginners)—The feeling that he has something to say and yet only manages to say platitudes pushes him over to the side of effect, although what he really desires is not effect, but something else very much better, which he is unable to obtain.

But in that case he will sooner or later feel dissatisfied, and will, after passing through more or less of a 'dark night', attain to a greater degree of purity.

Here, not a resemblance between the very low and the very high, but between the middling bad and the middling good.

Every effort proceeds from a source of energy and seeks a reward. (Gratuitous act: the lowest kind or the highest.) For each effort, to try to find out at what level.

It is bad to accomplish a superior action with an inferior form of energy (heroism for the purpose of a decoration). Also to do base and petty actions with a superior form of energy, unless they are used either as intermediaries (blind man's stick) or as images with respect to great things. 'Whatever thou doest, offer it to Me.'

What must be done with the inferior form of energy? Perhaps allow it to play; whence the necessity for play.

We should do every sort of work, make every sort of effort for God *while* thinking that he does not exist.

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High and low—In space, ascending movements are slow, falls and descending movements rapid. In music, the notes follow one another rapidly when rising, slowly when descending. Significance of this? Besides, the voice: when one loses control over oneself (brief show of temper, lamentation, momentary semi-insanity) the sounds quicken their pace and rise.

Zeus “ ‘*Ἰκέσιος* ’ ”¹—supernatural compensation for the unbalanced state of society. His wrath is *weighty*.

In the composition of a work and in the translation of a non-written text—*Not to add or change anything*—

Analogies between the ‘night of the spirit’ of St. John of the Cross with its alternations spread over a number of years, and alternations which I have experienced in the space of a few days or weeks (but sometimes months) in the composition of a poem.

Discrepancy between the inward and the outward—of two kinds. Beings with high aspirations, but who, in certain given circumstances, react in a more or less degrading way (e.g. too much time, attention and effort devoted to food; excessive prudence; attitude with regard to money, etc.); they cannot help themselves from doing so, and perhaps do not realize they are doing so, or else provide themselves with pretexts. And again: difficult, irreproachable actions (e.g. certain cases of austerity and asceticism—and very many other examples) which do not correspond to any inward motive.

TO BE RESOLVED TO DIE, TO ACCEPT THE VOID—SAME THING; THIS ALONE MAKES IT POSSIBLE, IN CERTAIN SITUATIONS, FOR LYING NOT TO BE A VITAL NECESSITY.

Place opposite each other:

1. the highest resembles the lowest
2. equivalence between apparently contrary things, at the same level (e.g. disorder and totalitarian order).

[Two conceptions of hell—Ordinary one (suffering without any consolation); my own (false beatitude, mistakenly believing oneself to be in paradise). I would choose between the two without any hesitation. But if I put this choice to myself in a moment of extreme suffering—will the reply be the same?]

From that, a host of possible mistakes in the conduct of life. (*Here is something to add to the Cartesian method*)—

Literature and morals—Imaginary evil is romantic, fanciful, varied; real evil is dreary, monotonous, barren and tedious. Imaginary good is tedious; real good is always fresh, marvellous, intoxica-

¹ Suppliant Zeus.

ting. [*Why is that?*] Thus 'imaginative literature' is either tedious, or immoral (or else a mixture of the two). It only manages to escape this alternative by passing to a certain extent, by dint of art, over to the side of reality—which genius alone is able to do— [Whence the satanic school: the mature expression of *their* particular genius is silence, the silence from below. 'I no longer know how to speak.']

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Analogy between algebra and money. Both are levellers. Vertical distances are not represented in them.

Belief. A belief occupies a certain layer (vertical section) in a man. How can one, if such a thing be desirable, cause it to pass to other layers?

Cause it to descend?

While expressing it by means of sensible objects and forms of behaviour.

What does this resemblance in expression consist of?

Not to understand new things, but by dint of patience, effort and method to come to understand those truths which are evident with one's whole self.

Father J. understands that the people who are staying with him are there by force—but he does not understand it with his whole being—

Real number—Instead of: impossible to pass from one side to the other of a straight line without crossing the straight line . . . axioms to do with aggregates. What advantage?

Fatigue, like physical suffering, acts as a hindrance, not to the higher efforts of the spirit, but to those belonging to the region in between. Conclusions to be drawn with regard to the cultural development of the people, which at present has no access to what is highest, because it is unable to pass through this middle region.

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R.—Example of absurdity: factory producing 'Simon' cream; a good thing because it provides people with work. Impossible to make him admit that if these same workmen were to receive the same money without doing anything, it would be better (when the product is a bad one). Work regarded as a good thing irrespective of any relation to other things. So also money. So also property. Without this triple form of idolatry there would be nothing to balance the fatigue and disgust produced by work [cf. also the remark

of the grandmother: men are choosy with regard to their food, because they work and that causes them disgust< . . . 'he feels sick with disgust' . . . >]—That would seem to indicate a *void*.

If there were a void, there would be degradation—or a way opened for grace.

Men exercise their imaginations in order to stop up the holes through which grace might pass, and for this purpose, and at the cost of a lie, they make for themselves idols, that is to say, relative forms of good conceived as being totally unrelated forms of good. If one conceives of them as relative, there is a void, for on reaching the degree of fatigue where the conception of relationships (which is knowledge of the 2nd kind) is destroyed, one must go on making an effort. And then the source of energy can only be supernatural bread. (We need some every day.)

Idolatry is, therefore, a vital necessity. To think on relationships is to accept death.

Core of Platonic thought.

[The kindness of the good people who are in the cavern is always limited by idolatry (forgetfulness of relationships)—Find out how, in each particular case.]

That which depends upon knowledge of the 2nd kind cannot, without supernatural aid (but then one passes to the 3rd kind) serve *for long* as motive.

Gîtâ. Renunciation of action does not produce a void. Renunciation, not of action, but of the fruits of action—here, there is a void.

Continually to suspend in oneself the work of the imagination, filler up of voids and restorer of balances.

If we accept any void, whatever it may be, what stroke of fate can prevent us from loving the universe?

(We have the assurance that, come what may, *the universe is full*.)

It is so difficult a thing to do that, for this reason, time is limited to the course of a day. Hence: 'give us this day . . .', 'sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof'. We cannot (perhaps?) even with the help of grace, bear the void which lasts for more than a day.

In no matter what circumstances, if one arrests the imagination which fills, there is a void. (Poor in spirit.)

In no matter what circumstances (but sometimes at the price of what degradation!), the imagination can fill the void. That is why average human beings can become prisoners, slaves, prostitutes, and pass through no matter what suffering without being purified.

Remark of old mother *** (during the wine-harvest): 'To suffer morally to that extent *is simply not possible*.' Characteristic feeling with regard to suffering (at the time it is experienced; disappears in retrospect)—It is *impossible*, and yet one cannot avoid it.

This feeling of impossibility is the feeling of the void. By contemplating it for a long time in a spirit of acceptance, we open the way to grace.

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Algebra and money—levellers, the first intellectually, the second effectively.

Our age destroys the inner hierarchy, how should it allow the social hierarchy, which is but a vulgar image of the former, to subsist?

Algebra destroys the purificatory power of mathematics, or at any rate only allows it to subsist at the point of invention, where there are constants still unnamed (whence Chevalley's theory). *Λόγοι ἄλογοι*,¹ there lies purification.

Adoration of the great by the people in the xviith century (La Bruyère). This was a result of imagination filling up the void, a result which has disappeared since money has been substituted for it. Two degrading results, but money the more degrading of the two.

About fifty years ago the life of the peasants ceased to resemble that described by Hesiod. The destruction of science as understood by the Greeks took place at about the same time. Money and algebra triumphed simultaneously.

The *λόγοι ἄλογοι*, unnamed constants, impose a vertical inner hierarchy.

Justice is one of these constants.

The universe is the image of God, but not the universe as seen from a point of view. In the universe as seen from a point of view there can only be imaginary forms of balance and plenitude, and thanks to an unlimited exercise of the imagination—an exhausting exercise.

The universe as seen by God is for man a nameless and formless constant.

Connection between the absolute outside its right place and contradiction. By posing as absolute that which is relative, one falls into contradiction.

Conversely, if one starts from an accepted contradiction (a

¹ Unnamed ratios, or words without words.

contradiction of the wrong kind, at the same level), one encounters an absolute. Einstein.

Hell as an illusory paradise. It is nothing else but sensual pleasure (*volupté*). Artificial paradises—an excellent expression. Sensual pleasure (but not the pure form of pleasure) is an illusory happiness.

The pure form of pleasure is in its place; it can accompany happiness, but does not contain the illusion of happiness. It does not seem to be infinite; it appears as limited.

Some people seek the kingdom of God as if it were an artificial paradise, only the best among artificial paradises.

Void. Those who have done him harm are far away, outside his reach; those who are within his reach have done him good; he owes them deference, smiles, he must not make them pay anything. He manages to do this at the cost of a violent effort of which one is unaware, for his attitude appears to be natural.

Void. If a man needs to make a violent effort in order to comport himself in the way that we look for as natural in him—void, unfathomable bitterness are indicated.

That which other people look for as natural in a human being corresponds to the working of gravity in them. If it does not take place, they feel a void.

(This often happens, for we look for in a man, as being natural, those actions and attitudes which correspond to his position in society, his apparent character, the label attached to him, and they do not always come easily to him.)

The imagination which fills up the void then gets to work, and its results sometimes, after a long time, suddenly burst upon us and surprise us.

Void, when there is nothing external to correspond to an internal tension.

Example: torment in a concentration camp, consisting of moving a stone from B to A, then from A to B, then from B to A again, and so on during the whole day. Very different from the same effort expended in the course of work.

R. Under such conditions . . . 'at the end of a year's work one hasn't done anything'—(all there has been is conservation)—'But one has lived.'—'As for me, if it were a question of working simply in order to live, I just couldn't'—

[He couldn't either 'do like old J., yield, knuckle under, pick

grapes for eight hours a day'—'But if you were forced to do so, if you had to?'—'If I had to . . . well, if I had to, I just wouldn't do it. I'd manage some other way.' He regards potato-stealers as fit to be shot down with a gun. 'All one has to do is to ask.' And yet, 'in order to beg, one must have the right sort of temperament.' What, in fact, would he do?]

For him, to work in order to live is to work in the void. 'I only have a taste for work if I can think of enlarging myself always more and more. [And it appears he has a million francs in cash (?) with which he doesn't do anything, for he hasn't changed his manner of living in the least, and has quite sufficient land.] He complains of being compelled to produce vinic alcohol, which results in his earning no more (is this true?) than if he worked his vineyard alone and it brought him in 500 hectolitres. 'Under such conditions as these I work for nothing.'

We must eliminate the void as far as is possible—and that is little enough—from social life, for the void is only of service to grace, and society is not a society of the elect. There will always be enough void for the elect.

Denial of St. Peter. To say to Christ: 'I will never deny Thee' was to deny him already, for it was supposing the source of faithfulness to be in himself and not in grace. Happily, as he was chosen, this denial became manifest to all and to himself. How many more there are who make similar [boasts—and they never understand!

(May all my denials become manifest. May they also be of rare occurrence.)

It was difficult to be faithful to Christ. It was a faithfulness *in the void*. Much easier to be faithful unto death to Napoleon. Much easier for the martyrs to be faithful, later on, because the Church was already there, a force, with temporal promises. We die for what is strong, not for what is weak; or at any rate for what, though momentarily weak, retains an aureole of strength. Faithfulness to Napoleon at St. Helena was not faithfulness in the void. The fact of dying for what is strong robs death of its bitterness—and at the same time of all its value.

A representation of the world in which there is some void is necessary, in order that the world may have need of God. That presupposes evil. *ὑπεναντίον ἀγαθῷ*.

At the same time, the world, as a manifestation of God, is full. 'This is full, that is full.'

'*Vere tu es Deus absconditus.*'¹ And at the same time 'They could know God through the world which manifests him.' The universe both manifests and hides God.

Void. The void is the supreme plenitude, but man has not the right to know this. The proof lies in the fact that Christ himself, for an instant, was completely without knowledge of it. One part of me must know it, but not the other parts, for if the latter were to know it in their base fashion, there would no longer be any void.

We should set aside the beliefs which fill up voids, soften bitter-nesses. The belief in immortality. The belief in the usefulness of sins: 'etiam peccata.'² [What is useful is that they should be made manifest.] The belief in the providential ordering of events.

(In short, the 'consolations' which are often sought in religion.)

[Mlle R., while admiring the beautiful weather for the vintage. 'One has to acknowledge the fact; we do what we ought to do, but at the same time God rewards us for it.']

The baser parts of myself should love God, but not too much. It would not be God.

Let them love in the same way as one is hungry and thirsty. Only what is highest has the right to be filled.

(Use of thirst and of hunger.)

Christ experienced all human misery, except sin. But he experienced everything which renders man capable of sin. It is the void which renders man capable of sin. All sins are attempts to fill voids. Thus my life with all its stains is close to his perfectly pure one, and the same is true of the very lowest lives. However low I may fall, I shall not stray very far from him. But if I fall too far, that is something I shall no longer be able to know. I can only know it, on any particular day, through grace received on that day.

The things which fill voids are either real (having come from outside) or imaginary, or else the two together (smiles from Louis XIV; money). One could form them into a hierarchical order,

¹ Verily thou art a God that hidest thyself (Isaiah xlv, 15).

² Even sins.

beginning with the most real and ending with the most imaginary; the latter being also the ones which contain the unlimited.

Motives. Thoughts are changeable, they are influenced by the passions, by fancies, by fatigue. Activity has to be constant. It has to continue each day and for many hours each day. Motives for our activity are therefore needed which shall be independent of our thoughts, hence of our relationships—absolute motives; idols.

We must seek out those idols which are least bad.

Lacking idols, it often happens that we have to labour every day, or nearly every day, in the void. We cannot do so without supernatural bread.

Idolatry is thus a vital necessity in the cavern. Even with the best of us it is inevitable that it should set narrow limits for mind and heart.

The imagination is continually working to stop up all the fissures through which grace might pass.

Imagination which fills the voids—unlimited, exhausting effort.
DANAIDS.

Obedience is the only pure motive, the only one which does not in the slightest degree seek a reward for the action, but leaves all care of reward to the Father who is in secret and who sees in secret.

(τῷ πατρὶ σου τῷ ἐν τῷ κρυφαίῳ. . . .¹
ὁ πατὴρ σου ὁ βλέπων ἐν τῷ κρυφαίῳ. . . .)²

The obedience must, however, be obedience to necessity and not to force (terrible void in the case of slaves).

We should do only those righteous actions which we cannot stop ourselves from doing, which we are unable not to do, but, through well-directed attention, we should always keep on increasing the number of those which we are unable not to do.

Each time we observe a fault in other people, we should ask ourselves whether we commit the same one; but we should also ask ourselves whether we commit the contrary and equivalent fault (or one among such faults).

Two remarks of X.: 'Death itself is nothing; it is only inner death which is terrible. For several months we had to learn to live as though we were to die the next moment, and so death for us means

¹ Unto thy Father which is in secret (Matt. vi, 18).

² Thy Father, which seeth in secret . . . (*Ibid.*).

nothing at all.' And again: 'If . . ., I could not bear it. That is to say, I could bear it for myself, for I can bear anything; but I couldn't bear it because of the others.' (Ugolino type of sophistry.)

Look for various forms (with authentic examples) of the Ugolino type of sophistry.

Why is it that as soon as a human being shows that he needs another human being either a little or a lot, the latter keeps his distance? I have often experienced this, occupying one side or the other of the relationship. *Gravity*.

The minimum time necessary for something (e.g. contact made between two human beings) and the time accorded by circumstances. Two chronologies which are very often a long way from concurring.

Concordant composition on several planes is hidden and only applies to the ensemble.

Before placing oneself in the position where it may be felt, not by the sensibility, but by the higher part of one's being, one must have felt to what extent it is non-existent. If through the imagination and inward lying one manufactures a false concordant composition for oneself, all access to the true kind will be denied.

Of two men who have no experience of God, he who denies him is perhaps nearer to him than the other.

The false God who is like the true one in everything, except that we do not touch him, prevents us from ever coming to the true one.

The 100 possible thalers in Kant. The same applies to God.

We have to believe in a God who is like the true God in everything, except that he does not exist, for we have not reached the point where God exists.

'Doing good.' By 'doing good' (materially, morally, or in any other way) to some unhappy being (one of those into whose soul affliction has eaten its way), we reduce his present form of affliction, but we run the risk of increasing his past form of it. How exert any influence over the latter? How cure the bygone years?

That is a supernatural thing.

If we do not manage to do so, ingratitude is justified.

('La Sauvage' of Anouilh.)

[Supposing the unhappy being who is aided places all his happiness in that of his benefactor . . . But then he pays dearly; and for that it is necessary that the distance between them should remain.]

You cannot make other people mount the ladder of force, except supernaturally.

Mountains, pyramids, the folds in statues—such beautiful things, and they are all of them manifestations of gravity.

Will not ugly, vulgar, shameful, or criminal things be beautiful, if we read in them the other form of gravity?

Not to think that one has rights. That is to say, not to cloud or deform justice, but not to think that one has the right to expect that things should happen in a manner in conformity with justice; and all the more so since one is very far from being just oneself.

Vertical superposition.

There is a wrong way of thinking that one has rights, and a wrong way of thinking that one has not any.

We must always be prepared for things to happen in accordance with gravity, unless there be supernatural intervention.

We ought to be grateful if we are treated with justice.

Conversely, we ought never to seek to do any other good to people than that which consists in treating them with justice.

In order to feel true gratitude (the case of friendship being set aside), I have to think that it is not out of pity, sympathy or caprice that I am being well treated, it is not as a favour or privilege, nor as a natural result of temperamental disposition either, but from a desire to do what justice demands; therefore that he who treats me in this way wishes that all who are in my situation should be treated in the same way by all who are in his own (but not, of course, that they should be made to do so by some form of coercion, for any such constraints may possibly produce more consequences of a dangerous than of a useful nature).

In such a case, gratitude is pure, joyful, a love accompanied by the desire not to do the same thing in return, but to imitate. If any desire to be of service exists, it is only called forth by admiration.

Any other form of benefit degrades both the benefactor and the person benefited a little.

The error (in the double sense of the word) with regard to these things is a question of level. Nearly always, we place justice too low.

All errors in level produce two false opinions which are contrary and equivalent to each other.

(We either deny a truth, or else we affirm it in a sense in which it is not true.)

Greater purity of physical suffering: whence greater dignity of the people.

Effects of too great a suffering, without grace: Ovid—Wilde—Van Gogh.

A uniform suffering, at the end of a certain time, becomes intolerable, because the energy which enables it to be borne is exhausted. It is thus not true that past suffering no longer counts.

Tragedy of those who, having been guided by the love of the Good into a path where suffering has to be endured, after a certain time reach their limit and become debased.

One can never at any given moment be sure (especially with my temperament, ever exposed to a sudden access of fatigue) if a day or an hour later the limit will not have been reached and the energy exhausted. Never to forget that.

Supernatural bread—the condition precedent consists perhaps in having reached and felt the limit.

On contact with the limit, not to lie to oneself, and to hold on though bereft of hope.

There is a point in affliction on reaching which we are no longer able to bear either that it should go on or that we should be delivered from it.

My two enemies: *fatigue* and *disgust* (physical disgust for all kinds of things). Both of them wellnigh invincible; and under certain circumstances can, in a flash, make me fall very low. Need watching.

'To suffer so is *impossible*.' This feeling of impossibility is the feeling of the void. It accompanies all true suffering and breaks through as soon as the imagination ceases for a moment to fill the void. Whence also the feeling of unreality in affliction. *It isn't true because it isn't possible*. It isn't possible because it isn't possible for me to bear it. But what do we mean by 'bear'? Sustain, uphold. It is being in a state of equilibrium.

Find out the connection between the void and the way in which time rolls by.

Not to forget that at certain times in the midst of my headaches (when a crisis was developing, but before reaching the extreme point), I had an intense longing to make some other human being suffer by hitting him in precisely the same part of the forehead.

Similar desires—very frequent in human beings.

When in that state, I have several times succumbed to the temptation at any rate to say words which cause pain. Obedience to the

force of gravity: the greatest sin, or one of the greatest. Thus one corrupts the function of language, which is to express the relationships between things.

We should consider all our sins as simple manifestations of human wretchedness, the wretchedness common to all men, including Christ; that alone will enable us to contemplate them unveiled. Otherwise we have not the strength to do so, we have to lie.

Conversely, by considering them in this way, we are unable to despise any one.

The persons condemned to death whom Ella Maillart saw and photographed in Russia, as they were all lowering their heads together whilst their sentence was being pronounced.

Effect produced by gravity.

These effects produced by gravity, in cases of great affliction, are slightly comic, slightly repugnant, make everything look small. They prevent nearly all feeling of pity on the part of the spectator; prevent him from experiencing the sensation of affliction, which, on the contrary, imaginary affliction, from which gravity is absent, gives him.

The person in affliction, finding neither pity nor sympathy, cannot understand why this is. He thinks that he, were he in the position of the spectators, would feel pity, for, imagining himself to be in their place, he offers himself the spectacle of an imaginary affliction in which there is no obstacle placed in the way of pity. That is why the principal emotion where we are the object of ill-treatment is one of astonishment. *Why* are we being treated like that? This astonishment lasts for some time, and when finally, as a result of fatigue, acceptance takes its place, this acceptance still remains that of something incomprehensible.

Innumerable Spanish stories to illustrate this.

It is also the absence of gravitational force in fiction which makes it so that evil there is interesting, fascinating, and good boring. For if there were no such thing as gravity, good would be a matter of course; evil would be unexpected, surprising, and would please on that account. As a result of gravity, it is the reverse.

A man walking—what can there be more ordinary than that? But if he walks upon the waters it ceases to be ordinary. Such is the difference between the just man of fiction and the just man of reality.

The force of gravity in epic poetry, tragedy (Sophocles, *Phèdre*, Shakespeare), triumph of genius.

Problem: that the effects of gravity corresponding to the circumstances should be present in the work of art, but should not provoke the correlative effects of gravity in the mind of the spectator (or listener, or reader). This is supernatural.

All very great art is supernatural.

Part played by form, rhythm, ceremony?

Obedience: there are two kinds. We can obey the force of gravity or we can obey the relationship between things. In the first case, we do what we are urged to by the imagination which fills up voids. We can affix thereto, and often with a show of truth, a variety of labels, including righteousness and God. If we suspend the filling up activity of the imagination and fix our attention on the relationship between things, a necessity becomes apparent which we cannot help obeying. Until then we have not the notion of necessity, nor have we the sense of obedience.

Even if the obedience is perfect (and it is practically never so), we cannot be proud of what we accomplish—at any rate at the time we accomplish it—so long as all we do is to obey; even should we accomplish wonders.

What we accomplish through pure obedience, however great the effort and labour involved, creates no need of a reward whatever.

(And yet it does at a certain moment—that of the death of the old man. *We kill the old man in us by working in the void.*)

In the same way a simple relationship, at the time we conceive it in all its simplicity, even should it constitute an extraordinary discovery, provokes no feeling of pride whatever. Ampère.

However much we give of ourselves to others or to some great cause, whatever suffering we endure, if it is out of pure obedience to a clear conception of the relationship between things and to necessity, we make up our minds to it without effort, even though we may accomplish it with effort. We cannot do otherwise, and there is no reversal, no void to be filled, no desire for reward, no bitterness, no degradation.

Breton cabin-boy's words to the journalist who asked him how he had been able to act as he did: 'There was nothing else for it.' Purest form of heroism. (More frequently found among ordinary people than elsewhere.)

Necessity. We have to see things in their true relationship and ourselves, including the purposes we bear within us, as one of the terms of that relationship. Action follows naturally from this.

Rock lying in the path along which we are hurrying. We don't want to, we refuse to accept the fact that it should be there; we rush forward and start pushing it. We exhaust all our strength in order to make believe that the rock isn't there. Or else we contemplate it, ourselves, our desire to get by; the rock lies there, but it isn't everything. This pause renders indirect action and the lever possible. He who pushes often succeeds; if he doesn't succeed, once he is exhausted, the rock seems to him an absolute, impossible to thrust aside. For him who makes use of the lever, even if he doesn't succeed, the rock is not an absolute; he thinks he would have succeeded if . . .

'If I had known (e.g. that Louis XIV would not bestow a glance on me), I should not have done that.' Thought which never occurs to the mind of anyone who only obeys necessity. He hasn't any debtors.

Man escapes from the laws of this world but the space of a flash of lightning. Moments of pause, of contemplation, of pure intuition, of mental void, of acceptance of the moral void. It is through such moments that he is able to approach the supernatural.

Whoever for an instant bears up against the void, either he receives the supernatural bread, or else he falls. Terrible risk; but we have got to run it, and even for an instant without hope. But we must not plunge into it. (Second temptation.)

To pass through death.

Inability to bear that which is. Yet, in fact, we do bear it, since so it is. Straining on the part of one's whole being towards the immediate future, the approaching instant when, so one thinks, that which is will be no longer. The Belgians who for the last year have been waiting for the war to reach a happy conclusion by the following week.

I cannot bear it, *therefore* it is going to cease.

The future, filler up of voids.

Or on the other hand (as in the case of my headaches in 1938), not to be able to conceive that the affliction could cease, because the thought of being delivered from it would force one to conceive more clearly the pain. Prostitutes, who do not want to escape from their condition, etc. Warriors who by dint of suffering reach the point where they do not want peace (*Iliad*).

Extreme suffering brings about either one or other of these results. (The first to start with, no doubt, then the second?)

Slaves whom it was impossible to reduce to obedience in towns where they had been freed en masse (numerous examples). The day before even, the possibility of not obeying could not have entered their heads, for it would have made them feel their affliction too keenly. But from that moment, the idea of obeying even for a single day seemed to them unbearable.

Yet nothing had been changed either in the case of their masters or in that of themselves, excepting only the imagination.

The future, filler up of voids. Sometimes the past plays this rôle too. (I was . . ., I did . . .) [Perhaps an imaginary past? Always imaginary in this case perhaps? Who knows?] In other cases affliction makes the thought of the past unendurable; it then deprives the afflicted being of his past. (Or else are the cases the same?)

The future. We think it will come to-morrow, until we reach the moment when we think it will never come at all.

Two thoughts lighten affliction a little: either that it is going to cease almost immediately, or else that it is never going to cease at all. We can think of it as impossible or necessary, but we can never think that it simply *is*. That is unendurable.

'It is not possible!' What is not possible is to envisage a future where the affliction will continue. The natural élan of thought towards the future is arrested, one's being is lacerated in its feeling about time.

'In a month, in a year how shall we suffer . . .'

Desire is an élan of thought towards the future. A future which contains nothing desirable is *impossible*.

Suffering is nothing outside the relationship between past and future, but what is there more real for man than this relationship? It is reality itself.

The being who can bear to think neither of the past nor the future is reduced to the state of matter. White Russians at Renault's. Thus one can learn to obey like matter; but no doubt they invented for themselves readily available and illusive pasts and futures.

One cannot imagine how affliction should not be ennobling. This is because when we think of an afflicted person we think of his affliction. But he does not think of his affliction; his mind is completely filled with whatever miserable alleviation he is hankering after.

In order to have the strength to contemplate affliction when one is oneself afflicted, supernatural bread is necessary.

Fragmentation of time for criminals and prostitutes; it is the same with slaves. This then is a characteristic of affliction.

Those whose city had been destroyed and who were led away into captivity no longer had either past or future: what had they with which to fill their minds? Lies and the meanest, most pitiful of covetous desires. They were perhaps more ready to risk crucifixion for the sake of stealing a chicken than they had formerly been to risk death in battle for the defence of their town. They must have been, or those frightful tortures would not have been necessary. The tortures to which the slaves were exposed were risks which had no ennobling effect.

Or else one had to be able to endure the void in one's consciousness.

Nobody pitied a slave; so it was only through malignancy that he could spread the evil from which he was suffering outside himself, since he was unable to make other people suffer through pity.

Transference.

Below a certain level, this desire to spread evil outside ourselves disappears, and affliction makes us kindly. Negro slaves. (Whereas, during the same period, there were the destitute Negroes in New York . . .) When, our astonishment at being ill-treated eliciting no response, we feel ourselves to be mysteriously made for receiving ill-treatment. When astonishment outweighs suffering—Indians in the xvth century. When astonishment making us lose the sense of a co-ordination in time, past and future, even when close to us, really disappear. We then become resigned like matter.

During my severe headaches, I used to be in the first state of mind when they were coming to a crisis, and in the second state of mind from the moment this crisis was fairly close to attaining its maximum. This used to happen regularly, each time.

The desire to hit somebody else in the same spot on the forehead. Desire to see somebody else suffering exactly what one is suffering oneself. That is why (except in times of social unrest) the resentment of the destitute is visited upon their companions in misfortune.

Therein lies a factor making for social stability.

Casanova. Giving up his plans to escape out of gratitude towards those who, having imprisoned him unjustly, allowed him paper and pencil after three weeks of solitary confinement. Gratitude as a pure phenomenon of force of gravity.

Resentment shown by wretched creatures towards one another; where there are two of them, and one humiliates himself a little

less than the other, each bears a bitter grudge against the other, for each is for the other a cause of humiliation.

Description of gravitational phenomena in society. What could be more important?

Would a society in which only gravity reigned be viable, or is a little of the supernatural element a vital necessity?

In Rome, perhaps, there was only gravity.

Among the Hebrews too, perhaps. Their God was a heavy one. And yet, Sattva everywhere.

All energy on this earth comes from the sun, except gravity. Everything is a combination of solar energy and gravity (supernatural bread excepted).

To liken the laws ruling the heavens to gravity (Newton) was really an act of impiety.

So much the better, then, that the science which developed from Newton should have gone bankrupt.

Find somebody who can tell me whether the second principle of thermodynamics is regarded as valid in biology?

‘Radiating energy’: since when has it been accepted and as a result of what? The sun being an unlimited source of it, as compared with our possibilities of measurement, such a notion introduces an indeterminate element . . . [but formation of glucose by a plant, in a closed vessel, with aid of arc-lamp].

Higher than mechanical energy, if it is transformed into mechanical energy, but not inversely [electricity is produced with the help of mechanical energy, light with that of electricity; but with a loss(?)].

Can life be defined by the transformation of radiating energy into chemical, mechanical, calorific energy?

Waterfalls—is not this a perpetual movement? (no, one more readily analogous to the steam-engine; the solar heat is consumed).

Desire is an incoercible force springing forward towards the future; if barriers are placed in its way, it changes direction (more or less violently, depending on the particular temperament); in the case of narrow destinies where it can only exercise itself on insignificant objects, it contracts the soul.

Lauzun, in his prison, thought more about his title of Captain of Musketeers than he did about his freedom. By what mechanism?

We dream of again meeting with the particular circumstances which made for our now lost happiness, the signs in which the latter may be read. The imagination, filler up of the void, attaches itself to the signs but not to their significance, which is not an object of imagination. Freedom as such is not an object of reverie.

We read the real signs, but not the imagined ones; the significance of the imagined ones disappears. It cannot therefore be present to the mind if it is conceived without either name or form. That is what fate can deprive us of, of the link between sign and thing signified, of the ability to read; and that is something truly precious.

Everything which is real, real enough to contain superposed readings, is either harmless or good.

The imagination, filler up of the void, is essentially a liar. It does away with the third dimension, for it is only real objects that are in three dimensions. It does away with multiple relationships.

We must not seek the void, for it would be tempting God to count upon supernatural bread to fill it. Second temptation of Christ.

Nor must we flee the void. First temptation.

The unfaithful steward. Pain is sent by God. But since you seek by every means in your power to avoid it, you should at least help others to avoid it also.

To try to define the things which, while effectively taking place, remain in a sense imaginary. War. Crime. Revenge. Extreme affliction.

Those which do not contain any multiple reading.

The crimes in Spain were actually perpetrated and yet they resembled mere acts of braggadocio.

Some realities that have no more dimensions than a dream—flat ones.

In the case of evil, as in that of dreams, there are no multiple readings; hence the simplicity of criminals. The simplicity characteristic of the highest form of virtue is the result of a supreme unity.

Simplicity of criminals, but also their play-acting.

To act with the imagination, filler up of the void.

Readings. Reading—unless a certain quality of attention be put into it—obeys the force of gravity.

We read the opinions suggested to us by gravity.

With a higher quality of attention we read gravity itself, and various possible systems of equilibrium.

To love truth signifies to endure the void, and consequently to

accept death. Truth is on the side of death. To love truth with all one's soul is something which cannot be done without a wrenching.

Crimes in Spain. Flat like dreams on both sides; on the side of the executioner and on that of the victim. What can be more appalling than to die in a nightmare?

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The system of Eudoxus, by which a ratio between weights can be equalled to a ratio between times, etc.—How is it we allow ourselves not to refer to it in education?

If it is a case of rational ratios—3 hours are to 2 hours as are 3 kilos to 2 kilos—at bottom the notion is the same, but concealed by the numbers. At Réville, while trying to explain to Marcel Lecarpentier what exactly is a ratio, I apprehended the definition of Eudoxus, without having as yet come to know it.

In the case of rational ratios, the simplest thing is to resort to equalizing. Where there are some weights of 3 kilos apiece and other weights of 2 kilos apiece, in order to arrive at a balance, we require 2 of the former kind and 3 of the latter kind; and so on . . .

As for the definition of Eudoxus itself, it rests upon an indefinite series of disequilibria. The equalizing process does not relate to any number at all. (There is something vertiginous about such an idea.)

Form of the idea of incommensurable magnitudes. Supposing you have two boxes of cubic cast-iron weights, such that the side where the larger weights are is the diagonal of one surface aspect of the smaller ones, you will *never* be able to arrive at an equilibrium by distributing them on a pair of scales of a symmetrical balance (without mixing them together), whatever may be the number placed there.

All the possible ratios between whole numbers will be distributed in two classes, according to whether the balance leans toward the right or toward the left.

An impossible equilibrium—what an admirable symbol! Impossible not only to bring about, but even to *name*. *ἄλογος*¹—Nothing surprising in the fact that there should have been mystical practices on the subject.

Since it was possible in this way to equalize the ratios in the case of two completely different pairs of magnitudes, one could hope to be able also to apply the notion of ratio to psychological and spiritual matters.

¹ Unnameable.

Proportion and the idea of a mediator in the Gospels.

Axiom relating to the proportional fourth term; is found in the story of Thales concerning the measurement of the pyramids.

Two equal ratios which vary while remaining equal—this is the idea of function.

If these two ratios make up a proportion having three terms (proportional mean), this variation may be represented by a parabola (if the first term is invariable)—

*We should read functions in the world—*Shadows. Anaximander, inventor of the gnomon.

Strange that these unnameable ratios should, on the other hand, be perceptible through the senses. Nature supplies some to the senses (through the properties of space).

Spatial mathematics, contrary to that of number, can be rigorously applied—and no longer by approximation—to the universe.

But the idea of Anaximander—disequilibria indefinitely compensating each other, as representations of equilibrium—resembles that unnameable equality which defines inequalities; resembles methods involving successive approximations . . .

Spectacle of the sea.

Compensatory oscillations.

(action and reaction . . .)

Limit—something which is always exceeded, but imposes a compensatory oscillation.

Circular motion—a representation of an indefinite oscillation (correspondence with alternate motion).

The 'natural locus' is the central point around which the oscillation takes place.

Never does a body occupy its 'natural locus'.

A truth is the unnameable (ἄλογος) point with reference to which one can order, by putting them in their right place, all possible opinions on a subject.

Instead of: every curve passing from one side to the other of a straight line, axiom relating to aggregates. The advantage is that this can be applied to several types of magnitude.

But it would be better to produce axioms of this sort for several types of magnitude (formulated concretely in the case of each one), and to give a name to the type of magnitudes for each of which one is able to formulate an ANALOGOUS axiom.

Galileo recognizes this axiom in the case of speeds (impossible to pass from repose to a *finished* speed) as true *not only mathematically, but physically*. He uses it also to establish the principle of inertia.

Implied also, with a physical value attached, by the notion of equilibrium in Archimedes.

Axioms are correspondences that are *evident in fact*.

They are *factual* truths a priori.

Such and such a thing is *in fact* impossible.

Science. To try to conceive everything which does not take place as impossible (possible under other conditions). Impossibility is always something conditional (*if three segments form a triangle . . .*)

The distinction between a *priori* and a *posteriori* is not what Kant said it was.

Logic

 To enumerate the truths which are of such a nature that by affirming them one destroys them (e.g. the grace included in sin), because they are not true on the plane on which the opinions one is affirming are found (on that plane, the reverse is true), but on a higher plane. They are only able to be perceived as true by such minds as are capable of conceiving on several vertical, superposed planes simultaneously; to other minds they remain completely incommunicable.

‘Through a natural necessity, every creature whatsoever, as far as it is able, exercises all the power at its disposal.’

Not to exercise all the power at one’s disposal is to endure the void.

Is it possible for there to be a voluntary acceptance of the void in the relations between collectivities?

A rock lying in our path—To hurl oneself upon this rock as though after a certain intensity of desire (effort is only desire) had been reached it could not exist any more. Or else leave the spot as though oneself did not exist.

One should conceive at the same time the existence both of the rock as a limited object and of oneself as a limited being, and the relationship between the two; lever. If one simply relies on the lever, effort of any kind may even be unnecessary.

One must have detached oneself from one’s desire in order to be able to conceive the equivalence, through transposition, between lowering and raising.

Desire contains an element of the absolute, and if it fails in its

object (once the energy has been exhausted), this absolute element is transferred over to the obstacle. State of mind of the conquered, the oppressed . . . (Imploring pity is like pushing a rock that is too heavy.) If, after a certain time, need causes desire to spring up again, an oscillation between desire and exhaustion takes place which can continue for a long time—The absolute element becomes ever more firmly rooted.

A rock. Desire hurls upon it the man who wishes to get by as though upon an enemy to be destroyed. But it is not the rock which is harmful, it is its position; and what holds it in this position is gravity. We can make use of this very same gravity so as to change its position.

Desire is no longer of the same kind when we use the lever.

It is difficult to make anyone grasp the analogical significance of this example, for it ought to be applied, in the case of each man, to what he himself actually desires.

It must be applied to all desires.

Desire leaps forward in Time across intermediate obstacles. In order to think on intermediate obstacles, one must endure the void.

By some strange mystery—which is connected with the power of the *social element*—a profession can confer on quite ordinary men in their exercise of it, virtues which, if they were extended to all the circumstances of life, would make of them saints or heroes.

But the power of the social element makes it so that these virtues are *natural*. That is why they need compensation.

Oscillations. There are in nature certain phenomena which produce oscillations and others which do not. No oscillation in the transference of heat from a hot object to a cold one. In the case of gravity—often there is no apparent oscillation, but often also there is definite oscillation. There lies the difference between the two forms of energy.

When some energy has been expended, if everything is the same as before as regards position, there must be an increase in heat. There has therefore been a degradation.

In a closed system, if there has been an increase in heat, the quantity of possible changes is less.

In a closed system, whatever may happen, there can never be any diminution of heat (?).

More energy (for example, electrical) is required to make a litre of water pass from 20° to 0° than from 0° to 20° .

[Reversibility and oscillations; the relationship is evident.]

We have simply to distinguish between the oscillating force and the non-oscillating force; we thus do without inertia.

And in the case of biological phenomena?

What happens when a living being, who was launched upon some course of action, is suddenly stopped?

What happens to the kinetic energy with which he was animated?

Transubstantiation. Matter becomes thought every day, in the sense that we breathe and eat; the energy liberated by chemical transformations becomes at any rate an instrument of thought. Eating is like absorbing springs whose subsequent release, operated by us, constitutes our action.

The carbon in the atmosphere becomes, by being combined for example with hydrogen, vegetable matter. The springs stretch. The digestion undoes the combination, operating a relaxation of tension. (But it is still not quite that.)

But what happens in the case of somebody who eats a lot and hardly stirs at all?

What happens in the case of an animal which (for example under the effects of the training received) stops right in the middle of its impetuous course? Overheating?

Is electrical energy of an oscillating type?

Product of a length and of a weight in the case of two quantities not of the same kind. In a sense, in whatever piece of multiplication, the two numbers are not of the same kind. But such a product implies the concept of Eudoxus. Unthinkable product.

Through algebra, we give a name to the *λόγοι ἄλογοι*,¹ and in this way we debase them.

Children ought to be made to feel how strange such products are.

4 rolls of 20 gold pieces each. 4 is a number of rolls, 20, one of pieces. But there is still a certain homogeneity.

Whereas $4 \text{ m.} \times 5 \text{ kg.}$ is not in any sense a product. Nevertheless, the latter expression follows the laws relating to the products of real numbers, that is to say, surfaces.

$a \ b$ indicates everything which obeys the laws of multiplication, without distinction of any kind.

¹ Cf. p. 146.

Mathematicians spend their time giving names to unnameable notions, and as a result are continually obliged to discover new notions, which exercise the mind just so long as they still remain unnamed.

We have tried to reduce caloric (non-oscillating) energy to mechanical formulae; it is then that something irreducible, which we thought to have reduced, has reappeared under the form of probability.—False progress.

The militiamen of the 'Spanish Testament' who invented victories in order to endure death: an example of imagination filling up the void. Although we may stand to gain nothing by victory, we can bear to die for a cause which is going to triumph, but not for one which is going to be defeated. For something absolutely deprived of force, it would be superhuman; Christ's disciples. *The thought of death calls for a counterweight, and this counterweight—apart from grace—cannot be anything but a lie.*

Pearl Buck: the counterweight was pride of race.

Death—source of all untruth and of all truth for men.

Causality and finality. In analysing, for example, the structure and method of functioning of several organs of a living organism taken separately, one begins by setting aside their relationship. It is not surprising that, *from the point of view of this analysis*, their relationship should appear as a *coincidence*. And we do not know how to make such analyses without first separating the component parts.

We do not know how to conceive of a causal process leading a complex whole from one state to another state.

What comes closest to such a conception is that of a *constant* and of a series of transformations made possible with that constant.

A machine. One conceives the relationship of the whole, then each of the parts is adapted to it. The mind of man has to do itself violence, in the same way as his hands do violence to matter.

The relationship is conceived according to some simple idea (use of the machine).

Living organisms have no external finality. Duration, i.e. the cycle, is the only finality. It cannot be conceived outside the system of means itself.

Societies, analogous to living organisms. Analogous phenomena.

Newton: attraction proportional to the mass ($\frac{f}{m} = \text{a constant}$);

this means only that the mass does not play any part in acceleration, but only the square of the distance. That the distance should play a part in acceleration is indispensable for calculation. (The greater the distance, the nearer the curve approaches to a straight line—the curve described at a given time.)

.
Newton. It is stupid to substitute for the gross numerical relationship a hypothesis (such as attraction from a distance) as impenetrable for the human intelligence as the relationship itself.

.
Pedagogy—One ought, in the primary schools, to draw up for the children a list of the things about which Science is not in a position to furnish any information at all.

.
Horror of the void—food queues: if people do not give up waiting, it is (perhaps) because once fatigue has really taken possession of the feelings, one is no longer able to go away. One cannot bear the idea of having tired oneself out for nothing.

But why does one go back to them again?

People are pleased and proud to be able to say: I managed to get such and such a thing. Whereas: I didn't do any queuing up—this is not the sort of thing which can be said; it is *negative*.

We do not go after what is negative.

The absence of toil (except for real Epicureans) is not an object of desire.

Epicurus: the *void* is a good.

The absence of toil is not an object for the imagination.

Labour—This means decomposing one's own living substance into inorganic matter. It is certainly a partial death. It is certainly turning oneself into matter.

Cycle. We decompose our living substance into inorganic matter in order to produce the energy which will enable useful movements to produce the conditions in which plants will best develop—plants which transform inorganic matter into living matter capable of being assimilated by man. We thus recuperate more than we have lost, for in addition to the labour expended life itself constitutes an expenditure of energy.

Organic life constitutes an expenditure of energy such that we are forced to expend still more energy in order to recuperate what is

indispensable for living. We have to spend some energy voluntarily so as to recuperate the energy that we expend involuntarily.

If we do not manage to do this, we die. If we only just manage to do it, we suffer all our lives.

Fever—Too great a proportion of chemical energy is transformed into calorific energy. It is not surprising that this weakens one, and that a feverish person is unable to make an effort.

What does the effort without labour (in the physical sense) represent which consists of holding up a weight in the air or holding a spring at full stretch?

Holding one's breath—

.

Popularization of science—must be carried out around the notion of *labour*.

Application to psychology of the notion of compensation, *in the sense used in the second law of thermodynamics*.

Phenomenon of the 'second wind' among long-distance runners: after getting more and more out of breath until it becomes almost unbearable, a new system of breathing is set up which makes it possible to complete the course without physical suffering.

General law of all transformations.

Non-commutability of products in Heisenberg.

Non-commutability is a sort of mathematical equivalent of *irreversibility*.

Order and disorder. Irreversibility. Papers arranged in order can be muddled up in a minute. It takes an hour to put them back in order again. But, naturally, if one wanted to arrive at some *particular, definite* form of disorder, more time would be required.

As far as we are concerned, in relation to atoms, every macroscopic phenomenon constitutes an *order*.

Discontinuity. It is clear that if we begin by eliminating it from our hypotheses it will have to be brought back again, since, in fact, there is some.

Astronomy. To create an astronomy which should not be finalist, but at the heart of which would be found the notion of *condition of existence*.

The same for atomic science.

Would not that simplify things a lot?

That would give a unity.

The notion of *labour* is not applicable either to stars or to atoms.

The calculation of dark radiation, starting from atoms, in accordance with accepted theories of mechanics, leads to conclusions which are not only experimentally false, but also absurd. An absurdity lies, therefore, *ab principio*.

Entropy is, *on the one hand*, a relationship of energy to temperature, *and on the other hand*, the logarithm of a probability. The two definitions only coincide if you define probability in a suitable manner.

Wrong way of seeking. The attention fixed on a problem. Another phenomenon due to horror of the void. We do not want to have wasted our efforts. Passion for the chase. We must not want to find. As in the case of an excessive devotion, we become dependent on the object of our efforts. We look for some outside reward which chance sometimes provides, and which we are ready to accept at the price of a deformation of the truth.

It is only effort without desire (not attached to an object) which infallibly contains a reward. *ὁ πατήρ ἐν τῷ κρυφαίῳ*. . .¹

To draw back before the object we are pursuing. *Only what is indirect is effective*. We do not accomplish anything if we have not first drawn back. Lever. Ship. All forms of labour.

By pulling at the bunch, we make the grapes fall to the ground. [The tension of work performed for wages comes from the fact that one has to do an indirect action with the rapidity naturally accompanying an effort combined with desire.]

Lever. We have to lower when we wish to raise.

It is on the same principle as 'he who humbleth himself shall be exalted'.

(There is also a necessity and there are also laws in the sphere of grace.)

Labour. No connection between the movements naturally accompanying desire and imagination in regard to such and such a transformation in matter and the effective movements for the accomplishment of this transformation. Whence the violent nature of apprenticeship. *And yet desire must remain as a stimulant*.

¹ Thy Father which is in secret . . . (Matt. vi, 18).

Educational science.

To make the body conform to the true relations between things.

Theoretical instruction, combined with apprenticeship, bearing on the analysis of the first acts of clumsiness. Why one commits them. Why they do not constitute effective movements. Moral transposition.

It is by such violence as this that labour causes one to step out of the imaginary and places one in contact with reality.

Analogy between this type of violence and the type which the savant imposes on himself.

Habit, second nature; better than first nature.

Habit in the performance of a particular type of labour puts us in possession of the world.

Habit in the performance of labour. Elimination of the 'I'. Image of perfect virtue.

For want of transposition, the virtue in labour often remains sterile.

Labour perfectly performed without the aid of a stimulant would be perhaps a form of saintliness.

Labour. The 'I' exists through the suffering of fatigue and through monotony: like something which is sacrificed.

Daily sacrifice. It ought to be addressed to God.

Feeling of abasement, inseparable from labour. Compensatory pride, whence does it originate? Or insensibility.

Time is the cause of this feeling of abasement.

Labour as ransom from original sin; participation in the redemption.

[In order to draw from the Catholic religion the potential efficacy it contains for turning labour into a spiritual exercise, it must be admitted that labour is a form of suffering.]

It is always a lie which stands in opposition to Good.

The violence we do ourselves in order to make desire serve as stimulant to movements that are not naturally connected with it—such violence itself springs from an energy of variable level.

What happens in the case of those who have acquired the necessary habit, work well, and are not of a high spiritual level?

They have been *trained*. Training, in the case of animals, only produces conditional reflexes (although, perhaps . . .); in man's case it can produce habits. What takes place then in the soul?

Taoists; and the louse.¹ A certain quality of attention is linked with effective movements, without effort or desire.

The thought expressed by such and such a human being provokes

¹ Cf. footnote, p. 30.

reactions in us. God is that which does not provoke any reflex actions in us.

Science *must not* be satisfying and coherent, for it belongs to the domain of names and of forms.

To be able to contemplate its limits.

Analogy between *habit* and *grace*. Physical sense of the word *grace*.

[Mlle Agnès R., who could cut the grapes faster than the others, without leaving a single bunch on the vines, a single grape on the ground, and saw at the same time everything that was going on on the road; level of intelligence and spirituality not very high. How does that come about?]

‘So-and-so has slighted me’—void.

For the human imagination, preservation belongs to the void and not destruction. As for creation, there isn’t any.

Man follows *naturally* after destruction.

R. (during the vintage season). A salary increase of one figure (just a simple figure) is a more powerful stimulant than the preservation of life.

Only the feeling of death possibly close at hand can turn the preservation of life into the most powerful stimulant.

‘To the afflicted, nothing seems sweeter than life at the precise moment when it is in no way preferable to death.’ Phenomenon of the *void*.

Horror of the void and working of the imagination in the acts of recollection and anticipation.

To have used up energy simply in order to find everything in the same state as it was before—intolerable.

[This often happens to the peasant: hay raked into cocks, dampened by the rain, spread out, put back into cocks.]

It is the law of human life: sweeping, washing, etc. . . ., eating. ‘Making both ends meet’—expression of a cycle. A field in autumn, and the following autumn: everything is the same, a man weighs the same, the house looks the same, the supply of corn in the barns is the same . . . (Danais). One has only got a little older.

The stimulant of avarice: the *succession of numbers* is the motive at the back of it.

For the imagination, to preserve is empty of significance; to destroy is unlimited in significance.

Marcel Lecarpentier. Barely used to find in himself the necessary energy to keep on beginning over again, always dreaming about 'getting out of it somehow'. Many work-people like that in these days. Before, from what source did they draw their energy? With what results?

.
De T.—The gloominess caused by the general situation increases, instead of diminishing, the attachment to money. The same applies to old people. *Phenomenon arising from feeling of void*. Money takes the place of the motives forcibly suppressed. *Numerous analogies*.

[N.B. that one often recognizes the self-seeking character of other people's actions and not of one's own.]

When external constraint suppresses certain motives, those which remain take the place vacated by the ones that have disappeared, unless new ones should arise.

When the suppressed motives are the noble ones, the constraining action degrades.

Fictitious example: a greedy painter; if he goes blind, he will no longer be anything but greedy. Demetrius.

(The hermit's cat; asceticism can have the same effect.)

Real example: hunger and sleep, the days which followed the armistice. William II, in 1918, and the cup of tea—

A suppressed motive—this signifies the disappearance of an object towards which one's efforts and a part of one's energy were effectively tending. This part of one's energy *must* go elsewhere. (In the case of him who *holds it back*, affliction increases his moral stature.)

Death of a beloved being.

Death of the homeland (patric).

The probability of one's own approaching death can produce the same effect, by suppressing all motives apart from those bearing on the immediate future. Prisons during the Terror; war.

The certainty of death produces a very different effect; a suppression of all motives at once; a void. That is why one doesn't believe in it—except during a few horrible moments. (Unless . . .) Feeling of impossibility.

Two very different feelings:

What must necessarily be, that is precisely what is.

What is impossible, that is precisely what is.

The former corresponds to the beautiful in nature.

The beautiful in nature: a union of the sensible impression and of

the feeling of necessity. Things *must* be so (in the first place), and, precisely, they are so.

The painting of a landscape, for it to be good, must give us this feeling.

In nature also, composition on several planes. Harmony between one wave and another wave, one drop of water and another drop of water. *Co-ordination of necessary conditions on several scales.*

Mathematical expression of this property possessed by the world?

A geometrical curve within which is drawn a *regular* broken up line. Whether the intervals are doubled, quadrupled, etc., or reduced by half, etc., you go on having *regular* broken up lines.

On this is based the quadrature of a parabola.

Has this property any name? Is there an axiom with regard to it? Or is it the result of an axiom?

The word *regular* employed here is not in the least precise.

[Quanta. The mistake was perhaps not to suppose continuity in the field of energy, but discontinuity in that of the atom? However, it was imposed by chemistry.]

Certainly the universe is the correspondence of an infinite number of compositions. Necessary conditions on an infinite number of scales correspond to each other; while at the same time orders on an infinite (?) number of scales coincide with each other.

Personal and impersonal aspect of God.

Perhaps: to have a personal relationship with an impersonal God?

Not to say 'I' to God; nor to say 'thou' to him. 'I' and 'thou' separate *men*, and this separation forces them to mount higher. Without 'I' or 'thou', let the relationship be closer than any human form of union.

The object of my search is not the supernatural, but this world. The supernatural is the light. We must not presume to make an object of it, or else we degrade it.

We should pray *ἐν τῷ κρυφαίῳ*,¹ even with regard to ourselves. It is not my 'I' which prays. If a prayer takes place within me, I must hardly be aware of it. I have no other Father than He *ἐν τῷ κρυφαίῳ*.

Discordance between words and conduct. One may have a

¹ In secret (Matt. vi, 18).

sufficiently strong conviction to furnish the energy necessary for the act of pronouncing certain words, but not the energy necessary to accomplish certain actions or refrain from doing certain other actions.

When the inward obstacle which opposes itself to one's adopting, in fact, a certain particular line of conduct is too strong in comparison with the force of the inclination urging one to adopt that line of conduct, such force, unable to find a useful outlet, is dissipated in words, like kinetic energy is in heat. (Proust, snobbery of M. Legrandin. Patriotism of ***—Disdain of temporal things of ***).

To hold back one's words is the first remedy. (St. John of the Cross: to be temperate in words is worth more than fasting and discipline.) One thus accumulates energy. *It is very difficult.*

One should speak in consonance with those things to which one is deeply attached just enough to pledge oneself in one's own eyes, not the tiniest bit more.

In my own case???

ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς . . . ¹ ἐν τῷ κρυφαίῳ . . . He is hidden in heaven.

'Let not thy right hand know'—well hidden from consciousness itself.

Relationship between man and God. The person of man must be pledged entirely, just as it is in the case of love, friendship, extreme anguish brought on by fear, hunger or suffering, and extreme joy; and yet, contrary to what happens with these emotions, it is not a man's person which is involved, but something else. And this something else is necessarily turned toward something other than a person.

Fear of God, in St. John of the Cross: is it not the fear of thinking on God when one is unworthy to do so; of sullyng him by thinking on him wrongly? Through such fear the lower parts of our nature draw away from God.

Taoists. If we hide the universe within the universe, we shall not lose it.

Inner revalorization of energy: to limit the degraded forms of energy in oneself (products of the imagination, spoken words . . .).

To keep some energy available in oneself.

¹ He which is in heaven (Matt. vi, 9; vii, 11; etc.).

Value of analogy in human life. Makes transferences of energy possible; to look for examples. (mio bien, mio sposo . . .)

When we do not wish a desire to be satisfied, when we restrain ourselves, what becomes of the *energy* contained in this desire? Hunger, thirst, and many other kinds . . . Is privation a means for the revalorization of energy? And when a desire remains unsatisfied as a result of some external constraint, can we not draw from such constraint itself the means for a revalorization of energy? This is certainly preferable. But if our thoughts keep on turning toward the imaginary satisfaction of the impossible or prohibited desire, there is, on the contrary, a loss of energy (unless one wants, in spite of the obstacles, to satisfy the desire).

All desires are precious, for all desires contain some energy.

Void as agent for the revalorization of energy.

Real satisfaction is worth more than imaginary satisfaction. But privation is, in certain cases, worth more than real satisfaction.

Desires become reality when we remove from them the cloak of imaginary satisfaction.

The energy liberated by the disappearance of objects which used to form motives always tends to go lower.

Base sentiments (envy, resentment . . .) are degraded forms of energy.

Upward transferences of energy. Some through association (the desire to get good marks leading to the writing of a good composition), others through analogy (examples?). Perhaps it is only those through analogy which can cause us to mount up to any extent, for they alone cause us to surmount a discontinuity.

E.g. love of *order*.

And other examples besides . . .

Transference through blind man's stick?

'I am free' is like a contradiction, for that which is not free in me says 'I'.

[Remark. It is much easier to say to oneself: I am going to translate, copy, etc., so many pages of . . . than to say: I am going to do an hour of . . . Application to wage-earners.]

You say to yourself: if I no longer have such and such a thing, I shall have nothing left at all. This is because the thought of the other things is at that moment devoid of energy. How could William II have foreseen that when the domination of the world was wrested from him his whole being would interest itself in a cup of tea?

Such a transference entails a thickening of falsehood, for how can one bear to contemplate oneself in such changed circumstances?

Marius, in his case, went on being attached to domination projected into the future. His desire was able to leap over the thought of time. Nevertheless, for this purpose, he had to change his nature (to enlarge himself upon the thirst for vengeance).

We admire Marius more than we do William II, through the sole prestige of force.

Transference. Transferences can be effected on the chain of means to ends (from good marks to a good version, or inversely); of signs to things signified; of associated circumstances; of analogues.

Lawrence : transference from S.A. to the cause of Arab liberty.

Exchange of energy—An object does not only direct energy, but accumulates it and restores it. Void of energy at a certain given moment, one finds some in order to serve a beloved being; this is past energy which one has accumulated on his account. In such a case (in the case of exhaustion), the disappearance of an object serving as motive does not liberate any energy, but rather causes some to disappear. (Lawrence, after the Treaty of Versailles)—Both results can happen at the same time (always do happen?). The sensible effectiveness of our effort is a source of energy. In the sight of a half-ploughed field there lies contained some energy for ploughing the other half.

... ἀνωφέληται¹—One has lost something—

With regard to every expenditure of energy we become creditors. What can be more difficult than to remit this debt?

In what sense does sin turn us into debtors? [Text of the Paternoster]. We have allowed energy to be lost (become degraded). We are unfaithful stewards. We must remake the void in ourselves.

Fable of the miser whose buried treasure has been stolen. 'What hast thou lost?' He has lost some *accumulated energy*; the energy corresponding to all manner of fatigue, all manner of privation undergone for the sake of this treasure. In addition, there is some directed energy (directed towards the increasing of the treasure) lying unused, which invades the disordered spirit and causes a frightful confusion.

To have lost his past—that which is past, that which does not exist—what can that mean exactly?

¹ [Labours] lost.

He can no longer bear to call to mind all his past labours. The memory of it all becomes a hindrance instead of a stimulant.

Resolutions. The energy required to form a resolution is far less than the energy required to carry it out. *But the energy connected with any resolution which is not carried out becomes degraded.*

Therefore: one should never take a resolution without having concentrated in it the necessary energy for carrying it out, and this can only be done by dint of attention and through a mechanism of transference. What mechanism?

An identical effort is more easily performed from a low motive than from a high one. By what mechanism? This is because low motives do not demand any attention at all, and consequently fatigue does not prevent them from being present to the mind. Whereas, on the other hand, fatigue, by paralysing the attention, causes the disappearance of high motives. An effort made to come to the assistance of some unfortunate being one has never seen: unless the vanity of 'doing good' should enter in, one can only be brought to do such a thing by a feeling for justice and an effort of the imagination. But fatigue soon puts an end to this, upsets the balance and manufactures sophistries.

What is present to the mind when the attention is relaxed is of a low order.

Like the 'second wind' of the runner, we need to have a 'second attention'.

If a man requires to make a violent effort in order to take up the attitude which the outside world expects from him as natural, and if, moreover, public opinion and external pressure prevent him from taking up any other, a void is inevitable, and it is inevitable that a *modification* should take place in him.

E.g. putting up with a brutal reprimand on the part of a foreman without answering back and without a look or a movement of ill-temper. Breaking-in.

Law—In certain given circumstances, a man's soul tends to take on a character such that, by adopting the behaviour which such circumstances impose upon him by force, there should not be any feeling of a void in him.

Therefore, such that what is expected from him as natural should, in fact, be natural.

(Or again . . . ? such that there may always be compensations at his disposal.)

Between the two states of equilibrium, *anguish*, and the feeling of *impossibility*.

Old J.¹ Compensation in the future. But he is then still in anguish. Soon after, becomes hard as stone.

After such an adaptation, what becomes of the desire for deliverance? One cannot conceive deliverance without thinking *that one is changed*, and that very thought makes one afraid. (In my case, headaches, 1938.)

One is then 'content with one's lot', so long as there is a certain stability.

There is nothing more intolerable to man than the consciousness of his own liability to modification. It is our fundamental tribulation, and in order to be able to contemplate it fixedly we need the light of grace.

Negative things which suddenly appear positive owing to the loss of them: liberty, security, health. We should then so much like to have them again for a moment, just one moment, in order to enjoy them *as* positive things. But if we do have them again, they at once become negative. In this way the most precious joys are denied us. Knowledge also—For in the midst of suffering, our mind is not free so that we may contemplate suffering, the contrary of suffering, and the relationship between the two; and we cannot give to suffering that is only imagined a degree of attention sufficient to conceive it. Always too much attention, or too little. We should be able both to suffer and not to suffer at the same time.

(Cf. Scève's² motto.)

There are certain joys—and they are the most precious—which, when imagined, are extremely pale; whose whole value consists in their presence itself. We lack the stimulus to seek out these pale joys, even at the cost of a slight effort—unless . . .

(May I no longer commit this crime towards myself of allowing them to slip by.)

To have within oneself some free energy capable of embracing the true relationship between things.

In order to liberate some energy in oneself—what a violent wrench is necessary!

ὁ ἄπρος δὲ ὃν ἐγὼ δώσω ἡ σὰρξ μου ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ζωῆς.³

¹ Cf. p. 147, last line *et seq.*

² Maurice Scève, sixteenth-century French poet. (Tr.)

³ John vi, 51.

'The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.'

'Except a corn of wheat . . .'

To give one's flesh for the life of the world, and to receive in exchange the soul of the world.

Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ὁ κόκκος τοῦ σίτου πεσὼν εἰς τὴν γῆν ἀποθάνῃ, αὐτὸς μόνος μένει, ἐὰν δὲ ἀποθάνῃ πολλὸν καρπὸν φέρει.¹

Perfect joy excludes the very feeling of joy, for in the soul filled by its object no corner is available for saying 'I'.

We cannot imagine such joys when they are absent; consequently we lack the stimulus for seeking them out.

'Except a corn of wheat die . . . ' It has to die in order to liberate the living matter and energy it bears inside it, so that from them other compounds may be developed.

So we have to die in order to liberate the *tied up energy* in us.

(Wouldn't it be easy for parish priests to say that to the peasants at sowing-time?)

Let energy be distributed in accordance with the recommendations of true intelligence. How far I am from achieving that!

We liberate energy in ourselves—then a little more—then again a little more. But it constantly reattaches itself. How are we to liberate it entirely? We have to desire that it should be done in us—to desire it truly; simply to desire it—not try to accomplish it; to think on it only. For every attempt in the other direction is vain and has to be dearly paid for. In such an undertaking all that I call 'I' has to be passive. Attention alone—that attention which is so full that the 'I' disappears—is required of me. I have to deprive all that I call 'I' of the light of my attention and turn it on to that which cannot be conceived.

Humility.

Attitude of supplication. I have necessarily to turn myself towards something other than myself, since it is a question of being delivered from myself.

To attempt such a deliverance by means of my own energy would be like a cow pulling on the tether and so being brought to its knees.

Supplication is effective by itself if it is persistent.

We liberate energy in ourselves with a violence which still

¹ Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit (John xii, 24).

further degrades it. Compensation corresponding to the laws of thermo-dynamics; vicious circle, deliverance from which can only come to us from on high.

The Pharisees were people who relied on their own strength to be virtuous.

Humility consists in knowing that in what we call 'I' there is no source of energy by which we can rise. We are then no more astonished by human meannesses, including our own particular ones, than we are not to see men walking upon the lakes; and yet we know that man's true vocation is to walk upon the lakes.

Everything which is valuable in me, without exception, comes from somewhere outside myself, not as a gift but as a loan which has to be continually renewed. Everything which is in me, without exception, is absolutely valueless. Among the gifts that have come to me from elsewhere, everything which I appropriate to myself becomes immediately valueless.

οὐδὲν εἰμί¹—

Story of Ulysses—οὐδεὶς²—hidden meaning.

(Navigation of the soul?)

Use of sin: to remember that. But sin is not a necessary factor therein.

Monotony of evil: nothing new; everything in it is *equivalent*. Nothing real; everything in it is imaginary. Evil is monotonous in exactly the same way as what is imaginary is so; like drawings in which everything has been invented, or fictitious happenings entirely invented by children.

To render this impression of monotony and of satiety.

It is because of this monotony that *quantity* plays such an enormous rôle. Lots of power, lots of kingdoms, lots of money, lots of women (Don Juan) or men (Célimène), etc.

Condemnation to a false infinitude—that is hell itself.

If we could manage to know exactly what the miser whose treasure has been stolen from him has lost, we should learn a lot.

Lauzun and the office of Captain of Musketeers. He preferred to be a prisoner and Captain of Musketeers rather than go free and not be a Captain.

These things are garments. 'They were ashamed of their nakedness.'

¹ I am nothing.

² Nobody.

How is it that this *buried* treasure is a source of energy?

—Entropy—Boltzmann. Probability. It is very amusing to see how the physicists at the end of the ~~xxx~~^{xix}th century brought back the (at that time so detested) notions of finality and order under the name of probability (faint probability, naturally). *For faint probability can only be defined as an order.*

Principle of entropy: the world goes from order to disorder.

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J., XII, 27. νῦν ἡ ψυχὴ μου τετάρακται, καὶ τί εἶπω; πάτερ σῶσόν με ἐκ τῆς ὥρας ταύτης· ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἦλθον εἰς τὴν ὥραν ταύτην. πάτερ, δόξασόν σου τὸ ὄνομα.¹

Remission of debts to our debtors. Not only in the case of men, but in that of things also—Not to attach to things or to human beings the energy that we have expended on their account (including that which enables us to endure suffering).

The desire for revenge is like the miser's attachment to his treasure.

Forgive us our debts. Give us back the wasted energy. From Thee alone do we expect to receive this energy, and not from any of Thy creatures.

If any one does me harm I expect to receive something from him who has done me the harm, just as the miser expects to receive something from his treasure. ('Satisfaction.') If, in my turn, I do harm to another I receive something from him: what? What has one gained (and which will have to be repaid) when one has done harm? One has enlarged, spread oneself—One has filled part of the void in oneself by creating a new element of void in another person.

We accept the evil that is done to us as a remedy for that which we have done ourselves; there is no other kind of remedy. If people did not injure us, we ourselves could not be pardoned.

It is not the suffering we impose on ourselves but the suffering imposed on us from outside which constitutes the true remedy; and it is even necessary that it should be unjust. When we have sinned by committing injustice, to be made to suffer justly is not enough; we need to be made to suffer injustice.

'By what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.'
Grace subjected to laws.

¹ Now is my soul troubled; and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour: but for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name.

Grace, although it is gratuitous, is not arbitrary. Mystery.

To be able to harm another with impunity—e.g. passing one's anger off on to a subordinate, while he is forced to keep his mouth shut—is to save oneself an expenditure of energy, which expenditure has to be met by the subordinate in question. So in the case of the unlawful satisfaction of any desire whatsoever.

The result is an attachment—on both sides. Such human beings are added to the 'I', to the things which one has at one's disposal. There they figure in a quantitative form.

Energy which is economized in this fashion is immediately degraded.

'It is a necessity of nature . . . that each one, whether god or man, exercise all the power at his disposal' (Thucydides). Like the expansion of a gas in the *entire* space lying open to it.

If we do not expect any restitution of energy on the part of objects, the pains we have been obliged to give ourselves enable us to re-create a void.

Tendency to spread suffering outside oneself. If through excessive weakness one can neither arouse pity nor do harm to anybody, one does harm to *the representation of the universe in oneself*. (Unless . . .)

Every good and beautiful thing is then like an insult.

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Since entropy represents the *logarithm* of probability, how can the chosen intervals modify the variation in entropy?

In reality, it is a question of the distribution of probabilities.

It is not *discontinuity* which is in question.

Ball rolling on a plane surface—Still a circle—Still oscillation.

Not inertia, but oscillating energy.

Billiard ball—Pendulum—Planets—Ball which rebounds—

'Quantity is changed into quality'—but accompanied by a degradation. That is what Marx forgot. Yet such is the case in the changes of physical state brought about by a quantitative difference, for example vaporization.

Electra—Supposed death, followed by the pure joy of reality.

Fulness of joy: something *is*. Feeling of reality; nothing else besides.

It is not possible—cry of pain.

Is it possible?—cry of joy.

What has Electra received from outside?

Her hunger, her fatigue, her humiliations . . . are restored to her.

. . . ἄτ' ἐν τάφῳ πετραίῳ
αἰεὶ δακρύεις—¹

The recognition scene in Electra is the best example of reading.

What is changed for her? (If one could answer that question . . .)

The miser whose treasure has been stolen. It is some of the frozen past which is taken from him. Past and future—man's only riches.

Evil is licence and that is why it is monotonous; for everything has to be drawn from ourselves. But it is not given to man to create; so it is a bad attempt to imitate God.

Supplication: attempt to bring a value into existence by dint of concentrating one's thoughts upon it. It is only reasonable when directed towards God and in the case of the very highest values.

The non-recognition and non-acceptance of this impossibility of creating is the source of a great many errors. We have got to imitate the act of creating, and there are two possible ways of imitating it—the first one real, the second one apparent: by preservation and by destruction.

No trace of 'I' in preservation; but there is some in destruction. 'I' leaves its mark upon the world by destroying.

Jealousy. Infidelity is like ingratitude: it causes a human being to lose his past. My past is always in the hands of others. So also is the death of those dear to us.

The death of those dear to us (or a break with them) deprives us of both future and past at the same time.

Death. *Instantaneous* state, without a future or a past—Indispensable for entry into eternity.

How does one accumulate energy on objects?

One only accumulates some outside oneself.

Conditional reflexes.

¹ *Since in the rock which serves thee as a tomb,
Alas! thou sheddest tears.* (Sophocles, *Electra*, 151-152.)

To accumulate energy in God—in that which does not exist. Or: in the whole universe (to hide the universe within the universe).

To accumulate energy on other things than *individual objects*: on the universal.

Excitations are always exterior. There are no interior excitations. Excitants can be grouped into classes—grass for sheep, bread, etc. Transferences of energy in obedience to pure intelligence.

Continuity: the sight of an object which recalls a past effort is an excitant.

(To take as an excitant the cycle of the days and of the seasons.)

Stimulants. Play—Whatever forms the object of the efforts of several people is a stimulant.

To exccel. *πλεονεξία*—

Fundamental principle: There are several different qualities of energy in us, as there are in the world, and to change one motive (to which a certain form of energy is attached) for another one which we believe to be better, without a transmutation of energy, constitutes an illusory step forward.

It is not given to us to conceive the entire solar system as a system. Since, in our terrestrial world, the sun is not included, there take place diminutions in entropy—

(To draw up a list of them. Are there any others besides the growth of plants?

Petroleum? Radioactivity?)

Sun, for this reason, image of God.

The sun gives and does not receive in return.

We must forgive debts just as God forgives them.

As we pardon others, so do we pardon ourselves.

We excuse, we dispense created things, including our own lower nature, from the need to restore to us the equivalent of the light—received by us from on high—that we shed upon them.

Non-active action is *obedience*. | Connection between the

Non-active action; *preservation*. } two ideas.

The energy of inferior quality demands to be restored from the outside, through the future or the past.

A road makes one want to walk. Stimulant, because image of time.

Indefinite time—Quantity, related to time (as opposed to eternity).—(Nevertheless, there have to be *stages*.)

What is the mechanism by which a decoration is able to restore energy (of an inferior quality)?

It is the force of gravity which is beautiful in the sea as in the mountains, as in sculpture, as in architecture.

Th. de Holbach

(end of xviiith century) $2n = \text{a prime } N^o + \text{a prime } N^o$ —always.
(c.g. $20 = 13 + 7$) ($24 = 13 + 11$), etc.—($22 = 11 + 11 = 5 + 17$).

Oscillation is beautiful in the sea.

Bach, oscillating music.

Sea, visible composition on several scales.

Rhythm, composition on several scales.

Oscillations and cycles—

Unimaginable congruity. Plenitude, not with reference to ourselves.

Double nature of number: addition, from 0 onwards, and relationship, which never carries with it a zero . . .

How is it that we express *relationships* with the aid of numbers?

Is it a multiplicative and not an additive group? . . .

Relationship, not multiplication.

In nature, relationships; no zero; and no *one* either. A great many difficulties derive from that (must look into it more closely).

Taoist text: (N. R. F.)¹

‘The universe . . . That which forms a good out of our life also forms a good out of our death. A boat can be hidden in a creek, a net in a lake. They will be relatively safe. But at midnight a strong man can come along and carry them away on his back . . . But if you hide the universe within the universe, there will be no place where it can be lost.’

‘That which is one is one. That which is not one is also one. He who knoweth the one followeth nature.’

‘When the streams run dry, the fish collect together on land. They communicate to each other their own individual moisture

¹ *Nouvelle Revue Française*, published by Gallimard (Tr.)

and thus keep themselves moist. But it is better for them to abandon themselves to the rivers and lakes.'

Gravity, both an oscillating and a non-oscillating force at the same time.

Schrödinger: differential equations containing a link between *continuousness* and *discontinuousness*. However, they do not explain anything, and are simply an expression of this mystery.

'I felt that whatever I had been ordered to do I should have done it, for I was only a private soldier; but I should have done nothing voluntarily, *I just couldn't*.'

What is this *source of energy* that lies in an *order* and enables somebody to accomplish a heroic action without being a hero?

To be a hero, one must give an order to oneself.

Where exactly lies the difficulty? And how does one manage it?

There is no other measurement for force than *gravity*. E.g. a magnet sustains a weight of so much, etc. A force is something which is able to balance gravity.

If we place a piece of iron *under* a magnet, and it rises, there has been some *work*. If we place it immediately underneath, and it remains in place, there has been no work. This is very obscure. In a balance the same thing applies; no work at all.

If we place a little iron ball on a horizontal plane surface and it is attracted by a magnet, if it does n^{cm} ; $\text{work} = f.e = m.y.e$.

But if we push it with an *instantaneous* impulsion, no work at all.

Yet the only difference is that in the first case the force is lasting and in the second case instantaneous.

However, if there is no resistance, the little ball must oscillate—and consequently the work is continually cancelling itself out.

$m y e$ — y , infinitely small, e infinitely big. Their product could, however, be given a finite value, that is to say $\frac{1}{2}v^2$.

Holding a weight of 1 kg., I overcome gravity. Lifting up the weight, I overcome gravity, and *besides this* I add some movement. But the difference between the two is *infinitely small*, for gravity having been ruled out (setting aside the resistance of the air), an infinitely small impulsion is sufficient. Thus a cord round a pulley, two equal weights attached to either extremity: a mere flick causes one of them to rise. Is there work in this case? If I pull one of the

weights, the force I exert can be decomposed into two: (1) a force equal to this weight, and (2) an infinitely small impulsion. The force equal to the weight sustains it, but does not shift it.

Subordination: economy of energy. Thanks to it an act of heroism can be accomplished without it being necessary that either the one who orders or the one who obeys should be a hero.

To reach the point of receiving orders from God.

Works whose 'merit becomes exhausted' are those which proceed from a finite energy.

Lawrence.

An order releases an interior spring.

To set up mechanisms of association with one's own power of attention.

Bad actions are not degrading in themselves, but as barriers to the power of attention. They afterwards create either barriers to attention or else obsessions.

Light, image of truth, because equally distributed over all things.

Good acts only raise us very little by themselves.

One should not *think about* . . . Hagar who does not see the fountain until 'her eyes were opened'. That is why one must beg the truth. 'Become so poor that thou hast to beg everywhere.' But he from whom one begs is just.

Plato. The immobile world in which we are is the image of the oscillating world where everything is in its place.

Argument in Plato's *Alcibiades*. 'Wilt thou propose to the Athenians just or unjust wars? Knowest thou what the just and the unjust are? What master hath taught thee this?—None; I discovered it myself—Thou hast searched for it then? There has then been a time in thy life when thou thoughtest thou didst not know it? When was that? A year ago?—two years?—three years?—four years?, or when thou wast a child? Used thou not then to say 'I've been played a dirty trick' at knuckle-bones? So thou hast never searched for it—The multitude taught it me like Greek—Doth the multitude agree over the just and the unjust as it doth over Greek? The wars related in the epic poems are they not mortal quarrels over the just and the unjust? So the multitude doth not know it; therefore it cannot have taught it thee. Thou dost not know it therefore.' 'I will not counsel the just, but the useful—Dost thou know it then?'

ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς σὺ σαυτοῦ ἀκούσῃς ὅτι τὰ δίκαια συμφέροντ' ἐστίν,
ἄλλω γε λέγοντι μὴ πιστεύσῃς.¹

Πῶς οὖν λέγεις περὶ ἀνδρείας; ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν αὐτοῦ δέξαιο
στέρεσθαι;²

Courage is the most noticeable virtue in the cavern, because it derives from force. *Μεταξύ.*

The just (since it is beautiful, and since what is beautiful is good) is always beneficial *as such*. It is only its consequences which can prove detrimental.

Contrary opinions held by the same mind are brought to bear on matters about which one is ignorant while being under the impression that one knows about them.

(Contradiction, touchstone, discrimination.)

Story of Proserpina. Analogy between the pomegranate and Eve's apple. In both cases *curiosity incites to enjoyment*, and death is the result.

Filiation between Proserpina and Ceres, ear of corn in the Eleusinian mysteries, and: 'Except a corn of wheat die . . .'

Pomegranate and apple; the thing signified is perhaps the same. We eat it in order to find out how it tastes.

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To implore a man is a desperate attempt to cause, by sheer intensity, one's own system of values to pass into the mind of the other person. To implore God is the reverse; it is an attempt to cause the divine values to pass into one's own soul. Far from thinking with all the intensity of which one is capable on the values to which one is attached, we have here an interior void.

One desires to become other than one is; one is thus turned toward the outside.

Dirac. 'Supercomplex' numbers not satisfying the law of the commutativity of multiplication. They are: the co-ordinates—the quantities of movement—energy—time.

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¹ If thou hearest not thyself declare that what is just is beneficial, believe not what another may say about it (Plato, *Alcibiades*, 114 c).

² Well, then, what thinkest thou of courage? At what price wouldst thou consent not to have any? (*Ibid.*, 115 d).

The accepted system of mechanics should be analysed in order to find out its *intrinsic* defects.

Discontinuous element in differential equations.

Waves are one of the intermediaries between continuity and discontinuity. Theory of vibrating chords.

Numbers in algebra. Mystery, wherever the unit is not defined. They can only operate as *multipliers* ($x+x+x=3x$). But there ought to be special signs to make them operate in this way.

Non-commutative numbers. We ought to see which invariants are denied, which others are affirmed.

$$3 \times 4 = 4 \times 3.$$

$$1-2-3-. \quad 4. \quad 5. \quad 6. \quad 7-8. \quad 9. \quad 10-11-12.$$

$$\text{---} 3 \text{ ---} 6 \text{ ---} 9 \text{ ---} 12$$

$$\text{---} 4 \text{ ---} 8 \text{ ---} 12$$

Invariance of the units in distribution.

We should return to the methods of Archimedes, and formulate an axiomatic system for physics.

Planck—What is enjoined by experience is only that energy should be proportional to frequency—

Every time that a non-elastic body falls there is a degradation of energy—unless by intercepting this energy, for example with the aid of a rope and pulley, we cause it to accomplish some work.

Stars: pure mechanical energy.

Assemblage and structure: succession of whole numbers, property of numbers.

$$(2n = \text{a prime } N^o + \text{a prime } N^o?)$$

7.13.10|7.11.9—Between prime N^os , even interval; the smaller one, + the half . . .

Given a certain number, among proportionals, in relation to this number there is at least one prime number out of all the prime numbers lower than itself.

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Reading and knowledge of the 3rd kind.

By passing through knowledge of the 2nd kind—Plato—

Axiomatic system in physics with the aid of the notion of *aggregates*.

In the xvth and xvth centuries people looked into this matter—

In the xixth they were stopped through the illusion of *evidence*—

Conventions and truth—Game of chess? Possible discussions on the value of conventions. But conventions are necessary.

'It is possible to find algebraical formulas . . .'

Probability and order, cf. Boltzmann

Incarnation, eucharist. God made himself man, he makes himself matter . . . Among the animal gods, cannot we find the trace of a similar idea?

'We believe by tradition in the case of the gods, and we see by experience in the case of men, that always, through a necessity of nature, every being exercises all the power at his disposal.' This is not true of the God of the Christians. He is a *supernatural* God, whereas Jehovah is a *natural* God.

The sun shines upon the just and upon the unjust . . . God turns himself into *necessity*. Two sides to necessity: the side exercised and the side endured. Sun and Cross.

Belief. Very different meanings attached. $2 + 2 = 4$, or: I am holding this pen. Belief is here the feeling of evidence. I cannot, by definition, believe in mysteries in this fashion. But I believe that the mysteries of the Catholic religion are an inexhaustible source of truths concerning the human condition. (In addition to which, they are for me an object of love.) Only nothing prevents me from believing the same thing with regard to other mysteries, or from believing that some of these truths have been directly revealed elsewhere. Spiritual adhesion similar to the kind obtained by a work of art (the very greatest art).

Intolerance proceeds from a confusion between ways of believing.

Entropy. Irreversible passage from good to evil. Conformity with traditional thought.

But then what about 'etiam peccata'¹? 'There is more joy in heaven . . .'? The publican? One must no doubt add: a sinner's repentance is 99 times more difficult and more uncommon than a just man's perseverance.

The lower is stronger than the higher: entropy.

Cohesion. Notion of force: balance—Cohesion is there set aside. Then the same mechanical system is carried into the study of cohesion as if small balances . . .

Metaphor of gravity: it is because of entropy. Fall, irreversible transformation.

Whoever humbles himself shall be exalted—That resembles 'compensations' in the sense used in thermodynamics.

¹ Even sins.

God's powerlessness. Christ was crucified; his Father let him be crucified; two aspects of the same powerlessness. God does not exercise his all-powerfulness; if he did so, we should not exist, nor would anything else. Creation: God chaining himself down by necessity—One may hope that the chains will fall at death; but one also ceases to exist as a separate being—Why is creation a good, seeing that it is inseparably bound up with evil? In what sense is it a good that I should exist, and not God alone? How should God love himself through the wretched medium of myself?—that I cannot understand. But everything that I suffer, God suffers it too, for that is the effect produced by necessity, the free play of which he refrains from violating. (For that reason was he man and is he matter, food.)

Dark radiation—What it has really shown (and which was expressed by Planck in the form of quanta), is that there is something which limits entropy.

.
Undulatory mechanics and concept of *totality*. Image of the wave and of the *vibrating chord*—Relationship between the whole and the parts.

Vibrating chord, link between continuity and number—Pythagoras—

To contemplate these images. Divine images.

Vibrating chords, opportunity for calculating involving partial derivatives.

'Everything is number', and number is *true*. No points of view, appearances, illusions, expression of opinion. Object of thought of the second kind, or of the third.

Brings us nearer to God; or else what sense can it have?

Reading of number . . .

To read numbers in the universe and to love the universe: the two things go together.

Ancient science was more suitable for such reading than is modern science. The Church was perhaps right in opposing Galileo.

(Since affliction causes everything to be called in question, let us call everything in question in our own consciousness.)

A science which does not bring us nearer to God is not worth anything.

But . . . (if it causes us to approach him in the wrong fashion, that is to say, as some imaginary God, it is worse still).

The three kinds of knowledge and the three degrees of mental energy.

From the less stable to the more stable: reverie—calculation—contemplation.

If we arrest a motive in full development, the kinetic energy is degraded into heat. In the soul, it is the reverse: a sudden stop brings about a revalorization of energy. [Yes, but only if the sudden stop proceeds from within; not if it is a mere question of training.]

Lucifer. The mere fact that there exist beings *other* than God implies the possibility of sin. This possibility is not attached to freedom (for it does not exist in the case of God), but to *existence*—a separate existence. (Christ could not sin.) God, by creating, created the possibility of sin. Creation, renunciation.

Love, pain produced by this separate existence. Two beings desire to be one; but if they were one, this single being would love itself, and what worse nightmare could there be than that? It is a still more unquenchable form of thirst. Narcissus. God is therefore the only possible object of love. Narcissus asks himself to become another, so as to be able to love that other. The lover asks his beloved to become himself.

(God alone is both himself and another.)

Original sin. Sin committed *before* any sin. Outside time, transcendental. *Apûrva*?

[Action does not, like thought, produce its consequences immediately, but in Time; nevertheless, every cause is bound to produce an effect when it exists, not when it has ceased to exist; we therefore admit that there is an immediate, imperceptible, potential effect: *apûrva*; forming a link between action and the results of action, germ of all future consequences, outside ordinary time (but not duration)—

Apûrva can on the one hand remain attached to the being who accomplishes the action, and on the other hand diffuse itself in the cosmic order and come back to the point of departure in the form of a reaction of the same nature as that of the initial action, a compensation for the breaking up of the balance which constitutes the action (cf. Taoism: concordant actions and reactions). For the sum of differentiations is bound to be undifferentiation. True in the human as in the cosmic order.

Thus relationship between karma and dharma.

[moral point of view: sentimental deformation of these things?]

The reaction, in the return influence exerted, takes on the individual and even temporal character which apûrva did not possess; if the acting being is no longer in the same state of manifestation, he will be affected all the same—Causal chain linking the various cycles—so that what is true for one being is equally true for the manifestation as a whole.]

Renunciation. Imitation of God's renunciation in creation. God renounces—in a sense—being everything. This is the origin of evil. We have got to renounce being something. Herein lies our only good.

Numbers as *μεταξύ*. No 'I' in numbers. Except as a cause of error.

God has renounced being everything to the extent of being nailed to the cross. We have got to renounce being something in the same measure.

Analogy between the degradation of kinetic energy into heat and the degradation in the imagination of the impulses of the soul which cannot be effectively fulfilled. (Anger towards a superior, etc.)

But other impulses of the soul which are fulfilled without any hindrance belong to the same level of energy (anger towards an inferior who is not able to answer back); equivalency between licence and constraint. Constraint throws us back into the sphere of the imagination, where there is complete licence.

Activity exercised against a hindrance, parallel with knowledge of the second kind.

Non-activity . . .

The love of self is the only love; but only God can love himself. That is why there is no other love open to us than to pray that God may love himself through us.

Vibrating chords—Comprehend circular functions, on account of the movement forward and backward—and *at the same time* whole numbers.

$$\begin{array}{l} Z = A \sin \frac{\pi x}{b} \sin \frac{\pi at}{b} \\ \\ Z = A_k \sin \frac{k-x}{b} \sin \frac{k at}{b} \end{array} \quad \left\| \begin{array}{l} x = n \frac{b}{k}, \text{ abscissa of nodes} \\ \\ k + 1 \text{ node [counting the extremities]} \\ \text{[diminution cancels out all the move-} \\ \text{ments corresponding to raised } k] \end{array} \right.$$

Whole numbers and circles: if one starts from a point on the circle, one will come back to it again after having traversed *a whole number* of circumferences.

Number and Time.

Celestial movements and music.

(Passage in *Timaeus*, hasn't perhaps any other meaning; theory of harmonics?)

Affinity between vibrating chords and rotation of the spheres.

Vibrating chords—connection between whole and parts.

It is *uniform circular movement* which comprises a measurement of time, not rectilinear movement—this is quite clear; for rectilinear movement to comprise a measurement, it would be necessary for it to be a moving forward and backward, which is the particular property of circular movement.

Pendulum.

Starting from uniform rectilinear movement, it is impossible to meet with number.

The 'waves' bring us back to it again. But how are waves determined? In the case of chords, there are the two extremities. In the case of a stone in the water, there is oscillation between two levels—see Huyghens—Fresnel—

And in the case of light, of radiations, what is it which determines their oscillations?

Hypotheses about the astronomical movement of atoms.

What meaning, then, does the principle of inertia contain?

Charity and injustice can only be defined by *readings*—and in this way they escape all definition. The miracle of the penitent thief did not consist in the fact that he thought of God, but in the fact that he recognized God in the man beside him. Peter, before the cock crew, no longer recognized God in Christ, otherwise he would not have denied him.

Others allow themselves to be killed for false prophets, false workers of miracles—false workers of true miracles, perhaps?—in whom, mistakenly, they read God. Their sacrifice does not lead them to the kingdom of God.

Who is able to flatter himself that he will read correctly?

That is why we have got to beg earnestly for truth.

(If Providence were to give each one what he deserves, should we be sure of reading always correctly? But such is not the case.)

One can be unjust through a determination to offend against

justice or through a faulty reading of justice. But it is nearly always (or always?) the second case.

What love of justice can guarantee one against a faulty reading?

Criterion of faith: to believe in spite of appearances. We have got to believe in spite of appearances, but when?

(This is the principal idea in 'The Ring and the Book'.)

What is the difference between the just and the unjust, if people always (or nearly always) behave in accordance with the justice which they read?

Joan of Arc. Those who rant about her to-day would almost all of them have condemned her. But her judges did not condemn the saint, the virgin fighting on behalf of justice, but the witch, . . . etc.

Cause of such and such a manner of reading. Public opinion is a very strong cause—The passions.

Joan of Arc: we read in her story what is dictated by contemporary public opinion. But she herself was uncertain. And Christ . . .

In fictitious moral problems, *calumny* is absent.

Great literary works: veils drawn in front of truth, but transparent veils. Electra. Antigone. Antigone also doubts . . .

What hope lies before innocence if it is not recognized?

We therefore commit a sin in believing a calumny.

'What is truth?'—What ought we to believe or not to believe? Nothing human is thinkable unless due account is taken of the past, and the past can never be verified. It is not an object of investigation; is reproduced by pure conjecture, and is hidden by lies—How then can we escape the danger of committing the worst forms of injustice?

To *read* dispassionately. For when we read what is suggested to us by passion, we never realize the fact; we think we are reading what is written down under our eyes.

Reading and force of gravity.

Mixture of the two: vertigo.

We *read* the text likely to provide us with the easiest form of equilibrium.

(Here the metaphors do not harmonize well together)—

h. Factor of proportionality which prevents entropy from being carried to its ultimate consequences. Has nothing to do perhaps with

continuity—Bell-shaped curve: hyperbole, which is not carried right up to the end (like that of Mariotte). Something prevents the stationary waves which are set up in the closed space from following the direction of the greatest probability, toward the smaller wavelengths; they do so up to a certain point, then stop, and this point depends on the temperature. Pl. has supposed, not another factor, but that probability itself becomes rarefied. For that purpose he has supposed it to be discrete; for if a straight line is divided into equal segments, in order that certain segments may contain fewer points than others, it is necessary that they should be discrete points. And yet . . . ? But discontinuity was in favour at the time.

Imaginary quantities. Must operate in arithmetic because of the rôle played by the circle in the relationship continuity-discontinuity.

Man counts the *days* and *steps*. Now, the act of walking is a cyclical phenomenon (balance—breaking up of the balance—return to the original balance: man walks like the ball rolls)—Oscillation.

Instead of seeking to eliminate man from science, like Planck, which leads to untruth and to disguising the human element in algebra, to do the reverse.

If we see other people in a three-dimensional space, we see ourselves in the same way, and in that case we discern our own faults and are able to ask for forgiveness. Otherwise we are unable to ask for it, and how should we then obtain it?

It is possible to imagine *anything* about other people concerning the past and the future (he did . . . he will do . . .), and consequently to justify *any action*.

‘Whoever wishes to drown his dog, first accuses it of rabies.’ Ugolino type of sophistry, etc.	} justifies <i>everything</i> .
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The universe composed of matter, without either past or future (or at any rate, always identical . . .)—The contemplation of it purifies.

[‘They make prices go up’—what an accusation! . . .]

It is only by suspending this work of the imagination that one reaches the point of conceiving that one may also be guilty (condition requisite for forgiveness).

Otherwise *it is only when chance suddenly happens to replace one reading by another one* that we detect ourselves in fault, as in the case

of optical illusions. Crowing of the cock. (Supposing the cock hadn't crowed! . . .)

[Judas—that is another matter.]

'Judge not'—In the end, we are obliged to act as though we had judged. (Shall I sack that workman? . . . etc.) But *we should hold back for a certain time from judging.*

Suspend judgment.

Try other readings.

'Existential' philosophy. Analysis of *belief*. Common-sense truths. Something inside us believes more in them than does the common-sense part of us. Something inside us believes less in them, or else does not believe in them at all. How are we to change the beliefs inside us? In what way and in what direction? But already we have Plato: 'with all one's soul'.

'Judge not', and yet we are constantly obliged to express judgments through our actions. Ought I to shake hands with that man, or not? 'Judge not' does not mean that it is necessary to shake hands with everybody.

'Judge not, that ye be not judged', i.e. judge not, or you will not judge yourself. We must either judge ourselves or else be judged.

How can good, in its true manifestation, be protected against appearance without a trust which pierces through appearances?

Good does not appear. Neither does evil.

The desire to believe as we are urged to do by public opinion makes us tend to reconstruct the past and the future. Public opinion, force. Disagreement with public opinion, *void*.

Even if we do not conform to it in our behaviour, we seek a certain inner conformity with it.

We are urged forward. We carry that impulsion along with us, and we read it in outward things.

Morally, man believes himself to be immobile, and thinks that things move around him.

To perceive one's own movement. To place the Immobile where it is. To find in oneself what is immobile. ĀTMAN.

Mathematics. One catches oneself out in flagrant commission of error—

Art, sciences—artificial worlds by which man tries to teach himself not to be untruthful. But when deflected from their true purpose,

they have the contrary effect. They are means and not ends. God is the one and only end.

Love: teaches one to believe in an *external* reality. That is why the *μεταξύ* are like mathematics. If one attains to *immobile love*.

Love. One places the centre outside oneself. But still in something finite.

Feeling of *impossibility*, disequilibrium; situations in which the imagination which moulds fictitiously the past, the future and distant objects does not succeed in filling up the voids. It tries but is unable to. Inner hunger, thirst. Arrested impetus. When suffering has reached a point where the imagination which manufactures compensations is hindered in its functioning. Inward oscillations between refusal and acceptance. Spiritual impulses without an object—even an imaginary one. An enforced void. After a long time, there follow the exhaustion and death of certain parts of the soul.

The soul, like a gas, tends to occupy the whole of the space left open to it. If a gas were to withdraw and leave a void, this would be contrary to the law of entropy. Thucydides: 'each one exercises all the power at his disposal'. Each one spreads himself as much as he is able.

To stop, to check oneself is to create a void in oneself.

There are times when some external violence creates the feeling of a void. Sudden death, betrayal, absence of one we love, sudden loss of something to which our thoughts for the future were attached. Oscillations. There is really and truly a void, for the soul contains some undirected energy. It then exhausts itself in disordered movements.

Should one inflict such a violence on oneself? It has to be grace which does so. But without oscillations in that case.

Grace fills, but it can only enter where there is a void waiting to receive it, a void for whose creation it is itself responsible.

The barren fig tree. The soul touched by grace must either produce supernatural fruit or else wither away. (Judas.) It is no longer open to it to produce simply natural fruit.

Irreducible anguish (and 'feeling of impossibility') between two states of equilibrium, whatever may be the respective value of the two forms of equilibrium.

'Woman when she is in travail, is sad.'

A little force which is directed produces more effect than a great force which is blind. But in order that there may be direction, that which directs must have a little force at its disposal.

If there is not something in us capable of directing and having a little force at its disposal, our very thinking is entirely chance; but we cannot have it so.

Anguish: whilst we are experiencing it, we cannot imagine a state of equilibrium.

Dependence of the imagination with regard to the actual state of affairs. When our hunger is satisfied, we cannot imagine what it is to be hungry. When we are hungry, we cannot imagine what it is to be satisfied. We can imagine the act of eating, we are even obsessed by it, but not the satisfied feeling which will be the result of it. Equilibrium and disequilibrium are two ways of being of such a nature that while experiencing one of them we are unable to imagine the other. When in a state of disequilibrium, we imagine a compensatory form of disequilibrium.

Compensations. Marius imagined future revenge. Napoleon thought about posterity. William II wished for a cup of tea. His imagination was not sufficiently anchored to power to bridge the years; it turned towards a cup of tea.

Two evenings spent at the Scala, in Milan, one of them standing up, the other sitting down. On the first evening, I was continually conscious of the existence of the spectators who were seated. On the second evening, I was completely unconscious of the existence of the spectators who were standing up (and of those who were seated also).

[Affinity between my notion of *reading* and the 'dasein' of the Existentialists: *πρῶτος καὶ ἔσχατος*¹.]

'... lest they should be converted.'

The imagination, on the one hand, goes to fill the voids, and, on the other hand, is chained to the present; sometimes oscillates between these two conditions. Where it is able to fill our needs unhindered, we feel at ease. In this way it fabricates faulty interpretations in the case of people condemned by public opinion, if one is not connected with them in some way. Most agreeable! It fabricates virtues for the strong, crimes for the afflicted. Or the other way

¹ The first and the last (Rev. i, 17; ii, 8; xxii, 13).

round if it is a question of rather distant forms of strength and affliction: compensation in either case. (Romantic affliction calls up the image of virtue, and real affliction that of crime or at any rate of minus-value.)

A malaise results when in its fabrication effort the imagination is chained down by reality. When the conflict is a violent one, there is a feeling of 'impossibility'. (Impossible that one should have to die before seeing tomorrow's sun . . .)

The beautiful: a stop on the part of the fabricating imagination.

A beloved being who disappoints. I have written to him. Impossible that he should not answer me using the words that I have said over to myself in his name.

Debtors. Men owe us what we imagine they will give us. We should remit them this debt.

To accept that they should be other than the creatures of our imagination is to imitate the renunciation of God; to accept simply that they should *be*.

[*Gîtâ*. Krishna gives to some his army, to others his personal self.]

Passion, renunciation of creation transposed on to the human scale.

I, too, am other than what I imagine myself to be. To know this is forgiveness.

To put up with the discordance between imagination and fact. Not to construct another imaginary system for oneself to fit in with a new fact.

'I am suffering.' That is preferable to: 'This landscape is ugly.'

[Sin in me says 'I'. Needs correcting. 'I' do not make it so that $7+8=15$; by a false addition 'I', in a sense, make it so that $7+8=16$. But so long as I remain in a state of error, I only say $7+8=16$.]

Sin in me says 'I', in relation to good. I make gifts, I produce a beautiful poem . . . But the evil in me I place outside myself and make of it an absolute. Not: I am angry, but: he is exasperating. *Γνωθι σεαυτόν*¹—No doubt it is a question of that.

Reading from an evil angle what one knows about a man's past because a certain fact (affront, or pressure of opinion) prejudices us against him.

When one is pushed, one doesn't say 'I'. In the moral sphere, one thinks, when one is in a train, that the trees are rushing by.

One says 'I' when one makes an effort. That is natural.

¹ Know thyself.

(It is necessary to learn the opposite kind of language. But when one has learnt it, 'I' is exterior.)

When I do not have the feeling of moving (of my own accord), I am being pushed. When I have that feeling, I am immobile. For it is the bringing to a stop which calls for an effort.

(It would be better to say: sin in me is I.)

I forget that *I* read: the text forces itself on my vision. I think that *I* act, when really it is not so at all. Same effort required—same acceptance of the void—in order to know that *I* read, and that *I* do not act.

Material work: I do solely what a machine would do in my stead. But therein lies the value of work; curse and ransom together. My intelligence and love turn themselves into matter—Eucharist—God, pure spirit on the one hand, pure matter on the other hand; non-acting under both aspects.

He is bad and I punish him. In reality: I see him as bad and he is punished.

Orestes—I do not kill thee; thine own past act killeth thee. If at the same time, while in the act of killing, he does not judge this past act, he remains pure.

Judge not, i.e. read not.

'Judge not, that ye be not judged.' The word judgment has not the same meaning on both occasions, since the second meaning is divine.

I give something to somebody and he is under an obligation to me: same inversion of the truth. (In reality, *something* passes from me to him, and *I* attribute to him an obligation.)

Miser and his treasure. The treasure plays the same rôle as the smile from Louis XIV. Minimum support indispensable for the imagination which fills up the void. To say that when he has been robbed he has not lost anything is like saying that a headache is 'nervous'. He *has* lost something, since he suffers.

Truth enunciated by Kierkegaard. 'One cannot live' in a world in which desire does not attain its object. We must desire in another way in order that desire may infallibly attain its object—and that is the only important problem. But in what way? He did not know. In the passage from one desire to another, there is a void. (And he did not want any void.)

We have to bring back the imagination into the self, place action outside the self. I read, and forthwith my action takes place.

(I must compel sin in me to say 'I'.)

We read, in what is in front of us, under our very eyes, a false translation of the impulsions which we receive from behind.

Samson and the ogre of folklore.

One must turn oneself into a correct balance by stopping and submitting, motionless, to the impulsion; 'take up one's cross'. One perceives it then, since one instinctively resists it. One ceases to read a false translation of it outside.

This is an effort without any particular end attached to it. It is thus an acceptance of the void. An acceptance of death.

For that one must hold on to God.

If one holds on to God, one suffers all impulsions like a pain.

Father 'I've carried out my 18th adult baptism . . .' Through *number* the miser's treasure insinuates itself into all things, including the most holy. This can, for example, blind one as to the quality of a baptism.

Efforts without any end attached to them alone are pure, but they are humanly impossible.

[The woman of Canaan. Importunity of prayer. Every man, having been created, is at God's table, if not as a child, at any rate as a dog, and has a right to God's bread, if he desires it sufficiently.

If we compare Christ's words: 'It is not meet to take the children's bread, and to cast it to dogs', the meaning is perhaps that we must give some crumbs to what is lowest in ourselves, since the lower part of our nature is also turned toward God?

The two meanings are complementary. If the child of God is not yet awake within me, at least there is the dog in me which can also ask for bread.]

If I like, the world can belong to me as the miser's treasure does to him. But it is a treasure which does not increase.

By stopping oneself, one becomes a just balance.

One desires it for oneself and for the world. To serve the world by being just.

We must renounce the energy which impulsions provide us with. Not only that, but we must expend energy directed against them. We then need an energy which comes from elsewhere.

(*N.B.* Kant leads to grace.)

Treasure. The miser is impelled by his past privations which appear before him in the shape of this gold whose quantity goes on increasing. (R.: self-aggrandizement.) If he loses it, in what state does he find himself? Lacking direction, lacking orientation. The

energy suddenly liberated in him causes him to smite his chest, tear his hair. Carthaginians: their city, to save which they had just sacrificed so much . . . Then came exhaustion and prostration.

Or rather: with an orientation, but without an object. It is this exchange which is a mystery.

[τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν ὄπλα δικαιοσύνης.¹]

Objects surely do not give any energy; they concentrate what there is always in us (even in moments of exhaustion) of non-directed, dispersed vital energy.

The miser; it is a form of madness: *ἔρως*.² Yet it is by *ἔρως* that we can be saved.

The voluptuary himself imposes a certain order upon everything, but one of which his own body forms the centre.

A lot of energy concentrated, all of a sudden liberated: violent disequilibrium.

Or if the object of the energy becomes an object of repulsion. Arjuna. (How does the sudden collapse occur? Energy turned against the body, in a more inward fashion than in the case of some one who smites his chest.)

Renunciation involves our passing through anguish equivalent to that which would be caused in reality by the loss of all loved beings and all possessions, including our faculties and attainments in the order of intelligence and character, our opinions, beliefs concerning what is good, what is stable, etc. And we must not lay all these things down of ourselves, but lose them—like Job. But the energy thus cut off from its object should not be wasted in oscillations, degraded. The anguish should therefore be still greater than in real affliction, and must not be broken up and spread over time or oriented towards some particular hope (Ovid).

Already simply to know, but to know with all one's soul, that those we love are mortal . . .

[Dasein—a truth in 'Existentialism', but they have mixed with it a temptation.]

To go down to the source of our desires. Kierkegaard vainly tried to do so. To go down to the source of our desires in order to tear the energy away from its object. It is there that desires are true, in so far as they are energy. It is the object which is false. But there is

¹ . . . Your members as instruments of righteousness (Rom. vi, 13).

² Desire.

an indescribable wrenching apart of the soul at the separation of a desire from its object. This wrenching apart is the condition of truth.

Simply to have already waited for nothing . . .

One has concentrated some energy, and all of a sudden it is released and oscillates.

If what one has been waiting for comes at last, sometimes one's joy is full. As though one received from the outside the energy that one has concentrated during the time of waiting.

Analysis of act of waiting.

Affliction. We are seized by the cold and the void until the imagination has taken on a new equilibrium and a smaller volume, and the soul is occupied with new and paltry satisfactions. Cup of tea. The more we are seized by the cold and the void, the more avid does the soul become for another form of equilibrium, at whatever cost.

[This cold, this void do not lay hold of us if there is a fairly strongly attached hope, nourished by the imagination. Marius.]

There ought to be different names for two different kinds of imagination. The kind which constitutes a genuine modification of the soul (miser's treasure, smile from Louis XIV), and the kind which is completely abstract (imagining one's own death whilst in absolute security). Imagining a danger in which one believes, and a danger in which one does not believe, are two very different operations.

The effective imagination of a revenge prevents one from feeling the icy touch of affliction.

. . . διὰ πίστεως, οὐ διὰ εἶδους.¹

. . . ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς γενώμεθα δικαιοσύνη.²

At this very moment, human beings are being led in spite of themselves, with every second that elapses, toward that which they cannot bear and yet will have to bear.

Priam. 'Is it indeed I who kiss the hand . . . ?' *To perceive that which we cannot imagine.* The miser cannot imagine the absence of his treasure, for it has been inscribed in his flesh by every privation

¹ . . . By faith, not by sight (2 Cor. v, 7).

² . . . He hath made [him] to be sin . . . that we might be made righteousness (2 Cor. v, 21).

suffered. At the moment when it is still part of his flesh, it is no longer before his eyes. Let him seek for it then in his flesh.

The will only controls a few movements of a few muscles, and these movements are associated with the representation of the change of position of nearby objects. I can will to place my hand flat on the table. If inner purity, or inspiration, or truthfulness of thought were necessarily associated with attitudes of this kind, they might form the object of will. As such is not the case, all we can do is to beg for them. To beg for them is to believe that we have a Father in heaven. Or should we cease to desire them? What could be worse than that? Inward supplication is the only reasonable way, for it avoids stiffening muscles which have nothing to do with the matter. What could be more stupid than to tighten up our muscles and set our jaws about virtue, or poetry, or the solution of a problem? Attention is something very different.

Pride is a stiffening of this kind. There is a lack of grace (in the double sense of the word) with the proud man. It is the result of an error.

Attention, taken to its highest degree, is the same thing as prayer. It presupposes faith and love.

Another form of freedom than that of choice is bound up with it, which is on the level of the will—namely, grace.

We should pay attention to such a point that we no longer have the choice. We then know our dharma.

Br. I could not prevent myself from imagining him living, imagining his house as a possible setting, for me, for those delightful conversations . . . And so the consciousness of the fact of his death made a frightful desert. A steely coldness. What did I care that there were other people to love? The love that I directed towards him, accompanied by outlines in my mind for exchanges of ideas which could only take place with him, was without an object. Now I no longer imagine him as alive, and his death has ceased to be intolerable for me. The memory of him is sweet to me. But there are others, whom I did not know then, whose deaths would affect me in the same way.

D. is not dead: but the same death has overtaken the friendship I bore him, and a like sorrow goes with it. He is no more than a shadow.

R., to a lesser extent, as a result of his going away.

But I cannot imagine the same transformation in the case of ***, *** and ***, who, nevertheless, so short a time ago did not exist in my consciousness.

Just as parents are unable to imagine that three years ago their child was non-existent, so we are unable to imagine a time when we did not know the beings we love.

I think I must love wrongly; otherwise things would not happen in this way to me. My love would not be attached to a few beings. It would be available for everything that deserves to be loved.

'Be ye perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect.' Love in the same way as the sun sheds its light. We must gather up our love in ourselves in order to spread it over all things. God alone loves all things, and he only loves himself.

To love in God is much more difficult than one thinks.

We sacrifice everything, if need be, to what we cannot bear to imagine the lack of. The egoist sacrifices everything, not to himself, but to the comforts of existence; it is not the same thing. Placing one's all in the possession of an apartment, or in the existence of a nation—is there such a lot of difference between the two? (The latter carries with it the prestige of force, for war enters in.)

The Hindu conception must remove a stimulant to charity, if one says to oneself: in the event of my not doing him this piece of good, either he does not deserve it, or else it will be done to him elsewhere. (The belief in Providence too, moreover.) Whereas, if one says to oneself: in the event of my not doing this, nobody else in the world . . .

Possibility. Notion which does not possess any meaning, for it carries the dimensions of space forward into time. Notion which we cannot, however, do without. It is the cause of all the paralogisms concerning liberty. It makes the difference between the future and the past.

We are obliged continually to employ in our discussions with ourselves an absurd and contradictory notion.

The highest form of stimulant is: if I do not do that, that will not exist. For a work of art, that is obvious. The work of art which I do not make, none other will ever make it. But I cannot choose between several different works of art. The same is true in the case of every great thing. And if such and such a person doesn't write such and such a poem, I shall never read that poem. The same applies to a good action.

I am only an intermediary, but an indispensable one.

And if I refuse to play this rôle? I then form part of the matter of the universe, through gravity.

Existence belongs to time, value to eternity. How should there not be a rending?

Possibility contains this contradiction.

Without possibility, there is no necessity, and no liberty.

We have not the right to resolve these contradictions.

Gravity. The agony of the Cross consisted in gravity. Prometheus. Atlas.

To believe that we are an instrument of God; but we must believe that we have got to make ourselves worthy of being so. Otherwise, if we are so at all times, the effort is unnecessary, and if it is unnecessary it does not take place.

Differences of value. *That* is what we are given. They presuppose an absolute. But the absolute destroys them.

God is the author of all; God is only the author of good: we cannot escape from this dilemma.

We read *possibility* which by its very nature it is impossible for us ever to verify.

. . . rooted and grounded in love, in order to be able to comprehend what is the length, and breadth, and height, and depth, and to know the love of Christ, which surpasses all knowledge, so as to be entirely filled with God.

Love and the three spatial dimensions.

To know that which is above knowledge, the love of Christ.

Τῷ δυναμένῳ ποιῆσαι ὑπερεκπερισσοῦ ὧν αἰτούμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν¹ . . . πνεῦμα², it is *energy* with the Stoics and the Christians.

He descended to the lowest depths of the earth—

To put on the new man. Change in the flesh, since previously 'there was another law at work in my members'.

To speak the truth *because* we are members one of another.

Ὁργίζεσθε καὶ μὴ ἁμαρτάνετε.³ To be angry, but not to sin, and that the sun should not go down upon our wrath.

Not to give pain to the Holy Spirit.

Τὰ δὲ πάντα ἐλεγχόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ φωτὸς φανεροῦνται.⁴

¹ . . . Unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think (Ephes. iii, 20).

² Spirit.

³ Be ye angry, and sin not (Ephes. iv, 26).

⁴ Ephes. v, 13.

All things that are convicted [of sin] shall be made manifest by the light.

Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ φανερούμενον φῶς ἐστίν.¹

For whatsoever is made manifest is light.

[Psychoanalysis, ersatz for yoga as practised in the xxth century.]

—and be not drunk with wine, *but* be filled with the Holy Spirit—

. . . ὃς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων (being in the form of God) οὐχ ἄρπαγμόν (robbery) ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ, ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ' ἑνώσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβὼν (he emptied himself taking upon him the form of a servant) ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος· καὶ σχήματι εὐρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν γενόμενος ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ (he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross) διὸ καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερέψωσεν . . . [ἴνα] . . . —Wherefore hath God highly exalted him.

—Πᾶν γόνυ κάμψῃ ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καὶ καταχθονίων, under the earth?²

Θεὸς ἐστίν ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ θέλει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν.³ It is God which worketh in you both to will and to do—God carries out in you both the will and the execution.

Christ *emptied* himself of his divine nature and took upon himself that of a slave. He humbled himself unto the cross—unto separation from God (My God, my God . . .). How ought we to imitate him?

Μὴ ἐμὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ νόμου, ἀλλὰ τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ.⁴

The Law is bad, because it is a question of a form of obedience which brings the will into play. It is a question of actions, and not of a state.

Διὼ κωδὲ εἰ καὶ καταλάβω, ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ κατελήμφθην ὑπὸ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ,⁵ I follow after, if that I may apprehend that for which I also am apprehended of Christ Jesus.

¹ Ephes. v, 13.

² Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him . . . [so that] every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth (Philipp. ii, 6-10).

³ Philipp. ii, 13.

⁴ . . . Not having *mine own* righteousness, which is of the Law, but that which is through the faith of Christ (Philipp. iii, 9).

⁵ Philipp. iii, 12.

. . . ὧν ὁ θεὸς ἡ κοιλία¹ (not themselves).

He shall change our vile body that it may be like unto his glorious body—

. . . τοῦ υἱοῦ τῆς ἀγάπης αὐτοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν, τὴν ἄφεσιν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν· ὃς ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως.²

The image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature—ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα.—³

τὰ πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἔκτισται. All things were created by him, and for him.⁴

Ἔστιν πρὸ πάντων καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν.

And he is before all things, and by him all things consist.⁵ Πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν⁶—the firstborn from the dead—ἀποκαταλλάξαι τὰ πάντα, εἰρηνοποιήσας διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ σταυροῦ αὐτοῦ δι' αὐτοῦ, εἴτε τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, εἴτε τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, to reconcile all things—make peace in earth and in heaven⁷—(end of hell?).

. . . ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ εὐαγγελίου οὗ ἠκούσατε, τοῦ κηρυχθέντος ἐν πάσῃ κτίσει τῇ ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανόν.⁸

. . . The hope of the gospel, which ye have heard, and which was preached in the whole of creation under heaven—(or to every creature).

[Christ is God in his relationship to creation, i.e. existence.

The Spirit is God in its relationship to good.]

Ἐν αὐτῷ (i.e. Χριστῷ) κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς:⁹ do not lie, since (μὴ ψεύδεσθε ἀπεκδυσάμενοι)¹⁰ you have put off the old man—(then, what need is there of the imperative?)

. . . ἐνδυσάμενοι τὸν νέον τὸν ἀνακαινούμενον εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν κατ'

¹ . . . Whose God is their belly (Philipp. iii, 19).

² . . . Of his dear Son, in whom we have redemption through his blood, even the remission of sins; who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature (Col. i, 13-15).

³ For by him were all things created (Col. i, 16).

⁴ Col. i, 16.

⁵ Col. i, 17.

⁶ Col. i, 18.

⁷ . . . Having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven (Col. i, 20).

⁸ Col. i, 23.

⁹ In him (that is to say, in Christ) dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead *bodily* (Col. ii, 9).

¹⁰ Lie not one to another, seeing that ye have put off the old man (Col. iii, 9).

εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν,¹ and have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him.

Ἐνδύσασθε σπλάγχνα οἰκτιρμοῦ.² bowels of mercy—

False signs and wonders will deceive those who have not received the love of truth.

Πέμπει αὐτοῖς ὁ θεὸς ἐνέργειαν πλάνης εἰς τὸ πιστεῦσαι αὐτοὺς τῷ ψεύδει, ἵνα κριθῶσιν πάντες οἱ μὴ πιστεύσαντες τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀλλὰ εὐδοκήσαντες τῇ ἀδικίᾳ.³

Those who have taken pleasure in unrighteousness will believe a lie; God shall send them strong delusion.

God deceives those who love unrighteousness—

St. Luke. Σοὶ δώσω τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην ἅπασαν καὶ τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν, ὅτι ἐμοὶ παραδέδοται καὶ ὃ ἐὰν θέλω δίδωμι αὐτήν.⁴

This power has been given to me, and I give it to whomsoever I will—

.

Suffering as punishment; this is only an image. Suffering is something different. Karma, original sin, the punishment of Prometheus, the offering of Christ; these are images.

Nothing compels us to admit that suffering is an evil.

But suffering inflicted on man by man—that is perhaps really an evil, and on either side. Why?

Zeus and Prometheus. Zeus takes upon himself the infliction of evil. The same applies, in a sense, to the Father and Christ. Why?

Imitate your Father who sends rain upon the just and upon the unjust—Yes, but he also sends them drought. Must he be imitated in that, too?

(But we already imitate him only too much in that, in any case, even though we should happen to be saints.)

When we lose something, we suffer for a finite length of time. We pass through a finite length of time, a finite amount of suffering (although at the time it seems to us infinite). An irreducible amount; no act of will can diminish it. After which, a bond is severed.

¹ Col. iii, 10.

² Put on, therefore, bowels of mercy (Col. iii, 12).

³ God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness (2 Thess. ii, 11-12).

⁴ All this power will I give thee and the glory of them (these kingdoms); for that is delivered unto me, and to whomsoever I will I give it (Luke iv, 6).

To attain detachment, mustn't we also have to pass through that amount of irreducible pain, equal, in the case of each thing, to what we should have to bear if we lost it?

In that case, to attain complete detachment, the soul must really suffer the equivalent of what Job experienced, or Christ on the cross (which was a veritable cross, with nails the reverse of symbolical).

Affliction is not enough; it must be an affliction without consolation. *Οὐαὶ αὐτοῖς, ὅτι τὴν παράκλησιν ἔχουσιν*¹. We mustn't have any consolation—any consolation which can be represented to the mind. (Ineffable consolation then descends.)

Remission of debts—It is accepting the past without asking, for the past, any compensation in the future. It is also the acceptance of death; arresting the course of time at the present instant.

The abstract intelligence can only conceive the causality of the present. (Continuity.) It is the only causality from the point of view of matter. But in the soul it is entirely otherwise. In this respect, too, the soul has got to make itself similar to matter.

Shiva, his third eye.

This break between past and future brings with it the ransom for faults.

The faults make it difficult; but so also do the punishments.

Opinions based on possibilities—'in the event of', 'in any case', etc., only reflect modes of inward tension.

Irreducible quantities—Like work in the case of simple machines. *Constants*.

If one suffered as much from knowing one's friends to be mortal as one would if they died . . .

[Reading.]

Impossible forms of economy. Ex. the machine in perpetual motion. There are also some in the moral sphere.

How is it that a letter (from some one we love) furnishes for the performance of any task the energy which we lacked an hour before receiving it? [Diderot.] How recuperate this energy without the letter?—The energy was attached to the state of expectancy.

The mystical wine. 'Even the sight of the seals on the bottle renders drunk.' (Sufi.)

We must really forge in ourselves other links. And yet we cannot

¹ Woe to them, for they have their consolation.

do so by ourselves—Training is not sufficient. (Mistake perhaps of Descartes.)

Retz. 'There is nobody who does not think he is doing honour to some wretch by being of service to him. There are very few honest folk able to withstand such a test, because this disposition, or rather indisposition, steals so imperceptibly into the minds of those whom it dominates that they do not feel it themselves; and it is of the nature of ingratitude. I have often pondered over each of these defects, and I have found that they have this in common, that the majority of those who have them do not even suspect themselves of having them. Those who suffer from the second one are not aware of the fact, because the selfsame weakness that encourages it in them encourages them also, as a preliminary step, to diminish in their own imagination the load of obligation they owe their benefactors.'

Defective way of reading.

How remedy this?

What is the true dimension of a benefit? The one we attribute to it at the moment when we desire it.

'... the sorrow one feels at the evil fortune in which one has a share continually takes on other objects.'

'Everything which seems hazardous and is not so is nearly always prudent.'

'Everything which is necessary is never hazardous.'

'Men are far more commonly inclined to repent themselves speculatively of a fault which has not had a successful outcome than to revert in practice from the impression which they never fail to receive of the motive that induced them to commit it.'

Not to repent oneself of a fault, but to abolish in oneself that which induced one to commit it. How?

The solutions we give to the problems that we have not posed are decisive in the conduct of life. We must pose them all. For that, we must empty ourselves.

'He emptied himself of his divinity.' To empty oneself of the world. To take upon oneself the character of a slave. To reduce oneself to the point one occupies in space and time. To become nothing.

To remit debts is to remain halted in the present; to acquire the feeling of eternity. Then, indeed, sins are remitted.

One must strip oneself of the imaginary sovereignty of the world, in order to reduce oneself to the point one occupies in space and time. Absolute solitude. Then one is in possession of the truth of the world.

If there were only God and matter?

God is crucified from the fact that finite beings, subjected to necessity, to space and to time, think.

To know that as a thinking, finite being I am God crucified.

(As in the case of my headaches), I can either sully the whole universe with my misery and not feel it, or gather it up into myself.

To be like God, but God crucified.

Like God almighty in so far as he has bound himself by necessity.

[Science and wisdom—Taoists—The Tao acts without effort. Newtonian gravitation, on the contrary, contains forces; a very inferior image.]

Retz. When we have put ourselves to some trouble on the supposition of a certain evil, and this supposition is shown to be false, mingled with our joy there goes the regret for the useless trouble taken, and we do not want straightaway to believe that it is false.

(Void)

Need of a reward; what is the basis for this? All effort creates a need. Suffering also, as implying an effort.

Transferring one's fatigue on to an object so as not to feel it.

The adoration of the common people for the great; same principle.

An effort has got to be oriented.

One imprints a directed movement upon oneself.

That is why death does violence to nature.

To remain standing and absolutely motionless for an hour, by order—that is a torture for the same reason.

Obedience, non-oriented effort.

(Newtonian attraction is doubly bad in the sense that it places orientation in necessity, and effort in divine action.)

Physical suffering takes away from time its orientation.

Suffering, indispensable in order to pass from time to eternity.

Mechanics came into being when the product weight-height was recognized as an irreducible constant. So did chemistry, etc.

Is there not an irreducible constant in the modifications of the soul—which, once recognized, would serve as a criterion so as

to do away with the illusions standing in the way of spiritual progress?

E.g. the suffering which corresponds to a severance of one of the bonds attaching the soul to this world is perhaps irreducible—so that, if one has not exhausted it, this bond subsists in a dissimulated or disguised form.

The story of Job, that of Christ, do they not signify this?

Also irreducible durations. At the moment when duty commands that we should act as though we were detached from such and such an object, we cannot do so if we are not effectively detached therefrom; we cannot sever the bond at the moment duty presents itself; severing the bond takes time. In actual fact, we do not sever it; we gnaw through it little by little. It is only if it is almost entirely gnawed through that we follow the path of duty at the cost of doing ourselves a violence. Otherwise we pull and pull, and simply hurt ourselves, and even tighten the cord around our limbs.

Law and grace.

This task of gnawing through the bond can only be carried out during those periods when we are not pulling.

Man is bound by a great many cords. Desirable objects present themselves to him, but he is only able to move towards them in so far as the cords permit him to do so.

The pain caused by pulling vainly on the cords results in the fact that these desirable objects can appear hateful to him.

We should not pull on the cords (on those which are intact). We should gnaw through them.

Each sin notifies us which of the cords are intact.

All the movements which man is able to make in the space allowed him by the cords are of no value from the point of view of progress. The cords must be gnawed through with the teeth.

*Statera facta corporis.*¹

It is the crucified body which is a true balance, the body reduced to its point in time and space.

It is through obedience that judicial power is earned.

'My judgment is just, because I do not mine own will, but the will of him that sent me.'

What enables me to recognize the difference between his will and my own?

The vision of *necessity*.

¹ . . . Become a balance for the body (hymn *Vexilla regis*).

To write like a translator, and to act in the same way.

Since Arjuna had decided upon war, it was only the feeling of pity which kept him from it. He was not worthy not to make war.

One is always reading in the world some action to be accomplished (immobility being an exceptional state). The question is to arrive at a true reading.

St. John of the Cross: the virtues acquired during spiritual aridity take root in the soul—Where one virtue is present, they are all present; and where one is lacking, they are all lacking—The soul in a state of spiritual marriage thinks ever upon God, even when it is not itself aware of the fact—*Exponential increase in all forms of grace.*

There is a period when the soul is already detached from the world without being yet able to attach itself to God: void, terrible anguish. (Dark night.)

The soul which loves God in solitude is loved by him in solitude, that is to say, without any intermediary.

‘Lucgo que el alma desembaraza estas potencias, y las vacía de todo lo inferior y de la propiedad de lo superior, dejándolas a solas sin ello, inmediatamente se las emplea Dios en lo invisible y divino.’¹

—[p. 805. Suffering]

‘El padecer le es medio para entrar más adentro en la espesura de la deleitable sabiduría de Dios; porque el más puro padecer trae más íntimo y puro entender, y por consiguiente más puro y subido goza, porque es de más adentro saber. Por tanto, no se contentando con cualquier manera de padecer, dice: Entremos más adentro en la espesura. Es a saber: hasta los aprietos de la muerte, por ver a Dios.’²

‘El alma que de veras desca sabiduría divina, desea primero el padecer para entrar en ella, en la espesura de la cruz.’³

¹ When the soul purifies these powers and empties them of all that is inferior, and of the characteristics of the superior, leaving them alone without itself, immediately, God employs them in the visible and the divine (*The Dark Night of the Soul*, xxiv).

² Suffering is most sweet and most profitable to it, in as much as it is the way by which it enters more and more into the thicket of the delicious wisdom of God. The most pure suffering leads to the most pure and the deepest knowledge, and consequently to the purest and highest joy, for that is the issue of the deepest knowledge. Thus the soul, not satisfied with ordinary suffering, says, ‘Let us enter into the heart of the thicket’, even the anguish of death, that I may see God (*Cant.* xxxvi, Tr. Lewis).

³ And how that the soul which really longs for the divine wisdom longs first of all for the sufferings of the Cross, that it may enter in (*Cant.* xxxvi, 13, Tr. Lewis).

Not to love one more than another, because he who is worthy of more love is the one whom God loves more, and we do not know which God loves more.

Suffering and enjoyment as sources of wisdom. The serpent offered Adam and Eve knowledge. The sirens offered Ulysses knowledge. These stories teach us that the soul becomes lost by seeking for knowledge in pleasure. Why?—Pleasure can be innocent provided we do not seek for knowledge in it. But it is right for us to seek for knowledge in suffering.

Allegory of the man bound fast; it must be added that he is not bound fast to stakes, but to things animated by divers movements, so that he is continually being pulled along according to the resistance set up.

He can only stop himself momentarily, at the cost of a big effort—or else when he has severed all his bonds without exception.

All suffering which does not detach us is wasted suffering. Thus, all non-accepted suffering. Lost suffering—nothing more appalling; produces a desolate coldness, a warped soul. Ovid. Slaves in Plautus.

If we behold ourselves at a particular instant—the present instant, severed from the past and the future—we are innocent. We cannot be at this instant anything other than what we are; all progress implies a duration. It forms part of the order of the world, at this instant, that we should be such as we are.

To isolate in this way an instant implies forgiveness. But such isolation is detachment.

All problems come back to the question of *time*.

Extreme suffering, time non-oriented; path to hell or to paradise. Perpetuity or eternity.

Affliction forces us to recognize as real that which we do not believe to be possible.

Enjoy through detachment. In the case of the good things, pure joy is the criterion of detachment.

‘Ye shall be as gods.’ The sin consists in desiring to be as gods *otherwise* than through participation in God’s divinity. We are born with this sin. It is Lucifer’s.

To want to be divine *as* creatures.

Need for a mediator in order that the adoration of God should be an imitation, and that this imitation should be pure.

He emptied himself of his divinity. We should empty ourselves of the false divinity with which we were born.

Prevent them from eating of the Tree of Life. Prevent ourselves from being false gods. Death warns us that we are not gods. That is why it is so painful to us, so long as we have not completely understood the fact. (And even Christ . . .)

Killing is evil (and intoxicating) because we feel ourselves to be delivered from the death that we inflict. The case of Achilles is the reverse. But for him, too, killing was evil because it was a suicide. Killing to revenge himself for being mortal; spreading his own personal affliction around him. My impulse, in the throes of my headaches, to hit somebody on the head.

(‘Instinctive movements’; we only recognize them if we do not obey them, if we put up with them as external phenomena.)

These are the two aspects of the sin of murder.

The institution of slavery hides from men (both masters and slaves) this truth, that man as such is a slave.

The best institutions are those which lie the least.

Money is a lie; too general a sign.

Necessity in the things of the soul. Those who look for it are generally materialists, atheists (in the true sense of the word); which falsifies everything. What is necessity without labour? Necessity must be regarded as being that which imposes conditions.

Whosoever humbleth himself shall be exalted. We must therefore humble ourselves to the ground. But what is to humble oneself? A monk who sleeps on a bare board doesn’t humble himself. Anything can form the subject of competition. To go down in the scale of force without being compelled to do so is to prove to oneself that one knows one can be compelled to do so; it is to cross the gulf separating one from those belonging to the degree lower down.

To consent to being anonymous, to being human material (Eucharist); to renounce prestige, public esteem—that is to bear witness to the truth, namely, that one is composed of human material, that one has no rights. It is to cast aside all ornament, to put up with one’s nakedness. But how is this compatible with social life and its labels?

It is, as always, a question of relationship to time. We have to

discard the illusion of being in possession of time; to become incarnate.

Man has got to make an act of self-incarnation, for he is incarnated through the imagination. What comes to us from Satan is the imagination.

(It is a finer thing to accept humiliations than to seek them. If we do seek them, we ought, when submitting to them, to forget they have been sought. Otherwise, it is preferable not to seek them at all.)

To humble oneself is supernatural, moral gravity is opposed to it; unless there be compensation.

In order to change something (abolish an evil) in the moral sphere, in oneself or in society, there must be an action corresponding to the result to be obtained. Otherwise the evil persists under a different, but equivalent, form. How can we define such a correspondence?

The lever, in the soul, is the attention or prayer. But what is it in society?

What is the relationship between the supernatural and society?

One can perhaps say that the lever, in society, is religion (any good religion). But in what sense?

The lever in society is the beautiful, ceremonies, etc.; consequently religion.

The force devoted toward achieving a certain result must be of the same kind as that result. Forms of energy. Entropy. Must look very closely into this.

To try to discover: how a seed germinates? what energetic processes operate?

To love whilst remaining detached. To endure the thought that those we love, on whom we think lovingly, are mortal, are perhaps dead at the very moment we are thinking of them—this is an anguish. We must not seek consolation for this anguish, but endure it. The greater our love the greater our ability to endure this thought. We should never think of a human being, unless he is by our side, without thinking that he is perhaps dead.

‘Take thou delight through detachment.’

More generally, never to think of a thing which we cannot actually see without thinking that perhaps it has been destroyed.

Let such a thought not dissipate the sense of reality, but render it more intense.

Every time we say 'γενηθήτω τὸ θέλημά σου',¹ we should call to mind the sum total of possible afflictions.

[Christ was not moved on hearing that Lazarus was sick, nor when he was told that he had died. But when he saw Mary and those accompanying her in tears: 'ἐνεβριμήσατο τῷ πνεύματι καὶ ἐτάραξεν ἑαυτὸν'² . . . 'ἔδάκρυσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς.'³ 'Ἰησοῦς οὖν πάλιν ἐμβριμώμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ μνημεῖον.'⁴

Reading. Irreducible participation of the sensibility.]

['She loved much' is not the *reason* for which much has been forgiven her, but the *sign*. 'Wherefore I say unto thee: Her sins, which are many, are forgiven (perfect expression); for she loved much' (faulty interpretation in the Vulgate). 'It is because she loved much that I am able to affirm that her many sins are forgiven.' When sins are blotted out, love takes their place. 'Ἡ πίστις σου σέσωκέν σε.'⁵ Always faith; always in the same sense. Recognition of unmanifest truth. It is faith which has blotted out the sins, and love is a result. In him who is *naturally* good there is less room for grace.]

When thinking of some one we love as being perhaps dead, we direct towards him the love we bear for the memory of a dead person, but not any energy. One avoids imaginary conversations.

'In the desert of the East . . .' We have to be in a desert. For he whom we must love is absent.

Πίστις⁶—discernment of the divine in us (divine inspirations) and around us. We need a pure heart for such discernment, and, in the first place, to thrust aside all that is manifested (St. John of the Cross)—In addition, πίστις is a virtue, a power (removing mountains). Régime of attention?

Those whom we love and who love us lend an objective existence, by discerning them, to certain values in ourselves. Different ones for each friend. We are like a compound of these values. When a friend dies it is a veritable amputation. And by changing our environment (social condition) we truly change our being.

¹ Thy will be done (Matt. vi, 10).

² He groaned in the spirit and was troubled (John xi, 33).

³ Jesus wept (John xi, 35).

⁴ Jesus therefore again groaning in himself cometh to the grave (John xi, 38).

⁵ Thy faith hath saved thee (Luke vii, 50).

⁶ Faith.

Through them we are something. But we have got to be nothing.

The same words (e.g. a man says to a woman: 'I love you') can be commonplace or extraordinary, according to the manner in which they are spoken. And this manner depends on the depth of the region in a man's being whence they proceed, without the will being able to do anything. And by a marvellous accord they strike the same region in the person who hears them. In this way the hearer can discern, if he (or she) has any power of discernment—and only on that condition—what is the value of the words. This relationship is also the one between art and taste. And the one between the two forms of faith, that by which we act and that by which we believe. The latter is a power of discernment analogous to taste. (At any rate was . . .)

To be a touchstone. 'If my soul were of gold.'

To read God in every manifestation, without exception, but according to the true manifestation relationship proper to each appearance. To know in what way each appearance is not God.

Faith, a gift of reading.

The gift of reading is supernatural, and without this gift there is no justice.

Understanding of that supreme reality consisting in this absence of an object which is the object of love, and reading of that reality in objects taken together as a whole and in each object separately. Condition of obedience, which is justice.

Faith is related to reading, and love to gravity.

We cannot stop ourselves from loving. But we can choose what it is we love.

We ought to love what is absolutely worthy of love, not what is worthy of it in certain respects, unworthy of it in others. (Plato.)

Nothing which exists is absolutely worthy of love.

We must therefore love that which does not exist.

But this object of love which does not exist is not devoid of reality, is not a fiction. For our fictions cannot be more worthy of love than we are ourselves, who are not.

Faith. To believe that nothing of what we are able to grasp is God. Negative faith. But also, to believe that what we are unable to grasp is more real than what we are able to grasp; that our power to grasp is not the criterion of reality, but on the contrary is deceptive. To believe, finally, that what lies beyond our grasp appears nevertheless—hidden.

Grace is as great a mystery as incarnation. Eternity which descends to insert itself into time. Incarnation represents the maximum of such insertion. Relations between man and God, between time and eternity, between the relative and the absolute, are in any case unintelligible. There is no degree of unintelligibility; everything on this subject is as unintelligible as the Eucharist.

Renunciation is submission to time.

Suffering causes time and space to enter into the body. What Satan offered was imaginary. Riches and power are imaginary. Imaginary suits of armour. Nakedness, the truth of the link between soul and body. The mortal soul is subject to necessity. To think the mortal part of the soul is freed from necessity is a mistake.

Incarnation. Descending movement as the condition of an ascending movement. Analogy with thermodynamics.

Incarnation. God is weak because he is impartial. Non-active action. He sends sunshine and rain to the good and the wicked alike. There is a correspondence between this indifference of the Father and the weakness of Christ. Absence of God. The kingdom of heaven is like a grain of mustard seed . . . God does not change anything. Christ was killed out of rage because he was only God.

In the soul, too, descending movement as condition precedent to an ascending movement. Humble yourselves and you shall be exalted. To cast aside that resemblance to God which makes us kings and masters of the world in thought, cast aside the imagination. To become like Lycaon when Achilles draws his sword.

Christ and the temptation of the kingdoms of this world. Opposite choice to that of Adam.

This renunciation is the source of energy; there cannot be any other. We have to cut away the bonds of energy; to choose between God and Mammon.

To humble oneself is to ascend from the point of view of moral gravity. Moral gravity makes us fall toward the heights.

To love the impartiality of God (the golden scales) is to abstain from a complicity with destiny, to limit oneself to what one is in space and time. By limiting oneself in this way, one discovers the Ātman.

The imagination is given to us so as to make it descend.

The imagination is the supplementary form of energy. In so far as it clings to a part of the world, it lies (false readings). It must be cut off from all objects in order that it may be caught up by the

infinite. To cut it off from all objects is to make it descend to the point in space and time which we occupy. Pure joy and pure suffering serve towards this end.

[? God not incarnate is not really God; he has been incarnate and sacrificed from the beginning; 'the Lamb slain from the beginning of the world'.]

This supplementary energy, on the one hand lies, on the other hand becomes degraded.

Joy is the fulness of the sentiment of the real.

But to suffer while preserving the sentiment of the real is better. To suffer without plunging into a nightmare. Let the suffering be, in a sense, purely exterior; in a sense, purely interior. Let it be in the sensibility only; exterior, in so far as it is outside the non-sensible parts of the soul; interior, in so far as it is outside the universe. (I am very far from that.) Suffering is time and space sinking into the sensibility.

There are three kinds of suffering. Needless suffering (degrading). Expiatory suffering. Redemptive suffering (this latter is the privilege of the innocent). We observe that God inflicts all three of them. (Why?) It is only given to man to inflict the second kind. (Why?)

In a sense, God is the whole world and very much more besides (this All is in me, I am not in this All). In another sense, he is only a part of the world, the beautiful and good part (I am the brightness in fire, the legitimate desire in man . . .).

Price of innocent suffering. 'A child white as snow and red as blood.' Hippolytus—Prometheus.

To try to analyse the rôle of suffering (particularly physical suffering) in the *mechanism* of grace.

The strong passions (c.g. love), a concentration of energy. One single link; if one severs it . . .

An attachment which contains an impossibility is a μεταξύ.

From human wretchedness to God. But not as a compensation or consolation: as a correlation.

The source of man's moral energy lies outside him, as does that of his physical energy (food, respiration). He generally finds it, and that is why he has the illusion—as on the physical plane—that his being carries the principle of preservation within itself. Privation alone makes him feel his need. And, in the event of privation, he cannot help turning to *anything whatever* which is edible.

There is only one remedy for that: a chlorophyll conferring the faculty of feeding on light.

Not to judge. All faults are worth the same. There is only one fault: incapacity to feed upon light; for in the absence of this capacity, all faults are possible and none is avoidable.

‘My meat is to do the will of Him that sent me.’

There is no good apart from this capacity.

In affliction, the vital instinct survives the attachments that have been torn away and fastens itself blindly to everything that can provide it with support, like a plant fastens its tendrils. Gratitude (except, in certain cases, in a degraded form) and justice are inconceivable in this state. Slavery. There is no longer the extra amount of energy which serves to support free-will, by the aid of which man detaches himself. Affliction, under this aspect, is hideous, as life in its nakedness always is; like an amputated limb, or the swarming of insects. Life without form. Survival is then the one and only attachment. That is where extreme affliction begins—when all other attachments are replaced by that of survival. Attachment appears then in its nakedness, without any other object than itself. Hell.

When a human being has passed through this, and has spent a certain length of time in so doing, what can he possibly become, if, later on, a relative prosperity is restored to him? How can he be cured of this past?

It is by this mechanism that ‘to those in affliction nothing seems more desirable than life, just when their life is in no way preferable to death’.

In this situation, to accept death represents total detachment.

Whoever has fully accepted death can never reach this state of affliction, whatever may be his situation. But there are many forms of accepting death which do not constitute a full acceptance of it.

When God is present to the sensibility, this is still a form of attachment; that is why it is necessary to pass through ‘My God, why hast thou forsaken me?’ Extreme affliction removes God from the sensibility, as it does all other objects of attachment. Life alone remains present to the sensibility. If we can then accept death, it is the fulness of acceptance of death; it is the fulness of detachment.

Πάτερ ἡμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς τοῦτο δὸς ἐμοί.¹

¹ Our Father, which art in heaven, give me this.

The position of indifference is the one which is outside any point of view.

Affliction which obliges one to fix one's attachment upon paltry objects lays bare the paltry character of the attachment. Hence the need for detachment becomes clearer. But if one remains attached, one is degraded.

Prometheus, the god crucified for having loved mankind too much. Hippolytus, the man punished for having been too pure and too much beloved of the gods. It is the drawing closer of the divine and the human which calls down punishment.

Hippolytus—theme of the man who is not what he appears, prevented, by oath, from making himself known. Frequent theme in folklore.

If God is something which, on the one hand, includes the whole universe and very much more besides, and, on the other hand, manifests itself in a part of the universe (I am the brightness in fire, etc.)—love also is double. On the one hand, to love everything without distinction; on the other hand, to love only good. Mystery.

There are certain cases where a thing is necessary from the mere fact that it is possible. Thus eating when one is hungry. One can put off the moment through asceticism, penitence, etc. But, apart from some particular case forcing one toward death, every man who is hungry and has some food in front of him will finish up by eating, whether he be a criminal and without intelligence or wise and saintly. So also if one sees a wounded man dying of thirst, and there is water close at hand, the mere fact that giving him to drink is an easy matter makes it a necessary one. Neither a scoundrel would abstain from doing so, nor a saint.

By analogy, to discern the cases where, although things do not appear in this clear fashion at first sight, the possibility implies a necessity. To act in these cases and not in the others.

Hippolytus. The God who sees the man who has too faithfully served him suffering and dying, and is unable to save him.

Man superior to the gods through suffering: Greek sentiment. (We are not very far here from a sort of jealousy of God.)

Causality in the purely spiritual sphere; is alone directly related to God. Although there is also a sort of mechanism of spirituality; but only perhaps as a result of the conditions entailed by the association between the human spirit and the body. [No, probably not *only* . . .]

If an inspiration on the part of grace is for a human being exterior, as it does not come from other men, from the air, the sun, etc., it comes from God.

Διγόνου Βάκχου¹
(Hip., 560)

Such is the meaning of the term: the Kingdom of God. (Whence is it derived?)

It is the only sphere in which God is an immediate cause.

But the association between the human spirit and the body makes it so that there are necessarily physical effects of grace.

Hecuba, v. 345 : πέφευγας τὸν ἐμὸν ἰκέσιον Δία.²

[348 : κακὴ φανοῦμαι καὶ φιλόψυχος γυνή.]³

[356 : ἴση θεοῖσι πλὴν τὸ κατθανεῖν μόνον· νῦν δ' εἰμὶ δούλη.]⁴

[362 : προσθεῖς δ' ἀνάγκην σιτοποιὸν ἐν δόμοις, | σαίρειν τε δῶμα κερκίσιν τ' ἐφεστάναι | λυπρὰν ἄγουσαν ἡμέραν μ' ἀναγκάσει· | λέχη δὲ τὰμὰ δοῦλος ὠνητός ποθεν | χρανεῖ, τυράννων πρόσθεν ἤξιωμένα.]⁵

[375 : Ὅστις γὰρ οὐκ εἶωθε γεύεσθαι κακῶν | φέρει μὲν, ἀλγεῖ δ' αὐχέν' ἐντιθεῖς ζυγῶ.]⁶

Troy—The original offence of the Greeks.

Folklore. The man who is taken to be a slave and who is really a prince. It is Man . . . A desire (to drink, to bathe) has made him fall under the power of his slave, to whom he has handed over the magic object. Original sin. But it is a question of Necessity, not of a punishment.

Possibly a contamination of two themes? (One of which is the incarnation?)

¹ Bacchus twice-born (Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 560).

² 345 You are safe
I'll not evoke the suppliant's god, but go,
Willingly

³ 348 It would move a base ignoble love of life

⁴ 356 Almost a goddess, save that I was a mortal,
And now I am a slave . . .

⁶ 362 And bake his bread and sweep his palace floor,
Then, after days of menial drudgery,
Compelled to share my bed, the royal bed
Which should have honoured Kings, with some bought slave?

⁶ 375-6 We who are strangers to the taste of grief
May bow beneath the yoke, and yet it galls

Euripides, *Hecuba*, Tr. J. T. Sheppard.

M. Pouget. 'The science of religions has not yet begun.' Assuredly. It is the science of the supernatural in its various manifestations through the various human societies.

Christians and non-Christians are alike incapable of understanding this.

(That there were supernatural manifestations before Christ is admitted. Why not then among all peoples? Which would imply in all religions, for they are all prior to Christ, except for the Mohammedan religion, which is strongly contaminated by Christianity.)

The children 'white as snow and red as blood', in Grimm's Fairy Tales, the fruits of desire on the part of their mother, always fall later on under the power of a stepmother.

(Aristotle's rule about the sufferings of the innocent is absolutely false.)

Study of folklore to be undertaken in quite a new way.
(Must absolutely get hold of some folklore.)

One can study the supernatural, either as such, or else as a phenomenon. The second manner of studying is necessary, if only so as to be able to discriminate (e.g. the social sentiment in Durkheim, if it is not the religious sentiment, is well and truly an ersatz of it). To be able to study it as such, one must first of all be capable of discerning it. Faith is therefore necessary, in the true sense of the word.

POSTULATE.

In the sphere of the intelligence, the supernatural is that which is dark and a source of light. Since the greater cannot come out of the less in the order of value (*postulate requiring to be examined*), this darkness is more luminous than what, for our intelligence, is luminous. We are continually moving from a lesser to a greater amount of light; when we jump, passing through some darkness, something has pulled us. Descending light.

To ask oneself first of all: Is the notion of the supernatural indispensable? And next: Where and in what circumstances is it indispensable to resort to it?

If it is indispensable, it is so in order to ponder the human condition (and not simply the history of the Jewish people in the first place, and then that of Europe).

The Word is the light which comes with every man.

Λόγος¹. The relationship. Λόγος and ἀγάπη.²

¹ Word.

² Love.

Need to restore spiritual liberty. The Church wrongly separated liberty and spirituality: the Renaissance, in its need for liberty, abandoned spirituality. It was impregnated by Greece, with the exception of Greek spirituality.

Princes mistaken for slaves. Separation between being and appearance. They receive back their rank from outside.

Theme of slandered innocence pledged not to defend itself. The swans.

Necessary bond between the supernatural and suffering. How should man, made of flesh, not suffer when he is united to the divine nature? God suffers in him for being finite. Suffering implied by creation. Suffering without consolation, for consolations are manufactured by the imagination, of which we have to have emptied ourselves so as to make room for God. The imagination is the false divinity. (The tree of life of Genesis? . . .)

Certain acts (e.g. killing, save perhaps in exceptional cases) are in their essence imaginary, even though they be carried out effectively. It is these which are forbidden.

By making room in the spirit for God, we abandon the flesh to necessity.

Obedience, supreme virtue of the creature.

God is and does not appear. The devil appears and is not. 'It is I who bestow all these kingdoms.'

Suffering is defined by efforts in the void. If one has a headache, one continually makes an effort to get rid of it, without any result. The acceptance of suffering is thus the acceptance of the void.

To renounce the fruits is to have a life entirely composed of efforts in the void.

To apply to the supernatural (whether in the soul, or in history) the notion of *conditions of existence*. Conditions of existence of the Christian religion in the year . . . ; this problem presents itself in the same manner both for believers and non-believers. All the problems that present themselves for non-believers should present themselves for Christians also—and others besides.

All the arguments with regard to these matters are full of sophistries. One cannot prove the existence of Providence (as do believers) at the same time by the arrangement of effects in view of a cause and by the producing of effects without a cause.

A logical system needs to be thought out.

Creation as the production of an appearance which we have got to undo (or is it sin? but can the two be separated?). The appearance that there is something other than God.

Relationship as *μεταξύ*. The Son is *λόγος*,¹ and not *νοῦς*,² because he is a mediator.

Lack of faith, as shown in the totalitarian orthodoxy of the Church. Whosoever asks bread of God will not receive a stone. He who desires truth, if an error appears to him, it is because it represents for him a stage along the road to truth, and if he continues his way he will see it as an error. He who does not desire truth deceives himself, but he also deceives himself when reciting the creed. The condemnation of errors was in itself good; but not 'anathema sit'. How do we know that such and such an error is not necessary for such and such a spirit at a stage in development? It was sufficient to say: Whosoever declares that . . . has not reached the goal. If it was a question of protecting simple folk, was it not possible to do this by prayer?

If I ask for truth, every thought which appears to me as true comes from God, even if be an error, and I have not the right to reject it through submission to an authority even freely accepted.

Each religion is alone true, that is to say, that at the moment we are thinking on it we must bring as much attention to bear on it as if there were nothing else; in the same way, each landscape, each picture, each poem, etc. is alone beautiful. A 'synthesis' of religions implies a lower quality of attention.

The supernatural in acts. An act is not supernatural in itself, but in so far as it is a consequence—and an expression—of a supernatural state.

The Roman Empire had destroyed the religions in the *οἰκουμένη*³ (except the Jewish) at the moment when Christianity appeared. The Jews alone resisted the State religion. But they were destroyed

¹ Word and relationship.

² Understanding, intelligence.

³ 'The inhabited earth', that is to say, the part of the world included within the Roman Empire.

in A.D. 70. Christianity inherited from all these religions. It only took root in the Roman world (and not even in the whole of the Roman world, because of the Mohammedan religion). [And yet Russia, Armenia, Ethiopia . . .]

The creature is nothing and believes itself to be everything. It has to believe itself to be nothing in order to be everything. Balance between appearance and being; when one goes up, the other comes down. To appear as nothing, imitation of God, non-active action; effect of love.

An imaginary divinity has been bestowed upon man in order that he should strip himself of it, as Christ did of his real divinity.

Proofs of the Incarnation. History cannot furnish any, for any other explanation of history would be less of a shock to our reason. One only: the internal evidence (*sic*) contained in the text lying in front of us. It is this which establishes the historical value of the testimony, and not the other way about.

There exists a 'theofugal' force, otherwise all would be God.

The *Iliad*; 'misery of the man without God'—Vain sufferings, for they are not the sufferings of innocents. (Except, perhaps, Patroclus? But it is barely indicated.)

Cry of suffering. *Why?* Resounds throughout the whole of the *Iliad*. *Spanish Testament*. Christ also.

To explain suffering is to console it; therefore it must not be explained.

Whence the eminent value of the suffering of the innocent.

It resembles the acceptance of evil in the creation by God, who is innocent.

Everyone that taketh up the sword shall perish by the sword. And everyone that taketh not up the sword (or lets it drop) shall perish on the Cross.

To be innocent is to bear the weight of the entire universe. It is to throw away the counterweight.

By emptying ourselves, we expose ourselves to the full pressure of the surrounding universe.

The suffering of a being who is not innocent is a punishment, provided it is felt and conceived as such. Otherwise, it is suffering of an infernal kind. The suffering of a pure being is redemptive.

Hippolytus. Superiority of man over God through suffering. It was necessary that man should be God for this superiority not to be scandalous.

By the side of the Hindu religious trinity (creator, destroyer, preserver) there is a metaphysical trinity (God manifested, God unmanifested, union of the two). The Word, does it correspond to God manifested? 'None hath seen the Father,' 'Who seeth me, hath seen the Father.'

God and the supernatural are hidden and formless in the universe. It is good that they should be hidden and nameless in the soul. Otherwise we run the risk, under a name, of having something imaginary. (Those who fed, clothed, etc. Christ did not know that it was the Christ. Meaning of the ancient mysteries. Christianity (Catholics and Protestants alike) talks too much about holy things.

In the case of every act, to consider it from the point of view not of the object, but of the impulse. Not: to what end? But: whence does it originate?

God has only been able to create by hiding himself. Otherwise there would only be he. A distinction between souls and God in paradise is inconceivable (except by assimilating paradise to the Hindu 'world of the just', which in some respects would be false).

Saintliness has therefore also to be hidden, even from the consciousness to a certain extent. (To a certain extent only, for Christ . . . But at the end . . .) And it has to be so hidden in the world.

Appearance clings to being and only suffering can tear them apart.

It is not joy and suffering which are in opposition to each other, but the types they respectively produce. There are infernal types of joy and suffering; healing types of joy and suffering, and celestial types of joy and suffering.

Whoever possesses being cannot possess appearance, and force is on the level of appearance. Appearance fetters being.

Time in its course tears appearance from being and being from appearance by violence. Milarepa's¹ broken pot. Time shows that it is not eternity.

What example is there of a second tragedy concerning the punishment of an innocent person? Immobile tragedy. Suffering is at the same time absolutely exterior and absolutely essential to innocence. Each because of the other.

Punishment. It is the evil which 'I' of such and such a date do to 'I' of such and such a later date. Thus, if I have so much bread to last Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, and I eat it all up on Monday, the 'I' of Monday makes the 'I' of Tuesday and Wednesday go hungry. But if on Tuesday what has urged me towards evil is still inside me, it is 'I' who do evil to 'I' at one and the same time.

¹ A twelfth-century Tibetan monk.

I can be unaware of it. If the root of the fault has disappeared (*μετανοεῖν*, to change heart), the evil that I suffer on Tuesday is exterior; it is innocent suffering. When I suffer the evil inflicted by me without knowing it, it is infernal suffering. When I set about knowing that it is inflicted by me, it is expiatory suffering. When I have changed, it is innocent suffering.

A culprit often suffers from the evil inflicted by others and not by 'himself in the past'; but the source of the evil, if not identical, is analogous to the source of the evil which is in himself. Recognition of this identity or analogy means the recognition of the evil in oneself as evil by parts of one's being which could not otherwise do so.

The thought of human misery, under its double aspect of sin and suffering, is precisely this recognition.

Pity for the self does not belong to extreme affliction. Below a certain level of affliction pity changes into horror of oneself as of others. That is why Napoleon used to say that real afflictions cannot be told; and the ancients, that great sufferings remain dumb. The epic or tragic poet cannot be unaware of that fact.

Renunciation is indivisible. Whoever renounces one single thing, truly and without compensation, renounces everything, and effectively loses everything. He will only have, in exchange, the kingdom of heaven. In order to keep something one must cling on to it. (Even clinging on so, one loses too, but accidentally.)

God's justice is, perhaps, strict (but hidden) in the spiritual sphere. There, good always receives its exact reward, evil its exact punishment. (Karma?)

If one asks for bread, one does not receive a stone. The Cartesian principle of clear and distinct thought is an aspect of this.

Order (lecture of Berger's). Notion composed of several superposed levels. The conditions of existence of a thing, taken as a whole, represent an order with respect to that thing. For example, the adjustment of a clock's mechanism and the indication of the time. The soil, bacteria, water, etc., and a plant.

That is why proving the existence of God by the order of the world has something more than strange about it. Order as the condition of existence of what? Of man? This would be placing us on the level of—and almost above—God. If the final purpose of creation

is us, it is indeed a miserable one. As the condition of God's existence? Ridiculous. The very notion of order of the world is more than strange. And yet, there is the cosmos.

There are certain orders which are not a condition of existence; or at any rate are such that the condition which they represent is mixed up with them. Thus, the interior order of the soul and virtue; aesthetic order and the beautiful.

Such an order is an imitation of something which is non-representable, which is no longer an order. Music. Order of sounds which imitates silence.

Criterion of indefinite repetition. (It is never wrong for one to correct, though one may correct badly and while making things worse. If one does correct, it is because an imperfection lay somewhere. Otherwise one would have no desire to correct.)

The fulness of being is identical with nothingness for the purposes of abstract thought; but not so when one is fleeing nothingness and directing one's steps toward being. There is the nothingness from which we flee and the nothingness toward which we go.

'Without name or form.'

Aesthetic order exceeds the imagination and the understanding. Third dimension of order.

Order and *Word*. *Μεταξύ* and mediator. (The Word is not only a mediator in the sense that it is incarnate, but also in the sense that it is a Word.) *Λόγος*, order.

The contemplation of human misery is the only source of supernatural felicity.

Beauty. One cannot say that it is a 'perspective' order. It *tears us away from* the point of view.

Divine plan, divine purpose—what can that very well mean? A plan is the subordination of a certain thing as a means toward a certain other thing regarded as an end, of certain things as parts toward a certain other thing as a whole. And it is all the same as far as God is concerned.

Beauty likewise, plan without subordination. Microcosm.

Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect (with reference to the sun and rain sent to all without distinction).

Trinity. Evil and disorder. There is not any disorder or evil for

the Father (for everything is in the *κόσμος*¹)—There can only be some for the Son. That is why it is he who possesses the judicial power. There is only evil in the *κόσμος* at the scale of the microcosm. The Son—he is God *in so far as* we ought to imitate him. That is why he is Wisdom and the *λόγος*, which are with reference to a transcendent order of the world above us, but to which we are sensible.

If there exists another thinking species, there will always be the same God for it, only another Word.

To put perfection in the microcosm.

But how, and in what sense?

Revelation and reason, faith and reason; reason is always the sole instrument. But there are certain things which reason can only grasp in the light of grace. (Not to give sight to the blind, but . . .)

The will of God. How to know it? If we produce a stillness in ourselves, if we silence all desires and opinions and if with love, without formulating any words, we bind our whole soul to think ‘*γενηθήτω τὸ θέλημά σου*’,² the thing which after that we feel convinced we should do (even though in certain respects we may be mistaken) is the will of God. For if we ask him for bread he will not give us a stone.

Criterion—An action (or non-action, an attitude) for which reason affords several distinct and convergent motives, but which we feel transcends all representable motives. Two criteria which coincide.

Μεταξύ. Every representation which draws us toward the non-representable. Need for *μεταξύ* in order to prevent us from seizing hold of nothingness instead of full being.

Milarepa. His experience when he ate. Saintliness itself as a phenomenon. And afterwards the broken pot. He had lost everything, renounced everything, but had not yet felt with his whole being that his pot itself was liable to destruction.

Superposed levels of belief. Even the most ordinary truth, when it invades the whole soul, is like a revelation.

Third dimension . . .

Lever. Tears the being away from appearance. *Λόγος*—Knowledge of the second kind? Already of the third kind?—Tears the will away from desire, or desire away from perspective—Third dimension.

¹ World.

² Thy will be done (Matt. vi, 10).

Sin and virtue are not acts, but states. Acts are only the automatic consequence of a state. But we are only able to represent them to ourselves in the form of acts. Whence the symbol of sin *prior to all act*. We are born in a state of sin. Has there been a time when man was not in a state of sin? But he did not possess knowledge.

Blood on snow. Innocence and evil. That evil itself may be pure. It can only be pure in the form of suffering, and the suffering of someone innocent. An innocent being who suffers sheds the light of salvation upon evil. He is the visible image of the innocent God. That is why a God who loves man and a man who loves God have to suffer.

Happy innocence. Violetta.¹ Something also infinitely precious. But it is a frail, precarious happiness, a fortuitous happiness. Apple blossom. Such happiness is not securely linked to innocence.

The woman who wishes for a child white as snow and red as blood, gets it; but she dies, and the child is handed over to a step-mother.

'Judge not.' Christ himself does not judge. He is judgment. Suffering innocence as measuring-rod.

Judgment, perspective. In this sense, every judgment judges him who pronounces it. Not to judge. It is not indifference or abstention, it is transcendent judgment, the imitation of divine judgment, which is impossible for us; but 'Be ye perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect.'

The drawing closer together of God and man is prohibited by the very nature of creation, by the gulf separating being from appearance. Upanishads: the gods do not wish it. It means an unmaking of creation, and creation unmakes itself in suffering.

Loss of the sense of reality when the mind submits itself to a perspective. Slavery; the perspective of the master. Other people's perspective. Underneath perspective. Disorder underneath order. But for this very reason slavery is the image of the relationship between man and God.

Not to speak about God (not in the inner language of the soul either); not to pronounce this word, *except when one is not able to do otherwise* ('able' is obviously used here in a particular sense).

Connection between the tree of earthly Paradise and knowledge, and between the tree of the cross and divine Wisdom. What mystery lies in this correspondence? (And whence comes the expression 'tree of the cross?')

Human misery, and not pleasure, contains (with respect to our-

¹ Character in *Venise sauvée*, unfinished play by Simone Weil.

selves) the secret of divine Wisdom. All pleasure-seeking is the search for an artificial paradise, for a more intense state (higher because more intense), for an intoxication, an enlargement. But it gives us nothing, except the experience that it is vain. Only the contemplation of our limitations and our misery places us on a higher plane. (Rajas — Sattva.)

'Whosoever humbleth himself shall be exalted.' Adam and Eve wanted to exalt themselves.

Fresco by Masaccio.

Their disobedience consisted in wanting without God to become *sicut dei*.

[Man has sinned in trying to become God (on the imaginary plane), and God has redeemed this sin by becoming man. By which means man can really become *sicut deus*. Thus the serpent had spoken truly.]

The ascending movement is vain (and worse than vain) if it does not spring from a descending movement.

'*Eritis sicut dei, scientes bonum et malum*'¹: that is strictly true through the redemption:

(Why should one be reluctant to think that God willed Adam's sin?)

It is as if man's approach toward an imaginary divinity were an appeal to God for this desire to be crowned by punishment and redemption. He was driven out of Paradise so that he should know that he is not *sicut deus*. (That is why we have to suffer; otherwise we forget the fact too easily.)

Our thought, which gives us dominion over the universe, makes us be *sicut dei* at all times when we are not being gnawed by necessity.

Adam and Eve sought for divinity in vital energy—in a tree, a fruit. But it is prepared for us on some dead wood, geometrically squared, upon which hangs a corpse. We must look for the secret of our kinship with God in our mortality.

The knowledge of our misery is the only thing in us which is not miserable.

Sin is nothing else but the failure to recognize human misery—it is unconscious misery and for that very reason guilty misery. The story of Christ is the experimental proof that human misery is irreducible, that it is as great in the absolutely sinless man as in the

¹ Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil (Gen. iii, 5).

sinner. Only it is enlightened. But this misery cannot be separated from the state of sin; the story of Christ is bound up with that of Adam.

In the same way that, in a sense, God is infinitely more than the whole universe, and, in a sense, manifests himself through a part of the universe, namely, good—so, in a sense, human misery is defined by the state of sin, and, in a sense, is independent of sin. Thus it is true to say that the Incarnation and the Passion are and are not consequences of Adam's disobedience.

Man's misery consists in the fact that he is not God. He is continually forgetting this.

Prometheus. God has given man fire—fire, the arts, writing, etc., all the material conditions for man's separation from the animals—and is punished for it by suffering, for, penetrating into the human soul, he there suffers human misery.

We can only know one thing about God: that he is what we are not. Our misery alone is the image of this. The more we contemplate it, the more we contemplate Him.

'He to whom much is forgiven, the same loveth much': sin (at the moment of repentance) is like an equivalent of suffering. The good *and* happy man cannot find room in himself for divine love (unless he has a supernatural insight into the fragile nature of goodness and happiness). He takes for an essential part of his nature that which is granted to him by circumstances. He confuses the 'I' with character.

For men of courage physical sufferings (and privations) are often a test of endurance and of strength of soul. But there is a better use to be made of them. For me, then, let them not be that. Let them be a sensible testimony of human misery. Let me endure them in a completely passive manner. Whatever happens to me, how could I ever come to regard affliction as too heavy, since the wound of affliction and the abasement to which those whom it strikes are condemned opens to them the knowledge of human misery, knowledge which is the door, the passage leading to all wisdom?

But pleasure, happiness, prosperity, if we know how to recognize in them what comes from outside (chance, circumstances), likewise bear testimony to human misery. The same use should be made of them. Milarepa and the food. (This applies even to grace, in so far as it is a sensible phenomenon.)

We must be nothing in order to be in our true place in the whole.

Sin and knowledge of our misery. If one knows with all one's

soul that one is mortal and one accepts it with all one's soul, one cannot kill (except, supposing such a thing to be possible, under the exigences of justice).

Sin and the prestige of force. Owing to the fact that the whole soul has not managed to know and accept human misery, we think there must be a difference between human beings, and consequently we fail to be just, either by drawing a distinction between our advantage and that of other people, or else by marking a preference for certain individuals from among other people.

This comes from the fact that we do not know that human misery represents a constant and irreducible quantity and exists in each man in the largest possible form; and that greatness comes from a one and only God, so that every man is identical with every other man.

Error as an incentive. Error as a source of energy. I think I see a friend. I run towards him. When I get a little nearer I perceive that it is someone else towards whom I am running—a stranger. The splash of colour formed by this face, these clothes, etc., which a moment before was a source of motor energy is so no longer. Some energy has been liberated.

Bad actions are those where the energy for them has been derived from an error.

All particular incentives are errors. Only that energy which is not derived from any incentive is good. Obedience to God, that is to say, since God is beyond all that we can imagine or conceive, to nothing. This is at the same time impossible and necessary—in other words it is supernatural.

Love of God is pure when joy and suffering *equally* inspire gratitude.

The handshake of a friend on meeting again after a long absence. I do not even notice whether it gives pleasure or pain to my sense of touch; just as a blind man feels objects directly at the end of his stick, so I feel the presence of my friend directly. The same applies to life's circumstances, whatever they may be, and God.

This implies that we must never seek consolation for pain. For felicity is beyond the realm of consolation and pain, outside it. We apprehend it through a sense of another kind, just as the perception of objects at the end of a stick or an instrument is of another kind to that of touch in the strict sense of the word. This other sense is formed by a shifting of the attention through an apprenticeship in which the entire soul and the body participate.

That is why we read in the Gospel: 'I say unto you that these

have received their reward'. There must be no compensation. It is the void in sensible impression which carries me beyond sensible impression.

Religion in so far as it is a source of consolation is a hindrance to true faith; and in this sense atheism is a purification. I have to be an atheist with that part of myself which is not made for God. Among those in whom the supernatural part of themselves has not been awakened, the atheists are right and the believers wrong.

The mysteries of the Catholic faith—and those of other religious or metaphysical traditions—are not designed in order to be believed by all parts of the soul. The presence of Christ in the host is not a fact in the same way that the presence of my friend Paul in Paul's body is a fact; otherwise it would not be supernatural. (Both facts are, moreover, equally incomprehensible—but not in the same way.) The Eucharist should not then be an object of belief for the part of me which apprehends facts. That is where Protestantism is true (or, with respect to the incarnation, where Deism is true). But this presence of Christ in the host is not a symbol either, for a symbol is the combination of an abstraction and an image; it is something which human intelligence can represent to itself; it is not supernatural. There the Catholics are right, not the Protestants. Only that part of myself which is made for the supernatural should adhere to these mysteries. But this adherence is more a matter of love than of belief. What is, then, the distinction between love and faith?

The rôle of the intelligence—that part of us which affirms and denies, formulates opinions—is solely one of submission. All that I conceive of as true is less true than these things of which I cannot conceive the truth, but which I love. That is why St. John of the Cross calls faith a night. With those who have received a Christian education, the lower parts of the soul become attached to these mysteries when they have no right at all to do so. That is why such people need a purification of which St. John of the Cross describes the stages. Atheism and incredulity constitute an equivalent of such a purification.

We should not seize upon these mysteries as truths, for that is impossible, but recognize the subordination to these mysteries which we love of all that we seize upon as truths. The intelligence can recognize this subordination by feeling that the love of these mysteries is the source of conceptions which it can seize upon as truths. Such would seem to be the relationship between faith and love.

In the sphere of the relationship between man and the supernatural we must seek a more than mathematical precision, something even more precise than science. Such is also one of the uses to which science should be put.

The mysteries of the faith cannot be either affirmed or denied; they must be placed above that which we affirm or deny.

Since we are, in fact, in an age of incredulity, why neglect the purificatory use of incredulity? I have had experimental knowledge of its use.

Necessity enters into contact with the intelligence through knowledge of the second kind and with the sensibility through affliction. There is only purification if we recognize it as being identical under these two forms.

Affliction degrades when it abolishes knowledge of the second kind. Nothing is more difficult than to preserve the latter in affliction (for that it is necessary to pass to the third kind?).

The will of God. Composition upon several planes. A plurality of distinct and convergent motives places the will in contact with what is above the sphere of particular motives.

Μεταξύ.

It is always a question of rising above perspectives through the composition of perspectives, of placing oneself in the *third dimension*.

‘The breadth and depth of the love of Christ.’

Not to take one step, *even in the direction of good*, beyond that to which one is irresistibly impelled by God, this applying to action, word and thought. But to be willing to go anywhere under his impulsion, to the extreme limit, if there is one. (The Cross . . .) To be willing to go to the maximum length is to pray to be impelled, but without knowing whither.

Humility; believing oneself to be beneath others. This in itself does not make any sense. It is an operation similar to that by which Descartes denies in order to bring himself round to the point where he doubts. One must believe oneself to be beneath others in order to bring oneself round to the point where one regards oneself as their equal and does not prefer oneself. Since it is impossible to prevent oneself from imagining a hierarchical order, a ladder amongst human beings (and perfection consists in not imagining it), one must place oneself on the lowest rung so as to avoid being situated above any other human being in one's own estimation. By dint of maintaining oneself on the lowest rung, the ladder disappears.

Contact with human creatures is given to us through the sense of

presence. Contact with God is given to us through the sense of absence. Compared with this absence, presence becomes more absent than absence.

We should examine very closely the notion of *possibility*, for it is the key to a great number of mysteries which surround the human condition.

What is not truth can be above or below truth. It is above when it is a source of truths.

Faith is the experience that the intelligence is lighted up by love. Truth as the light coming from good—the good which lies above essences. The organ in us through which we see truth is the intelligence; the organ in us through which we see God is love.

‘The eyes of the soul—these are the demonstrations themselves.’ In the case of truths. But the eye of the soul for the contemplation of the divine is love.

Only the intelligence must recognize by those means which are proper to it, namely, verification and demonstration, the pre-eminence of love. It must only submit itself when it knows in a perfectly clear and precise manner why. Otherwise submission is an error, and that to which it submits itself, in spite of the label attached, is something other than supernatural love. (It is social influence for example.)

‘When two or three are gathered together in my name.’ Not just one. But not a hundred either. Two or three.

Why (setting aside confession and direction of conscience) have colloquies between two or three never been recognized among religious exercises? Not talks, but colloquies pursued with the maximum concentration of attention. This would no doubt be of as much value (at any rate for those with a corresponding vocation for it) as reciting the breviary.

Beauty. Impossible to define it psychologically, because the fullness of aesthetic contemplation excludes introspection. One cannot therefore define aesthetic order as the condition of existence for the production of the aesthetic sentiment (. . . but as the condition for contemplation). It is an order which does not constitute a condition of existence.

The proof of the existence of God by the order of the world, in the manner in which it is usually put forward, is a wretched one.

But we can say: the fact that man can pass into a state of aesthetic contemplation before a spectacle of nature as before a Greek statue is a proof of God.

A work of art has an author, and yet, when it is perfect, there is something essentially anonymous about it. It imitates the anonymity of divine art. Thus the beauty of the world proves that there is a God who is at the same time personal and impersonal, and neither just the one nor the other.

Author and order. Necessity also (mathematical and mechanical relationships) represents an order without an author.

Mathematics as *μεταξύ* leading towards the impersonal aspect of God.

If the 'I', in the personal sense, fades away in proportion and in so far as man imitates God, how could it be sufficient to conceive of a personal God? The image of a personal God is a hindrance to such an imitation.

Faith. It is for the intelligence to discern what forms the object of supernatural love. For it must perfectly discern all that which is at the level of intelligible truth and all that which is below it. All that which is neither the one nor the other is the object of supernatural love. Discrimination on the part of the intelligence is essential in order to separate supernatural love from attachment. For we can be attached to something which we name God.

Love (*ἀγάπη*) is a disposition of the supernatural part of the soul. Faith is a disposition of *all* the parts of the soul—and of the body as well—each one assuming with regard to the object of love the attitude suitable to its nature. Justice, according to Plato. (In the Scriptures, too, faith is continually assimilated to justice.)

Hope, this is faith in so far as it is oriented in Time towards the future. It is the supernatural equivalent of the resolve to persevere in the path of virtue.

That which is below resembles that which is above. Hence slavery is an image of obedience to God, humiliation is an image of humility, etc.

This being so, it is necessary to seek out that which is lowest in its quality of image.

Let that which is base in us go to the bottom in order that that which is noble in us may go to the top. For we are reversed beings. We are born like this. Re-establishing order means unmaking the creature in us.

Order and disorder. All order presupposes a correlative disorder, in this sense that order is essentially partial, and thus the proof of the

existence of God by the order of the world (in its commonly accepted form) is just as much a proof against the existence of God. But it is otherwise in the case of beauty; beauty is a perfect order. So, likewise, the absolutely obedient soul is in a perfect order.

The world is only beautiful for him who experiences *amor fati*,¹ and consequently *amor fati* is, for whoever experiences it, an experimental proof of the reality of God.

An order implies a person as author of it, a particular end, a plan in view of such an end, material objects which constitute at the same time means and obstacles, and which are caught up in a host of relationships apart from their actual relationship to this order. For example, a clock.

All that disappears in the case of something beautiful, although the work of human hands. All that has no meaning at all when related to the world.

Faith is an attitude of all the parts of the soul other than supernatural love with respect to what they are unable to apprehend, and in so far as it goes unapprehended by them. If they do apprehend something, it is a question of something of a different order from faith, and the object does not correspond to the label. Dark night.

By saying that the Catholic religion is true and the other religions false, one does an injustice not only to the other religious traditions but to the Catholic faith itself, by placing it on the level of those things which can be affirmed or denied.

The intelligence needs to have complete liberty, including that of denying God; it follows from this that religion is related to love and not to affirmation or denial. For no good thing can harm the intelligence. But supernatural love, although its function is not to affirm, constitutes a fuller apprehension of reality than does the intelligence, and this is known through the intelligence itself, in the soul in which supernatural love exists; for if it does not exist, the intelligence is unable to pronounce with regard to it.

We know through the intelligence that what the intelligence does not apprehend is more real than what it does apprehend.

Experience of the transcendent: this seems a contradiction in terms, and yet the transcendent can only be known through contact, since our faculties are unable to construct it.

Incarnation. The thought that God knows something of the

¹ Love of destiny.

world, of men, and of time, is not any less great an absurdity than the incarnation itself. Nevertheless, one cannot help thinking it.

All these absurdities are no greater than those one is in any case obliged to think.

The identification of a perfect man with God may be considered from the point of view of descent or from the point of view of ascent. But it is descent which matters.

The contemplation of these absurdities draws one upwards, if they are contemplated *as absurd* (they must not then be defended).

The Greek gods—capricious, neither good nor evil, good and evil in turn, more readily evil than good, worse than man and more powerful. One cannot do without them either.

There is a usage for every kind of error. To define it is of more interest than 'anathema sit'.

What is the difference between the incarnation and the creation of a soul? It seems impossible to think of this difference otherwise than as constituted by sin, or at any rate the possibility of sinning (possibility—most mysterious of notions).

Cf. Melchizedek and *John* viii, 56: is this an allusion to another revelation at the dawn of historical times?—2000 B.C. (Or the sequel to a prior revelation; but in any case in 2000 B.C. there existed a revelation superior to that of Israel.)

Study of a religion from the historical, sociological, etc. angles: finding out the *conditions of existence*—which reserves the problem as to the value of the revelation.

A good many problems would be simplified at any rate as regards their data if it were posited in principle: God does not mix up established orders; he acts supernaturally within the sphere of the supernatural, and naturally (that is to say, in a sense, not at all) within the sphere of nature. Creation represents this respect for established orders. He does not unmake creation; it is for creation to unmake itself.

The stories about miracles confuse everything. One expedient is to deny them altogether: that is almost impossible. Another is to put them back among natural phenomena. Science has not done so because where the scientific conception of the world predominates there are no such things as miracles; consequently the opportunity for studying them is lacking. The same thing has happened to science in the case of miracles as happened to the Church in the case of astronomy and critical examination. Owing to the fact that socially

they belong to spheres foreign to science, science has adopted a hostile attitude toward them, thus confirming the error committed by the Church.

A miracle is a natural phenomenon which only happens with a man who finds himself in this, that or the other particular state. States likely to produce such phenomena are: sainthood, hysteria, self-mastery brought about by asceticism, and others besides perhaps.

Theatre (or epopee). Third dimension in the order of human destiny—*Edipus Rex*—*Maenads*—*Jaffier* . . . —

Art and third dimension. And what about music?

Elevation and abasement. A woman looking at herself in a mirror and adorning herself does not feel the shame of reducing the self, that infinite being which beholds all things, to a small space (*μικρὸν ὄγκον*¹). In the same way every time that we raise the 'I' (the social 'I', the psychological 'I', etc.), however high we may raise it, we degrade ourselves to an infinite degree by reducing the self to being no more than that. When the 'I' actually is abased (unless energy exerts itself to raise it in desire), we know that we are not that.

A very beautiful woman who looks at her reflection in the mirror can very well believe that she is that. An ugly woman knows that she is not that.

Folklore; the prince who has become the slave of his slave.

Only the past and the future hinder the salutary effect of affliction by offering an unlimited field for imaginary elevations. That is why the renunciation of the past and the future comes first among all renunciations.

Time is an image of eternity, but it is also an ersatz expression of eternity.

There is also that effect of affliction which consists in really believing that one is nothing. Terrible suffering. It can represent hell, or else the gate to paradise. I am nothing. Impossible! It is in this sense that extreme suffering is *impossible*. It forces the soul to adopt thoughts which are logically contradictory.

Production of beauty—*Timaeus*, 28 a.

When a thing is perfectly beautiful, as soon as we fix our attention

¹ Small mass.

upon it, it represents unique and single beauty. Two Greek statues: the one we are looking at is beautiful, the other not. The same is true of the Catholic faith, Platonic thought and Hindu thought, etc. The one we are looking at is beautiful, the others not. Thus those who proclaim that such and such a faith alone is true and beautiful, although they are wrong, are in a sense more right than those who are right, for they have looked at it with their whole soul.

The distinction between *domains*. Essential idea in Plato. "Οτι περ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια.¹

The Demiurge looks toward the eternal. δῆλον ὡς πρὸς τὸ αἰδίου ἔβλεπεν.² God the Father is not related to time. It is the Word which, although eternal, is related to time. Soul of the world. Thus 'No man cometh unto the Father, but by me'.

Model and Holy Spirit?

When we listen to Bach or to a Gregorian melody, all the faculties of the soul become still and tense in order to apprehend this thing of perfect beauty—each in its own way—and among them the intelligence. The latter finds nothing in this thing it hears to affirm or to deny, but it feeds upon it.

Should not faith be an adherence of this kind?

The mysteries of the faith are degraded if they are made a subject of affirmation and negation, when in reality they should be a subject of contemplation.

In the domain of the intelligence, the virtue of humility is nothing other than attention.

'Whosoever believeth not in me . . .', and other things of this kind in the Gospel, can be interpreted in two ways. In the first place, by the Word: we can only go to the Father through the Word, that light springing up within each man; and that is true, always, for all men, without any exception. (But this does not require that we should give a name to the Word, or even perhaps to God; this relationship is expressed differently in different languages, or without language at all.) In the second place, by the man who was ὁ Χριστός³: whoever met him in the flesh, on earth, and heard him; whoever reads his words in the Gospel text, and has not thought:

¹ What essence is with respect to becoming, so truth is with respect to belief (Plato, *Timaeus*, 29 c).

² It is evident that he hath looked toward the eternal (*Timaeus*, 29 a).

³ The Christ.

that comes from God, has no discernment for holy things. But it is a question only of discernment for a divine inspiration, not for the particular nature of this inspiration. As for the common identity linking together the Word and this man, there is nothing to show that the affirmation of such a link is a condition of salvation, and such a thing would be absurd.

‘Other sheep I have . . . the day cometh when they shall all be in one fold . . .’ But they are already his sheep before being in this fold. And this unique fold is perhaps in the next world.

Timaeus. *Αὐτὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τροφὴν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φθίσιν παρέχον.*¹ The World supplies itself with the food that constitutes its own destruction. Communion.

The Word—*purely* powerful, *purely* passive. Has done everything from the beginning; the lamb slain from the beginning.

Man: mixture of power and passivity. Being a creature, a partial being, can only find purity in pure passivity.

Timaeus, 34 a—*Ἀπλανὲς ἐκείνων.*² Rectilinear movements as sources of error. Subject calls for a lot of thought.

*Ὡς δὲ κινήθην αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνόησεν τῶν αἰδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα ὃ γεννήσας πατήρ, ἡγάσθη.*³

A mediator is necessary because there is no possible relationship between God and time.

The being lacerated throughout the length of time. God on the Cross.

Beauty is an imitation of celestial harmony; that is to say, a composition of the Same and the Other, in which the Same dominates and the Other is subjugated by compulsion. Team of horses in *Phaedrus*; thus beauty is the sensible image of good.

Order of the world, condition of existence of a *thinking creature*.

Stars, in *Timaeus*—. . . *τὴν (κίνησιν) μὲν ἐν ταύτῳ κατὰ ταυτά, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ διανοοιμένῳ.*⁴ The stars, model of contemplation.

¹ . . . Giving itself as food its own destruction (*Timaeus*, 33 c).

² . . . Not erring by these movements.

³ When the father who had begotten him saw him living and moving, image of the eternal gods born into Time, he contemplated him admiringly (*Timaeus*, 37 c).

⁴ . . . Movement which is ever in the same place and subject to the same laws, for each one ponders within himself the same thoughts with regard to the same things (*Timaeus*, 40 a).

Destruction. God has created the world and desires perpetually that it should exist; to destroy is therefore evil, unless it be by causing something created to pass into the uncreated. *Destruction is a bad imitation (an ersatz form) of such an operation.* Accordingly, man, in killing, makes himself resemble God, but it is a bad resemblance. *Timaeus*—God powerless himself to create mortals (only the immortal part of their soul); the part: Θεῖον λεγόμενον ἡγεμονοῦν τε ἐν αὐτοῖς τῶν αἰὲ δίκῃ καὶ ὑμῖν ἐθελόντων ἔπεσθαι¹—ὑμῖν,² these are the fixed stars.

In order to be perfect, the world has to contain some imperfect parts which God is unable to create directly. Why?

‘Ὅποτε δὴ σώμασιν ἐμφυτευθεῖεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ τὸ μὲν προσίοι, τὸ δ’ ἀπίοι τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν.³

The secret of our misery lies in the fact that certain things enter into us and certain things go out from us. Food. Attachment.

We are a part which has to imitate the whole.

The mystery of good in actions. The only criterion of the value of an action is the effect it produces on the soul, but one can in no wise judge of this through introspection. Or again (but this comes to the same thing, in view of the rigorous exactitude of retribution in the spiritual sphere), the only criterion of the value of an action is the source within the soul which furnishes the incentive for it; but neither can one in any way judge of this through introspection.

Detachment, indifference (in the elevated sense). One says to oneself: I no longer have any incentives; how am I to act? Why am I to act? But therein lies the miracle of the supernatural. Silence all the motives, all the incentives in yourself, and you will nevertheless act, impelled by a source of energy which is other than the motives and the incentives. But although no motive or incentive is the cause of this action, a host of motives and incentives converge towards its execution.

Timaeus. Relationship between *number* and *circle*.

Notion of *transcendent value*—to be elucidated. Is connected with the void.

¹ . . . [The part] which is called divine and which governs those among them who desire always to follow justice and to follow you (*Timaeus*, 41 c).

² You.

³ When [souls] have been planted in bodies through the effect of necessity, and when certain parts join themselves to their body while others separate themselves from it . . . (*Timaeus*, 42 a).

To silence the motives and incentives in oneself, and act—this is a miracle analogous to that of the incarnation.

The receptacle (Plato) is outside of forms; image of the transcendent.

Idea of the receptacle. Γῆ¹—The great Mother—It is the vast expanse.

Metaphor of the bride and bridegroom in mysticism.

To preserve in oneself *only* that which is passive.

Science, art and religion are connected together through the notion of *order of the world*, which we have completely lost.

Plato. Intelligence dominates necessity by persuasion. Image of inward order? Non-active action upon the self. Non-violence with regard to the self.

Beauty is the image of this persuasion.

There is not one cause amongst errant causes which is the organ of the intelligence. Persuasion is exercised over the whole of necessity.

(In the same way, there is not one man amongst men who is the agent of God—The Messiah of the Jews . . .)

Acts of violence done to the self belong to states inferior to perfection and should be looked upon as an indispensable exercise imposed by outward circumstances and native imperfections. The need for such acts of violence is a measure of one's imperfection. They should be accomplished without an object. When accomplished in the right spirit, without attachment, they are finite and become spent. Otherwise they are always beginning over again.

One ought to feel the violence one does oneself as something which one endures rather than as something which one actually does. As in the case of physical sufferings and temporal fears, one should taste and measure therein the extent of one's misery. Such a violence is not an effect produced by the will; it is imposed by one's imperfections and by particular circumstances in which the mind perceives an obligation.

St. Paul . . . Law and sin.

Inspiration, grace, truth, etc., regarded as alien. St. Paul: the Word was not attached to its divinity.

All men are ready to die for what they love. They only differ in

¹ The Earth.

the quality of the thing loved, and in the concentration or dispersion of their love. No one loves himself.

No man is capable of dying for what he does not love. (But there are transpositions.)

Fact: no precise definition of fact, supported by analysis, can be enunciated which is capable of being extended to such a thing as the Incarnation or the Eucharist. Fact belongs to the domain of time. Kant.

But the domain of reality extends infinitely beyond that of fact.

Incarnation. Not to be attached to the supernatural.

The Word stripped itself completely of its divinity. 'Why hast thou forsaken me?'

Judgment. A rigorous mechanism governs spiritual things; but a hidden one; known of the Word only. . . . ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς τοῦ ἀπνίου.¹

Order of infinities (*to read Cantor*²).

My misery is infinite with respect to my will, but it is finite with respect to grace. Thus it can exhaust itself, and perfection is possible. Grace is something infinitely big of the second order.

But my misery is, with respect to grace, finite, not infinitely small. It can exhaust itself; but it is necessary that it should exhaust itself. Irreducible quantity. There are equivalencies, but no economy of labour is possible. If the slightest bit remains in a human being, that human being is a long way from the state of perfection.

To have sinned much is a favourable circumstance, unless one can look upon natural virtue as a form of misery equivalent to sin.

Reading. Just as in a piece of bread we read something to eat, and we set about eating it; so in such and such a group of circumstances we read an obligation; and we set about performing it. The more clearly we have read, the quicker and more directly we set about it; and the better we learn this language, the more clearly we read.

In such and such a place there are pictorial indications and others that are printed. He who is unable to read follows the indications given by the pictures. He who is able to read obeys the printed directions and no longer even looks at the pictures.

Thus it is in the case of desire and obligation.

¹ And from the wrath of the Lamb (Rev. vi, 16).

² Georg Cantor, German philosopher and mathematician (1845-1918).

The reading in *itself* implies a transference of energy (conditioned reflex).

Whoever is incited by desire toward a bad action, and who resists, has the feeling that he is being pushed toward the bad action, and is not conscious of the energy attached to the feeling of duty. But if he tried to perform the bad action, he would feel a resistance that had to be overcome.

That is why in a life directed toward evil, good appears as a temptation. Marlowe's Faust. Gilles.¹

If one gives in to the evil desire passively, it is after a struggle in which the energy attached to the feeling of duty has become exhausted.

It is not true virtue which in the soul thus enters into direct conflict with evil.

How does one learn to read obligations? In the same way as one learns to read, essentially through the attention, the latter being helped by exercises in which the body takes part. Every time one performs an obligation one makes progress in this art, provided this performance be accompanied by genuine attention. The attention in apprenticeship is directed towards what one does not yet know.

The Greek sophism according to which to learn is impossible, because it is contradictory, is an image of the relationship between the representable and the transcendent.

Desire: first dimension. Obligation: second dimension. Third one . . .

Obligation, is it *μεταξύ*? Like the letters of the alphabet, musical intervals . . . Relationship. *λόγος*.

Cases of conscience, conflicts, readings of contradictory obligations, incompatible ones, within the same set of circumstances. So long as one remains on the level of such a conflict, one chooses almost at random; but the conflict, contemplated with attention, not with a view to its solution, but in itself, withdraws the soul outside the domain of obligation.

In what case does the struggle against a temptation exhaust the energy attached to good, and in what case does it cause such energy to rise in the scale of energetic qualities?

This must depend on the respective importance of the rôles played by the will and the attention.

Israel alone resisted Rome, in the religious sense, because its God,

¹ See footnote, p. 80, cf. pp. 108-9, 111.

although immaterial, was a temporal sovereign, on a par with the emperor; and it is thanks to this (a reversal) that Christianity was able to spring up there. A 'chosen people', if you like, in this sense. The religion of Israel was not sufficiently elevated to be frail, and thanks to its robust nature was able to protect the initial growth of what constitutes the most elevated in the realm of the spirit.

(Within the order of conditions of existence, good produces evil, and evil good; but as a result of fixed mechanisms.)

The development of the attention ought to be the sole object of education. The same in the case of apprenticeship.

The search for a good degrades good to the level of representable things. That is why it is necessary to act in order to avoid or wipe out an evil. Evil is representable.

Self-satisfaction after some action (or work of art) is a degradation of higher energy. That is why the right hand must not know . . .

Any form of reward (*μισθόν*) constitutes a degradation of energy.

When a struggle takes place between the will attached to an obligation and an evil desire, there is a wearing down of the energy fixed upon good. We must submit to the sting of desire passively, as to some form of suffering—suffering in which we taste our misery, and keep the attention turned toward good. A rise in the scale of energetic values then takes place, leading from the second to the third kind of knowledge.

This should also be extended to the temptation of idleness, although, to outward appearances, giving in to it represents passivity and resisting it activity. Fatigue is a form of suffering in the same way as toothache. When working in a state of fatigue, we must endure this suffering passively, our attention turned toward the thing in hand.

Pain is not an evil. The misery of the creature is not an evil. Creation is not an evil.

We should steal the energy from desires by taking away their orientation in time.

That which the transcendental 'I' possesses is not a form of energy, but a faculty of regrading energy through the attention (?).

The clash between Israel and Rome—two atrocious manifestations, each in its own way—produced Christianity; that is to say,

a new form of the mysticism destroyed by Rome (already decadent before Rome?).

Human misery would be intolerable if it were not diluted in Time.

We should prevent it becoming diluted *in order that* it may be intolerable.

The worst form of misery, so diluted, is tolerable.

Iliad. 'And when they had had their fill of tears . . .'; yet another way of rendering the worst form of misery tolerable.

We must not weep so as not to be comforted.

'Ο φαῦλα πράσσω μισεῖ τὸ φῶς . . . ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔρχεται πρὸς τὸ φῶς . . .'¹

He that doeth evil hateth the light . . . he that doeth truth cometh to the light . . .

(And yet, Mary Magdalene . . .)

Οὐδεὶς ἀναβέβηκεν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν εἰ μὴ ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς.²

Law of the lever in spiritual things.

Means of apprehending the non-apprehensible	analogy blind man's stick.
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(To love Christ in the Eucharist is to meet him there. Blind man's stick.)

Analogy tending toward the non-apprehensible. Eudoxus. Cantor. Use of mathematics.

Blind man's sticks making it possible to touch God. Ceremonies? Sacred chants? Sacraments?

In the phenomenon of the blind man's stick, analogy plays a part, but it is also a question of *contact*.

Quasi-hell on earth: complete uprooting in affliction. Human injustice generally produces not martyrs but quasi-damned souls. Beings who have fallen into this quasi-hell are like the man stripped and wounded by thieves. They have lost the clothing of character.

The greatest suffering which allows some roots to remain intact is still infinitely removed from this quasi-hell.

When we do a service to beings uprooted in this way and we

¹ John iii, 20-21.

² And no man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven (John iii, 13).

receive in exchange discourtesy, ingratitude, betrayal, we are merely enduring a small share of their affliction. It is our duty to expose ourselves to it in a limited measure, just as it is our duty to expose ourselves to affliction. When it happens we should endure it as we endure affliction, without associating it with any persons in particular, for it cannot be associated with anything. There is something impersonal in quasi-infernal affliction as there is in perfection.

It is necessary to pass through hell in order to perceive what redemptive suffering is. But how pass through it?

*Τοῦτο δὸς ἐμοί. . .*¹

Sacraments as *ordeals*. That alone is indicated—*κέκριται*² . . . (the story of the centurion indicates sufficiently that we exaggerate the rôle of the sacraments). Sacraments, a spiritual balance: partaken of worthily, they constitute moments of eternity, in which one passes from one level to another—The baptism of Christ marked the passage from private life to public life.

*Ὁ ἀπιστήσας κατακριθήσεται*³: it is a fact and not a punishment.

Sacraments are related to the nature of time. Eternity enters time through the agency of moments. A moment can only be circumscribed by material circumstances. When these circumstances go back to the union between eternity and time, to the incarnation, what could be more sacred? (Is not this the case with nearly all traditions . . . ???) One is weighed in that moment. If sufficiently light, one passes into eternity—at any rate a part of the soul does. Blind man's sticks for touching eternity.

Analogous to art, but much more powerful. Art of which the material is life.

*Ἀρνησάσθω ἑαυτόν*⁴—to *disown* oneself.

Aesthetic order and condition of existence. Is this related to the possibilities of human perception?

Evil and the innocence of God. We have to place God at an infinite distance to conceive him innocent of evil; conversely, evil indicates that we have to place God at an infinite distance.

*Βάσταζε*⁵—it is necessary to hold, lift up and try the weight

¹ Give me this.

² He is judged.

³ He that believeth not shall be condemned.

⁴ Let him disown himself.

⁵ Lift up.

of one's cross, to feel and know its weight (i.e. that of human misery).

Heb., 2, 15 . . . ὅσοι φόβῳ θανάτου . . . ἔνοχοι ἦσαν δουλείας.¹

Fear of death, foundation of slavery.

Providence; the best definition is in *Timaeus*: the good cause has persuaded the necessary cause . . . Composition on two planes. But in a sense necessity limits good. In another sense not, for it is good that there should be necessity.

Logic with regard to transcendent things: when can two contradictory things be true? With regard to the transcendent, one can only deny, and affirmations are in their true sense negations. An affirmation is a denial of an error; but the contrary affirmation may be something totally different from this error. Two contrary errors may both be errors at the same time. Thus God is neither personal as we are nor impersonal as a thing is. We love him (which is never fully the case with things), but not as we do a friend, etc., etc.

The errors which have to be denied are *in fact* degradations. This system of logic is inseparable from some concrete experience.

Evil. Manichaeism. God alone has created everything; or: the devil has created our bodies . . .? God is the cause of everything; God is only the cause of good. There is then a cause of evil, etc.—It is not true that everything is good. It is not true that the All is imperfect. (To manage to see both these things clearly is not easy.)

The contrary affirmations at the same level (personal and impersonal God) and those which belong to different levels (reality and non-reality of God) have to be studied.

Art, instrument in the search for the Ātman.

Ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς²—eternity on the one hand, and also flow of time.

Aesthetic order; is related to the possibilities of human perception (what can easily be apprehended by the senses at a given moment) on the one hand, to the transcendent on the other hand.

Supplementary energy, when it is wholly turned toward the higher, serves as a lever for turning the vital energy itself—that of the vegetative life—in the same direction also.

¹ All those who through fear of death were . . . subject to bondage . . .

² In the heavens.

Those who, from childhood, have never had any supplementary energy . . . (slavery).

Those who lose it as a result of affliction, and who at the moment they lose it had not yet turned it wholly, or even for the most part, toward the higher . . .

Affliction as an *ordeal*.

(The Cross as a balance.)

In the lack of supplementary energy there is a sort of innocence. Innocence of affliction. Expiatory suffering.

The rooting up of vegetative energy itself and its orientation toward the higher constitutes redemptive suffering. It ransoms creation while unmaking it.

When vegetative energy is pulled away from its function and turned toward the higher, is this void filled by τὸν ἄπτον ἐπιούσιον¹?

Experience shows that supplementary energy, when sufficiently concentrated, pulls vegetative energy along in its train: gamblers, misers, lovers, debauchees, collectors . . . *Conquest comes before need with the individual, as it does in society*. Supplementary energy corresponds to armed force. (God of hosts: is this the meaning?)

But the armed force of the soul can be turned toward the higher; that of society cannot. Society ('the world') is a mirror of sin.

Matter and society—mirrors.

However, we must not love God as a gamester loves his game.

The pictures drawn of human misery (*Iliad*, Job, flight from Gilgamesh—(and cf. lecture by Prat—) are beautiful. Such misery does not therefore impair the beauty of the world. But whence comes it that they are beautiful, seeing that misery itself—at the quasi-infernal level—is so horrible? Is it because in the picture the force of gravity appears?

To manage to love God through and beyond the misery of others is very much more difficult than to love him through and beyond one's own suffering. When one loves him through and beyond one's own suffering, this suffering is thereby transfigured; becomes, depending upon the degree of purity of that love, either expiatory or redemptive. But love is unable to transfigure the misery of others (with the exception of those who are within the range of one's influence). What saint shall transfigure the misery of the slaves who died on the cross in Rome and in the Roman provinces throughout the course of so many centuries?

¹ The supernatural bread (Matt. vi, 11)

In the case of our own suffering, too, there is one irreducible moment when it has not yet been transfigured, when it is quasi-infernal, and when nevertheless we must love. This is the laceration-point. We always remain exposed to this laceration when considering others.

(True enough, our neighbour is he whom we come across stripped and wounded on the roadside, not he whom we do not come across. And yet . . .)

The author of the *Iliad* succeeded in loving God through and beyond the misery of others.

The reward for thinking on God with sufficient attention and love is that one is constrained to do his will. And conversely, the will of God is that which one cannot but do when one has thought on him with sufficient attention and love. Stoics: good is that which the man of wisdom does.

Freedom and sin. The possession of a treasure implies the possibility of losing it; nevertheless, losing a pearl is not the same as having a pearl. Sin is a wasting of freedom.

A rigorous necessity, which rules out all arbitrariness, all chance, governs material phenomena. There is, if possible, still less arbitrariness and chance in the case of spiritual things, although free.

Catholic idea (cf. St. Catherine of Siena) that God (or Christ) is unable to do a certain thing he desires if we do not pray to him with sufficient intensity (mythical image).

The two 'dark nights' of St. John of the Cross. One of them corresponds to expiatory suffering, and the other to redemptive suffering.

Passage to the limit. We conceive of the limit through an operation analogous to mathematics. Then certain people actually make the passage.

Is it a new method of mathematical contemplation?

Prometheus of Aeschylus (numbers, letters, etc.) and *Philebus*. Analogy with the Word.

The blood transformed into wine; animal and vegetative energy transformed into spiritual energy by a death.

Affliction (whether redemptive or quasi-infernal) is a more exact image of our misery than crime, because in crime power and choice are present. If Adam and Eve had not been driven forth (cf. Masaccio), they would have believed themselves to be gods. Afflic-

tion prevents us from eating of the tree of life which would make false gods of us.

St. Catherine of Siena. 'Thou art she which is not, I am he which is.' 'From this knowledge . . . springeth up humility.' 'You, the light, have not regarded my darkness; you, the life, have not spurned me who am death . . . '—'The tree of charity only groweth in the soil of humility.'

'What must be given to the earth, that is to say, to the sentient part? What it deserveth; and what doth that which killeth deserve? To die . . . A corpse doth not see, doth not hear, doth not feel.'—'. . . The dagger, the sword of hatred . . . ' '. . . if we lay down the sword . . . ' 'take this sword and let it never leave the hands of your free will until death . . . ' '. . . it is by violence that we acquire true and robust virtue'. 'Whoever fleeth not remaineth a prisoner.'

Theaetetus. Φυγή.¹ There is nothing more violent than fear, nor more insane. To flee our sojourn here below as the French fled in June, 1940, that represents something totally different from an ascent—which would be the image of 'natural' virtue).

Saint Catherine—'Man hath to make of himself two parts, which are that of sensuality and that of reason. Reason must draw the two-edged sword from the scabbard: hatred of vice and love of virtue. Armed with this sword, it forceth sensuality to its knees.'

'Very often I have seen those who appeared to be stripped bare and have found them to be clothed.'

With regard to temptations, 'to follow the example of the absolutely chaste woman who answereth the seducer not a word when he speaketh to her and pretendeth not to hear him'.

Gorgias and nakedness.

'All penitence does is to prune [vice]; but thus (by hating thyself) thou pullest it up by the roots.'

'Divine charity . . . is like the usurer . . . it is the treasure of Time which yields interest.'

'O sweet obedience! thou makest dead men to live and run.'

'. . . The quintessence of pride, impatience . . . ' '. . . patience, indubitable sign of my presence in a soul'.

'. . . The night of knowledge of the self.'

Non-active action. [Apart from natural duties.] Never to take one step beyond the point towards which one feels irresistibly

¹ Flight (Plato, *Theaetetus*, 176 b).

impelled; since good itself ceases to be so if it is not accomplished through obedience.

This does not prevent the will from being given free play within its own sphere, which is that of limited actions disposing exteriorly of material means with a view to reaching definite ends.

Bhagavad-Gîtâ. Ordering of finite means with a view to an infinite and transcendent end: how is this possible?

Manufactured beauty provides the only example of a transcendent end with reference to the means.

The possible combinations of *n* notes are finite in number . . . (Calculation of the combinations, cf. Dch.)

Action without incentive with a view to an infinite end.

Imitation of creation.

To let necessity act within the self. (Renunciation of personal will.)

All is good for him who knows that all is good. (And yet: Why hast thou forsaken me? . . .)

Cross. Extreme affliction alone brings complete redemptive suffering. It has to be, therefore, in order that the human creature may de-create itself. But one must undergo it in spite of oneself; one must have begged not to have to undergo it; death is what is required, not suicide. And since one must love one's neighbour—that is to say, he whom one meets on one's way—as oneself, one must also try to shield him from it. But just as one consents to one's own affliction when it comes upon one, so one must consent to that of others when it is *absolutely* impossible to prevent it, but with the same irreducible bitterness. This bitterness does not prevent the love of God, for it does not prevent one from feeling beauty; it is, in fact, a condition for feeling it. It is through its bitterness that the *Iliad* is beautiful. There is no first-class art without this core of bitterness.

To love God through and beyond the destruction of Troy and of Carthage—and without consolation. Love is not consolation, it is light.

True earthly goods are *μεταξύ*. We can only respect those of others (e.g. foreign cities) if we regard those we possess ourselves only as *μεταξύ*—which implies that one is on the way towards the point where one will be able to do without them.

We can only have a horror of doing harm to others if we have

reached, are close to, or moving towards the point where others can no longer do us harm. (One then loves others, in the last resort, like one's *past* self.)

To submit oneself to the will of God—what does this mean?

Three domains:

1. That which does not depend in any way upon us (in particular, all accomplished facts). We should love all such things taken both as a whole and in detail, absolutely; should feel (read) therein the presence of what we love.

Love becomes transcendent when one reads the object loved through and beyond horrible things (horrible for the whole soul).

[God can never be an object, and it is in this sense that he is loving before being loved. We only love him perfectly when he loves himself through us as medium.]

2. That which belongs to the domain of the will, that is to say, things which we can clearly represent to ourselves through the intelligence and the imagination, and where we can dispose of exteriorly and combine certain particular means with a view to the accomplishment of certain particular ends. Here, we must carry out unfalteringly and without delay whatever appears to us to be manifestly our duty, or else, if no such manifest duty appears, we must follow arbitrary, but fixed, rules chosen in such a way as not to shock the conscience.

This must be done in order to avoid having a will of *one's own*. Furthermore, we must choose objective rules, rules possessing the *virtue of limiting*, since it is a question of a limited domain—or else follow our inclination, provided this be only in a limited measure.

3. All that which without belonging to the domain of the will is not absolutely independent of ourselves.

When we think on God with attention and love, he rewards us by exercising upon the soul a constraint which is exactly proportional to that attention and love. (Here we have the spiritual equivalent of an automatisin.) In the state of perfection, this constraint is total. Below that state, it is partial.

We must only carry out that which we are irresistibly impelled to do by this constraint. The rest belongs to the domain of evil, and whatever we do there we can only do evil. We must, therefore, allow ourselves to be carried along thither by the current of events (while making use of the limiting rules: perseverance in a certain line of conduct once adopted, conformity to social decorum, etc.)

when the need to make a choice arises, and abstain from all action when we are able to, until a greater attention and love have brought with them as a reward a greater constraint.

St. Catherine of Siena. The goods of this world are like flowers which only retain their scent and beauty so long as they are not picked. Cf. 'In detachment find thy delight.'

Contemplation is that with reference to which the aesthetic order is a condition of existence. Contemplation, not pleasure, is the aesthetic criterion. What are the conditions for contemplation?

These conditions are found in nature and in certain works of man. (Certain things produce an aesthetic pleasure—of a secondary order—without being objects of contemplation.)

One has to deserve by dint of love to undergo a constraint. Cf. poetic inspiration.

The mode of reading we employ for a melody as a whole (not for the individual notes) is the mode which, out of love, we must employ in the world at all scales of magnitude, for each part represents an absolutely beautiful whole.

Mathematical invention is transcendent. It proceeds from absolutely non-representable analogies, and all we can do is to mark their consequences.

It is because mathematics are clear *par excellence* and to a unique degree that the mystery is caught therein as in a net.

That to which authentic genius has access, to the exclusion of the common run of mankind, is purely and simply the transcendent, which is also the object of sainthood.

How is it that morality seems far less necessary in connection with the transcendent under the form of genius than it does under the form of sainthood?

Job. How is it that the pure cry of human misery, when imitated, is so beautiful? It is what reality never, never offers us. And yet it is pure, naked reality.

It is *σῶμα σῆμα*¹ which appears. The soul absolutely subjected, by constraint, to this necessity, and the *impossible* nature of this subjection.

Evil, third dimension of the divine. Solitude of man. Remoteness of God. Transcendence.

¹ The body is a tomb.

By the perfectly pure contemplation of human misery we are caught up to heaven.

Cross.

[*Sap.*—The impious man lives in Time. (And so he passes.))
Evil is a condition of de-creation.

In each nation of antiquity there is as it were an obsession with regard to one aspect of divine things. Israel: one and only God. India: assimilation of the soul to God, in the state of perfection, through mystical union. China: passivity, absence of God, non-active action. Egypt: salvation and life eternal through assimilation to a suffering God, who has died and come to life again. Greece: transcendence, distance of the divine and the supernatural, misery of man, search for connecting bridges (mediation)—[And what about Mesopotamia ???]

(Israel's mission was continued by the Mohammedans. India and China were left to carry theirs on. Christianity took over the inheritance of Egypt above all, but also that of Greece.)

Without evil, we should never renounce this world.

Job, at the end of his dark night, which he has passed through without consolation, manifestly sees the beauty of the world. It is necessary to have passed through total misery. Satan addressing God: 'Doth he love Thee for thyself alone?' It is a question of the level of love. Is love situated on the level of sheep, fields of corn, numerous children? Or is it situated deeper down, farther back in the third dimension, behind? However far back this love may reach, there is a breaking-point when it succumbs, and it is this moment which transforms, wrenches us away from the finite toward the infinite, makes the love of the soul for God *transcendent in the soul*. It is the *death of the soul*. Woe to him for whom the death of the body precedes that of the soul. *What kills the soul is the destructive flow of time*. But this death is an ordeal. The soul that is not filled with love dies a wrong kind of death. Slaves. Why is it necessary that such a death should happen without distinction? It must needs be so. It is necessary that everything should happen without distinction.

If I thought that God sends me pain by an act of his will and for my good, I should think that I was something, and I should disregard the principal use of pain, which is to teach me that I am nothing.

But one must love God through and beyond pain (feel his presence and his reality through the organ of supernatural love, the only organ capable of this) as one feels the consistency of the paper through and beyond the pencil.

Similarly, the spectacle of men's misery teaches me that they are nothing, and, provided I identify myself with them, that I am nothing. It is not simply as a particular human being, it is as a human being as such that I am nothing. As a creature.

I have to love to be nothing. How horrible it would be if I were something. I have to love my nothingness, love to be nothingness; to love with that part of the soul which lies on the other side of the curtain, for the part of the soul which is perceptible to consciousness is unable to love nothingness, has a horror of it. If it thinks it does love nothingness, what it really loves is something different.

Human misery is not created by the extreme affliction that falls upon some human beings, it is only revealed by it.

We should mitigate this affliction whenever we can solely for the following reason: we must avoid falling into it ourselves, or must extricate ourselves therefrom when we can do so, because it has to come from outside, to be endured; and we must love as ourselves, in the same way as we do ourselves, the human being whom chance gives us the opportunity of helping.

To look upon oneself (as far as one is a phenomenal being) simply and exclusively as a small part of the universe.

The domain of the will. We must conduct ourselves here (in those cases where inclination is not a legitimate and sufficient guide) in such a way as to suppress it (to replace the will by rules).

'Thou art become a balance . . . ' The Cross as ordeal.

'Madness of love.' The creation is a very much greater act of madness still than the incarnation.

Suicide condemned as an ersatz form of de-creation.

The expression of God's commandments in the sacred texts is only given as an object for the attention. But there is really only commandment from the moment when they receive an answering echo in the heart, namely, an impulsion.

Louse and thread of the Taoists.¹

Attention: non-active action of the divine part of the soul upon the other part.

¹ See footnote, p. 30.

'Thou art become a balance for this body.' The Cross as ordeal. Affliction is the supreme ordeal, and ordeals in general are images of this.

Christ curing the sick, raising up from the dead; this is the humble, human, almost menial part of his mission. The supernatural part is the bloody sweat, the unsatisfied desire to find consolation among his friends, the supplication to be spared, the feeling of being forsaken by God.

Θεέ μου θεέ μου, ἵνατί με ἐγκατέλιπες;¹

There lies the real proof that Christianity is something divine.

Acts of obedience. There is a part of the soul for which genuinely good actions constitute a violence, but another part for which they constitute a surrender to an impulsion. In this way they operate as a sieve.

[For this notion of sieve, cf. sieve in *Timaeus*.]

God is the object of all praise. He is value.

Prov. Wisdom: 'I love them that love me.'

Anaximander's principle. Evil in matter; and at the same time good, as representing something copied. Evil imitates good as a result of necessity which determines all its modalities.

I noumenal, I phenomenal; union of the two.

Trinity, is it the divine equivalent of this?

There are two ways of obeying God, as matter and as spirit. To do evil is to obey God as matter. There cannot be anything in us which does not obey God. Consequently, if we obey him as matter, the spirit is absent. God in us is dead.

I am nothing. A state of hell exists for all those for whom 'I' is being ('I' projected on to finite things).

Notion of the relationship of the whole to the parts in the relations between the manifested and the divine—Source of a great many errors. Needs to be very closely examined.

Ps. 39. 'Remove thy stroke away from me: I am consumed by the blow of thine hand.' So also Job.

One yearns for a moment not to bear any longer the weight of the universe on one's back.

Trinity—God's relationship to himself—Things are not related

¹ My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? (Matt. xxvii, 46).

to anything—man is related to something other. God alone is related to himself. Narcissus aspires to what is only possible for God. God alone knows and loves himself. This relationship is his very essence. This relationship is the fulness of being.

Distinct persons: he himself has a relationship analogous to that between one man and another man. But far from this relationship being an abstraction with regard to terms, it possesses as much reality [or even more?].

In the case of a man who loves and beholds God, it is God who loves and beholds himself through him; in this sense the Holy Spirit dwells in him.

The Model in *Timaeus* corresponds to the Holy Spirit.

The Father is creator. The Word is incarnate (already in the order of the world, before the incarnation properly so-called). The Spirit is not related to the world. But it constitutes the 'I' of the perfect man. It is the de-created 'I'.

Timaeus. The Model is the Good. That is obvious. Beauty is the exact image of good.

The question at issue in *Timaeus* is that of God in relation to the world. But there is nothing which proves that the triad Father, Soul of the World and Model does not correspond to something outside relationship to the world, within the being of God; this could have been reserved for esoteric instruction. Dialectics make it possible to attain God; does this indicate that there is a relationship in God? cf. *Parmenides*.

The idea of the miracle prevents one from conceiving non-active action.

Νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.¹

The meaning of the Trinity is that God is *thought*. All thought has a subject and an object. The Father thinks his word.

This thought is love.

This word is order.

This order is the image of this thought, of this love.

Theaetetus—*φύγη*—conversion.

God one, purely one, is *object*—Old Testament—Koran. God one and three is *thought*.

Unity which is not the correlative of the multiple—

Hindu trinity. God the Preserver—Brahma—The Sacred Word—

¹ Thought is the thought of thought (Aristotle).

Order of the world: is the Word. God the Creator—Vishnu: is the Father. God the Destroyer—God of de-creation—Shiva: is the Spirit.

Labour: descending movement. Man has to turn himself into object in order that the object should turn itself into human energy. (Similarly, God turning himself into man in order that man should turn himself into God . . .)

And with plants? (Except the seed die . . .)

The spectacle of blind necessity is beautiful because it suggests a NON-REPRESENTABLE harmony with good.

The function of duty (second point in my letter to P. P.¹) is to delimit the domain of inspiration, so that it should not become confused with caprice—LIKE THE FIXED FORM IN POETRY.

(That is why perhaps artists, possessing an equivalent, have less need of an ethical standard than saints?)

The Gospel—With respect to God, love is no different from *obedience*.

By bringing the attention to bear every day on the analogy between duty and the fixed form in poetry, it is impossible not to make the former penetrate more deeply into the heart.

I must suppress the 'I'.

I must bring my soul into conformity with the flow of time; cause the revolutions of the stars to enter into my soul.

Omissions in the performance of duty are the *signs* of imperfection.

I must try to cure faults through the attention and not through the will.

Two contradictory ideas about God:

he knows all things, for he is truth;

he is ignorant of all things, for he is outside time.

Water of Taoists.

Similarly:

he does all things;

he does nothing—

In so far as he is Cause, he is equally present, with an equal density (everything is full of being) here, there and everywhere, in all parts of the world, and in all collections of parts, at all levels.

In so far as he is Model, he is present in the souls ascending toward perfection or which have reached that state.

¹ Father Perrin.

To say that God does such and such a thing in order that . . . is absurd. If God can want a certain particular thing to happen, he can bring it about immediately.

The notion of *condition of existence* is for us the sole link between *good* and *necessity*.

Beauty is the harmony between chance and good.

The real (for man) is what is at the same time felt and thought.

Joy is the feeling of reality.

The more we feel the opposition between chance and good, the more deeply do we experience beauty and joy.

Sorrow is the weakening of the feeling of reality. It is a wrong form of de-creation, on the level of the imagination.

It is a crime to make men sorrowful.

Adam and Eve, turned out of the earthly Paradise, were sorrowful.

Even Christ. 'My soul is sorrowful unto death.'

If man could not be subjected to evil on the part of Nature and above all on the part of men, the human part of the soul would then not be subjected to necessity. The man who is not rooted in God through supernatural love is entirely at the mercy of chance. But every human being, however lowly his origin, has, at a certain period of his life, the opportunity of rooting himself in God. If he does not take advantage of it, and if later on he is delivered over to affliction to the extent of no longer having this opportunity, such a phenomenon is no different from that whereby human beings die prematurely.

God wants everything that takes place *to a like degree*, not certain things as means and certain other things as ends. Similarly, he wants *to a like degree* the whole and the parts, each portion, each slice that can be cut out of continuous reality.

This can only be represented to the human intelligence in the following terms: he wants necessity to exist.

The will of God cannot be for us a subject of hypothesis. To know it we have only to observe what takes place: what takes place is his will.

The Word is the silence of God.

One must not say that God wants the suffering of a saint with a view to his progress toward perfection, but: he wants his suffering, and he wants his progress, and he wants the relationship between the two—and a host of other relationships besides.

I must not love my suffering because it is useful, but because it *is*. Necessity is the veil of God.

Superposed readings: we should read necessity behind sensation, order behind necessity, and God behind order.

We must love all facts, not for their consequences, but because in each fact God is there present. But that is tautological. To love all facts is nothing else than to read God in them.

We must love our enemies, because they exist. We must (if the opportunity for it occurs and there is no serious drawback to prevent us) do them good *in order to* love them.

Precepts are not given in order to be put into practice, but practice is prescribed in order to understand precepts. They are like scales in music. One does not play Bach without having practised scales. But nor does one practise scales for the sake of the scales. Cf. Upanishads; Lao-Tse.

The idea of Providence diminishes the purity of the love of God.

There is only one proof of the goodness of God—it is that we love him. The love that we have for him is the sole benefit worthy of our gratitude, and consequently this love contains within itself the proof of its legitimacy. When it has no other incentive than itself, nothing can shake it; for even at the point of 'Why hast thou forsaken me' love does not falter, but takes on the form of absence instead of that of contact. It thus attains the extreme limit of purity.

Be ye perfect even as your heavenly Father is perfect. This is to love all things equally; as the Father is in an equal degree the creator of all things.

But, under a different aspect, of the *order of the world*.

The Word: silence in God, expression in creation.

The essence of God is neither subject nor object, but thought (*νόησις*¹, attribute).

Macrocosm and microcosm. Just as Christ, according to St. Thomas, allowed to each part of his being the fullest exercise of its function—e.g. in the case of his sensibility, on the Cross, suffering—so likewise does God in the world. Matter has there all the blindness which belongs to its nature; the wicked do there all the evil which belongs to their nature, and the good all the good which belongs to their nature. An absolute rigour prevails in the orders of causality, even there where there is a mixture of good and evil (where good and evil mutually condition one another).

Evil in the universe is analogous to suffering, not to sin. Sin relates to the individual.

¹ Thought.

The good and the wicked are to an equal degree parts of the order of the world. But the perfect alone are the image of it as well.

Balance and sieve.

Men in whom there is an excess of reason over sensibility are inferior to the perfect man. In the same way a god who intervened providentially in the world would be something inferior to God.

He who loves is indifferent to his trials, his suffering, his unworthiness so long as he knows that the object of his love is happy.

What does it matter that there should never be joy in me, since there is perpetually perfect joy in God? And the same applies to goodness, intelligence and all things.

Folklore. Giants whose life it is impossible to take because it is outside themselves. But where can one find a place to put it for it to be absolutely safe?

The crucifixion is the conclusion, the accomplishment of a human destiny. How could a being whose essence it is to love God and who finds himself situated in space and time have any other vocation than the cross? Adam before the Fall is inconceivable; one can only conceive a causal, non-temporal anteriority between his creation, his sin and his punishment. The whole of humanity has sinned in a non-temporal sense by possessing its own will. It has been created with a will of its own and the vocation to renounce it. But this vocation can only be carried out with time and effort.

(Christ himself . . .)

Adam's sin and time. Bluebeard, etc. Don't do a certain thing. Don't open a certain door. At the end of a given time one disobeys, unless one has been able to drive away the thought of it once and for all. (This latter consideration is in contradiction with the former one, but this doesn't matter at all.)

The capacity to drive away a thought once and for all is the door to eternity. The infinite in an instant.

The order from God was an ordeal proving that Adam had a will of his own. He was in a state of sin in view of the fact that he had a will of his own. It is clear that there never was a period of time in which he was in a state of innocence.

God created man in a state of misery. To have created him in a state of holiness would have been equivalent to not creating him at all. (That is why: *genitum, non factum*.¹)

¹ . . . begotten, not made (Nicene creed).

Creation is a descending movement, and it is in this sense that labour is an imitation of creation (as also of the incarnation and of the eucharist.)

The tree bearing the forbidden fruit was a balance, like the cross.

(Whence comes the similitude between the cross and a tree?)

Why trees? *in ligno*¹?

St. Paul. The law as cause of sin. The law as ordeal.

Tree and force of gravity—Tree and entropy. Carnal life and spiritual life. Adam sought the carnal, immediate life.

Tabus as ordeal.

Eve considered the tree good to look at, attractive to the eyes and valuable for the intelligence.

(Bergsonian intuition. Desire in Blake. Etc.)

Adam is afraid of God, not because he has disobeyed, but because he is naked.

The tree that nourishes kills, and the tree of suffering saves.

Salvation takes place not through an ascending but a descending movement.

Only the things relating to inspiration are nourished by delay. Those relating to natural duty, to the will, do not suffer delay.

Correct use of *Time*. There is nothing more important.

Adam's nakedness. Naked with an unchaste nakedness, the nakedness which longs to be clothed.

Life is an ersatz form of salvation.

Tree and beam. Descending movement of life towards matter.

The three forms of obedience—in enunciating that I have been untruthful, since I do not comply with it. *Ποιοῦντες ἀλήθειαν*.²

Repentance is a violence which the soul does itself in order to bring its blemishes toward the light.

God has clothed man. Man has got to make himself naked again.

One only has experience of good by accomplishing it.

One only has experience of evil by refusing to allow oneself to accomplish it, or, if one has accomplished it, by repenting of it.

To accomplish the evil lying potentially in oneself is to prevent oneself from having a knowledge of it.

When one accomplishes it, one does not know it, because evil flees the light.

There is a certain instinct of self-preservation which encourages

¹ . . . in wood.

² . . . Doing the truth.

us to remain as we are, which rejects progress. It makes us flee the light, because the light effects changes. It does not prevent remorse, because there is no light in remorse. On the contrary. Remorse is the very movement made to hide oneself.

In *Phèdre*, the moment of remorse is: 'Where to hide myself . . . ?'; the moment of repentance: ' . . . all his purity.'

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The destruction of a city, of a people, of a civilization—what action gives man a false divinity more surely than this one? Already the fact of killing a man, his fellow-creature, lifts him in imagination above death. But to kill something social, belonging to that social element which lies above us, which we can never understand, which constrains us in what is *almost* the innermost part of ourselves, which imitates the religious element to the extent of being confounded with it without the aid of supernatural discernment . . .

The remorse felt by the Greeks for this action—a supernatural sentiment—brought them the miracle of their civilization.

The will to power. Rajas. This was the temptation of Adam and that of Christ.

Venise sauvée.

Act I. Renaud concludes: let us wait . . .

Act II. *Bring out the fact that Jaffier's recoiling is supernatural.*

In so far as I have a clear representation in my mind of one of my faults, I have got to make use of my will in order to cure it, although this use I make of my will be often vain. But I have not got to ask that it should be cured supernaturally. For the veritable evil is not this fault, but the root of this fault, which can only be supernaturally known. If, through the effect of grace, this indeed happens, by the same act one knows the evil, one asks to be cured of it and one is cured of it. So long as this does not happen, one does not know what it is right to ask for, and consequently one has to make supplication in the void.

It is a fortunate thing that the hidden impurity which is in us is partially diffused in representable faults.

Love in the case of someone who is happy is to wish to share the suffering of the beloved who is unhappy.

Love in the case of someone who is unhappy is to be filled with

joy by the mere knowledge that the beloved is happy, without sharing in this happiness or even desiring to do so.

If one turns the intelligence toward good, the whole soul is bound to be drawn toward it little by little in spite of itself.

Venise sauvée.

R.—It is necessary that they should no longer look upon us as made of the same human material as themselves. And besides, it is true. This action transports us above humanity. For a State is very far indeed above man. What sort of a man is it who has destroyed a State?

It was necessary that man should be able to be a false god for man.

It is not through the medium of the notion of utility that we can arrive at contemplating everything with love, but *through the medium of the notion of necessity, which excludes all representable forms of good.*

The theories on the subject of genius which always comes to the top, progress, etc., proceed from the fact that it is intolerable to imagine what is most precious in the world being delivered up to chance. It is because this notion is intolerable that it has to be contemplated.

Creation—this is an exact case in point.

The only good which is not subject to chance is the one that is outside this world.

To discover the specific spirituality contained in all forms of human activity. Labour in all its forms, science, art . . . (war?!)

Criterion: those which are incapable of containing spirituality should be abolished.

To accept time, descend into time—what could be more painful for the mind? But it is necessary.

Reverie provides an ersatz form of eternity.

The different means the soul has of hiding itself, being ashamed of its nakedness—Reverie—Carnal satisfactions (even elementary and legitimate ones), etc.—(Daily occupations, particular profession or calling . . .)

Make time enter into my soul like a cross, like the nails of a cross.

The death of beings dear to us is a purification, if we do not believe in their immortality.

[A certain good action which I can do and which I do not do is a certain good action which God wishes to do and cannot through my fault, for he does not wish to do it otherwise than through me.]

To see one's misery not as an individual thing, and therefore a non-essential thing, but as the misery of the creature in oneself.

It is not for man to go towards God, it is for God to go towards man. Man has only to watch and wait.

Everything that is real is subject to necessity. It is the necessity contained in the spiritual mechanism which enables us to distinguish genuine cases of saintliness from imaginary ones.

God sends affliction to the wicked and to the good without distinction, as he does rain and sunshine. (He has not reserved the cross for Christ.) He only enters into contact with the individual human being as such by means of purely spiritual grace which responds to the gaze turned toward him, that is to say, to the precise degree in which the individual ceases to be one. No event whatsoever is a favour on the part of God; grace alone.

Visions of the saints, etc. Although closely bound up with religious fervour, they are related to human weakness. A saint's life is marvellous; it would be still more marvellous if it had been what it was without visions or voices. But human weakness—even in the case of the saints—is never or hardly ever capable of this. Christ on the other hand . . . He had no visions or voices on the Mount of Olives, nor on the Cross.

The visions and voices proceed from the fact that the imagination plays a rather larger part in supernatural love than is strictly legitimate.

To see one's own misery as something impersonal. To take the 'I' out of sin is to uproot it, to take away its vital nourishment. That is why excessive scrupulosity, remorse, a too-detailed examination of conscience, etc., are bad things. The only misery that is really mine is to be nothing; it is the feeling of nothingness. But the feeling of sin is not the feeling of nothingness. It is the feeling of a negative being. It is affliction which gives the feeling of nothingness, and then only in so far as it is felt neither as an expiation nor as a test.

I must transform sin into affliction in the mind. Not by seeking for excuses. It is an affliction of a particular kind. Being an accomplished fact, it no longer depends on me, and yet through it I find myself in a state of degradation.

(The children punished for the sins of the fathers—symbols of

what takes place in a life. The paradox of original sin is found again and again throughout the course of life.)

I have to contemplate this state, perceive its necessity, and accept it.

Mystery of *time*.

In a sense afflictions are just. For the beings upon which they fall are either rooted in supernatural love, or else they are not. In the former case, they are not debased. In the latter, they would be capable, under certain given circumstances, of inflicting a like affliction upon others. Affliction only has a hold over the whole soul in the case of those whose whole soul is at the level of evil, and of good merely as the opposite of evil.

By taking the 'I' out of sin, I extenuate the sin and abolish the 'I'.

The spiritual and temporal good which God does to humanity as a whole over a given period is mathematically proportional to the co-operation God receives from men during that period. There is no possible question of there being an atom more.

C. Love is in need of reality. What could be more appalling than to love through a corporal appearance some imaginary being, when the day comes that one realizes the fact? Far more appalling than death, for death cannot prevent the loved one from having existed.

It is the punishment for the crime of having fed love with imagination.

To try to love without imagining. To love appearance in its nakedness, devoid of interpretation. What one then loves is truly God.

Prodigies are to be found in all the passions. A gambler is capable of fasting and going without sleep almost like a saint; he has premonitions, etc.

It is very dangerous to love God as a gambler loves his game. Certainly it is very beautiful and very noble, but it is not perfection.

The flesh is dangerous in so far as it refuses to love God, but also in so far as it indiscreetly concerns itself about loving him.

In order to prevent this, is it perhaps a good thing to allow it certain limited satisfactions?

The best thing would be to undergo pains and privations inflicted from without, as the result of affliction.

God has clothed us with a personality—*what* we are—in order that we should divest ourselves of it.

The leper. 'Εὰν θέλῃς, δύνασαι με καθαρίσαι.¹ Leprosy—that is me. All that I am is leprosy. The 'I' as such is leprosy.

Destruction of Troy. Fall of petals from fruit-trees in blossom. To know that what is most precious is not rooted in existence. That is beautiful. Why? Because it projects the soul outside time.

'All that thou desirest, living or dead . . .'

Compare Troy to Jerusalem. Jerusalem believed itself to be rooted in Time.

To love human misery, to rejoice that one is nothing.

Love is a sign of our misery. God can only love himself. We can only love something other than ourselves.

It is not for us to bring ourselves to a state of humility. Humility already lies in us. Only we humble ourselves before false gods.

A man of letters bows down before his genius, a coquette before her beauty, and a woman queuing up before an egg.

In the order of intelligence, humility is nothing other than attention. Speaking generally, humility is love without self-requital.

To accord value in myself only to what is transcendent, that is to say unknown to me in myself, which is not me—and to nothing else, without any exception at all.

Humility makes the difference between art of the very first order and all the rest of art.

Venise sauvée.

Act II. Violetta has to appear at the moment when Jaffier reaches the very height of exaltation. When she has gone, Pierre replies at length to Jaffier who remains silent. On bidding good-bye to Pierre, Jaffier says like someone who has to force himself in order to do so: You are right, what does a man or a woman in our path count at this moment . . . ?

Must bring the Old Testament into Pierre's pronouncements.

Temptation of good. One can only avoid good by turning one's attention away from it. If one devotes sufficient attention to it, and for a sufficient length of time, whatever one may do to defend oneself, one is caught.

In the case of evil, on the other hand, one is caught when one's attention is not directed towards it.

Arjuna; it is not *in this way* that one passes from evil to good.

¹ If thou wilt, thou canst make me clean (Matt. viii, 2; Mark i, 40; Luke v, 12).

The key to spirituality in the various temporal occupations is humility.

Humiliations turn away from the path of humility those in whom there is not already at any rate a beginning of supernatural love.

The wrong kind of humiliation leads one to believe that one is nothing in so far as oneself—a certain particular human being—is referred to.

Humility consists in the knowledge that one is nothing in so far as one is a human being, and, more generally, in so far as one is a creature.

The intelligence has a great part to play here. One must conceive the universal.

A rational creature is one that contains within itself the germ, the principle, the vocation of de-creation.

Sattva represents this tendency towards de-creation.

Creation and de-creation, like centrifugal and centripetal force.

[If my eternal salvation were on this table, in the form of an object, and all I had to do was to stretch out my hand to take hold of it, I would not stretch out my hand without having received the order to do so.]

As, in general, beauty is the image of good, so purity is the image of humility.

Humility is the only entirely supernatural virtue, that is to say one to which no natural virtue that imitates it corresponds.

India.—Superposed readings—One must love the impersonal God through and beyond the personal God (and further behind still the God which is the one and the other, and yet again further behind the God which is neither the one nor the other) for fear of sinking down to conceiving him as a thing, which is what happens sometimes to Spinoza.

Symmetrical solids and fourth dimension. In the same way, the representation of contradictory truths draws the soul up to the non-representable.

Mathematics, and the ability to reason in a rigorous fashion concerning the non-representable.

But the *signs* (the abuse of the signs) degrade this wonderful thing and prevent its mystical application.

Hippolytus of Euripides. It is marvellous that Aphrodite has

absolutely no power to make him fall in love. She can only cause his death by means of Phaedra.

Just as God is powerless to perform good among men without the co-operation of men, so likewise the devil in the case of evil.

Hindu definition: 'Men devoid of wisdom are the cattle of the gods. Just as a man doesn't like losing a head of cattle, so the gods don't like the fact that a man should become wise.' We find an echo of this conception in the account of original sin, as given in Genesis, and in the story of the tower of Babel. So also in Greece, in the story of Prometheus and in that of Hippolytus. One could easily imagine such an interpretation of Christ's crucifixion (although, as far as I know, there is not any such). The doctrine concerning the devil's reactions in the face of spiritual progress is also connected with this.

What is the meaning of this conception?

De-creation is contrary to nature.

(But in the story of Adam it is a question of false de-creation. Or else has there been a mixture of two different traditions? Can it be said that the supernatural vocation of man is the cause of his misery? In a sense it would not be false.)

God does not look lovingly on such and such an event as a means with a view to such and such another event as an end, but on both of them on exactly equal grounds. We should do the same. We have to be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect. The intelligence is obliged to dispose means with a view to ends; but love should attach itself to each in an equal degree. We have to love the act of sweeping as much as we do the swept room. (This does not necessarily mean taking pleasure in it.)

Renunciation of the fruits.

[Feeling, due to fatigue, of *insuperable* time. It is a favour to experience it often.]

Love without any prospect in view.

The knowledge of human misery is difficult for the rich man, the powerful man to acquire, because he is almost invincibly brought to believe that he is something. It is difficult for the poverty-stricken man to acquire, because he is almost invincibly brought to believe that the rich man, the powerful man is something.

Ecclesiastes. Indispensable moment of love; to be preserved always. Job. 'God will laugh at the trials of the innocent.' To know this, and to love it; and without seeking for an explanation.

Man has also to endure the sufferings of the innocent in what is outside his own sphere. (I am come only for the lost sheep of the house of Israel . . .) [But to endure them as a laceration.]

Within the sphere of his action, on the other hand, he is man and not God. (It is at the level of supernatural love and of prayer that he has to be indifferent like God.)

(The text says: . . . ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ἀγαπάτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν καὶ προσεύχεσθε ὑπὲρ τῶν διωκόντων ὑμᾶς· ὅπως γένησθε υἱοὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς, ὅτι τὸν ἥλιον αὐτοῦ ἀνατέλλει ἐπὶ πονηροὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς καὶ βρέχει ἐπὶ δικαίους καὶ ἀδίκους. Ἐὰν γὰρ ἀγαπήσητε τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας ὑμᾶς, τίνα μισθὸν ἔχετε;¹

ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τελειός ἐστιν.²)

The love experienced for God by a creature is such a marvel, such a favour, that it provides a proof (and the unique proof) of the goodness of God. The more fate causes me to sink into misery, the more marvellous does this marvel become, and the more convincing is the proof I receive.

That is why nothing can equal in value the bitterness of affliction without consolation.

Consolations are exceptional psychic phenomena, but do not belong to the supernatural.

Pavlov's dogs, and martyrs in general.

Need to distinguish very clearly between extraordinary phenomena (of the order of miracles) and the supernatural.

God desires the salvation of souls. God has to be obeyed. There are two ways of linking together these two truths (truth from the point of view of faith). To obey God because he desires our salvation. Or to direct our steps toward salvation solely through obedience. The latter way is the purer.

The idea of revelation, and that morals themselves are derived from it (and not the reverse); just in the same degree as this idea is stupid on the plane on which it is ordinarily situated (cf. Euthyphro), so, at a greater depth, is it true and beautiful.

Transcendent nature of true morals. Supernatural character of all pure virtue.

¹ But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust. For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? (Matt. v, 44-46).

² Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect (Matt. v, 48).

Use of temptations. It arises from the connection between the soul and time. The contemplation of a possible evil (possible in the full sense of the word), during a long time, without accomplishing it, brings about a sort of transubstantiation. If we resist with a finite energy, this energy becomes exhausted within a certain given time, and when it is spent we yield. If we remain motionless and attentive, it is the temptation which becomes exhausted (and we then reap the re-graded energy in it?).

Likewise, if we contemplate a possible good action, in the same fashion—while remaining motionless and attentive—a transubstantiation of energy also takes place, thanks to which we carry out this good action.

The transubstantiation of energy consists in this, that in the case of evil there comes a moment when we cannot accomplish it, and in the case of good, one when we cannot do otherwise than accomplish it. This also provides a criterion of good and evil.

When one contemplates a picture of the very first order for three hours, during the course of those three hours the nature of the contemplation changes.

‘Quantity is changed into quality.’ This is eminently applicable to duration. It is the grace by which time conducts us outside time.

If I meet a very dear friend who has been long absent, and he comes toward me and grips my hand; if he grips it too hard and hurts me, this pain is a joy. Not because I think he has gripped my hand so hard for my own good; nor because I regard the force of his grip as a sign of affection; it may only be due to the fact that he has powerful muscles, or to the fact that some injury received makes my hand sensitive. It is just that this contact furnishes the proof of the presence of the person loved, and so, although the contact may take the form of pain, as a proof of that person’s presence it is a joy. If the contact were an agreeable one in itself, it would be an added joy, and neither more nor less of a joy intrinsically. (To tell the truth, I hardly pay any attention to the painful or agreeable nature of the sensation as such.)

So in the case of affliction or prosperity, and God.

It is not because God loves us that we should love him. It is because God loves us that we should love ourselves. How could one love oneself without this motive?

[The love of self is impossible for man, except by this detour.]

'He first loved us.' This is only true in a sense. For since supernatural love alone makes us believe in him, it is also a condition, not a result, of our belief in his love. By this grace it is given to us to love gratuitously.

It is wrong to desire one's salvation, not because it is egoistic (it is not within man's power to be egoistic), but because it is orienting the soul toward a merely individual and contingent possibility, instead of toward the fulness of being, toward the good which exists unconditionally.

If one could believe in God without loving him, one would not be able to love him.

Cf. Lagneau. (Kant also, clumsily expressed.)

Man would like to be egoistic and is unable to be. This is the most striking characteristic of his misery and the source of his greatness.

Man always devotes himself to an *order*. Only, except with the aid of supernatural illumination, this order is centred either in himself, or else in some particular being (who can be an abstraction) into whom he has transferred himself. (Napolcon—for the soldiers of the Empire, Science, the Party, etc.) It is a perspective order.

One always finishes up by finding the spot where the giant has hidden his life.

(Must write a book about folklore)

Profound truth contained in Catholic confession—namely, that it is not resolution accompanied by an interior stiffening, the expenditure of energy, which wipes away sin, but repentance, that is to say, the light of attention, and this with repetition and time. Each instant of light wipes away a little of it, until it is finally obliterated—provided one never throws oneself into it voluntarily.

Conditions of existence.

The universe is so made that a creature is able to love God in a pure manner.

In other words, creation contains within itself the condition for de-creation.

The superiority of Euripides' *Hippolytus* over the other plays is so striking that its esoteric source is evident.

[Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*—*Prometheus*.

Sophocles: *Antigone*—*Electra*—*Philoctetes*.

[Euripides: *Hippolytus*—*Bacchae*.

God only loves himself. He loves us—this only means that he desires, with our co-operation, to love himself through us.

God has made us free and intelligent in order that we should renounce our will and our intelligence. To renounce them means, in the first place, in the representational sphere, to exercise them correctly (according to just rules) and in their fulness; and in the second place, to know that the reality of the representable is unreal as compared with that of the non-representable.

Why is it that the coincidence between necessity and existence (which defines reality at our level) is a joy?

Degradation of Catholic thought. It is not *because* the Word became incarnate that we have to serve men in their flesh. (When, Lord, saw we thee an hungred and fed thee . . . ?) (It would be truer, although still incorrect, to say that it became incarnate especially in order to teach us to serve men in their flesh.)

... ὅπως ἡ σου ἡ ἐλεημοσύνη ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ καὶ ὁ πατήρ σου ὁ βλέπων ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ ἀποδώσει σοι.¹

... τῷ πατρί σου τῷ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ. . . .²

The mere consciousness of having performed a good action is a natural reward which reduces to that extent, mathematically, the supernatural reward.

Οὐαὶ ὑμῖν τοῖς πλουσίοις, ὅτι ἀπέχετε τὴν παράκλησιν ὑμῶν.³

By taking *πλούσιοι*⁴ in a wide sense like *πτωχοί*⁵, one may translate:

Woe unto those that have received their consolation (for it is impossible for them to be supernaturally consoled).

There is no place in them for the Paraclete.

It does not say: love God, and thy neighbour for the love of God; but: thy neighbour *as* thyself, and the two commandments form one.

Therefore: whosoever genuinely loves God, even if he thinks he has forgotten God's creatures, loves men without knowing it.

Whosoever loves his neighbour as himself, even if he denies the existence of God, loves God.

One does not love oneself. That is a product of perspective. We have got to lay aside perspective; to transfigure the sensibility by

¹ That thine alms may be in secret; and thy Father which seeth in secret himself shall reward thee openly (Matt. vi, 4).

² . . . To thy Father which is in secret (Matt. vi, 6).

³ Woe unto you that are rich! for ye have received your consolation (Luke vi, 24).

⁴ Rich.

⁵ Poor.

illuminating it with the light of the universal. The beautiful succeeds in doing this.

So also does compassion devoid of preference.

[The beautiful in the case of pleasure (to a certain extent), compassion in that of pain.]

The soul must be vulnerable to the wounds of *all flesh*, without any exception, as it is to those of one's own flesh, neither more nor less so; to every death as it is to one's own death.

This is transforming all pain, all affliction that one endures (—and that one sees being endured—and that one causes oneself) into a feeling for human misery.

By a strange mystery, this feeling is akin to that for beauty and implies *amor fati*.

By conceiving the affliction of a certain particular individual (myself or another) as human misery, and not as affliction of that individual, one reads therein the spirit captive in the flesh, the image of God captive in the flesh, and *at that instant* every man acquires a fellow-likness to Christ.

(By doing good to men '*for the sake of the Lord*', one reverses the order.)

The identity existing between the two commandments is a mystery. For in view of the host of terrible sufferings—and so often such undeserved ones—inflicted upon mankind, one might think that the love of one's neighbour leads to rebellion against God.

(But the mere fact that the supernatural feeling of love for one's neighbour is possible constitutes an experimental proof of the reality and goodness of God.)

Supernatural compassion is a bitterness without consolation, but which envelops the *void* into which grace descends.

Let it be an *irreducible* bitterness, like the irreducible bitterness of the suffering one undergoes in the flesh. Job.

This identity between the two commandments, which is an inconceivable mystery, is, it seems, a fact of experience. And this fact, itself, is genuinely *providential*.

(This proves that the Hebrews did not possess the supernatural love of God.)

The contemplation of human misery violently pulls us toward God, and it is only in others loved as ourselves that we can contemplate it. We cannot contemplate it either in ourselves as such or in others as such.

Iliad. Lawrence.

Duration. When pain and exhaustion reach the point where they cause the feeling of perpetuity to spring up in the soul, by contemplating this perpetuity with acceptance and love we are caught up to eternity. Cross.

To love one's neighbour as oneself implies that one reads in every human being the same combination of nature and supernatural vocation. The spirit in a bottle. Thought fettered. This reading goes against gravity; it is supernatural.

To love one's neighbour as oneself is nothing else than to contemplate human misery in oneself and in others.

Our neighbour is for us a mirror in which we discover the knowledge of ourselves if we love him as ourselves.

Knowledge of the self is love of God.

Why?

The silence of God compels us to an inward silence.

When we are cold and hungry from necessity, we are always a little sorry for ourselves, however highly placed spiritually we may be. Compassion for those that are cold and hungry implies the ability to conceive and imagine oneself as being placed in any sort of social and material circumstances whatsoever, and consequently the casting aside of the circumstances in which one finds oneself. This means nakedness; or at any rate a partial nakedness.

[It is consequently (*why consequently?*) the ability to conceive and imagine a perfect man—an incarnate God—placed in any sort of state of affliction whatsoever.]

'Inasmuch as ye have done it . . . '—This signifies that a perfect and pure compassion contains an implicit faith in the incarnation. Why?

Passage to the limit.

'That ye may be one with me, *as* I am one with the Father.'

Nakedness of spirit is not only a condition of love of God; it is an all-sufficient condition; it is love of God. Void.

'No man cometh unto the Father but by me.' What is the meaning of this pronouncement? It must evidently not be taken in the sense of those who believe that belonging to the Church is a condition of salvation. Therefore in some other sense. What sense?

What is *mediation*?

'Inasmuch as ye have done it . . . ' Pure compassion as *μεταξύ*.

Sacred character of suppliants. Honouring of affliction. (And at the same time ' . . . οὔτε θεοῖσι τετιμῆνος οὔτε βροτοῖσιν.'¹)

¹ . . . Who hath been honoured neither by the gods nor by mortals (*Iliad*, 24, 533).

Beauty. A fruit one contemplates without stretching out one's hand. Also an affliction one contemplates without recoiling.

The feeding of those that are hungry is a form of contemplation. In what way is it so?

None goes to God the creator and almighty without passing through God EMPTIED OF HIS DIVINITY. If one goes to God directly, it is then Jehovah (or Allah, the one in the Koran).

We have to *empty God of his divinity* in order to love him.

He emptied himself of his divinity by becoming man, then of his humanity by becoming a corpse (bread and wine), matter.

We must love God through and beyond our own joys, our own affliction, our own sins (past ones). We must love him through and beyond the joys, the afflictions and the sins of other men—and without any consolation.

To love God through and beyond a certain thing is to love that thing in purity; the two sentiments are identical.

To love God through and beyond our sins is repentance.

To love God through and beyond the affliction of others is compassion for our neighbour.

How is this? There lies the mystery.

To rebel against God because of man's affliction, after the manner of Vigny or Ivan Karamazov, is to represent God to oneself as a sovereign.

Chilean tale of the woman passionately fond of her husband. The husband dies and returns in the form of a vampire to suck her blood. She cuts his head off without the slightest hesitation.

This signifies that love is limited; it only engages the interest of supplementary energy; it stops at life (vegetative energy). Supernatural love goes beyond this limit.

That is why 'greater love hath no man than this than to lay down his life for his friends'.

It needs supernatural discernment to understand the meaning of these words. For the soldiers who used to die for Napoleon were very far from this greatest form of love. The same is true (in a great many cases) of lovers; of a miser, etc.

The supplementary energy then precipitates the body into the jaws of death. The vegetative energy is not concerned. As soon as its concern is aroused there appears (except with the help of supernatural grace) the coldest type of egoism. This is indeed the only case in which man is egoistic.

The imagination is unable to represent this state to itself, because the imagination is made up of supplementary energy. That is why we discern this truth with such difficulty.

To look for other examples.

(Fear is perhaps a momentary disappearance of supplementary energy? St. Peter—A man condemned to death.)

Martyrs have not been reduced to vegetative energy by affliction. Christ was reduced to it, without losing the light of grace.

Christ as *idea* (εἶδος) of man.

A particular man identical with the idea of man (unintelligible).

[In the Church, considered as a social organism, the mysteries inevitably degenerate into beliefs. If one adheres to it purely from the point of view of the mysteries, can one honestly enter into this social organism?]

To represent God to oneself as all-powerful is to represent oneself to oneself in a state of false divinity.

Man is only able to be one with God by uniting himself to God *stripped of his divinity* (EMPTIED of his divinity).

I am the Way.

The Tao, non-active action, is an equivalent form.

To draw the vegetative energy up to the light. The Cross alone manages to do this.

(τοῦτο δὲς ἐμοί.)

Love thy neighbour *as thyself*. This means rooting out the vegetative energy in oneself and placing it under a universal light. ('All creatures'—that is even better.) Cross.

[Not to desire suffering with a view to spiritual progress, but to desire spiritual progress with a view to the purity of suffering.]

To love God all-powerless.

To accept the suffering of others, but as suffering; which means in the first place undergoing it oneself.

The capacity for pure compassion is exactly proportional to the acceptance of one's own suffering. By what mechanism?

To account for this mechanism, we require the notion of universal sensibility (not unconnected with that pure sensibility Kant makes use of for space and time), which is also related to beauty.

It is the refusal to accept for oneself the possibility of suffering which places an obstacle in the way of compassion. It is the refusal to recognize oneself in the misery of others—which necessarily wears

an ugly appearance. (Lack of humility; compassion is never pure without humility.) The contemplation of one's own misery in others is a form of contemplation. It is voluntarily placing one's own 'I' in the miserable body in front of one (procedure followed by the unhappy prince in tragedy). [Folklore—a princess who becomes a servant; the only way of convincing people that a servant is a human being.] Impulse analogous to that of incarnation; emptying oneself of one's false divinity. This is supernatural, because it is supernatural to *descend*: moral gravity is opposed to it. (Slaves in Plautus who make us laugh. Charlie Chaplin.) The notion of necessity, which alone enables one to suffer while accepting one's suffering, alone enables one also to transfer through the mind one's own 'self' into some unhappy being.

To empty oneself of one's false divinity, to submit oneself unconditionally to the condition of human misery. Submission, acceptance and irreducible bitterness.

Compassion implies acceptance, since one voluntarily causes one's own being to descend into some unhappy being. The compassionate impulse is not that of revolt.

[Com—passion. God has had compassion on our misery, although he consents to the fact that it should exist.]

Acceptance and bitterness. Condition in which beauty emerges. *Iliad*. But why is this so?

Because only in this way can the vegetative life be wrenched up and placed beneath the light of contemplation.

Hindu Karma; the good that exists is mathematically equal to the good desired, the evil that exists to the evil desired. This is only true for humanity as a whole (except the evil which proceeds from matter: lightning, etc.). It is true for each individual in the purely spiritual sphere (and only when he has entered into that sphere).

No good is ever lost. No evil is ever lost either.

For the individual, spiritually speaking, the evil committed thickens the darkness. (For every effort accomplished by attachment increases the attachment.) (But this is only true with regard to effort; actions which are a natural product of the darkness in which he finds himself only leave him in the same identical darkness.) With respect to the world, every upsetting of the balance for which he is responsible exposes him (does not condemn him, but simply exposes him) to an upsetting of the balance in a reverse sense. And owing to the increased darkness within him he has become less capable of coping with it; he is therefore all the more *exposed* to it,

both in fact and spiritually. Whosoever kills runs the risk of being killed, and of dying wrongly. (Outwardly, perhaps, in a courageous manner; but wrongly.)

But the converse is just as true (has anyone ever said so?). Evil that is suffered, spiritually, increases the darkness, and induces a disposition making for an upsetting of the balance in a reverse sense (revenge).

At the same time, there is also a disposition to continue (inertia); in the case of one who does evil, to do more evil; in the case of one who suffers evil, to suffer more evil (to humble himself with a false kind of humility).

Only he who is *inside* the supernatural escapes both these moral defilements, and even then only with a part of himself. He feels with all the greater horror the defilement suffered by the other part. Arjuna. Christ.

(If Krishna himself were troubled in spirit, as Christ was in the Gospel, wouldn't it be far more beautiful?)

It is only by entering into the transcendent, the supernatural, the truly spiritual that man can rise above the social. Up till then, in fact, and whatever one may do about it, the social is transcendent with respect to man.

It follows, then, that the only possible protection open to man is that those who are upon the road to sanctity should fulfil a recognized social function.

But what a danger lies there!

(Plato, *Republic*.)

Two domains within man: the one which is controlled by the will (writing a Greek composition) and the one which is outside the control of the will (writing a beautiful line of poetry)—(although the will does play a certain part in the latter by the adoption of the bodily attitudes connected with attention)—

And the *social*, where does that come in? Does it not form a third domain, a particular type of transcendent, a hybrid, an ersatz form of transcendent?

'Prince of this world.'

If the will is suitable for manifest and clearly representable duties; if prayer is suitable for the supernatural; what is suitable for the social?

Nothing, according to Lao-Tse (that is to say, nothing beyond manifest duty).

That is a hard saying.

If nothing is ever lost, neither good nor evil, is the social mechanism immaterial?

In so far as one is unable to modify it in much or in little through the will, one must simply *bring the light of attention to bear upon it*.

Real progress will be precisely proportional to the total amount of genuine attention which is brought to bear upon it amongst the bulk of individuals concerned (nowadays, this means the whole world).

We commit a grave fault by turning our thoughts away from it; but a no less grave one by attaching our thoughts to it.

(Social missions, the rôles played by great leaders of men are phenomena outside nature; but are they divine or demoniacal? Has the former case ever been met with??? Moscs, Mohammed? What a strange mixture . . .)

Social influence on a vast scale is surely not something which a human being can acquire by merely exercising his will. Even in Napolcon's case, it came to him. Richelieu?

Nor is it something pertaining to the order of inspiration.

Revolt consists in averting one's eyes—Ivan Karamazov—Acceptance is nothing else than a quality of attention. When we suffer in our flesh, we cannot avert our thoughts from the fact that we are suffering, and we long to do so, we tug at the chain. Job. 'O God, let me alone but for a moment!' Whoever consents to suffer brings the light of attention to bear upon suffering. In the case of others' sufferings, the choice is not lacking. Job's friends allowed compensatory imagination to function in them; this is criminal. It is a manner of averting the eyes. Ivan Karamazov also averts his eyes; diversion. (If, in conclusion, he were to say: 'I won't accept—not a single tear shall be shed over and above what it is strictly outside my power to prevent'—he would then possess the implicit love of God—but by what mechanism?)

The attentive contemplation of misery, without compensation or consolation, drives us on into the supernatural, and then we cannot do otherwise than love the source of it. The only connection between God and the world lies in the possibility that the supernatural exists in the world, in a human soul.

Consequently, we also transport the supernatural as a possibility into our neighbour, seeing that we transport our own being into him in thought.

This should not lessen our inclination to succour him in the flesh, on account of that irreducible bitterness contained in suffering against which the supernatural can do nothing.

(It is clear that to bring the full light of the attention to bear upon a state of suffering, to know that we can come to the aid of it, and not to do so, is like causing it. Why must one not cause it?)

(‘I was an hungred, and ye gave me meat . . .’, and yet: ‘my meat is to do the will of him that sent me’. If one were really to come across Christ famished, why ought one to feed him?)

To accept what is bitter; acceptance must not be allowed to project itself on to the bitterness and lessen it; otherwise the force and purity of the acceptance are proportionally lessened. For the object of the acceptance is to taste what is bitter, as such, and not anything else. (St. Thomas on the suffering of Christ.)—To say like Ivan Karamazov: nothing can possibly make up for a single tear from a single child. And yet to accept all tears, and the countless horrors which lie beyond tears. To accept these things not simply in so far as they may admit of compensations, but in themselves. To accept that they should exist, simply because they do exist.

Not to accept a certain event because it is the will of God. The reverse way is purer. (Perhaps . . .) But to accept that event because it exists, and by this acceptance to love God through and beyond it.

To accept that it should exist, because it does exist, what exactly does this mean? Is it not simply to recognize that it *is*?

Joy increases the feeling of reality, pain diminishes it. It is just a question of recognizing the same fulness of reality in the case of pains as in that of joys. The sensibility says: ‘That is not possible.’ One must reply: That *is*. It asks: ‘Why so?’ One must reply: Because that *is*; if that *is*, there is a reason for it.

(Cf. ‘Spanish Testament’.)

When one loves God through and beyond evil as such, it is indeed God whom one loves.

There is no feeling of reality without love, and the association between them is at the root of beauty. But why is that?

Among human beings, we only fully recognize the existence of those we love.

A certain bitterness is inseparably associated with beauty under all its forms.

Beneficence—feeding, clothing, etc. others—has no value in itself, but only as a sign. There is a natural inclination, weak certainly,

but which exists, to relieve distress, and when what acts as a barrier to this inclination is removed, it is exercised. A right form of attention directed towards others' misery is precisely what breaks down such a barrier. (Inattention is generally the reason why this inclination is not exercised.)

Everything that takes place in this world is only of value as an *ordeal* or as a *sign*. All is balance.

('Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect,' that is to say we must be the same for all, including ourselves. Now, we feed ourselves when we are hungry. Even Tibetan hermits eat a few grains of barley each day.)

We must not augment the inclination to relieve distress—it matters little whether it be strong or weak, for it is natural, and is neither good nor bad—but do away with what prevents it from being exercised.

It follows that to relieve distress is not an action; it is surrendering to an inclination, it is passivity.

In the state of superior indifference, why act at all? And indeed, properly speaking, we don't act. But man not being by nature an immobile creature, for him non-action consists as much in movements as in immobility.

The Gîtâ.

Not to seek Good in action. That is what the Gîtâ teaches us. But . . .

You think that you're not going to fight, but the motives that induce you to fight have at that moment the upper hand. It is not through the choice of a particular demeanour that one is able to rise.

Tamas and Rajas. The light of the attention abolishes certain inclinations and rouses others from a state of inertia. (Maybe there is compensation, transference of energy?) There remains a system of inclinations to which man has nothing else to do but to yield himself.

Man never has anything else to do but yield himself to inclinations (amongst which is included the clear representation of duty), but the attention changes them.

Arjuna hadn't the time to carry out this operation.

'Thou art that which is not.'—Since I am not, I can, under the sway of circumstances, become *anything whatever*.

A Platonic conception.

The representation of what is unbearable. Fresco at Asolo. This means dragging horror out of the gloomy depths and placing it under the light of the attention. It is an act of de-creation.

Nothing is more beautiful, in the most precise sense of the term.

Purity is the ability to contemplate defilement.

Extreme purity is able to contemplate both the pure and the impure; impurity is able to do neither: the pure frightens it, the impure absorbs it. (It requires to have a mixture.)

The prince in folk-lore, bound by oath . . . Represents God himself. God is more hidden in creation than in incarnation.

To reveal him is to de-create.

He is as though bound by oath. Everything is possible for him, but everything happens as if everything were not possible for him.

No good thing is ever lost. But in what sense? By what mechanism?

'When *two or three* shall be gathered together in my name . . .'
This is to eliminate the social element.—Two or three only: Socratic tradition.

The good that is above the correlation good-evil is never lost. And it also constitutes a limit. (This is badly expressed.)

Application to the spiritual kingdom of the principle: 'Nothing is lost, nothing is created.'

Redemptive suffering. A purely spiritual good.

Pure joy—is it not a condition of redemptive suffering?

To say that this world isn't worth anything, that this life isn't worth anything, and to adduce evil as the proof, is absurd; for if it isn't worth anything, of what exactly does evil deprive us?

Thus suffering in affliction and compassion for others are all the purer and more profound the better we are able to conceive the fulness of joy. Of what does suffering deprive him who is without joy?

And if we conceive the fulness of joy, suffering still remains related to joy in the same way as hunger does to food.

Krishna.

It is clear that Krishna reproaches Arjuna for wanting to carry out an ersatz form of de-creation.

(And yet, generally speaking, it is precisely killing which constitutes this fault.)

Transcendent joy: one cannot (perhaps?) attain to it through the sensibility except by extreme and pure suffering.

To know with all my soul that I am nothing. The joy of being nothing.

In order to find reality in suffering, the revelation of reality must have come to one through joy. Otherwise life is nothing but a more or less evil dream.

One must manage to discover a still fuller reality in suffering, which is emptiness, nothingness.

Likewise one must greatly love life, so as to be able to love death even more.

If one finds the fulness of joy in the thought that God *is*, one must find the same fulness in the knowledge that oneself one is not, for it is the same thought. And this knowledge is only bestowed on the sensibility through suffering and death.

Those who rebel in the presence of affliction would like to *be* something.

But one must not be a cause of affliction, for that would also be being something.

Joy is directed towards an object. I am full of joy at the sight of the sun shining, or the moon over the sea, or a beautiful city, or a fine human being; no 'I' obtrudes itself in the fulness of joy.

On the other hand, 'I' suffer.

Joy is the consciousness of that which is not me *qua* human being. Suffering is the consciousness of myself *qua* nothingness. Two correlative aspects of the same thing. But in the second case there is spiritual laceration. I can well forget my existence, but not think of myself as being nothing. But the more I strive, the more capable I become of pure joy.

When I suffer, I cannot forget that I am, nor fail to know that I am nothing.

The 'I' is the irreducible element contained in suffering.

By dint of suffering, one wears down the 'I', and one abolishes it altogether when suffering goes as far as death.

One also wears down the 'I' through joy accompanied by an extreme attention.

Pure compassion should make one more capable, and not less capable, of pure joy.

And how is that?

Once one has understood that one is nothing, the object of all one's efforts is to become nothing. It is with this end in view that

one accepts to suffer, *it is with this end in view that one acts*, it is with this end in view that one prays.

O God! grant that I may become nothing.

As fast as I become nothing, God loves himself through me.

God is All, but not when considered as a person. When considered as a person he is nothing. 'Ομοίωσις θεῷ.¹ (Personal and impersonal.)

(The Gospels: God's perfection consists in non-intervention.)

Wholes and parts with respect to God . . .

Necessity (condition of existence) alone offers a resource to the intelligence on this point.

Necessity contains both causality and finality.

Love and justice—To be just towards a being different from oneself means putting oneself in his place. For then one recognizes his existence as a person, not as a thing. This means a spiritual quartering, a stripping of the self; conceiving oneself as oneself *and* as other.

The belief in the existence of other human beings as such is *love*.

When the passion of love reaches as far as the *vegetative energy*, then we have cases such as those of R., Phèdre, Arnolphe, etc. ('Et je sens là-dedans qu'il faudra que je crève . . .')²

Hippolyte is really more necessary to the life of Phèdre,³ in the most literal sense of the term, than food.

For the love of God to be able to penetrate so far down (supernatural bread) it is necessary that nature should have suffered the supreme violence. Job. The Cross.

The love of Phèdre, of Arnolphe is impure. A love which descends so far down and which stays pure . . .

Down in the depths, it can only be negative, can only mean emptiness, anguish and death. Carrying one's death in oneself. (Carrying one's cross.)

Creation: the human intelligence is unable to conceive this downward movement without something corresponding to a necessity.

In my relations with R., I touched this mortal cold of the *vegetative energy* that one so rarely touches.

(Did I touch it in myself during the worst period of my headaches?)

Scene of the sack of Magdeburg. *Hasdrubal*.

¹ Assimilation to God (Plato, *Theaetetus*, 176 b).

² *L'Ecole des Femmes*, Act IV, sc. 1.

³ Racine, *Phèdre*.

The world ceases to exist.

Unless one has managed to become nothing, one always runs the risk of reaching a moment when all things other than oneself cease to exist.

We must become nothing right down to the vegetative level. It is then that God becomes bread.

Τὸν ἄρτον ἡμῶν τὸν ἐπιούσιον δὸς ἡμῖν σήμερον.¹

To accept the woes of others while at the same time suffering on account of them.

Acceptance is nothing else but the recognition that something *is*.

Suffering is nothing else but contemplating affliction with the mind.

To contemplate the fact that affliction exists: that constitutes acceptance and suffering.

Reality has, in a sense, need of our adherence.

In that way do we become creators of the world.

Ivan Karamazov: flight into unreality. But that does not constitute a movement of love. A child that is crying doesn't want you to think that he doesn't exist, or to forget that he does exist.

Feeding one who is hungry: the act of feeding is only the sign that we recognize that he exists.

This irreducible 'I', which is the irreducible foundation of my suffering, must be made universal.

It is impossible to conceive Good without going via Beauty. When all motives and urges have been reduced to silence, the energy remains, suspended to God. And it acts, since it is action. It acts in the sphere of the particular, since it is physical (one may also say psychological) energy. Beauty alone is what enables us to form an idea of this mystery.

'The lilies of the field . . .' Applied to the laity, it means the renunciation of the fruits of action.

Timaeus. Rectilinear movement as a source of error: *direction*.

Ὁ ἀριθμὸς μεταξύ²: how fail to be reminded of the mediatory λόγος?

¹ Give us this day our daily (supernatural) bread (Matt. vi, 11).

² Number is an intermediary. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.*, N. 3, 1090 b, 35: ποιοῦσι γὰρ αὐτὸν μεταξύ, 'They (the Platonists) make of number an intermediary.'

Sa yadi pitṛ-loka-kāmo bhavati, saikalpād . . . ¹

Paternity as a possible form of relationship is a reality. An orphan can find his joy in the thought that others have fathers.

The possibility of the thing desired (it is possible in so far as it is representable) is a reality.

Everything that I desire—and which consequently I look upon as a good—exists, or has existed, or will one day exist somewhere. For I am unable to invent completely. Therefore, how can I fail to have all my desires gratified?

Inspired actions. We translate circular movement into rectilinear movement.

A beautiful movement: Ladoumègue ² in a running race.

People of no worth. There must have been some moment in their life, if only at the age of four, when they spurned truth.

Arjuna's mistake consists in wanting to raise himself in the sphere of outward manifestation. In this fashion one can only degrade oneself and thicken the amount of evil both within and without at the same time. His action in fighting was in keeping with his spiritual level, since he had made up his mind to fight. It was not possible for him to do better, but only worse. All that he could do was, while remaining through and beyond his action in a state of contemplation, doubting its validity, standing outside it and straining towards the better and non-represented, to prepare himself to become later on capable of doing better.

That is what his dharma signifies.

Action is the pointer of the balance. One must not touch the pointer, but the weights.

Exactly the same is true in the case of opinions.

Hence, 'where lies the confusion? where the suffering?'

If there were no affliction in this world, we should be able to believe ourselves in Paradise. Horrid possibility.

We must do our best to avoid affliction, only in order that the affliction we do meet with may be absolutely pure and absolutely bitter.

We must do our best to avoid the affliction that befalls others, so that it may be for us a pure and bitter sort of affliction.

¹ 'If he aspires to the world of the fathers, he has only to think . . .' (Chândogya-Upanishad, VIII, 2, 1).

² Famous French running champion.

To know that other beings have an equal right with us to say 'I'—to know it completely, such a thing is supernatural. As supernatural perhaps as the belief in the Eucharist. And, as in the case of the Eucharist, the organ for such knowledge is supernatural love.

[Rationalism: if it means thinking that reason is the only instrument, that is true; if it means thinking that reason can be an all-sufficient instrument, that is ridiculous.]

Yo el Rey.¹

It is only with reference to those whose orders we carry out that we are prepared to recognize the above prerogative. (The kings of tragedy.) But, even then, not completely; or else we surrender our own personal right to say 'I'.

The same applies to carnal love.

'Love your enemies . . .' Recognize the fact that they are 'I's.

If we place ourselves in the position of someone who is hungry, we are naturally inclined, as a result of a blind and automatic action on the part of the sensibility, to wish that he should eat. Furthermore, there is absolutely no reason (unless there happen to be special reasons due to the circumstances) why we should resist such an inclination.

But the act of providing food is only the sign of the inclination, which itself is only the sign that one has recognized the existence of the famished individual's 'I' as such. It has no other importance than that of a sign.

But it possesses the full value of a sign, for the recognition of an 'I' in the person of the famished individual is fictitious, imaginary, if it is not accompanied by an almost irresistible inclination to provide that person with food.

(And even, as the act of pronouncing the words of a prayer can produce prayer, the act of providing food can produce such recognition if it is carried out with this intention.)

The act of providing food is linked with such recognition, just as the rhythm of verse is linked with poetic contemplation.

One could draw up a catalogue of signs, links of this sort.

Recognition is in the first place a matter for him who renders the aid, if the aid is pure; it is only due from him who receives the aid on the ground of reciprocity.

He who receives the aid owes exactly the equivalent of what he

¹ I, the King.

has received, namely, the recognition that the other man has the right to say 'I'.

Every pure act of beneficence (pure on both sides) establishes a relationship of perfect equality between the two beings taking part in it.

A pure act of beneficence breaks down the barrier of force, and is consequently supernatural.

An act of beneficence may be pure on one of the two sides only.

There is only the feeling of a debt owing where there is an absence of purity on both sides.

The social problem. How to restrict to a minimum the part played by the supernatural indispensable for rendering social life bearable. Everything which tends to increase it is bad. (It is tempting God.) The problem of 'justice' and 'charity' (using these two words in their commonly accepted sense) needs posing after this fashion.

In individual life, too, one must rigorously restrict the part played by God to the absolute minimum—while ardently desiring that this absolute minimum may become *all*, absolutely all.

But as regards this second point, there is no analogy in the social sense.

The two domains into which good does not enter are the vegetative and social domains.

Christ ransomed the vegetative domain, but not the social one. He did not pray for the world.

The social domain is unreservedly that of the Prince of this World. We have but one duty in regard to the social element, which is to try to limit the evil contained therein.

Richelieu: 'The salvation of States lies only in this world . . .'

(A society with divine pretensions, like the Church, is perhaps still more dangerous on account of the ersatz form of good which it contains than on account of the evil which sullies it.)

The vegetative and social spheres are alike non-psychological ones.

A divine label affixed to what pertains to the social sphere presents an intoxicating mixture containing every form of licence. The devil in disguise.

And yet a city . . . (Venice, for example . . .)

But that does not pertain to the social sphere; it is a human environment of which one is no more conscious than of the air one breathes. It is a contact with nature, the past, tradition; a *μεταξύ*.

Venise sauvée.

Spain; for the conspirators, the conspiracy is a *social matter*. Venice is a city.

A city—that does not conjure up the social element.

**Ἰλιος ἱρή*.¹

The state of being rooted is something altogether different from the social element.

To contemplate the woes of others without turning away one's gaze; not only that of one's eyes, but also that of one's attention, as a result of revolt, sadism, or some inner consolation of one kind or another—that is beautiful. For it is contemplating the non-contemplatable. Exactly like contemplating some desirable thing without approaching it. It is stopping oneself.

Renunciation alone enables us to stop ourselves (ropes that pull at us, and which have to be cut), and thus to gain access to Beauty. Job and the splendour of the world.

Not to accept some event taking place in the world is to desire that the world should not exist. Well, that I am able to do in the case of myself; if such is my desire, I obtain my desire. I am then indeed an abscess on the world.

(The expression of wishes in folklore. Desires have this danger about them, that they are granted.)

To desire that the world should not exist is to desire that I, such as I am, should be all.

If I desire that this world should exist—this world in which I am but an atom—then I become a co-creator.

The subjectivism contained in the Upanishads is only to prepare for this co-creative action.

Geometry as practised by the Greeks is also a participation in creation.

Perhaps there was only one people in antiquity without a *mystique* of any kind: the Romans. How did this happen? Rome was an artificial city made up of fugitives, like Israel.

Necessity—an image which the intelligence can grasp representing God's indifference, his impartiality.

It follows that the commonly held notion with regard to miracles is a sort of impiety. (A fact which has no second cause, but *only* a first cause.)

¹ Holy Troy (*Iliad*, IV, 46; VI, 448, etc.).

The Tree of the World—the eternal fig-tree whose roots have to be severed with the axe of detachment (Gîtâ).

This is the vegetative energy.

The cross is of wood, but it is made from a tree that has been cut down.

Adam ate of the fruit of the tree. (Two birds: one of them eats the fruit . . .)

The tree must be cut down and one's own dead body must be its fruit.

The vegetative energy has to be uprooted.

Faith, justice; these come from a sense of right inner disposition and a sense of reading. It is the inner disposition that produces the correct reading, and there is no other criterion.

Certain acts proceed from us when we are in such and such a state, without any particular intention motivating us while we are carrying them out. Such is the case with writing poetry, feeding the hungry.

(Alexander and the helmet filled with water.)

In like manner does the world proceed from God.

Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.

One must uproot oneself; cut down the tree and make of it a cross, and then carry it always; uproot oneself from the social and vegetative angles; have no native land on this earth that one may call one's own.

To do all that to other people, from the outside, is an ersatz form of de-creation; it is producing unreality.

But in uprooting oneself one seeks a greater reality.

One must not be *I*, but still less must one be *We*.

The city gives the feeling of being at home.

One must acquire the feeling of being at home in exile.

The city is a *μεταξύ* for the purposes of uprooting.

If, under the stroke of affliction, one is deprived of one's roots before one has even begun to transfigure them (or if one has never had any), what possible hope can there be?

The Incarnation does not bring God closer to us. It increases the distance. He has placed the Cross between himself and us. The Cross is harder to bridge than the distance between heaven and earth. It is this distance.

He has made it plain that the Cross lies between himself and us.
One can only shed all gravitational weight through the Cross.
St Paul: Christ *was completed*—or *accomplished*—or *made perfect* (τετελείωται¹)—even in his case that was necessary.

The saints who approved of the Crusades, the Inquisition or the conquest of America . . . I think they were mistaken. But I cannot call in question the light of conscience. If, while being so very far beneath them, I am able to see more clearly than they did in this matter, it must be because they were blinded by something extraordinarily powerful. This 'something' is the Church considered as a social product, as a domain of the Prince of this World. If that could do them this harm, how much more harm would it not do me?

Venise sauvée—Monologue by Jaffier: *how* have I got inside here?

In Act I, the idea of the *Empire*.

Social element without roots, without a city; Roman Empire.

A Roman always thought in terms of *We*.

A Hebrew also.

Jaffier—It is supernatural to arrest the flow of Time.

It is here that Eternity enters into Time.

To believe in the reality of the outside world and to love it—these are but one and the same thing.

In the last resort, the organ of belief is supernatural love, even in regard to earthly things.

As soon as Jaffier is aware that Venice *exists* . . .

To believe in the existence of something and yet to destroy it—for that an altogether imperative conception of duty is necessary.

(Unless one possesses diabolical faith, if such a thing is possible.)

(In a sense, I think it *is*. With those who have defiled themselves to the extent of no longer being able to bear the light, each touch on the part of grace must be transformed into diabolical grace.)

Saints (all-but saints) are more exposed to the devil than other people, because the genuine knowledge they possess of their wretchedness renders the light *almost* unbearable for them.

Maya—illusion. It is real enough (in its way) since so much effort is required to emerge from it. But its reality lies in being illusion.

¹ Heb. v, 9.

The mystery of creation finds its analogy in us in the mystery of charity passing into acts. Why has God created us? But why do we feed those that are hungry (when we do so . . .)?

In the *Gîtâ*, a scandalous example of the duty of charity is chosen on purpose.

Conformity to public opinion. Râma expels his wife for the same reason.

(Note that Râma *suffers*.)

Râma killing the shûdra.

Upanishads: Brahma is Space. St. Paul: Being rooted and grounded in love, that ye may be able to comprehend, with all the saints, what is the breadth and length, and depth, and height . . .

To be rooted in the absence of a definite place.

The extreme difficulty that I often experience in carrying out the simplest action is a favour that has been granted me. For in this way with quite ordinary actions, and without attracting attention, I am able to cut away the roots of the Tree. However indifferent one may be to outside opinion, extraordinary actions, as soon as they have been decided on, acquire a certain external stimulant which cannot be taken away from them. Such a stimulant is altogether absent from ordinary actions. To find an extraordinary difficulty in performing a quite ordinary action is a favour for which one ought to be grateful. One must not ask that this difficulty should disappear; but, on the contrary, ardently desire, beg for grace to be able to make use of it.

Generally speaking, one should not wish for the disappearance of any of one's personal failings, but for the grace which can transfigure them.

Beyond the *guṇas*.

Not to feel repugnance toward Tamas in oneself.

Conversation with D.—The cigarette—Not to forget this incident, not as far as the incident itself is concerned, but as a symbol. The enumeration was incomplete. It was an explanation of ways of behaving seemingly inexplicable. One should not take everything into account at once; but place a certain thing on one side; or not think of a certain thing and a certain other thing at the same time. Malr.¹ One can only cure oneself of this tendency by frequently

¹ [André Malraux?]

pondering the fact and by catching oneself out from time to time in the act.

I must look upon every sin that I commit (that I have committed rather) as a favour on the part of God. It is a favour I have received that the fundamental imperfection which lies hidden in the depths of me should have been partly manifested to me on a certain particular day, at a certain particular hour, under certain particular circumstances. I desire, I implore that my imperfection may be wholly manifested to me, in its completeness, as far as the human mind is capable of letting its gaze rest upon it; not with the precise purpose of its being cured, but even were it not to be cured, so that I may know the truth with regard to it.

A geometrical or arithmetical problem requires to be solved; all that is necessary is to fix our attention upon it. A Latin, Greek or Sanskrit text requires to be translated; all that is necessary is to fix our attention upon it. So likewise a personal failing must needs be transfigured if, with the help of grace, we bring to bear upon it the attention that is accompanied by supernatural love. Time alone is needed . . . 'He whose sin has been drained away . . .' (*Gîtâ*).

(What application has this analogy to pedagogy?)

Manual work. How is it there has never yet been a workman or peasant mystic to write on the use to be made of the disgust for work?

This disgust which is so often present, ever threatening to break out—the soul flees from it and seeks to conceal it from itself through a vegetative reaction (instinct of self-preservation). There is a mortal danger in admitting it to oneself. Such is the origin of the lie peculiar to working-class circles (there is a lie peculiar to every type of environment).

To admit it to oneself and yield to it is to fall. To admit it to oneself and not yield to it is to rise.

This disgust is the burden of Time. It is a cross.

Disgust, under all its forms, is one of the most precious natural evils that are given to Man as a ladder by which to rise. (My personal share in this particular favour is a very large one.)

Venise sauvée—Disgust with a monotonous existence as a stimulant in the background. Bring out the fact of boredom.

Disgust—a 'dark night.'

Turn all disgust into disgust with the self (as with me in the case of my poems).

Disgust and preference as a third dimension. Indifference lies behind.

Space—symbol of indifference, of justice. There everything exists on the same grounds.

To recognize the fact that everything which exists, as a whole and in every detail, does so on the same grounds.

Wholes and parts. God does not arrange the parts in view of a whole. He has no need to. Since he wants a whole, he posits the whole. However, in positing it he necessarily posits the parts also. But he also wants the parts, each part in itself; and he wants that just as much as he does the whole. It is a miracle of composition on several planes. A miracle imitated in the highest form of Art. An unfathomable mystery. Such imitation constitutes Art.

The purpose behind Providence, the plan behind Providence. Every plan, every purpose that is discernible in events is certainly that of Providence, one of the purposes of Providence, among an infinity of such purposes (and furthermore, an infinity with reference to an infinitude of what power?). God wants each atom, each event, together with all the innumerable combinations which they form between them, all the perspectives which they offer, without any exception whatsoever.

We can take only one of the following three decisions: Either to renounce God; or to renounce all activity (Arab tendency); or again to turn every activity, without any exception, into a bridge toward God (those activities where it is impossible being excluded as illegitimate, even should they happen to be vitally necessary). Because Europe failed in the Middle Ages resolutely to take the third decision—which demands a certain preparation, study and elaboration—and failed equally to take it at the time of the Renaissance, when she attempted to do so in another way, she has taken the first one. Greece attempted to take the third one, except where manual labour was concerned; which is why, moreover, her cause was betrayed by her workmen and manufacturers.

At the Renaissance, there was a movement in the right direction, accompanied by a double lapse; that on the part of those athirst for spiritual liberty who abandoned the Church, and as a result, almost immediately, spiritual inspiration; and that on the part of the

Church, which did not lay herself out to quench the thirst for spiritual liberty.

Two things linked together by Necessity. Example: An empty pair of scales. A piece of plaster falls on to one of the scales. The latter drops.

God wants one of these things in itself. He wants the other in itself. He wants the whole formed by the two together. He wants the link between the two. He wants the necessary nature of this link. Taking each of these things separately, the whole together, neither coincidence nor chance plays a part.

There is an identicalness between: God wants a certain thing, and: a certain thing is. The counterpart of this identicalness in us is that between supernatural love and belief. Supernatural love, which is obedience, is that which in us answers to the will of God.

We have to be indifferent both to good and evil; but whilst remaining indifferent, that is to say, whilst bringing the light of the attention to bear equally on the one and on the other, good prevails as a result of an automatic mechanism. This represents the essential form of grace. But it is also the definition, the criterion of good.

A divine inspiration operates infallibly, irresistibly, if one does not turn the attention away from it, if one does not reject it. There is no need to make a choice in its favour; all that is necessary is not to refuse to recognize its existence.

Obedience—sole means of passing from Time to Eternity.

Just as each minute of attention—even of an imperfect kind—directed towards the higher causes one to rise a little, so likewise does each act carried out with the same attention. No particle of Good is ever lost. One relapses only to the extent that one imagines one has risen higher than one actually has done. Every obligatory act against which nature sets up an obstacle, when it is carried out with a rightly directed attention, wears away a bit of that obstacle. A sufficient number of such acts uses up that obstacle, causes it to disappear. If, before having accumulated this number, one imagines, just because one has succeeded in carrying out the act, that the obstacle has disappeared, one is quite astonished to 'have a relapse', and one may think that one isn't making any progress; which latter consideration, owing to the perversity intimately connected with the lack of hope, is quite enough to set one back. It is enough in order to retain one's courage to recognize that the obstacle is finite

and can be disposed of by a process of nibbling. Those who do not recognize this fact are doomed to the punishment suffered by the Danaïdes.

Hope consists in the knowledge that the evil one carries about in oneself is finite, and that the slightest orientation of the soul toward Good, were it to last only an instant, does away with a little of it; and that in the spiritual domain every particle of Good infallibly produces Good.

This knowledge is experimental, which is why Hope is a supernatural virtue. It represents fearlessness in affairs of the Spirit.

[The names of the four Greek virtues designate either natural virtues—and they have remained in this capacity in the Christian tradition—or else supernatural virtues; so it is that Wisdom corresponds more or less to Charity (or Love), Justice to Faith, and Courage to Hope. There is no analogue for Temperance (or would this be Obedience? . . . but the latter means very much more. Although, after all, *σωφροσύνη* . . . ¹)]

The comparison drawn by St. John of the Cross concerning the wood, the fire and the degree of heat furnishes the key to spiritual things.

Krishna offering a choice between his personal self and his army. It represents an ordeal. The choice indicates infallibly the lawful side and the unlawful side . . .

God gives himself to Man under the aspect of power or under that of perfection: the choice is left to Man.

[Krishna's army—is it not the Prince of this World?]

[To force myself each day to write down in this very notebook that I have failed in my duty, which has been the case to-day.

Mountains and rocks, *Fall on us, and hide us from the wrath of the Lamb.*

I deserve that wrath at this moment.]

*Πέσετε ἐφ' ἡμᾶς καὶ κρύψατε ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς τοῦ ἀρνίου.*²

Not to forget that according to St. John of the Cross inspirations that turn us away from the performance of easy and menial obligations come from the evil side.

Temperance.

² *Fall on us, and hide us from the wrath of the Lamb (Rev. vi, 16).*

We are given the sense of duty to enable us to kill the 'I'. And I let such a precious instrument go to rust.

One must accomplish one's duty at the prescribed moment in order to believe in the reality of the outer world.

One must believe in the reality of Time. Otherwise one is just dreaming.

For years I have recognized this flaw in myself, the importance that it represents, and yet I have done nothing to get rid of it. What excuse could I be able to offer?

Hasn't it increased in me ever since the age of ten? But however big it may be, it is finite. That suffices me. If it is so big as to take away from me the possibility of wiping it out during this life, and thus reaching a state of perfection, then that—always supposing it to be so—must be accepted, like everything else that exists, in a consenting spirit accompanied by love. It is enough for me to know that it exists, that it is evil, that it is finite. But effectively to know each of these three things and the three together implies the inauguration and uninterrupted continuation of the wiping-out process. If this process does not begin to take place, it is the sign that I do not effectively *know* what I am just writing down.

I am the son who answers: 'I go, Sir' and doesn't go to the vineyard. It is better then to say No; that way the lie is discounted.

The requisite energy resides in me, since I have enough with which to live. It has got to be pulled out of me, even though this should mean the death of me, which is certainly not the case.

'Εάν θέλῃς δύνασαι με καθαρίσαι.

One must accept everything, all things, without any reservation, both inside and outside oneself, in the whole universe, with the same degree of love; but evil must be accepted as evil and good as good. Two perpendicular planes. Space. The breadth, and length, and depth, and height, and the knowledge of Charity which surpasses all knowledge.

The correct expression of a thought always produces a change in the soul; the thought is either consolidated or else superseded. In the matter of thoughts, the right expression constitutes an ordeal. That is why the correct expression of thoughts that have reached a state of maturity, including erroneous thoughts, is always good (before reaching this state, always bad).

There are two ordeals in the case of thoughts—that of expression and that of doubt, which is to say the absolute silence of the whole soul during a short space of time. The latter is by far the superior one of the two.

I feel so bitterly the dependence of great things in regard to little ones—for example, that an accident when a removal is taking place can ruin an absolutely first-class picture; and yet I neglect to do little things upon which great ones may depend. This is a crime. I am far from feeling this dependence with sufficient bitterness.

I must carry out obligatory actions with my attention fixed not on the satisfaction of carrying them out, but on the shame at having been slow in doing so; or, if by good fortune once, in an exceptional way, such is not the case, at having a tendency to be slow in this respect; which will certainly be my case for a long time to come, even under the most favourable assumption.

Tῆς ὀργῆς τοῦ ἀπύλου. Never to forget this.

Gītā, VII, 28 — *ycām tv anta — gatam pāpam*
anta, janānām puṇya — karmaṇām
limit 'for mortals that have gone to
end the extremity of evil, whose acts
are virtuous . . .'

An order is an intermediary between a multiplicity [of conditions] and a thing.

In the order of the world, what is this thing?

In the aesthetic order, what is this thing?

The void.

Good infallibly produces good, evil evil in the realm of pure Spirit. On the other hand, in the realm of Nature, including that of Psychology, good and evil are all the time mutually producing each other. Consequently, one cannot feel secure until one has managed to reach the spiritual realm, where, precisely, one is unable to get anything for oneself, where one has to wait for everything to come from elsewhere, from on high.

Pharisees: 'Verily I say unto you, they have their reward.' Conversely, Christ could just as well have said of the publicans and

prostitutes: Verily I say unto you, they have their punishment--- to wit, social reprobation. In so far as they do have it, the Father which is in secret refrains from punishing them. Whereas the sins that do not involve social reprobation receive their full measure of punishment at the hands of the Father which is in secret. Thus social reprobation is a favour on the part of Destiny. But it is transformed into an additional evil in the case of those who, under the pressure of this reprobation, construct a marginal social *milieu* for themselves within which they have full licence. For example, criminal, homosexual circles. Why is that?

There is something *irreducible* about social degradation, as there is about physical pain. Needs contemplating.

The factory.

And what about the slaves in Plautus?

Requires examining with very great attention.

When we pray, we must not have any particular thing in view, unless we have been supernaturally inspired in this respect. For God is a universal being. Certainly he descends into the particular. He has descended, he descends in the act of creation (observe that the 'continued creation' of Descartes is precisely the same thing as the 'manifestation' of the Hindus); as he also does in the case of the Incarnation, the Eucharist, inspiration, etc. But it is a descending movement. The link established between the universal and the particular is a descending movement, never an ascending one; a movement on God's part, not on ours. We are unable to effect such a link except in so far as it is dictated to us by God. Our rôle is to be turned toward the universal.

Therein lies perhaps the solution to the difficulty raised by Berger about the impossibility of linking the relative to the absolute. It is impossible through an ascending movement, but it is possible through a descending one.

The search for a scale of values. Such a search implies Value (moreover, the same is true of all search; consequently, right at the beginning of the scale, at the top, we must place Value—as such, *in itself*, *αὐτό*—).

We must always conform to the law of descending movement.

Participation, as expressed in Plato, is a descending movement.

So also, in the *Republic*, is the Light towards which it is sufficient to turn one's eyes.

Grace is the law of descending movement.

An ascending movement is natural, a descending one supernatural.

Gítá. Those who have gone to the extremity of evil are freed from the aberration produced by contraries. This is literally true, even before having reached the extremity, when, from the spiritual plane, one can see that it *has* an extremity.

Connexion between the idea of sacrifice and that of incarnation. *Gítá*, VIII, the beginning.

Τοῦτο δὸς ἐμοί : to discern the beauty of things in all the fulness of its purity.

Beauty. A part of matter which, through the senses, renders spiritual perfection sensible.

A part of matter which compels the transcendental part of the soul to become visible.

It is the same faculty of the soul, to wit supernatural love, which has contact both with Beauty and with God.

Supernatural love is the organ in us by which we adhere to Beauty, and the sense of the reality of the universe is identical in us with that of its beauty. Full existence and Beauty merge into one another.

The flesh in us (when through sin it steps out of its lawful rôle) says 'I', and the devil says 'We', or else 'I' with a halo of 'We' about it.

'Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one, that is, God.' *'Ἀγαθὸν αὐτό.*¹ Platonic conception.

That which is natural is simply that which in fact has been placed within our reach; but all the different parts of human life are as densely packed with mystery, absurdity, inconceivability as is, for example, the Eucharist, and are equally impossible to contact in the real sense otherwise than through the faculty of supernatural love.

In Beauty—for example the sea, the sky—there is something *irreducible*; *exactly like there is* in physical suffering: the same irreducibility; impenetrable for the intelligence.

Existence of something other than myself.

Relationship between Beauty and Suffering.

The mind is not forced to believe in the existence of anything.

¹ Good itself.

(Subjectivism, pure idealism, solipsism, scepticism. See the Upanishads, the Taoists and Plato—in all these cases this philosophical attitude is adopted as a means of purification.) That is why the only organ of contact with existence is acceptance, love. That is why Beauty and Reality are identical. That is why pure joy and the feeling of reality are identical.

Everything that is grasped by the natural faculties is hypothetical. It is only supernatural love which posits. In this way we become co-creators.

We participate in the creation of the world by de-creating ourselves.

All the (insurmountable) difficulties in connexion with the story of Original Sin are due to the fact that we represent this story to ourselves as unfolding itself in Time. Whereas it is the expression of causal relationships, or rather of what in the supernatural domain corresponds by analogy to causal relationships.

God has created Man with the capacity of becoming like unto Himself, but in a state of sin consented to by Man.

The Fall expresses this essential character of consent attached to sin. Sin lies within Man, not outside him; it comes from Man; but Man has been created such.

Man has been created such, and yet God is innocent. This innocence is not harder to conceive after this fashion than is, for those who represent to themselves the story as unfolding itself in Time, God's innocence at the moment when Adam disobeys. For everything that takes place is the will of God, at each instant just as much as at the precise instant of creation, if this expression can be said to have a meaning.

Meaning of stories about desires (in which, after having made three wishes, one finds oneself as before): all human beings get here below what they desire.

In one sense this is absolutely true; in another sense absolutely false. (One would not be able to do harm to other people.)

According to what mental combination must we conceive this and its opposite together?

Composition of the Lord's Prayer.

The invocation. The passage into the supernatural (*οὐρανοῖς*¹).

¹ Heaven.

Eternity. The Trinity. The Word. (ὄνομα¹), the Spirit (βασιλεία²), the Father (θέλημα³).

Time. Present (σήμερον⁴), past (ὀφειλήματα ἡμῶν, ὀφειλέταις ἡμῶν⁵), future (εἰς πειρασμόν⁶).

That contains everything.

In a sense, the Spirit, Shiva, the transformative, de-creative agency corresponds to the future; the Word, Vishnu, the mediatory, incarnatable agency, representing beauty, immortality, to the present; the Father, representing sovereign power, to the past.

By conceiving indefinite time as being related to the Father, and all the events taking place therein, whatever they may be, as constituting his Will, one thinks of the totality of Time from the point of view of the past.

By conceiving indefinite time as being related to the Word, the ordering principle, which sheds on all things the light of beauty and immortality, one thinks of the totality of Time from the point of view of the present.

By conceiving indefinite time as being related to the Spirit, which cuts away the roots plunged into Time, and descends into souls to save them and transplant them, root them in Eternity, and place them in the fulness of perfection, one thinks of the totality of Time, lighted up by hope, from the point of view of the future. 'Ελθάτω βασιλεία⁷—may this kingdom come—that is in the future.

(Faith, Charity and Hope may be placed in this order.)

In the case of the past; detachment from the past, remission of all debts.

In the case of the future; attitude of waiting mingled with fear and trust.

In the case of the present; desire as overpowering as hunger: urgent need, requiring to be immediately satisfied.

Πάτερ ἐν οὐρανοῖς.⁸ That to which we are unable to attain—the transcendent; it is that which is our real home.

Ἀγιασθήτω⁹—consecrated, for example a place to a particular divinity. Let the order of the world be consecrated to Thee.

Three aspects of Eternity as viewed through and across Time.
Creation. Everything already accomplished by an act of God's will.

¹ The name.

² The kingdom.

³ The will.

⁴ This day.

⁵ Our debts, (as we forgive) our debtors.

⁶ Into temptation.

⁷ May the kingdom come.

⁸ Father in heaven.

⁹ Hallowed be.

De-creation. The term set to Time.

Immortality (*amṛtam*) in the plenitude of the present.

Consciousness is absent at the vegetative level of life and is distorted by the social mechanism. The supplementary energy is (to a large extent [?]) attached to the social mechanism. It must be detached therefrom. This constitutes the most difficult form of detachment.

Meditation on the social mechanism is in this respect a purification of the greatest value.

(And so I was not wrong to interest myself in politics for so many years.)

(Perhaps every attachment is of a social kind?)

Contemplating the social mechanism is as good a road to follow as withdrawing from the world.

The evil and the good that *are in us* are finite.

The *orientation* of the soul toward evil or toward good possesses an exponential property.

Therein lies the foundation of security.

I must not, therefore, fight against the evil that is in me by means of the good that is in me, but by means of a right orientation of the attention.

Supernatural love and prayer are nothing else but the highest form of attention.

Analogy between mysticism and mental pathology. This analogy needs to be understood.

There is a right way of approaching the study of mental pathology, which has no doubt not yet been thought out.

(Ought it to be regarded exclusively as a study of the imagination?)

There are certain people in whose case everything that brings God nearer to them is beneficial. In my case it is everything that makes Him more remote.

Between me and Him there lies the thickness of the universe—and that of the Cross in addition.

Human life is *impossible*. But affliction alone causes this to be felt.

When one understands the nature of affliction, one loves it; but one also understands that it is for God to send it by means of his own instruments, namely, Matter, water in floods, fire in outbreaks

of fire, and men whose soul is not open to the light, the Social Beast.

One is not given the choice between causing affliction or not causing it. (And not to go to the assistance of some one in distress when one knows one can render him assistance is, in fact, to cause affliction.) When one knows the actual nature of affliction, it is easier to die than to cause it. (Such is still far from being my own case.)

But just as there are certain circumstances in which it is necessary to die, although the soul rebels against it, as happened with Christ, so there are certain circumstances in which it is necessary to cause affliction.

They are those in which one is tied to the Social Beast by a strict obligation. *Râma* and the *shûdra*.

Which are they?

This problem of Indifference is a false problem, an absurd one. Just as a sage sitting and meditating or a saint on his knees praying have not the same bodily demeanour as an ordinary man sitting or on his knees, so likewise they have not the same demeanour in their relations with men and society, without, however, being under the necessity of making a choice.

The use (methodical or otherwise) made of divers forms of madness in the practice of mental asceticism and mysticism corresponds to the purificatory use of scepticism (pure idealism, solipsism) on the philosophical plane.

It is a question of uprooting our readings of things, of changing them, so as to arrive at non-reading.

We should recognize, experience and test the rôle, the power and the degree of participation of the imagination in Perception.

It is the same thing (but taken to a much more advanced stage) as the meditation on the illusions of the senses put forward by Chartier and Lagneau.¹

It is *realization* which corresponds to doubt.

This also corresponds to the purification of Impressionist painting.

It is a question of conceiving Reason through madness.

What distinguishes the higher states from the lower ones is, in the higher states, the co-existence of several superposed planes.

Modern research in Europe seeks in psychiatry what the tradi-

¹ E. A. Chartier (1868-1951) and Jules Lagneau (1851-1894): two teachers of philosophy who had a very marked influence on S. Weil.

tional forms of knowledge seek in the study of pathological phenomena produced from within.

Zen sect.

'A cloud of spray now rises up from the ocean, and the roar of the waves is heard from the land.'

(Cf. Proust on the subject of Impressionist painting.)

'A flag floats in the wind. What is it which stirs, the wind or the flag?' (It is the spirit.)

A philosophy of Perception, of a practical and experimental nature, lies at the basis of this form of knowledge.

Plato: *Theaetetus*.

Sophists. Their material world is smashed to bits.

Experiments made concerning the meaning of Reality.

A lighted lamp placed on the head used as a test—immobility the sign of perfect concentration.

A bowl of water filled to the brim carried from one place to another, either before or after the exercise for developing concentration.

Tibetan practice: as a result of meditation over a number of years, to attain to the vision of the corporal presence of a divinity, which appears more real than the rest of the material world. After that, to understand that this apparition is but a phantasm—and consequently the universe too.

(But perhaps this only represents a stage?)

Exercise for detachment through the intelligence. One is not attached to that which does not exist.

It is attachment which produces in us that *false reality* (ersatz form of reality) connected with the outside world.

We must destroy that ersatz form of reality in ourselves in order to attain to the true reality.

No doubt extreme affliction produces this far more surely than any religious practices (Job. The Cross).

When Catholics say that a certain particular sacrament has a certain particular supernatural effect because God has willed it so, that is true, but neither more nor less true than to say that a stone flung into the air falls because God has willed it so. The will of God is not the cause of any single occurrence; it is the very being of everything that exists. Causality is a relationship between a certain phenomenon and a certain other phenomenon.

[A philosophical clean-up of the Catholic religion has never been undertaken. In order to do so, it would be necessary to be at once inside *and* outside.]

The baptismal water, the bread of the Host produce supernatural effects because they are charged with a supernatural content. But by what mechanism? For it is by a certain mechanism.

Examples of such mechanism. Jean-Jacques' room at *Les Charmettes*.¹ Prisons. The convent of the Dominicans.² Appearance, look, etc., of a particular human being. Works of art.

Likewise a medallion that has been blessed, etc.

The laying on of hands in the Acts of the Apostles.

Tibetans: their belief in beings that can give or take away energy (in the latter case, especially with a view to increasing longevity or physical strength).

'If veneration is present, a dog's tooth gives forth light.'

Invisibility bound up with the cessation of mental activity. (Reaching the stage of not arousing any sensation at all among living beings whom one approaches.)

'The disciple must understand that gods and demons really exist for those who believe in their existence and can do either good or evil to those who worship or fear them.'

Protagoras.

Practices designed to *cause scepticism to enter the body*.

As a matter of principle—one might say as a matter of hypothesis—never to accept as true anything which is in contradiction with the scientific conception of the world. Not that the latter possesses any very great value. But it is entirely legitimate within its own sphere, namely, that of natural phenomena; or in other words, of all which takes place, without any exception, in conformity with natural becoming. If it is not entirely legitimate, it must be entirely illegitimate; in which case the fact of its existence would be more inexplicable than Lourdes is for the average doctor.

The doctors say that the phenomena which take place at Lourdes are the result of suggestion; the Catholics that they are the result

¹ The property belonging to Madame de Warens, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's patroness, near Chambéry.

² The reference is, presumably, to the one at Marseilles, frequented by S. Weil in 1941-42, before her departure for America.

of faith. Where is the difference? Solely in the value accorded to the state of soul itself. But the conception of the psycho-biological mechanism is the same.

I do not know whether Christ did or did not raise Lazarus from the dead. But if he actually did so, first, it was an action that he performed in his capacity as a man, like all those he performed on this earth, and secondly, this action was performed as the result of a perfectly intelligible mechanism for any one capable of taking this mechanism to pieces.

‘Red banquet’ of the *Theuth*.

‘During untold periods of time, in the course of repeated existences, I have received from innumerable beings—at the expense of their own well-being and life—my food, clothing and all manner of services in order to maintain my body in health and joy and shield it from death.

To-day, I am going to pay my debts, offering up this body that I have so loved and cherished for destruction.

I give my flesh to those that are hungry, my blood to those that are thirsty, my skin to act as a covering for those that are naked, my bones as fuel for such as suffer from cold.

I give my happiness to those in distress and my vital breath to restore to life the dying . . .

Shame be upon me if I recoil from this sacrifice. Shame be upon you all if you dare not accept it.’

After which, the initiate—imagining himself, in the silence, to be a little heap of ashes in a lake of black mud—must understand that this sacrifice has only been an illusion born of pride, and that he has nothing to give, because he is nothing.

This apparently goes back about two hundred years. Once the objective has been attained, the ritual is dispensed with.

(*Affliction* is of greater value.)

‘. . . I am going to pay my debts. Feast yourselves upon me.

Come, you famished demons; at this banquet my flesh will be transformed into any object whatsoever that you may desire.

Here are fertile fields, green forests, flowering gardens, pure or animal foods, garments, healing medicines . . . Come, eat your fill.’

[But all this is very artificial and imaginary.]

Words of a lama: ‘There are many methods of attaining to *tharpa*. Yours may be less grossly brutal than the one that suits the man for whom you feel pity, but I am certain that it is as harsh.

If it is easy, that means it is not worth anything.—He seemed really to feel himself being eaten alive.—Without any doubt he is being eaten alive, but he doesn't realize that he is eating himself. Perhaps one day he will find it out.'

'Tharpa is the absence of all forms of belief, all forms of imagination, the cessation of the activity which creates delusions.' Non-reading.

Milarepa. 'If only I may be capable of dying in this hermitage, then I shall be content with myself.'

Gîtâ. Arjuna's mistake is to seek good in Action.

All the density of second causes lies between God and the world.

Why does movement require a cause *more than* rest? Or accelerated movement *more than* uniform movement?

Rest means equilibrium, therefore symmetry.

Movement means disequilibrium, therefore dissymmetry.

Absurd nature of the principle of inertia.

The state of rest of Matter conceived as a particular form of movement, as two movements that cancel each other. Matter is what is moving. Rest, like the void, is spiritual.

Milarepa and food. After having destroyed to the utmost the reality of the universe, he finally reached its irreducible point, the point where the very mind which conceives finds itself degraded to being one out of the number of appearances.

Food constitutes this point. Food is the irreducible element.

Fasting constitutes an experimental knowledge of the irreducible character of food, and hence of the reality of the sensible universe.

We must not destroy that which we are incapable of rebuilding or the equivalent of which we are incapable of destroying.

Christ's first temptation.

We must not feel remorse on account of bad actions or self-satisfaction on account of good ones: we must look upon that in the same light as insensibility in the face of physical pain. It is a fine thing to overcome physical pain by concentrating the mind; but it is a finer thing still, as in the case of Christ, to keep the supernatural part of the soul outside the reach of suffering and just leave the sensibility to suffer. Likewise, it is only a minute part of the soul that must look on good and bad actions indifferently.

The story of Buddha and of the yogi who walked upon the waters.

(The story of Reschungpa [the wound . . .])

[To cast from us as we breathe out pride, hatred, covetousness, idleness, stupidity.

To draw into us as we breathe in the blessing of the saints, the spirit of the Buddha, the five forms of wisdom.]

Tibetans: becoming a tree, etc.—Still another form of voluntary madness (cf. one of Cervantes' tales).

Tale of the three nights. A girl betrothed to a prince goes in search of him, and finds him in his palace about to get married to another. On her way thither, an old woman has handed her three hazel-nuts. She enters the palace in the guise of a servant, cracks open one of the nuts and finds a beautiful dress inside which she offers the future bride in exchange for the privilege of spending the night in the prince's room. The latter agrees to this, but gives the prince a sleeping-draught, and he sleeps while his true fiancée in vain sings a song recalling the past. The next day she finds in the second nut a still more beautiful dress. That night everything happens exactly as on the first night. On the third night, the prince wakes up just before dawn, hears the song, recognizes the woman he really loves, and sends the other one away.

Beauty exerts a charm over the flesh in order to obtain permission to penetrate right to the soul.

*Quaerens me sedisti lassus.*¹

It is God who tires himself out seeking us.

Grace.

God traverses the density of the world to come to us.

As soon as the prince recognizes his beloved, he no longer hesitates.

The princess who has bound herself by oath not to reveal her identity. This represents Creation. God bound as it were by oath not to reveal himself.

Material objects as transformers of energy. We bestow on them our energy and they give it back to us in either a regraded or a degraded form. Whence the practices connected with meditation (cf. the two alternate movements, as practised in Tibet) and the virtue contained in the sacraments.

Berger's comparison with the man who inherits a million. Three

¹ Seeking me, thou satest thyself down, weary (*Dies irae*).

possible stages. You are not yet aware of the fact. You know it, but you suffer nevertheless from hunger for lack of money. You have the million in your possession.

It is unthinkable that a physical fact, as such, should be supernatural. That which is supernatural can only be psychical, and the reasons for regarding it as such are of a purely and exclusively metaphysical order. Or, better still, psychical phenomena, as such (for example, apparitions, voices, etc.), are not supernatural either. It is the transcendent point lying immediately above them that is supernatural.

Milarepa managed to raise himself above the *guṇas*, thanks to his experience in connection with food. He then detached himself completely from the 'I', cut the last thread.

Madness as a *μεταξύ*. Plato expressly mentions it in the *Phaedrus*. Orientals practise a voluntary pursuit of madness with this object. But such as are destined to reach their spiritual goal only surrender a part of their soul to it.

Madness or pure reason (as in mathematics). Two *μεταξύ*.

The reality of the world is made up for us of our attachment. It is the reality of the 'I', which is transferred by us into material objects. It is in no sense *external reality*. The latter only becomes discernible through total detachment. Should but a thread remain, there is still attachment.

The case of Job.

Relation between pain and beauty: poetical inclinations felt after the climax has been reached during my severe attacks of headache.

Not to judge. After the manner of the heavenly Father, who does not judge; through him human beings judge themselves. To let all beings come to one, and leave them to judge themselves. To be a balance.

One will then not be judged oneself, having become an image of the true judge, who does not judge.

Analogy between Tibetan practices and the drama of Calderón, *La vida es sueño*.

Art, too, is a purification based on the transfers of imagination that take place. Greek art.

Beauty: reality without attachment.

To destroy the past (as we have done in Polynesia)—what greater crime could be committed?

The naked and the dead (Plato). That only has a meaning if we know what rôle the body plays in our thoughts; or in other words, by an experimental study of the imagination.

Parmenides—The One *qua* One doesn't exist—God as purely One is God under the aspect of non-being, of a vacuum. God *qua* being is three (then all the numbers, it is true; and why limit oneself to three? Yet there must be a reason.)

The Cave . . . ὥστε μένειν.¹ Without movement. State of passivity. Activity as a condition of knowledge (cf. Maine de Biran). Bodily movement is necessary for purposes of discernment. We are to intelligible things exactly like what a completely paralysed person is to sensations: quite incapable of reading. *It is necessary that we should read in order to arrive at non-reading.*

Plato and the mysteries. The Cave; *Republic*, book VII; the reference to the 'slough'—*Phaedrus*; the myth of the soul, the word 'initiate' used continually—*Philebus*; 'a certain Prometheus'—The chariot in the *Phaedrus*, cf. the *Upanishads*; therefore traditional. Reminiscence in the *Phaedrus*, cf. Orphic inscription—The head thrust out of the skies: ἀτελεῖς θεάς,² those not initiated in the science of contemplation. This myth resembles an initiation test.

The Cave. The third dimension is lacking. St. Paul.

Tibetan exercises for the imagination play the same rôle as the myth of the Cave.

With the Tibetans—superstitions themselves used as μεταξύ!

Carnal beauty has been made desirable in order that one should not lay hands on it. Promotes a revaluation of energy.

Symposium. Mediator love, born of the divine plenitude and of human misery. Plays the same rôle of μεταξύ as the order of the world.

Beauty, moreover, links the two of them together.

Beauty—sole form of being of the intelligible world that is

¹ . . . So that they cannot move (Plato, *Rep.*, VII, 514).

² Plato, *Phaedrus*, 248.

apparent to the senses. It stimulates desire. (Otherwise it would not be apparent to the senses.)

Love and beauty—children of the sky and of the earth.

(*Παῖς Γῆς καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος*).¹

Hippolytus and Prometheus. Something binds the friendship between man and God to the point of extreme, of mortal suffering.

Timaeus. The inhabited city in a state of vigil. The world is no longer an underground prison. It is beautiful.

Phaedrus. The beloved is given wings through the admiration which the other feels for its beauty (the flow of beauty streams into the lover's eyes, but part of it showers on to the beloved and warms that part of the soul where the wings sprout).

Does this refer to energy, since there is heat? To spiritual chlorophyll?

Is beauty to be regarded as a source of spiritual energy, or else as a transformative, regrading instrument? One or other of these effects is certainly produced. More probably the second one.

In the case of the soul, too, the flat dimension alone is given; the third remains to be constructed.

(‘Ce livre est plat’—Strange expression.)

The distinction made between those who remain in the Cave, close their eyes and imagine the journey, and those who actually perform it. The same distinction between the real and the imaginary applies to the spiritual sphere, and there also it is *Necessity* which causes the difference. It is not just suffering. There are imaginary sufferings; imaginary efforts also. As for the inner feeling, there is nothing more deceptive.

With Milarepa, spiritual progress, too, is an illusion. He immediately has that illusion. (Illusion in the sense of phenomenon.)

The analogy to be drawn between spiritual progress and a piece of work. (But it needs to be understood, for it is very misleading. It resides solely in the existence of a causality, not in the structure of that causality.)

The object of humility is to do away with the imaginary in

¹ Child of the Earth and of the starry Sky (Orphic tablet from Petelia: Γῆς παῖς εἰμι καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος).

spiritual progress. There is no disadvantage at all in believing oneself to be less advanced along that road than one actually is: the light produces none the less its effect, which does not have its source in opinion. But there is a great disadvantage in believing oneself to be more advanced along it than one is, for then opinion does exercise an effect.

With time, the light causes one to become accustomed to light, which enables one to receive more light, and so on. There is an exponential progression of grace.

(My image of gravitational force is represented in the myth of the *Phaedrus*.)

[The transcendental choice of life, and the idea of Providence in T.]

Genesis—The Bible says that Cain and Abel were born, then 'in process of time it came to pass' that they were sacrificing. It is clear that a certain amount of time must have elapsed. If this is emphasized, isn't it in order to show that what took place in the earthly paradise is outside Time? (And how could there have been an absence of woe and suffering if there had been Time?)

Phaedrus—The gods who cross the sky to look out on the other side. Analogy with the image—which is found in the myths of all countries, including those of so-called primitive peoples—of the egg as representing the world. Easter egg. An egg implies a chick. We have to pierce through this visible sky by pecking at it. 'Knock, and it shall be opened unto you.'

A little problem that deserves to be pondered:

How does one distinguish between what is imaginary and what is real in the spiritual domain?

A definite choice must be made in favour of a real hell rather than of an imaginary paradise.

So long as one finds it necessary to do oneself violence, one is still in the 'dark night of the sensibility', in the Cave.

'He that wishes to save his soul shall lose it.' It is an imaginary form of salvation.

(The *beauty* in the *Phaedrus*; this side was not touched upon in the myth of the Cave.)

Timaeus. There are two desires which naturally reside in men, one through the body, which is desire for food, the other through the divine part of us, which is desire for reason.

Διττῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν οὐσῶν φύσει κατ' ἀνθρώπους, διὰ σῶμα μὲν τροφῆς, διὰ δὲ τὸ θειώτατον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν φρονήσεως . . . ¹

τροφή,² vital energy.

Timaeus. The Demiurge and the Soul of the World. Beauty is bound up with spiritual perfection in two ways. Looking at a perfectly beautiful statue, we think of the genius of the sculptor. Looking at a perfectly beautiful human being, we think of the perfect quality of the soul. The beauty of the world is related to God in both these ways at the same time, and we must love God through the universe with both these forms of love at the same time.

If we really love God, we necessarily think of him as being, amongst other things, the Soul of the World; for love is always connected with a body, and God has no other body which is offered to our senses except the universe itself.

Then each occurrence, whatever it may be, is like a touch on the part of God; each event, each thing that takes place, whether it be fortunate, unfortunate or unimportant from our own particular point of view, is a caress of God's.

The Eucharist. The consecration of the Host does not make it so that God is present therein, for he is always wholly and entirely present in each particle of matter to the full extent to which matter is capable of receiving him. But—even if we know that in an abstract way—we do not know it with our whole soul, for we have not contact with God through every single particle of matter. However, the act of consecration, owing to the grace attached to it, for the soul capable of receiving this grace, makes this particle of matter, at that particular moment in Time, transparent, in such a way that we do find therein a veritable contact with God; just as we have a veritable contact with a man through touching his clothing.

But just as the practice of human love must be to make us understand that every human being is as deserving of love as any one of our friends, so in the same way the practice of the Eucharist consists in making us understand that every particle of matter partakes of the nature of the Eucharist.

The presence of God scattered throughout the whole of creation being something too abstract for us, we have to think of His presence as being something distinctive at each level of creation. (The level of Man, and that of matter.)

¹ Plato, *Timaeus*, 88 b.

² Food.

(And why not also that of plants and animals? Is not that what totems represent perhaps?)

Phaedrus. It is the nature of the wing to convey aloft that which is heavy.

Here we have a being attracted from heaven down to earth not by gravity but by love, by wings raised to the second power.

Still another dimension.

The breadth, the length, the depth and the height.

The knowledge of the love of Christ, which passeth all knowledge.

The true love of our neighbour would be an assimilation to this love, a love that descends. But how many are capable of it?

'Identification' (in the sense used by Mmc. de S.) through love.

The wings and the unruly horse. The spiritual state is the mathematical resultant of a combination of forces.

(Mathematics was very well able to be an object of mystical contemplation . . .)

The link existing between mathematics and *reality*.

Suffering and evil. Suffering is an evil for those who think that suffering is an evil. [Protagoras is right in such matters; but how define them?] If I think that suffering is not an evil for me, then it is not one in fact. In this way I can accept suffering for myself and feel compassion for other people, endeavour to shield them from it, unless some strict obligation prevents me from doing so.

When we look upon affliction, we must understand that there is on God's side the divine equivalent of a strict obligation not to intervene.

In a sense, the fact that a certain beggar is hungry is far more important than if Christ himself were hungry—Christ, that is to say, considered as man.

But the Word which became incarnate is hungry that this beggar should be fed, if it is possible to conceive a divine equivalent to desire.

To put off the false divinity is but a preliminary image. We have to put off the true divinity after having acquired it, as far as this is possible for human nature, through a process of assimilation.

We then rediscover the capacity for suffering and the fact of human misery, from which we had been freed.

Viewed in this light, returning into the Cave takes us farther than St. John of the Cross.

The sin against the Holy Spirit consists in recognizing a thing to be good and hating it as such. We experience the equivalent of this in the form of resistance each time we turn ourselves toward the good. For every contact with the good gives rise to a recognition of the distance brought about by the evil in oneself and to the beginning of a painful effort of assimilation. This causes anguish, and we are afraid of it. But our fear is perhaps the sign of the reality of the contact. The corresponding sin can only result if an insufficiency of hope makes the consciousness of the distance unbearable and turns the anguish into hatred. Hope constitutes a remedy in this respect. But a superior remedy consists in an attitude of indifference toward oneself, and in one of rejoicing that the good should be the good, even though we be far removed from it, and even on the assumption that we are doomed to be removed from it infinitely farther still.

Obedience signifies obedience to what one conceives to be an order. We will suppose that a saint appears before a man and orders him to do a certain action and that this apparition is, in fact, the work of the devil. If this man obeys the order, after due examination, as being, according to the best of his belief, of divine origin, without attaching himself either to his belief or to his action, while ever desiring more light, and otherwise remaining steadfast in carrying out the order, whatever the outward circumstances may be, so long as he has not received a greater amount of light, what he does is right for him, and far better than not obeying at all.

That is where Arjuna is wrong. The action of engaging in battle was in accordance with the light which was within him, since he prepared to carry it through resolutely. He ought to have stuck to his decision so long as he had not received more light; otherwise he could only fall to a lower level, not rise to a higher one. For that pity which enters into him through the visual senses and sweeps away his energy—it is not in that fashion that the light comes to one.

As Krishna observes, Man cannot under any circumstances remain absolutely without movement. Movement is ineradicably attached to human life. But the movements of a saint are not the same as those of a crook when the two of them are walking in the street.

Similarly, the feeling that there is a certain thing which needs to be done is ineradicably bound up with human life. What varies is the actual thing which one feels needs to be done.

There is a sense of obligation attached to the state of so-called indifference. It is different from the one attached to inferior states.

A mathematical series (recurrence through analogy), with or without passage to the extreme limit, and spiritual problems.

Must study Cantor.

Phaedrus. The driver has only two things to do: pull on the curb of the unruly horse, thus hurting him, so as to train him by conditional reflex; and as for himself, behold.

Circus dogs are trained with the aid of sugar and the whip. We must train the 'dog' in us with the aid of sugar and the whip. It is immaterial which of the two we use. The pain we inflict on ourselves is not an end in itself, any more than our pleasure is. The end is the training. (Sugar: such are the agreeable sensations which encourage meditation, according to St. John of the Cross.)

All this depends to a certain extent on the temperament of the particular dog. Some dogs are trained more easily with sugar, others with the whip.

But the dog must not be *over-trained*. *Timaeus*. St. Thomas on the subject of Christ.

The Eucharist is something more than a symbol, in the sense that the act of consecration brings about a real transformation—but in the soul capable of experiencing it, exclusively.

Substance: the question is what represents the object
not from the point of view of the senses (accidentals)
nor from the point of view of the intellect (substance)
but from the point of view of love.

A symbol does not bring about any transformation, does not cause one to cross any boundary, pass through any gate. A symbol dwells in the soul, and something outside the soul is needed to *draw it forth*.

The seven gates of Ishtar.

The soul that has thrust its head out of the sky devours Being (amṛtam): the one that stays inside devours Opinion.

It is a question of the difference between the *real* and the *imaginary* in the spiritual domain. Of that, and not of anything else.

Nothing is easier than to fall into an imaginary love of God. True love does not shield one from imaginary love so long as true love does not occupy the entire soul, for imaginary love can be added on to true love. Imaginary love occupies a place, which is not an empty one, where true love cannot enter.

We should give God the strict minimum of place in our lives, that which it is absolutely impossible for us to refuse Him—and earnestly desire that one day, and as soon as possible, that strict minimum may become all.

Imaginary love for creatures. There was C. What was it I loved, when I loved him? Love that dies. What was he for me? We are attached by a cord to all objects of attachment, and a cord can always be severed. We are likewise attached by a cord to the imaginary form of God, to the God for whom love is also attachment. But to God himself we are not attached, and that is why there is no cord which can be severed. He enters into us. He alone is able to enter into us. Wisdom: 'My perfect purity enables Me to penetrate everywhere.' All other things remain outside, and the only thing we know, the only thing we understand about them is the tensions of varying degree and direction impressed on the cord when there is a shifting of position on their part or on ours.

There is the form of the imaginary which enters the soul from outside with every property attaching to the real. It is a question of reading. (The moon seen on the horizon; the moon seen traversing the sky.) And there is the form of the imaginary that one produces as such in oneself with an expenditure of effort. But if there is sufficient intensity, something clicks into place, and this second-rate form of the imaginary becomes turned into a first-rate form of it. Tibetan mystical experiences turn upon this latter principle.

Is that not just what takes place in spiritual progress? What I call the real love of God, is it not simply a second-rate form of the imaginary revalued, transformed through sheer intensity into a first-rate form of the imaginary? Horrible thought. One must dwell upon it, return to it, contemplate it, love it in its very horror.

Imagination of a first-rate order is contained in perception as it is in illusion.

Perception is made up of imagination of a first-rate order with necessity in addition.

Necessity is essentially foreign to what is imaginary.

The same applies in the spiritual field. We find there the counter-

parts of reverie, of illusion and of perception, and the essence of the latter consists in the apprehension of the necessity of relation.

There is a certain *feeling of reality* which is the very form and colour of the imaginary.

There is another, and very different, *feeling of reality* which is truly real.

It needs to be analysed in perception.

This criterion is sufficient to apply the notion of value to any part whatever and to the whole of the psychological life of Man.

(It is something Chartier failed to think of.)

Phaedrus—θεσμός τ' Ἀδραστέας.¹

Nemesis who presides over order, dharma, and compensatory upsettings of the balance.

Ὑπεριδοῦσα,² a transcendent, supernatural vision.

The castes enumerated in the *Phaedrus*: (1) a philosopher, a devotee of beauty, or a musician and lover, μουσικοῦ τινος καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ :³ a votary of the Muses and Love. || (2) a king, a warrior, or a civil officer || (3) a man holding a political or economic function or one connected with money-making (πολιτικοῦ, οἰκονομικοῦ, χρηματιστικοῦ⁴) —(or again; of a political, organizing or economic nature) || (4) φιλοπόνου⁵ (?) an industrious man, a gymnast, or a man practising Medicine || (5) soothsayers or persons versed in the mysteries (μαντικὸν βίον ἢ τινα τελεστικὸν ἔξουσιν⁶) || (6) a poet or other adept in an imitative art || (7) a craftsman or husbandman || (8) a sophist or deinagogue || (9) a tyrant—(He who has lived justly in his allotted condition is afterwards promoted to a better one; he who has lived unjustly is relegated to a worse one.)—Exactly the doctrine of dharma. (1), (2), (3) and (7) correspond to the four castes.

This enumeration, in the above order, resembles a mystification.

Slaves do not figure in the list.

‘Great Pan is dead’—It was not Christ who killed great Pan. It was because Pan had died that, to replace him, it was necessary that Christ should be born. Life and death of the gods, cf. Heraclitus? (No, this text has another meaning.)

Existence is the meeting-place of opposites; good would not exist without evil.

¹ And the law of Adrasteas (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 248).

² Looking high over (*ibid.*, 249).

³ *Ibid.*, 248.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

God, in so far as he exists, is the universe composed of phenomena. God, in so far as he is other than the universe, is other than existence.

Heraclitus, 7. If all existing things turned to smoke, the nose would be the discriminating organ. Each faculty is judge in its own province.

Heraclitus's 'Marxist' interpretation is ridiculous; nevertheless, it is true that, in view of the ascendancy the Great Beast exercises over the soul, among all the types of experience which form the subject of contemplation, the social type of experience is of the very first importance.

Marxism, in so far as it is true, is entirely contained in Plato's page on the subject of the Great Beast, and its refutation is also contained there.

Heraclitus, 2—Not to regard one's reasoning faculty as a *personal*—*ιδίαν*—possession.

Sacrifice as a means of being being purified of murder—cf. the Tibetan story of the reincarnated murderer, and Marpa's initial instructions to Milarepa—And, after all, why not the sacrifice of the Mass? Amongst all the various significations . . . Fragment 5 of Heraclitus on this subject—of a Voltairean flavour.

Heraclitus—*ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ*.¹ Current of consciousness. *καὶ ψυχὰι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμῖνται*.²—Souls are vaporized from liquid substances. Marvellous way of expressing what was Maine de Biran's obsession ['I am changed']. Only in this case, the 'I' plays no part.

'Time is a child playing a game of backgammon.'³ We are the draughtsmen in the hands of a child.

We should turn everything into an intermediary leading toward God (everything—occupations, events, public functions, etc.). This does not mean adding God on to everything (it is then the imaginary form of God). But each thing must be wrought upon to bring about a change so that it may be made transparent to the light.

Knowing an alphabet is not the same thing as knowing how to

¹ Those who step into the same river have different waters flowing ever upon them (Heraclitus, fr. 12, Diels, 5th edit., I, 154).

² Heraclitus, fr. 12, Diels, 5th edit., I, 154.

³ *Idem.*, fr. 52, *ibid.*, 162.

read. After having learned an alphabet, it is possible to spend the rest of one's life without being able to read a single word printed in that alphabet.

'Mortals are immortal, immortals are mortal, living each other's death and dying each other's life.'¹

To live the death of a being is to eat him. The reverse is to be eaten by him.

Man eats God and is eaten by God—and that in two senses, one in which he is lost, and another in which he is saved. Communion.

Contradiction, a bulwark against pantheism.

'The hours that bring all things.'² Time which is indifferent to what it contains—or Space—theme of all the arts.

The contradictions which the mind is brought up against form the only realities, the only means of judging what is real. There is no contradiction in what is imaginary. Contradiction is the test on the part of Necessity. This applies to all spheres.

Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus*.

By thee the whole wide firmament of heaven is swayed
And guided in its wheeling journey round this earth
In glad submission to thee: for in thine unconquered hands
Thou hast a mighty servant, the thunderbolt of heaven,
Wrought with a double edge, and of never-dying fire,—
A pulse of life beating through all created things
That walk in thy ways; and with this thou dost direct
Thy Omnipresent Word that moves through all creation
And mingles with the sun and the company of the stars—
And whose nobility makes king o'er all that is.³

The two-edged Cretan axe, symbol of the thunderbolt and of Zeus. The axe: the sword of the Gospels.

Shiva.

The thunderbolt, symbol of the Holy Spirit.

The above lines contain the Trinity.

Prometheus stole the thunderbolt to give men fire.

¹ *Idem.*, fr. 62, *ibid.*, 164.

² *Idem.*, fr. 100, *ibid.*, 173.

³ *Oxford Book of Greek Verse in Translation*, p. 534.

Hippolytus. Aphrodite, being unable to tempt Hippolytus, beguiles Phaedra in order to bring her to kill him.

In the same way the devil, having failed in his attempts to influence Christ, enters into Judas in order to prevail on him to betray his Master.

The instrument with the double edge. I am not come to bring peace, but a sword.

The instrument of fire. See Luke xii, 49. 'I am come to send fire on the earth; and what will I, if it be already kindled?'

Fire, a metaphor for indicating love. Stroke of lightning.

'He that is not born of water and of the spirit.'

Water represents death, the liquefaction, the dissolution of the self, matter reduced to its absolutely passive form; it is self-annihilation, *vināsham* of the Īśa Upanishad. *πνεῦμα*,¹ is the spirit of life, of the other life, the spirit of eternal life; it is *amṛtam*.

'... through self-annihilation having crossed the bounds of death, through becoming (birth) he feeds on immortality.'

Heraclitus, fr. 36. To souls, it is death to become water.

'In gloomy darkness walk those who accept

the notion of non-birth

and perhaps in still deeper darkness those who

are satisfied with birth.

Birth and self-annihilation—for those who understand that as being the two things at the same time—

Through self-annihilation having crossed the bounds of death, through birth they feed on immortality.'

St. Luke xii, 49-50.

Πῦρ ἦλθον βαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ τί θέλω εἰ ἤδη ἀνήφθη; βάπτισμα δὲ ἔχω βαπτισθῆναι, καὶ πῶς συνέχομαι ἕως ὅτου τελεσθῇ,² and how am I straitened till it be accomplished!

If one believes that God has created in order to be loved, and that he cannot create anything which is God, and further that he cannot be loved by anything which is not God, he is then brought up against a contradiction. The contradiction contains in itself Necessity. On the other hand, every contradiction resolves itself through the

¹ Spirit.

² I am come to send fire on the earth; and what will I, if it be already kindled? But I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished!

process of becoming. God has created a finite being, which says 'I', which is unable to love God. Through the action of grace the 'I' little by little disappears, and God loves himself by way of the creature, which empties itself, becomes nothing. When it has disappeared . . . he goes on creating more creatures and helping them to de-create themselves.

Time arises out of the state of becoming implied by this contradiction.

The necessity contained in this contradiction represents the whole of Necessity in a nutshell.